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タイトル: | Dynamic environmental taxes in an international duopoly |
著者: | Ohori, Shuichi |
キーワード: | environmental tax dynamic programming international duopoly |
発行日: | Jan-2007 |
出版者: | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University |
誌名: | KIER Discussion Paper |
巻: | 628 |
抄録: | This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in a Cournot duopoly. Based on the assumption of linear demand functions, we demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady-state equilibrium is lower in a dynamic environmental tax game than in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behavior of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the first period, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax; this is due to the decrease in the effect of the rent-shifting. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/129542 |
関連リンク: | http://ideas.repec.org/p/kyo/wpaper/628.html |
出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |

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