意志の無限後退論 : ライルと意志理論

Abstract

In modern theories of action, classical volitional theories are treated as a relic of the past which uses an artificial concept illegitimately. G. Ryle's series of objections against 'the myth of volitions' is a starting point of contemporary theories of action. The infinite regress argument of the will which Ryle proposes is not restricted to such volitional theories as take volitions to be acts of the mind, but applies to all the theory that volitions cause actions. But I don't think that his argument is successful in overthrowing the volitional theory. The supposition of his argument is not merely that volitions make actions intentional as their causes. Unless it has the supposition that voluntariness of actions is a necessary and sufficient condition for their avoidability, no absurd consequences are to be drawn. However, it is difficult to consider the latter supposition to be true, and so one cannot derive the conclusion that the former supposition is false. It seems impossible to show that the volitional theory brings about absurdities by reforming the traditional infinite-regress argument or by modifying Ryle's argument into a simple form regarding intentional actions. The idea that the will is intentional in itself by virtue of its act which makes actions intentional saves the volitional theory from infinite regress arguments. Agents will something immediately. Kant's doctrine that free will consists in 'unconditioned causality' of us also survives infinite regress arguments of the will.