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dc.contributor.authorCzerny, Achimja
dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixja
dc.contributor.authorMun, Se-ilja
dc.contributor.alternative文, 世一ja
dc.date.accessioned2015-03-10T07:19:37Z-
dc.date.available2015-03-10T07:19:37Z-
dc.date.issued2014-09ja
dc.identifier.issn2212-0122ja
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2433/196053-
dc.description.abstractPrivate operation of port facilities is becoming increasingly common worldwide. We investigate the effect of port privatization in a setting with two ports located in different countries, each serving their home market but also competing for the transshipment traffic from a third region. Each government chooses whether to privatize its port or to keep port operations public. We show that there exist equilibria in which the two governments choose privatization and the national welfare of each port country is higher relative to a situation where ports are public. This is because privatization is a commitment to increase charges relative to public port charges, which allows for a better exploitation of the third region. For some parameter regions, port countries non-cooperatively choose public port operations, while they would be better off if both ports were private. However, customers of the third region are always better off if port operations are public. We further show that the port country with the smaller home market has a relatively strong incentive to choose private port operation.ja
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfja
dc.language.isoengja
dc.publisherElsevier Ltd.ja
dc.rights© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics of Transportation. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics of Transportation, 3(3), 2014 doi:10.1016/j.ecotra.2014.06.002ja
dc.rightsThis is not the published version. Please cite only the published version. この論文は出版社版でありません。引用の際には出版社版をご確認ご利用ください。ja
dc.subjectHub portja
dc.subjectTransport policy competitionja
dc.subjectInfrastructure pricingja
dc.subjectPrivatizationja
dc.titleHub port competition and welfare effects of strategic privatizationja
dc.type.niitypeJournal Articleja
dc.identifier.jtitleEconomics of Transportationja
dc.identifier.volume3ja
dc.identifier.issue3ja
dc.identifier.spage211ja
dc.identifier.epage220ja
dc.relation.doi10.1016/j.ecotra.2014.06.002ja
dc.textversionauthorja
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