ヒュームにおける「偶然」について

Abstract

Traditionally, David Hume (1711-76) is seen to negate chance, "negation of a cause" (T.1.3.11.4), as other contemporary philosophers did. Indeed, in his Treatise and First Enquiry, Hume indicates his negative views of chance and states that chance is [･･･] directly contrary to experience (T.2.3.1.18), or that it is universally allowed to have no existence (E.8.25). However, when we consider Hume's philosophical methodology and description of our epistemic attitudes, we can find some points where Hume implicitly allows the existence of chance. Some commentators have pointed out, and criticized, Hume's inconsistency about chance, but as far as I can see, these critics fail to capture what Hume really intended to say, and what still remains problematic on this problem in Hume's Philosophy. Taking the issue above mentioned into account, this paper aims, firstly, to examine how Hume discusses the problem of chance, paying attention to two concepts: namely, the "vulgar" and "philosopher." These concepts play an important role in distinguishing and delineating several distinct modes of "experience, " which is also a vital concept of Hume's Philosophy. From this point, I show that the two modes of experience are concerned with the way people apply "rules" of judgment to an apparent irregularity, and that Hume negates chance, siding with "the philosopher" and intending to correct unsufficient causal judgments of the "vulgar." Secondly, this paper attempts to point out ontological and epistemological problems Hume has with regard to chance, and to investigate whether, and how, these problems can be settled. I proceed to suggest that, while Hume is carelessly committed to the ontological negation of chance which his philosophy essentially cannot offer (in that case the problem cannot possibly be solved); yet, from the epistemological viewpoint, Hume succeeds to some extent in describing how we learn to negate chance. However, it is to be remarked that when Hume's philosophy epistemologically handles the problem of chance, "experience" is thought to contain some public character which is alien to the phenomenalistic feature of Hume's philosophy.