レヴィナス『存在するとは…』における倫理的主体の受動性をめぐって (新宮一成教授 退職記念号)

Abstract

According to Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, all human activities are selfish and deprive the Other, to which they relate, of its otherness by assimilating it. Therefore, to relate to the Other as the true Other, one has to relate to it with pure passivity. A typical relation with the Other (the other people) without assimilation is an ethical one, and Levinas asserts that when in an ethical relation with someone, he/she demands a responsibility that is without selfishness. Furthermore, Levinas considers that recognizing someone (or something) is an activity in itself and must impair his/her otherness. However, the question is whether one can relate to someone ethically, without recognizing him/her as someone. With respect to this point, Levinas states that someone who demands responsibility without any selfishness is not a person one can see, rather he/she is a third person behind this person. Levinas admits that one cannot present any evidence of responsibility because of the third person's absence. Thus, it is not evidence but a kind of impulse beyond reason that agitates one and forces one to fulfill his/her responsibility. However, there is a limitation in Levinas' theory. According to him, recognizing oneself as a subject continuing in time is not approvable because he considers any recognition as an activity, that is, a selfish activity that is morally impermissible. In contrast, undertaking a responsibility (e.g., offering one's bread to someone) is accompanied by one's future loss, which one will be unaware of without a selfish activity. However, if one offers bread, being unaware of one's future hunger, is the gift a mere imprudence? Can the gift be regarded as truly carrying out one's responsibility? Moreover, if we suppose that it is a kind of impulse, and not reason, that makes one help someone else, it follows that demonstrating an unhelpful behavior would not be one's fault but attributable to the lack of "force from the outside." But we are afraid that such a way of thinking would deteriorate the moral subject's responsibility. In fact, the "outside" is not the real outside, and the "force" is not a real physical force. These metaphors distort moral reality. Levinas' theoretical presupposition given in the beginning furnishes the reason why he insists the passivity. However, it is necessary to be free from his presupposition and metaphors and reconsider ethical facts.