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DP1001.pdf | 507.56 kB | Adobe PDF | 見る/開く |
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DCフィールド | 値 | 言語 |
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dc.contributor.author | Okada, Akira | en |
dc.contributor.transcription | オカダ, アキラ | ja |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-01T02:10:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-01T02:10:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018-09 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/236152 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider the cultural transmission of trust and trustworthiness in a trust game with spatial matching à la Tabellini. Players are assumed to enjoy psychological benefits from good conducts. The equilibrium probability that an investor trusts a receiver is a monotonically decreasing function of social distance, and the one that the receiver behaves in a trustworthy manner is non-monotonic. Parents with imperfect empathy transmit their own values to their children through education, and the ratio of individuals with good values globally converges to a stationary point with heterogeneity if educational costs are sufficiently small. Trust and trustworthiness are influenced by institutions in different ways. A better "intermediate" enforcement crowds out trust and crowds in trustworthiness. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University | en |
dc.publisher.alternative | 京都大学経済研究所 | ja |
dc.subject | crowding effect | en |
dc.subject | cultural transmission | en |
dc.subject | random matching game | en |
dc.subject | social distance | en |
dc.subject | trust | en |
dc.subject | trustworthiness | en |
dc.subject.ndc | 330 | - |
dc.title | The Cultural Transmission of Trust and Trustworthiness | en |
dc.type | research report | - |
dc.type.niitype | Research Paper | - |
dc.identifier.jtitle | KIER Discussion Paper | en |
dc.identifier.volume | 1001 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 40 | - |
dc.textversion | author | - |
dc.sortkey | 01001 | - |
dc.address | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University | en |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |
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