<論説>米国のベトナム戦争介入と日韓国交正常化 : 韓国軍ベトナム派兵に着目して

Abstract

本稿では、日韓会談の妥結が米国のベトナム戦争への本格介入と同時期に行われた要因について、在韓米軍及び韓国軍削減、日韓会談をめぐる日韓の世論、韓国軍ベトナム派兵の相関関係に着目し、分析を行った。米国は一九六三年末、経済的な観点から在韓米軍及び韓国軍削減を優先し、日韓国交正常化によりそれを補完しようとした。しかし、韓国政府の強固な反対と、韓国の反対世論による日韓会談の中断から、米国は日韓国交正常化を優先する必要に迫られた。一九六五年に入り日韓会談が進展すると、韓国政府が在韓米軍の維持と韓国軍のベトナム派兵を継続的に訴えたことなどから、在韓米軍の削減は不可能になり、米国は韓国軍の派兵を受け入れる他はなくなった。その後、米国は日韓の世論の間で介入へのバランスを取りつつ、日韓会談の早期妥結のために尽力した。結果的に、韓米のベトナム派兵により日本世論が日韓会談に反発を強める寸前に、会談は妥結に至った。

Negotiations over Japan-ROK (Republic of Korea) diplomatic normalization were originally aimed at coming to terms with Japanese colonial rule. The negotiations were arduous and it took nearly 14 years to reach an agreement. However, the negotiations can be characterized as trilateral because the US government took part in them from the first with the intention of strengthening the ties among free nations in East Asia. This paper examines the primary factors in the simultaneous conclusion of Japan- ROK diplomatic normalization and US intervention in the Vietnam War, focusing on the interrelationship of three factors: reduction of United States Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK Armed Forces (ROKAF), public opinion in Japan and South Korea over the Japan-ROK talks, and dispatch of ROKAF. In the first section, I review the progress of Japan-ROK negotiations in the early 1960s and South Korean and American policy toward Vietnam. Immediately after the establishment of his regime, the administration of Park Chung-hee in South Korea demonstrated a positive stance toward the normalization of Japan-ROK relations and the dispatch of troops to Vietnam from the standpoint of being of benefit to free nations, but due to the negative stance of the Ikeda Hayato government in Japan that feared the domestic reaction to the military regime, Japan-ROK negotiations were suspended. The Kennedy administration in the US sought an early conclusion of negotiations and promoted them aggressively, but was wary of South Korean involvement in Vietnam. However, when the situation in Vietnam deteriorated after 1963, the US government with the Vietnamese situation in mind planned for a reduction of USFK and ROKAF and attempted to compensate this through the normalization of Japan-ROK relations. Sensing a crisis, the South Korean government increased its demands for the maintenance of existing troop levels and efforts to strengthen relations with the US government with an eye on reaching an early conclusion of Japan-ROK negotiations. In the second section, I examined the responses of both the South Korean and US governments in response to the Japan-ROK negotiations and the Vietnam problem from the end of 1964 to the commencement of Japan-ROK negotiations. The reduction of USFK and ROKAF, which had become established policy, was interrupted due to the intensification of movement against Japan-ROK negotiations in South Korea, and the US government placed priority on realization of the normalization of Japan-ROK relations rather than the reduction of the armed forces of both countries. The South Korea government also sought the direct involvement of the US in Japan- ROK negotiations, but was unable to discover an effective measure due to worries that American involvement would elicit a negative reaction in Japanese public opinion which became critical of US in regard to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. With the birth of the Sato Eisaku government, which emphasized US Asian strategy over Japanese public opinion, Japan-ROK negotiations were recommenced. Likewise, the United States reversed its initial position and deepened relations with South Korea because the South Korean government had attempted to cooperate positively with American policy amidst the intensifying Vietnamese situation. In the third section, I examine in detail how agreement was reached in Japan-ROK negotiations and ROKAF were dispatched to Vietnam. The South Korean government, which had dispatched a company of military engineers to South Vietnam, actively volunteered to send additional ROK army troops, and at the same time firmly demanded the continuation of American aid to South Korea as a public relations strategy. For this reason, the US government was unable to implement the reduction of USFK; and with the worsening situation in Vietnam as the background, ROKAF were incorporated in the plans to dispatch American ground troops. Park's May visit to the US had a strong aspect of political theatre that was produced dually by the US and South Korea in order to mollify South Korean public opinion to the normalization of Japan-ROK relations, and the US and South Korea sought early agreement in the negotiations in order not to ruin the effect. In regard to the final difficult hurdle of the Takeshima issue, with the pressing necessity of the dispatch of ROKAF as the background, an agreement was reached in the negotiations that was close to the South Korean position as a result of the pressure applied by the US on Japan to compromise. The Japan-ROK basic treaty then went into effect without regard for the opposition in public opinion in both South Korea and Japan, and the intervention of South Korea and the US in Vietnam continued. In the last section, I summarize the contents and make the following conclusions. The United States, which was forced to accept the dispatch of ROKAF instead of reducing USFK in 1965, strove for an early agreement in the negotiations while trying to avoid antagonizing public opinion in Japan and South Korea. For this reason, the negotiations were brought to conclusion just prior to the strengthening of opposition to Japan-ROK negotiations in Japan that would result from the dispatch of American and ROK troops.