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ファイル | 記述 | サイズ | フォーマット | |
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DP1029.pdf | 4.46 MB | Adobe PDF | 見る/開く |
タイトル: | Two-sided Strategic Information Transmission |
著者: | Chiba, Saori Hori, Kazumi |
キーワード: | Cheap Talk Two-Sided Asymmetric Information Two-Way Communication |
発行日: | Apr-2020 |
出版者: | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University |
誌名: | KIER Discussion Paper |
巻: | 1029 |
開始ページ: | 1 |
終了ページ: | 24 |
抄録: | We study a cheap talk model in which a decision maker and an expert are both privately informed. Both players observe independent signals that joint ly determine ideal actions for the players. Furt hermore, in our model, the decision maker can send a cheap talk message to the expert, which is followed by the expert's cheap talk and then the decision maker's decision making. We show that the informed decision maker can informatively reveal her private information to the expert but her talk does not affect the quality of the expert's information transmission in models in which optimal actions are only additively or multiplicatively separable in the two players' information, and their preferences are represented by quadratic loss functions. We also apply our finding to a decision maker's information acquisition problem. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/262346 |
関連リンク: | https://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/publication/?cat=en |
出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |
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