<研究論文(原著論文)>対等者間の不一致における妥協主義の擁護論証を補強する

Abstract

The situation that two subjects who believe that they are epistemically equally reliable for each other are in disagreement over the truth of the same proposition p is called "peer disagreement", and it is now one of the most important topics in epistemology. The point of the discussion in this topic is the following question; whether the fact that there is disagreement among the peers over beliefs about p is higher-order evidence that defeats the justification of the subjects' belief about p. The position that answers this question in the affirmative is called "conciliationism, " and the position that answers it in the negative is called "non-conciliationism". These two positions are the major competing theories on the subject and are in an intense dispute. In this dispute, two serious criticisms of conciliationism were raised by non-conciliationists. In response to these criticisms van Wietmarschen (2013) p resented a defense for conciliationism, which is now accepted as a strong argument for conciliationism. However, in my view, his argument is insufficient to defend conciliationism. This is because, for this argument to be convincing, two issues need to be resolved. Therefore, in this paper, I point out these two issues and then present a solution to them, aiming to supplement his argument. With this argument, I argue that although conciliationism is defensible, its scope of application will be narrower than currently thought. Besides, I show how this position's claim is applicable in actual disagreement situations that are not idealized.