プラトンの認識論の分析

Abstract

The article analyses Plato's epistemological theory as it is found in his middle and later works (mainly Theaet., Soph., Phileb.), examining in particular the part played therein by perception (αϊσθησις). It is stated that perception is to be understood as "the process of grasping the constant being of objects (βέβαιος ούσία) subsisting independently of us, by the soul (ψυχή), through the body (όιά σώματος)", giving thereby answers to two questions. (1) How false judgements of perception are possible.----Our perception has as its object the constant being of something independent of our body; therefore, what each man perceives cannot be indifferently "true" (i.e. equally a "fact"), in spite of what the Protagorean type of theory insists upon in the Theaeletus. (2) How the simultaneous supposition is possible of μέθεξις and χωρισμός --two principles contradictory to each other-- in regard to the relation between "what is real" (τό őν) and "what is perceived" (τό αίσθηόν).---- (a) What is grasped by perception participates in (μετέχει) reality. For perception suo iure has as its object "what is real", that is to say, the constant being of things. (b) "What is real" stands distinct (χωρίςεται) from "what is perceived". For since our perception is exercised through our body and thus is inevitably subject to temporary conditions of our bodies, "what is perceived" cannot but suffer from individual differences and be also liable to change, so that it is impossible that the constant being of the object should be grasped as it is by means of perception.