観念・性質・実態 : ロックの場合

Abstract

This paper is concerned with Locke's view on the relation between the physical world and the data of sense. In the first three sections I attempt to clarify the meaning of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is pointed out that secondary qualities are not mental states, but the power or dispositions of the physical micro-objects, and that the distinction is significant only if it has the "corpuscular philosophy" or atomism as its background theory. In the fourth section of the paper I expound an analysis of what Locke said about the idea of substance and its relation to his theory of the physical world. Locke's concept of substance is, in its proper sense, logical. Berkeley, however, in his attack upon physical realism, confused substance in the logical sense with physical reality. The ambiguous character of "ideas" in Locke is closely connected with Berkeley's mistake. (For this interpretation I am much indebted to Jonathan Bennett.) The paper concludes with a short comment on the relevance of Lock's physical realism to his theory of knowledge which is stated in Book IV of the Essay.