現実活動態 (下) : アリストテレスにおけるキーネーシス (あるいは運動の論理) とエネルゲイア (あるいは活動の論理) との対置について

Abstract

Although the points that Aristotle is trying to bring out with his distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (motion) (in Metaphysica 6, Ethica Nicomachea K3-4, et al.) are of continuing philosophical interest, it is by no means easy, as is generally recognized, to understand precisely what distinction he has in mind. Investigating carefully the relevant passages in Aristotle's works and reviewing critically arguments submitted on the problem by G. Ryle, J. L. Ackrill and T. Penner, this paper trys to give a clear and consistent interpretation of what Aristotle says about energeia and kinesis, and diagnoses those difficulties which we encounter in interpreting it as largely due to the fact that Aristotle is inseparably connecting this distinction with his another favourite distinction between theoria and praxis (in wider sense, including poiesis), the latter distinction being similar to, but in its very nature quite different from, the distinction between energeia and kinesis. According to this diagnosis, the present writer holds that, by removing from it the covering of the heterogeneous theoria-praxis distinction, we can focus much light upon the real philosophical significance of Aristotle's conception of energeia as opposed to kinesis--a conception which should be regarded as agreeing in some important aspects with the motive in Plato's theory of Forms. It is argued, however, that, in the final analysis, Aristotle's own general theory of the physical world further imposes a serious restriction on the fully developing this important conception.