<社会的なもの>と<個人的なもの>における非決定性の関係論 : 規律社会から管理社会への移行をめぐって

Abstract

According to sociological perspective, the person has generally been considered as a "social-being", whose recognition and practices have been always-already regulated by the social conditions. This perspective was emphasized by the spread of structuralism which persuasively discusses the de-centering of the subject. The implications of structural determinism, however, have been opposed by the attempt to theorize the return of the subjectivity. The leading sociologists of this critical perspective, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens reconsidered the concept of the structure, and put forward the interdependent relationship between the structure and the subject. There are not a few different points between the two theorists, but Bourdieu and Giddens take up a common theoretical position under which the subject is not to simplify as the subjugated but is regarded as the agency with a certain activity. Their social theories don't accept the static relationship between the structure and the subject but conceptualize the structuration, that is, the structuring process of social relations with a dynamism that accompanies the subjective agents. Their concept of the structure is the medium organizing the way of the agents and the outcome produced by them. To indicate the reflexivity that mediate between the society and the person, Bourdieu and Giddens established their social theories that subscribe neither structural determinism nor voluntarism. Their reflexive sociology, however, shows merely the reproduction of the structure in spite of suggesting the activity of the agency. Their theoretical frameworks are inherently possessed of this aspect as their own limit. Both of them are to interpret consequently that the changes are reduced to the generative foundation of the given structure or habitus, by reason of presupposing the external relation between the society and the person which is mediated by the practices. Is it possible to consider logically and empirically, however, that such a relation is an external one? It is unrealizable to suppose the society without the person, or the person being outside the society for all practical purposes. The society and the person are inseparably related to each other and simultaneously constituted. Bourdieu and Giddens give substance to the binomial relation that the agents mediate between the society and the person. We might think that such a suspect, binomial schema is what their analytic procedures call for, but the in-between that is indicated by this relation is the actual. Both what is called the society and the person are effects or derivations that internally arise from the in-between keeping the intensity. It would be better to regard the action not as the medium that is reduced to the structure or the subject but as the event that the in-between gives rise to. Such a point of view will enable us to consider the social and the personal as the internal lines that arise from the space in-between. The action is to perform in the moment excited by the intensity of the in-between, which has no determinant foundation. This theoretical reconsideration would moreover give us the effective perspective in dissection of the contemporary society of control that Gilles Deleuze called.