<招待論文>概念の自己運動に関する一考察 --ヘーゲル論理学における方法の再検討--

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the structure of Hegel's philosophical method followed by, as well as argued in, his major work, Science of Logic (1812–13, 1816/1832). Hegel's conception of “method, ” which is formulated as “the Self-movement of the Concept” in the last section of Logic, “the Absolute Idea, ” is still controversial in contemporary philosophy. To solve the problem of how and why Hegel can argue that a Concept moves to another Concept by itself in his philosophical system, some scholars focus on the logic of “determinate negation, ” which explains the Hegelian methodological principle that self-controversy does not come to “nothing” but generates determinate positive content. Others interpret the Self-movement of the Concept as “speculative inference.” According to them, the unique logical inference constructed by the Concept's three structural moments --the universality, the particularity, and the singularity-- shows itself as movement. However, both interpretations are not sufficient to justify Hegel's methodological argument, especially regarding the negativity and the determinatedness of the Concept. Based on this background, I analyze the structure of “the Self-movement of the Concept” described in the section of “the Absolute Idea” and attempt to prove that it is a self-negating and self-determinating activity of the Concept itself. In my view, the movement of the Concept is summarized as follows: Once the Concept is determined as a universal, it turns out to be a particular immediately, negating its universal form, and further turns out to be a singular with the negation of its particular form. This dynamic indicates that the negative determinatedness of the Concept and its negating-determinating activity are inseparable, and this is what Hegel calls the identity of Content and Form in the context of his methodology. Although it is not a kind of general method applied to the entire Logic, but appropriates only to “the Absolute Idea, ” my thesis shows that this method may establish the foundation of Hegel's whole system of philosophy, “the Science, ” characterized by the identity of Content and Form.