<研究論文(原著論文)>効果的利他主義は道徳的義務なのか? --帰結主義とカント的観点からの正当化

Abstract

The world faces various problems, such as starvation and infectious diseases. One approach to solving these problems is Effective Altruism (EA), which seeks to make the world as good as possible based on objective evidence and careful reasoning. EA has been supported by utilitarians such as Peter Singer. In fact, many people who support EA are utilitarian. However, in recent years, some previous studies have defended EA in non-utilitarian approaches. This paper argues that EA is justified not only from utilitarianism but also from other forms of consequentialism and a Kantian perspective, which existing studies have not yet examined. This paper also discusses the difference between consequentialism and the Kantian perspective in supporting EA. First, this paper introduces and briefly explains William MacAskill’s definition of EA. According to that definition, an EA act maximizes the good based on careful reasoning and objective evidence. Next, this paper shows that the practice of EA is justified by some form of consequentialism, which takes the consequence of an action as the basis for moral evaluation. Second, a Kantian perspective requires altruistic acts to promote the happiness of others as a duty. This paper focuses on two points to suggest that altruistic acts from Kantian duty can meet the definition of EA acts. 1. non-intuitive and non-emotional reasoning about the happiness of others; and 2. taking an impartial standpoint. From these points, this paper shows that from a Kantian perspective, it is argued that we must aim to help others and act in a way that promotes the well-being pursued by others as far as possible. The last part of this paper explores the differences in approach when justifying EA acts from a consequentialist or Kantian perspective. Specifically, this section compares the selection of donation recipients and the level of self-sacrifice under each viewpoint.