|Title:||途上国の青果物市場の制度分析 : インドネシア・タイを事例として|
|Other Titles:||Institutional Analysis of Market of Fruits and Vegetables in Developing Countries : In the Case of Indonesia and Thailand|
|Author's alias:||Asami, Atsuyuki|
|Abstract:||The efficiency of marketing of fruits and vegetables is demanded more and more, as economic situation is developing in developing countries such as Indonesia and Thailand. The characteristics of market institution have to be analysed to get the market efficiency in the framework of Neo Institutional Economics. In this paper, institutions are analysed by using the paradigm like "institutional characteristics of market → tactics behavior as conduct → self-enforcement of best transaction as efficiency", according to "structure → conduct → performance". Tactics behavior means that sellers and buyers are apt to use tactics like insisting on their price valuation distortedly by using their experience in order to overcharge or discount. As far as tactics behavior is permitted, transactions between best parties cannot be enforced, because non-corporation equilibrium is realized in game, that is, the efficiency of market cannot be realized. Under the bilateral one time bargaining between anonymous parties like bazaar institution, such as pasar in Indonesia, tactics behavior is permitted and best transaction cannot be enforced originally. Then in bazaar, customer relationship institution has be formed to get corporation equilibrium in repeated game. But perfect repeated game cannot be realized in real world, so still tactics behavior is to be remained in bazaar. In Bangkok public wholesale market, the third party management of market infrastructure restrains each tactics behavior, then best transaction can be enforced. But the third party does not regulate each transaction enforcement itself, then still tactics behavior is thought as important commercial activities.|
|Appears in Collections:||No.2|
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