企業におけるリスク負担と誘因形成

Abstract

There are many kinds of approaches to the problem of motivation and incentives. In the first place, especially among such approaches, Vroom's model in expectancy theories is investigated by comparing his second proposition with expected utility theory in this paper. In the Second place, the strength of the incentive is analized through constructing basic agency model which introduced mesurable utility functions and expected utility maximization hypothesis. Furthermore the influence of the hypothesis on equiliblium is analized in order to find the basic view on the relation between the hypothesis and the incentive in the agency model. Finally, Arrow-Pratt risk aversion is explained from the viewpoint of the incentive. And a general theory of the act of selection between two objects, including Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, is showed. Through this thinking, the general relation between the risk-bearing and forming incentives in the firm is investigated, so that it's proved that one is motivated in the direction of decreasing expected opportunity loss of his utility and the strength of the incentive is a monotonically increasing function in regard with the difference between the two expected opportunity losses.