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Title: ダム再開発プロジェクトの成立過程に関するゲーム論的分析
Other Titles: A Game Theoretic Analysis on Coalition Formation Process for Reservoir Redevelopment Projects
Authors: 榊原, 弘之  KAKEN_name
岡田, 憲夫  KAKEN_name
多々納, 裕一  kyouindb  KAKEN_id  orcid https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7209-4358 (unconfirmed)
Author's alias: SAKAKIBARA, Hiroyuki
OKADA, Nono
TATANO, Hirokazu
Keywords: ダム再開発
純便益配分
ゲーム理論
Reservoir Redevelopment
Net Benefit Allocation
Game Theory
Issue Date: 1-Apr-1998
Publisher: 京都大学防災研究所
Journal title: 京都大学防災研究所年報. B
Volume: 41
Issue: B-2
Start page: 21
End page: 32
Abstract: ダム再開発プロジェクトの成立過程に純便益の配分ルールが与える影響について, ゲーム理論を援用した分析を行う。本論文では, 既存事業者と新規事業者の利用権の有無を反映させた純便益配分法の提案を行う。次に, 利用権に時間的制限を設定することを提案する。最後値, これらの費用・便益配分法の有効性を検討するため, プロジェクト実施のための提携形成過程を提携リンク形成ゲームとして, 非協力ゲームの枠組みで分析する。
A game theoretic approach is applied to costlbenefit allocation problem in reservoir renewal projects. By focussing on the differences between new and existing agencies, the problem of allocating net‐ benefits is explicitly modeled by use of game theory. Permission structure is defined between providers and owners of sites.Next the net benefit allocation method based on permission structure is proposed. Then the method is extended to reflect the effect of temporal limit on provider's usership. Finally, another model is proposed to formulate a coalition formation process based on Fair allocation Rule developed by Myerson.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/80363
Related Link: http://www.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/nenpo/nenpo.html
Appears in Collections:No.41 B-2

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