

に有している特性、すなわち、神意の顕現に基づく王（王国）の正統化と、ジャワ人は如何に振る舞うべきであるのかという教訓性が指摘される。ここでは、年代記はそれ自身としての形と力を備えており、オランダ語の第一次資料によってその（年代記の）内容が裏書きされたり、歴史記述の誤りが検証されたりすることはないのである。著者は、この時代を扱ったジャワのさまざまな年代記とりわけ「ジャワ年代記」を、「歴史実証主義」にてらしてその真偽を測定したり、あるいは歴史記述にいささかのふくらみを添える「副読本」として読むのではなく、まさに〈物語〉そのものとして読むべきであると主張している。著者は、「歴史か文学か」というカテゴリーの設定そのものについて疑義を呈しているのである。このような問題提起は、ジャワに関心をもつさまざまな研究者が、研究者の文化的背景や専攻領域や国籍を越えて、これから考えていくに値する課題であろう。²⁾

本書は、ジャワ史上の激動を詳細な史料に基づいて生き生きと再現し、併せて、方法論的な問題を新しく提起することで、ジャワ王国史の研究に確かな一歩を印しており、これから広く読まれていくことになるであろう。しかしながら、本書を読んで、第二章から第五章にかけての歴史叙述がまことに迫力にみちているのに対し、肝心の第六章がこれによく抗してそれ自身の重量感を示し切れていないという感想を抱くのは何故であろうか。第六章は本来もっと手厚く叙述すべきところであるように思われる。もう一つ物足りないことは、大反乱の過程で反乱軍そのものの内実や動向が不明のままであることである。史料等の点で望むべくもない点かも知れないが、ここがさらに解明されればと念ずる次第である。

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Jane Drakard. *A Malay Frontier: Unity and Duality in a Sumatran Kingdom*. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990, 205 p, maps, ill. bibl. index.

Several seminars and conferences have been held on the “region” conveniently called “the Malay world.” One seminar might take “Malay civilization” as its major topic, while another might deal with the questions of “Islamic civilization in the Malay world.” In the 1970s Unesco also had “Malay culture” as one of its projects. But what is the meaning of the “Malay world”? Could it refer to the notion of ethnicity? If it does, then the less than enthusiastic attitude of the Indonesian government to this concept is understandable. Malay is, after all, only one of the many ethnic groups in Indonesia. Perhaps we should not look at it from this narrow perspective. But it cannot be seen from the political perspective either. Despite its potential impact on the political sphere, the “Malay world” might be better treated initially as a cultural concept. If so, where does this “world” end and “the other world” begin?

The strength of an ideology might be best seen in the way it solves its internal crises and responds to external challenges. The unity of a cultural world is, perhaps, better viewed from the perspective of its frontier zones. This is what Jane Drakard attempts in *A Malay Frontier*. Instead of looking at the notion of the “Malay world” from its presumed centers, the Palembang-Malaka-Johor axis or the Pagaruyung myth, she takes the history and the traditional historiographies of Barus as the focus of her study. Barus (now a small town on the northern west coast of Sumatra) is a genuine frontier cultural zone. A coastal town, Barus had, from as early as the tenth century, been involved in the long-distance trade of the

2) オランダにおけるジャワ研究の大伝統については拙稿を参照。

土屋健治、「19世紀ジャワ文化論序説——ジャワ学とロンゴワルシトの時代」『東南アジアの政治と文化』土屋健治・白石隆(編)所収。東京大学出版会。1984。

maritime “Malay world.” Its economic significance grew with the development of this maritime trading world. It was frequented by merchants from many countries. Despite its economic importance, Barus never had a chance to make itself a strong political center. In time, when strong economic and political powers were emerging on the west coast of Sumatra, Barus became an arena of stiff competition. Since the 17th century Barus had to live under the political domination or hegemony of either the Sultanate of Aceh or the V.O.C., the Dutch company. The involvement of Barus in the long-distance trade and, perhaps unwillingly, in the political and economic competitions, made it not only an Islamic region but also a “Malayized” state. One of the most famous and influential Islamic mystic-poets in the Malay world, Hamzah Fansuri, was probably born in this “cosmopolitan” trading center. The economic importance of Barus, however, was very much due to the produce of its hinterland, notably benzoin and resin. Unlike the “Malayized” coast, the hinterland was populated by the Batak people. The intricate relationship between the coast and the hinterland is one of the most interesting aspects of the historical dynamics of Barus.

The strategic position of Barus as the focus of the study on the Malay world is enhanced by the fact that Barus was ruled by two “royal dynasties,” namely, the *Hulu* (upstream) and the *Hilir* (downstream), whose relative authorities were largely determined by the supports and loyalties of their respective alliances in the hinterland. In other words the “Malayness” of these coastal ruling dynasties, either because of political expedience or simply due to shared cultural moorings, had somehow to be “tempered.” Drakard had not only Dutch archives and other external sources at her disposal but also, more importantly, historiographical texts

produced by the competing local “royal dynasties.”

In her well presented short survey on the ancient history of Barus, the small trading center with two names (Fansur or Pansur being the other), Drakard is very much aware of the fact that there are still many gaps in our knowledge that have to be filled (or perhaps can never be filled) before a satisfying reconstruction of ancient history can be undertaken. It is, therefore, understandable that she prefers to stick to available records rather than getting involved in the ongoing debate on the concept of Barus itself—could it be a territory or a clearly defined urban settlement? After all, the main topic of her study is not the history of Barus as such, but rather historical views of the competing royal dynasties. History is used only as a setting from which the texts are originated. For this purpose, the history of Barus from the late seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century is the most relevant setting. In this period, the two competing royalties were the main actors of history. It is to this period that the two texts of traditional historiographies address themselves. No less important, Dutch records provide valuable data for historical reconstruction. Several pertinent points appear from these records. The competition between the Hulu and the Hilir dynasties was certainly a nuisance to Dutch economic and, later, political interest. This competition also invited the intervention of Aceh. The hostilities between the Hulu and the Hilir finally drove the Dutch, who had abandoned their factory in 1778, to intervene and subjugate Barus. More importantly, the records show the intricate relationship between the coastal centers of power and the hinterland. One record even suggests that the rulers of Barus had more authority inland than among their own people on the

coast. Drakard is perhaps right in her suggestion that the bond between the coast and the inland population “may have contributed to the ability of both families to maintain their royal claims into the nineteenth century” (p. 46).

Since the main theme of the present study is a comparison of two traditional historical writings, the book can also be considered as the analytical accompaniment to Drakard's edited romanization of the manuscripts, which were written in *jawi*—that is, Malay language written in Arabic characters (Jane Drakard, *Sejarah Raja-raja Barus: Dua Naskah dari Barus*, Jakarta: EFEQ, 1988). Both texts were composed in the late nineteenth century, after Barus had been included into the domain of the Netherlands Indies and the two dynasties abolished. Although Drakard does not directly address philological questions — she is more interested in the texts as the sources for the reconstruction of *l'histoire de mentalité* — she suspects that both texts, particularly the Hilir one, might have been prepared “with an external audience in mind” (p. 57). The text prepared by the Hulu royal dynasty is titled *Asal Keturunan Raja Barus* and that of the Hilir is called *Sejarah Tuanku Batu Badan*. There are several romanized versions of the *jawi* MS of the *Sejarah* available, mostly published by descendants or relatives of the Hilir house. Instead of trying to judge the relative historical reliability of the texts, Drakard takes their respective attitudes toward authority as the focus of her attention. By taking this theme as her central focus she can also make reference to other relevant texts in the Malay world. After all, most of the so-called Malay historical texts directly or indirectly also concern themselves with the question of authority.

Although Drakard prefers to look at the texts as documents on historical consciousness,

for practical purposes she treats them as historical texts which describe collective memories in chronological order. In other words, she makes a diachronic comparison. After relating “the origin stories” of both the Hulu and the Hilir dynasties, the texts are divided into three categories of main events, namely, “a common past” (consisting of three episodes), “dual settlement” (two episodes), and “crisis and denouement” (two episodes). These divisions and episodes not only refer to the internal dynamics of the respective ruling houses but also to the alleged events that bound them together. With these parallel chronological or diachronic categorizations, Drakard hopes that she can, on the one hand, compare the two houses' collective memories of commonly shared experiences, and on the other, investigate possible changes in their respective attitudes toward power and authority. The later aspect is important, because in the course of history the two local “royal houses” not only had to deal with each other but also with the far superior outside powers.

The founder of the Hulu royal house, according to its *Asal*, was Alang Pardosi, who came from the Kampung Persoluan in the Balige area of Toba. The fifth son of Raja Kesaktian, he left his village after a quarrel with his father. He and his wife and followers went west. He laid claim to uncultivated land, created rice fields, and made *kampung*, which in time became a *negeri*. After experiencing some disappointments and conflicts with his son-in-law, Si Namora, Alang Pardosi finally succeeded in making himself the sole *perintah*, holder of authority, over Rambe and its border with Tukka Dolok. The consolidation of power was continued by his sons. A ruling dynasty had been established. It had begun with the claim over a territory.

Sultan Ibrahim, the son of Sultan Muham-

mad Syah, the *raja* of Tarusan-Indrapura (a scion of the Minangkabau/Pagaruyung royal house), left his kingdom, according to the *Sejarah* of the Hilir because he was disgusted with the injustice done by his father, the king. He sailed north and went inland, to the Batak land. Recognizing his charismatic quality, the people of Toba Silindung wanted to make him their king. But he refused, and instead he appointed four *penghulu*. He was still acclaimed king, however, so he and the *penghulu* agreed to support each other. Sultan Ibrahim continued his journey, in search of proper land for him. In Bokara he was accepted as a member of the *marga* Pasaribu. They also wanted him to be their king. He agreed to accept this invitation on condition that they convert to Islam. The people replied that they would accept any of Ibrahim's commands except that to convert to Islam. Ibrahim then asked them to build a mosque. He was married to the daughter of the *raja* of Bokara. Out of this union, Singamangaraja, — the legendary king of Bokara was born. Sultan Ibrahim continued his journey. Finally he found a proper place to settle. He established a *kampung*, in the territory which, the *Asal* claims, already belonged to the Hulu.

These "stories of origin" show, as Drakard rightly says, that both texts, despite Minangkabau influences in their vocabularies (and, it can be added, in their style of story-telling), belong to the *hikayat* genre of Malay "classical" literature. The continuing journey of a prince in search of a suitable kingdom and the recognition of the legitimacy of a stranger-king are familiar themes in traditional historical treatises. References to divine power are at the same time the recognition of the omnipresence of Allah and explanatory devices of the events described.

The most crucial point, however, is how the

respective texts explain the existence of the other. Perhaps, on this particular point, Drakard should have ventured on a more lengthy discussion. From the beginning, the Hulu text cannot accept the legitimacy of the Hilir royal house. The *Asal* holds that there could be only one legitimate ruler in the country. It is this legitimate ruler who has sole authority. The other can only be considered as either his temporary representative or deputy. The *Sejarah* of the Hilir, on the other hand, sees nothing wrong with the country having two legitimate rulers, as long as they could maintain a harmonious relationship and decide everything of common interest by consultation and consensus. These initial attitudes, as the texts show and Drakard emphasizes, are hardened by their collisions in history.

The situation of a *kerajaan* having two *raja* is sometimes treated as a stigma in Malay tradition. It is tantamount to a situation in which *fitnah* (calumny) rules. On this point, the *Asal* might simply be taken as an example of this widely shared political tradition. Or should it be seen as an "intrusion" of the Batak attitude toward power into a "Malayized" political setting, as Drakard tends to suggest? The recognition of the legitimacy of two sources of authority is not, however, a unique phenomenon in the Malay world. Perhaps the *Sejarah* of the Hilir reflects its Minangkabau origin — the tradition that acknowledges more than one source of authority. Not only do the Minangkabau, according to tradition, have three kings (the Raja Adat, the Raja Ibadat, and the Raja Alam, the "senior king"), they also emphasize the complementary nature of their two "political traditions" (Bodi Caniago and Koto Piliang), whose positions should be considered as being equal.

Despite the *Asal*'s rejection of Hilir's legitimacy, the uniqueness of Barus lies in the his-

torical reality that, as corroborated by outside sources, it did for several centuries have two ruling dynasties—one tracing its origin to the Batak land, the other to Minangkabau. Drakard is right in stating that Barus is, indeed, “a Malay frontier.” But the question remains, how can we know about the heartland itself?

What kind of picture might we have had if Drakard had also looked at the ways the two texts describe and explain events the historicity of which can be examined by using outside sources? The different attitudes taken by *Sejarah Melayu* and the *Hikayat Hang Tuah* on the fall of Malaka (1511)—a commonly accepted historical fact—is quite well known. In other words, what would happen if the “dialogue” of the two texts were also conducted through the “intermediary” of verified historical events, not only, as it were, through “assumed events”? What would happen to the study had Drakard also tried to relate the presumed actions of the texts’ main actors with the prevailing commonly shared “theory of state” in the Islamic-Malay tradition?

Let us take the last point as an example. Because he felt he had been treated unjustly by his father—the adat feast was held before he came home—Alang Pardosi left his village. Sultan Ibrahim was disappointed because his father, the king, punished by death a boy, who, through his cunning, had saved Tarusan

from attack by a swordfish. In other words, the “origin stories” begin with protests against the affronts to the sense of justice. Perhaps the notion of *adil* (justice) could be taken as a yardstick for further deliberation on the concepts of authority and power. This abstract notion is the core theme of the oldest “theory of state” written in Malay, *Tajus-salatin* (The Crown of All Kings). Perhaps the unending controversies in Malay traditional literature over the questions of *daulat* (legitimate authority) and *derhaka* (disloyal conduct) can be referred to the elusive concept of *adil*. The lack of *adil* might incite a *derhaka* action. But a *derhaka* action would certainly bring about calamity. Since traditional Malay treatises prefer to tell stories, historical, mythical, legendary or imaginary, rather than define ideas, how should the Malay concept of the state, the *kerajaan* be ideologically, not merely structurally, conceptualized?

An indication of a good monographic study, as everybody knows, is that it does not end in itself. It inspires its readers to pose other questions. And Jane Drakard has not only written a well researched and well documented history and historical consciousness of the neglected Barus, her monograph has also raised other important questions on the nature of the so-called “Malay world.”

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