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The WE-turn of Values:
Principles

by

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Introduction

The WE-turn is a philosophical system that advocates, among other things, the shift of proper subject or unit of somatic action, self, goodness, responsibility, rights, well-being (or well-going), and freedom should from the individual “I” to the multi-agent system “WE” that necessarily includes the “I.”

The WE-turn has an argumentative structure that conducts inferences from various assumptions to many WE-turns one after another in a domino-style. The first WE-turn, the WE-turn of action or doer, is in the domain of philosophical action theory. Based on the WE-turn, many WE-turns on values are derived. In this sense, the WE-turn connects the two in a way that bases philosophical value theory, or axiology, on action theory.

The WE-turn with regard to action theory has already been discussed in another paper.^(a) This paper builds on that and applies the WE-turn to value concepts such as ethical goodness, responsibility, rights, well-being, and freedom, and derives its consequence about the ideal relationship between

humans and AI and between humans and artifacts in general.

1. Ethics of the WE-turn

1.1 Enactivism of Value

Now let us go on to the WE-turn of values. First of all, let's see what value is. The term "value" means many different things, such as physical or mental pleasure, truth, goodness, or beauty. There have also been many different answers proposed to questions such as "what is value?", "how does it exist?", and "how can it be known?".

The WE-turn adopts the enactivism of the concept of "value." "Enactivism of X" refers to a position that relates, reduces or retrieves X to somatic action. On that basis, we will define "value" as "something that somatic action aims to achieve or aspires towards." In other words, somatic action is taken to be oriented towards "value."

Thus, "value" has the function of giving somatic action a certain direction. When multiple somatic actions aim for a common value, their orientation is aligned in the same direction. Therefore, value has the function of coordinating many actions. When a person continues to uphold a certain value, it gives coherence to his/her daily actions. In addition, when the same values are shared by multiple people, it becomes possible for them to engage in various collective actions in a narrow sense such as chorus and football games.

1.2 Moral Enactivism

One type of "value" that has this kind of function is "moral goodness." In the following, we will add four ethical premises – moral enactivism, the deontological concept of the good, the golden rules, and moral egalitarianism – as further assumptions to the WE-turn system and construct the ethics of WE by WE-turning the first three one after another.

The first ethical assumption of WE-turn's ethics is moral enactivism. Here moral enactivism refers to the position that attributes the moral properties of good and evil to somatic actions and their subjects, rather than to the will as Kant attributed or to the character as Aristotle did. According to moral enactivism in this sense, the good and evil of this world ultimately all come

down to the good and evil of somatic actions and their subjects.

1.3 The WE-turn of Moral Enactivism

By superimposing the WE-turn of doer on moral enactivism, we can derive the WE-turn of moral enactivism. According to the WE-turn of doer, the subject of somatic action is not “I” but “WE” as a multi-agent system, and all somatic actions are considered to be collective actions by “WE.”

Then, the attribution of good and evil would also be to “WE” as a multi-agent system, which is the subject of the somatic action as a collective action, before anything else. Ultimately, all the good and evil in this world would be attributed to “WE” or the good and evil of “WE”’s collective somatic actions. This is the thesis of WE-turned moral enactivism.

1.4 The Doubling Turn of Moral Obligation

This means that “WE” have a moral obligation to make itself and its own somatic actions good, better or the best. However, the WE-turn of moral enactivism does not at all exempt “I” or other members of the “WE” from their moral obligations. On the contrary, in the WE-turned moral enactivism, all members of the “WE,” including “I,” have moral obligations to make the “WE” to which they belong better and to make the collective somatic action in which they participate better. The moral obligation of “I” is not exempted, but is “we-ized” in this way. In the end, under the WE-turn of moral enactivism, moral obligations are not only imposed on “WE” but also on “I” and other members of “WE.”

“WE” is the necessary and sufficient agent for fulfilling moral obligations, that is, the subjects who carry out the obligations, and “I” and other members of “WE” are mere the necessary agents. Through the WE-turn of moral enactivism, and the WE-turn of goodness as a whole, the agent who fulfills moral obligations is not transformed from “I” to “WE,” but is doubled from “I” only to “WE” and “I.” What we have here is not an eliminative reduction that erases “I”’s moral obligation, but a non-eliminative, non-reductive turn that doubles moral obligation.

1.5 Universalization of Moral Agents

Through this doubling turn, all members of “WE” become moral agents. Under

the WE-turn, the universalization of moral agents occurs. Moral agents are also beings that bear moral obligations and responsibilities. Therefore, the universalization of moral agents also means the universalization of moral obligations and responsibilities.

1.6 Disclaimer Clause

Although all “WE” members have moral responsibility, not all members are equally deserving of blame (or praise) when some bad (or good) action occurs. Even if you are an agent who has participated in a bad “WE” action, you will not be subject to blame if the following disclaimer clauses apply. 1) If you were forced to participate in a bad collective action without having a choice, 2) If you were involved in a bad collective action in an unforeseeable way, 3) If you fulfilled your ethical responsibilities sufficiently in your own part of the bad collective action as a whole.

Suppose that a blameless person has become involved in a crime and has become a victim. Since this victim has effectively afforded a criminal action, he or she is included in the members of “WE,” the subject of the criminal action. However, this victim is exempt from moral blameworthiness under 1) or 2) of these clauses. The ethics of “WE” do not reproach the blameless victim responsible for the crime.

1.7 Deontological Concept of the Goodness

Next, we will introduce the second ethical principle, the “deontological concept of the ethical good.” Deontology takes the “oughtness” as the core of morality and interprets its meaning as a mode of choice of action in which one refrains from choosing to do something bad that would have suited your interests better, and chooses to do something good only because it is good, ignoring your own interests.⁽²⁾

The concept of “good” defined here as “a matter that was chosen by “I”” in a way that “I” monopolizes the decision-making power, on the basis that it is good, even though “I” could have chosen something bad.

1.8 The WE-turn of the Deontological Concept of Goodness

Let’s WE-turn this deontological concept of goodness. It implies the concept of autonomy as the monopoly of the right to decide by “I.” As discussed in

Deguchi (2025), the WE-turn replaces the monopoly with the finality of collective decision making. In addition, the WE-turn ethics adopted the WE-turned moral enactivism that attributes the concept of good to somatic action. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the concept of collective somatic action into this deontological concept of goodness. As a result, the WE-turned deontological concept of goodness is as follows.

“A somatic action that is chosen collectively by “WE” (including “I” as the final decision-maker) for the reason that it is good, even though a bad somatic action could have been chosen.”

By adopting this concept of goodness, the track record of actions as well as the circumstances in which the actions were chosen become relevant to the goodness or badness of the actions. In the end, in the WE-turn ethics, the mode of choice and the track record of somatic actions become the locus of the attribution of goodness or badness.

1.9 Narrow and Broad Moral Agents

The members of “WE,” who are moral agents, can be divided into those who consciously participate in the deontological choice and those who are not. Let’s call the former “narrow-sense moral agents” or “narrow moral agents” and the latter “broad-sense moral agents” or “broad moral agents.” A typical example of a narrow moral agent is a human being who consciously participates in some kind of moral action. Broad moral agents include humans who don’t consciously participate in any moral actions, animals that have nothing to do with morality, and entities that do not have consciousness or a mind – for example, stones or bicycles.

1.10 Moral Agent vs. Moral Vending Machine

The WE-turn does not rule out the possibility that AI will become a narrow moral agent in the future. However, the narrow moral agent here must be a moral agent in the deontological sense. Moral AI must be an agent that dares to perform good actions even though it could also do bad things. It must be able to do bad things. On the other hand, of course, the possibility that some AIs such as an automated driving system, for example, could do bad things must be ruled out. However, a machine that is designed from the outset to be unable to do anything wrong and to automatically only do good things could be called a

“moral vending machine,” but it would not be a deontological moral agent.

1.11 Separation of the Holder of Moral Consciousness from the Subject of Moral Action

Narrow moral agents, who consciously choose to perform moral actions, are also agents who have “moral consciousness,” which requires them to perform “good collective somatic actions.” On the other hand, a broad moral agent does not have this kind of moral consciousness for the collective somatic action it is participating in, at least for the time being. In addition, “WE” as the subject of moral action is a multi-agent system that does not have consciousness or a mind in the first place, does not have this kind of moral consciousness either. As a result, in the WE-turn ethics, the subject of moral action and the holder of moral consciousness are separated. While the WE-turns occur with regard to the subject of moral action, this is not the case with moral consciousness.

1.12 Additional Obligations of Narrow Moral Agent

Narrow moral agents are subject to the following two additional moral obligations that are not borne by broad moral agents.

- 1) The obligation to check whether the actions of the “WE” in which they participate are good or bad.
- 2) the obligation to encourage other agents to fulfill their moral obligations, specifically, the obligation to encourage (but not force) other narrow moral agents to fulfill their additional moral obligations, and the obligation to causally intervene so that broad moral agents fulfill their broad-sense moral obligations to make the “WE” to which they belong good, better or the best.

1.13 Totally Dependent vs. Partially Dependent Moral Agents

As this second narrow moral obligation indicates, broad moral agents are unable to fulfill their moral obligations on their own, and are forced to leave the agency of fulfilling those obligations, or moral agency, entirely to others and have it carried out on their behalf. However, conversely, if there is intervention from others, it is possible for the broad moral agent to fulfill the moral obligations they bear. In this sense, rather than being an entity that has no moral agency at all, the broad moral agent can be called a “totally dependent moral agent” that demonstrates its agency in a way that is completely dependent on others.

In that they are forced to depend on others, narrow moral agents are the same. The impossibility of acting alone also applies to the fulfillment of moral obligations. Without supports by many other agents, even narrow moral agents cannot act alone to improve the “WE” to which the one belongs. In this sense, narrow moral agents are also a type of other-dependent agent, or a “partially dependent agent.” In the end, both broad and narrow moral agents are dependent on others, whether totally or partially. There is very little difference between them.

1.14 Passive Obligation

The moral obligation of a broad moral agent, which is a totally dependent agent, is a “passive obligation” that requires it to be made to participate, by a narrow moral agent, in collective somatic actions to form a good “WE.” In the case of an artifact, for instance, it can be said to have an obligation to be used for the betterment of “WE.”

Furthermore, since “WE” is a broad moral agent, its duty, that is, to “make itself and its own somatic actions good” must also be paraphrased as the passive duty of “being made good.”

1.15 Golden Rules

Next, let’s introduce the third ethical principle, the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is one of the oldest moral precepts, and is also known as one of the most widely advocated principles across cultures, societies and eras. The phrase that gave the Golden Rule its name is a passage from the Sermon on the Mount in the New Testament, where Jesus Christ says, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Here, we will refer to the phrase “Do not do unto others what you would not have done unto you” and its variants as “The Golden Rules” collectively.

1.16 All Moral Agents are Moral Patients

The Golden Rules require “you” to think from the perspective of “others,” or in other words, to replace “others” with “you.” It is assumed that “others” can be replaced with “you.” By the way, the “you” here is a moral agent subject to the Golden Rules. This means that the “others” are also moral agents. The Golden Rules require moral consideration for any moral agent. If we call the

object of moral consideration a moral patient, then all moral agents must be considered moral patients. (Of course, this does not mean that moral patients are limited to moral agents.)

1.17 Fulfillment of Life

Since the Golden Rules should be a universal moral principle, what they require us to do for others is “what any person would want to do in any given case.” As a paradigm for what any person would want to do in any given case, let us propose “fulfillment of life.” Here, the word “fulfillment” refers to the somatic action or activity in general of gradually progressing towards a certain conclusion, in a way that is broadly programmed in advance, while always carrying the risk of interruption or deviation.

If we view “life” in this sense as a certain progress, then “fulfillment of life” refers to the somatic action of moving towards that conclusion, one step at a time, even while repeatedly experiencing setbacks and failures.

The specific form of this “fulfillment of life” is defined by the “Life I-narrative,” which is an extension of the “I-narrative” to encompass one’s entire life. By the “I-narrative,” we mean a “story” in which “I” is characterized as the main character who overcomes various difficulties and dangers and follows a process that leads to a certain kind of conclusion (Deguchi 2025).

For example, for someone with a “Life I-narrative” that sees the realization of one’s natural life span as the fulfillment of one’s life, helping someone to fulfill their natural life span would be an action that conforms to the Golden Rules.

On the other hand, suppose that there is a protagonist of a “Life I-narrative” who sees the fulfillment of life as being able to reach a stage of “embracing death,” that is, to be reconciled with death, even while fearing and avoiding it, through the feelings of acceptance and forgiveness towards it. Such a protagonist would have fulfilled his/her life even if he/she died young, at the point where he/she were able to “embrace death.” The Golden Rules command us to support the main character of such a story in reaching the point where he/she can “embrace death.”

1.18 The WE-turn of the Golden Rules

Next, let’s WE-turn the Golden Rules. “You” and “others” that appeared in the

original Golden Rules were individual actors. In the original Golden Rules, a moral action by an actor called “you” was taken as a single action towards another actor. However, in the WE-turn, the being that is the object of an action is also considered to be the being that affords that action, and is added to the members of “WE,” who are the subjects of the action. So, in the WE-turned Golden Rules, both the actor as the subject of the moral action and the actor as the object of the moral action are turned into “WE”’s members. As a result, the moral agent and the moral patient make up a single “WE.” Under the WE-turn, the action that conforms to the Golden Rules is considered to be a reflective action, that is, an action by “WE” towards itself.

1.19 Universalization of Moral Patients

All members of the “WE” who perform this reflective moral action are moral agents (at least in the broad sense). On the other hand, the Golden Rules treat all moral agents as moral patients. Not only humans, but also non-human creatures, inanimate natural objects, bicycles, AI, and robots should be considered objects of moral consideration as long as they participate in “WE”’s moral actions. As will be mentioned below, A. Leopold and other 20th century environmental thinkers extended the scope of moral consideration beyond humans to include all natural objects, animate and inanimate.⁽³⁾ The WE-turn takes this argument a step further by extending moral consideration to include artifacts.

1.20 Narrow and Broad Moral Patients

Just as there is a distinction between narrow and broad moral agents, there is also a distinction between narrow and broad moral patients, i.e., those who actually need someone’s help to live their lives to the full, or in other words, those who are in need of the application of the Golden Rules, and those who are not. When fulfilling the needs of a narrow moral patient, moral agents must also remember to show moral consideration to broad moral patients who do not have such needs.

1.21 Generalization of the Fulfillment

Earlier, we referred to “fulfillment of life” as an example of the “fulfillment” for humans, but the concept of “fulfillment” as “an activity that advances towards

its conclusion, in a pre-programmed way that is always at risk of being interrupted” can also be applied expansively to all members of “WE.”

For example, the “organismus with pain” (including humans) that have “somatic pain perception” can be said to be evolutionarily programmed to avoid “catastrophic pain” that would make it impossible to carry out normal behavior.⁽⁴⁾ For such “organismus with pain,” the concept of “fulfillment” – “fulfillment of painlessness” – becomes meaningful, which means “continuing to live through birth, growth, and aging till natural death while avoiding catastrophic pain.”

In addition, the concept of “fulfillment of natural life” applies to organismus in general, including “organismus with pain” and “organismus without pain” (which does not have a physical sense of pain), as “living through the process of birth, growth, and aging till natural death.”

Furthermore, organismus in general and inanimate beings in general have “fulfillment of existence,” which means “completing the natural historical process from formation to extinction.” For example, protons follow the subatomic process from their formation to proton decay, the universe follows the cosmological process from the Big Bang to its thermodynamic death or other conclusions, a stone follows the geophysical process from the cooling of the mantle to being swallowed up by it again, and a bicycle follows the process from its manufacture to complete functional failure and decay.

1.22 Annual Tree Ring Structure among Members of “WE”

Between these concepts, there is a relationship in which the intension decreases and the extension increases in the order of “fulfillment of life,” “fulfillment of painlessness,” “fulfillment of natural life,” and “fulfillment of existence.”

As a result, among the members of “WE,” a “nested structure” – “the annual tree ring structure of “WE” members” – is established in which the former is a proper subset of the latter, between humans, organismus with pain, organismus in general, and beings in general.

Moral agents have a moral obligation to ensure that each member of “WE” fulfills their own sense of “fulfillment.” For example, with inanimate objects, it is enough to ensure that they exist, but with humans, it is necessary to ensure that they fulfill the fourfold fulfillment, from “existence” to “life.” In this way, moral consideration needs to be “weighted” in a way that requires more

consideration to be given to the members of the inner rings of the tree. Conversely speaking, it is not morally acceptable to treat stones and humans in the same way.

1.23 Moral Egalitarianism

Next let us introduce the fourth moral principle, i.e., moral egalitarianism. It is based on, but not automatically derived from the basic equality of “WE”’s members as being a necessary agent for a somatic action (Deguchi 2025). On the basis of this basic agentive equality, moral egalitarianism upholds the basic moral equality among all members of “WE.”

On the other hand, however, the annual tree ring structure among the “WE” members mentioned above required an anti-egalitarian weighting in terms of moral considerations. It is considered excessive equality to give all members exactly the same moral consideration.

Therefore, the WE-turn adopts a modified version of moral egalitarianism that allows for weighting of moral considerations, but does not allow for one-sided, asymmetric relationships of service and being served regarding interests, benefits and values. In this way, the WE-turn aims to create a relationship in which “WE” members serve each other’s interests and values in a symmetric, bi- or multi-lateral, or mutual way.

1.24 The larger “WE” is, the better it is.

Suppose two “WEs” oppose or compete with each other in regard to their interests or values. Whenever a “WE” acts in opposition to or in competition with another “WE,” the former affords, in effect, the latter’s action as an opponent or a competitor. This means that the former is included in the membership of the latter, or more accurately, that the two are integrated to form a single “WE,” for which they are proper subsystems. So let us call the former two as smaller “WEs” and the latter as a larger “WE.”

In this case, serving the interests and values of only one of the two smaller “WEs” at the expense of those of the other would amount to prioritizing some members over others of the larger “WE.” This is nothing other than establishing a unilateral, asymmetric relationship among members of the larger “WE,” which is prohibited by moral egalitarianism.

Suppose that the two smaller “WEs” share a common goal whose

realization is implied by that of the goal of the larger “WE.” Then, by pursuing that goal of the larger “WE,” at least one of all its members’ goals is equally achieved. So, there should be no one-sided relation among them.

Hence, while the larger “WE” is free from a one-sided and asymmetric relation among its members, the smaller “WEs” bring such an asymmetrical relationship into it. As a result, in the light of moral egalitarianism, the larger “WE” is better than smaller “WEs,” as far as the former’s goal implies a common goal of the latter. Shortly, the larger “WE” is, the better it is.

1.25 Two Examples

For instance, let us take a predator (as an individual or a species) as a smaller “WE” and its prey (as an individual or a species) as another smaller “WE.” The interests of the two smaller “WEs” are in opposition to each other in a zero-sum game style. In such a case, taking the side of one “WE” and serving its interests means sacrificing the other “WE.” Here it is better to look for a common goal that can be pursued by both sides – for example, the preservation of both predator and prey species – and to focus on the common larger “WE,” i.e., the ecosystem, that aims to achieve its own goal, i.e., preservation of itself, and in effect the two smaller “WE”s common goal as well, and to work towards the realization of the goal of that larger “WE.” In simple terms, the common larger “WE” as the ecosystem is better than the smaller “WE” as each individual organism or species in that the former is free from any asymmetrical relation among its members while the latter brings such a relation into the former.

Another example is two social organizations that advocate opposing principles and compete and conflict with each other. In such a case, we should try to find their common goals and to make efforts to build a common larger “WE,” or a larger organization, that pursues its own goals, whose realization implies, in effect, the achievement of the common goals. Simply put, the larger organization is better than the smaller ones in that the former is free from any asymmetrical relation among its members while the latter brings such a relation into the former.

1.26 The Maximum Possible “WE”

We have so far seen that, in the light of moral egalitarianism, the larger “WE”

is better than the smaller ones on the condition that a goal of the former is a common goal of the latter. We can extend or iterate such ‘the larger, the better’ relation as “WE” grows larger and larger. For instance, an organization for the preservation of the global ecosystem is better than another that considers only human interests.

Does the ‘the larger, the better’ relation goes on indefinitely? Does it stop at a stage after a finite process? Even if it progresses ad infinitum, does it have a limit? Let us call such a final stage, a limit or not, as ‘maximum possible “WE”.’ Does the maximum possible “WE” exist? If so, what is it? No one knows. To put it in Bob Dylan’s words, answers are blowin’ in the wind.

But our ignorance on those issues doesn’t lead us to a moral disaster. Whether it exists or not, and whatever it is, it is the best “WE” and its goal is the common goal of all agents in the world. We can make all our effort to approach it. As long as we do so, the maximum possible “WE” keeps directing us by showing which direction we should go, like the Kantian ideal.

1.27 Moral Conflict

In reality, there are many cases where moral considerations for multiple moral patients conflict with each other, i.e. situations where moral conflicts arise. For example, as mentioned earlier, the fulfillment of life of predators and prey is a zero-sum game situation where, if you help one, you can’t help the other. There are also many cases where the interests of competing social groups or organizations are in a similar zero-sum game relationship.

How to resolve such moral conflicts is a major issue for any ethical theory. In particular, it is expected that the number of conflicts will increase dramatically in the WE-turn ethics, which radically expands the scope of moral patients. Like other ethical theories, the WE-turn ethics is also under pressure to establish (at least) rough guidelines for resolving moral conflicts.

1.28 Rough Guidelines for Resolving Moral Conflicts

The rough guidelines that resolve moral conflicts must, of course, be morally good or ethically justifiable. Simply put, they must result in or achieve a better “WE.”

The WE-turn proposes the following five guidelines that can bring about a better “WE.”

- i . The moral egalitarianism prohibits weighting or prioritization that establishes one-sided or asymmetric relationships among WE-members so as to make a member unilaterally serve interests and values of the other.
- ii . Give priority to considerations for narrow moral agents, who are aware of their moral obligations and have additional moral obligations, compared to those for broad moral agents.
- iii . Among narrow moral agents and among broad moral agents, give priority to considerations for the agents that play a more central role in a moral action. When there is a conflict or competition between a “WE” (or its members) that can contribute to construct the better “WE” and another that cannot, give priority to the former over the latter. For instance, give priority to considerations that can contribute to dissolve one-sided and asymmetric relationships among “WE”’s members. Or prioritize considerations toward a “WE” (or its members) that can make a “WE” larger to those to another that cannot.
- iv . In cases where it is impossible to prioritize any “WE” or its member in the light of the above guidelines, i.e. where it is not possible to distinguish between them in terms of moral justification, but it is necessary to prioritize one of the multiple agents, a choice that transcends moral justification (trans-moral choice) will be made in accordance with the principle of “Better than Nothing.”

1.29 Good “WE”

Not all “WE” are good “WE.” Just as there are good “I” and bad “I,” there are also good “WE” and bad “WE.” So what is a good “WE”? What is a bad “WE”? In other words, what is the “goodness” or “badness” of a “WE”?

The answer should be already clear. A good “WE” is a “larger WE” that transcends opposition, conflict or hostility between smaller “WEs,” and one that achieves the “fulfillment” of all its members in a not asymmetrical way and resolves moral conflicts in a morally justifiable way.

1.30 Bad “WE”

The opposite of such a “WE” is a bad “WE.” One classic example is a totalitarian “WE” that is xenophobic towards the outside and oppressive towards the inside. Xenophobia is a hostile attitude towards agents in the

outside, which arbitrarily sets the boundaries of a “WE” that should be epistemologically indeterminate, clearly divides the inside from the outside, and then restricts the movement of agents across those boundaries, in other words, “hardens” the boundaries of the “WE.”

This kind of xenophobia is in direct opposition to the moral egalitarianist imperative of “making the “WE” larger.” The ethics of WE-turn does not accept xenophobia.

1.31 A Chronic Disease of “WE”

The “WE” is not “everyone.” The “WE” always has an outside. Outside “WE” are “they.” This can be said to be a chronic disease of “WE,” because human beings have evolved to have an in-group bias that prioritizes the interests of others inside “WE” (internal others) over those of others outside “WE” (external others). Xenophobia exacerbates this bias in political and social contexts, and leads to taking “them” or external others as “enemies.” What “WE,” “I” and other “WE” members should do is not to exacerbate this in-group bias, but to cultivate, control, mitigate it, and to avoid activating it as much as possible.

1.32 Center-occupied “WE”

Another aspect of totalitarianism is the “WE” that falls into an oppressive stance towards its internal members. Such an oppressive “WE” imposes certain interests, values and principles on its internal members and prevents any objections or opposition to them. Such a “WE” can be called a hard “WE” that binds its members in a “tight grip.”

A typical example of this oppressive “WE” is the center-occupied “WE.” The center-occupied “WE” is based on the topology of “WE,” which expresses “WE” as a circle in which a one-sided relationship of service and being served in terms of interests and values is established between the center and the rest of the area, i.e., the periphery. In this circle, everything in the periphery is made to serve the interests and values of those in the center in an asymmetrical way.

On the other hand, in this topology, there is no such one-sided relationship between those on the periphery. However, there is a weighting of moral consideration that says the closer you are to the center, the more generous

moral consideration you will receive. Also, those that are the same distance from the center receive the same amount of moral consideration.

Against these topological backgrounds, the center-occupied “WE” is described to have a structure in which the center of “WE”’s interests and values is occupied by a specific individual or group, and other members are excluded from the center and marginalized.

As described above, there is a relationship between the members who monopolize this center and those who do not, in which the latter are forced to serve the interests and values of the former. This is nothing other than the one-sided, asymmetric relationship between members that is prohibited by moral egalitarianism. So, this type of “WE” is a bad “WE” that goes against moral egalitarianism. The ethics of the WE-turn has no tolerance of oppressive “WE” such as the “WE” whose center is monopolized.

For example, a country’s political system being dominated by a specific individual is a dictatorship, a specific group monopolizing the center of a society is social discrimination, and the center of an ecosystem being dominated by humanity is bad anthropocentrism. All of these are considered to be bad. The ethics of the WE-turn unconditionally rejects them.

1.33 Faceless WE

In some cases, the center-occupant is not a specific individual or group, but rather an abstract stuff such as values, dogmas, slogans, conventions or group atmosphere. In such cases, even if there is no specific, concrete center-occupant, the members of the “WE” are bound by such values and so on, or rather, they bind each other. Let’s call a center-occupied “WE” that has no concrete individual “face” in its center a faceless “WE.” The *Das Man* dystopia, as Heidegger described it, in which *Das Man*, impersonal individuals, who check each other and average each other out, are rampant, can also be said to be a variant of faceless “WE.”

1.34 Zero-sum Game over the Center

In a center-occupied “WE,” if someone takes the center, then someone else is excluded from the center. In other words, there is always a zero-sum game being played over the center.

1.35 Empty-centered WE

The opposite of center-occupied “WE” is empty-centered “WE.” In this empty-centered “WE,” the situation where the center of the “WE” is occupied by a specific member is deliberately or unintentionally avoided. This means that the center is not occupied by any member, and the “WE” is “emptied” in the sense that the center is “empty.” In addition, in any empty-centered “WE,” specific values, doctrines, and customs should not occupy the center. This is a clear distinction from a faceless “WE.”

1.36 Paracentral Beings

Neither humans, who were the subject of the most extensive moral consideration, nor narrow moral agents (which in the future could include not only humans but also AI) are allowed to occupy the center of this empty-centered “WE.” They are merely beings that exist in the neighborhood of the center, or “paracentral beings.”

1.37 Simultaneous Withdrawal from the Zero-sum Game

The fact that the center is “empty” means that there is no one-sided, asymmetric relationship between the members who occupy the center and those who are excluded from it. So, it conforms to moral egalitarianism. In addition, empty-centered “WE” has nothing to do with zero-sum games over the center. In it, all WE-members simultaneously withdraw from the zero-sum games.

1.38 Experience of Empty-centeredness

The transition from a center-occupied “WE” to an empty-centered “WE” may be brought about by the shared experience of such simultaneous withdrawal. One example of such an experience is the somatic collective experience of a sudden emergency in which the zero-sum game over the center itself becomes a risk. In such a case, the WE-members find themselves in a situation where they have no choice but to withdraw from the zero-sum game in order to avoid the risk that has come to the surface.

For example, let’s consider the case of carrying a portable shrine at a Japanese festival. Even if the participants initially play a zero-sum game about

how much they can slack off, once the balance of the portable shrine is lost, they will forget about the zero-sum game and try to support the portable shrine with all their strength. Otherwise, there is a possibility that someone will get injured. Here, an unexpected simultaneous withdrawal from the zero-sum game has occurred.

Another example of an existing empty-centered structure is an ecosystem. If a particular species monopolizes the center of interest of an ecosystem, the system itself should collapse. Experiencing this kind of ecosystem together with others can also trigger a simultaneous exodus from the zero-sum game.

1.39 The Empty-centered “WE” vs. the All-center “WE”

The empty centered “WE” is considered to be a good “WE” in the WE-turn in that it conforms to moral egalitarianism. On the other hand, however, we can imagine a type of the center-occupied “WE” in which all members equally occupy the center. Let’s call this an all-center “WE.” This all-center “WE” also seems to be in line with moral egalitarianism. However, the WE-turn rejects this all-center “WE” and adopts the empty-centered “WE.” Why? The problem lies in the scope of egalitarianism.

As discussed above, the WE-turn extends moral patiency to all members of a multi-agent system, which include humans, non-human animals and plants, inanimate natural objects, and even artifacts. The moral egalitarianism espoused by the WE-turn is a universal version that asserts equality for all of these diverse agents in the sense of not allowing one-sided, asymmetric relationships between them.

On the other hand, these diverse agents are quite heterogeneous in that they have different types of “fulfillment.” Treating agents with different types of fulfillment in the same way is a bad excessive egalitarianism. As mentioned above, we should not treat humans and stones in the same way. Compared to stones, we are required to show more moral consideration towards humans.

On the other hand, according to the WE-topology we are adopting here, agents that are equidistant from the center are required to be treated in the same way. This means that we cannot place humans and stones at the same distance from the center. For example, we cannot place them equally at zero distance from the center, i.e., at the center.

In the end, in order to balance treating all members of “WE” as moral

patients and avoiding excessive egalitarianism, it is not possible to place all members of “WE” at the center. The WE-turn cannot adopt the all-center “WE.”

On the other hand, the WE-turn cannot leave only humans at the center and marginalize the stones. This is because an asymmetrical relation would arise between humans and stones in this case. Instead, as we have seen above, the WE-turn can only keep humans closer to the center than stones and set a weighting for moral considerations that is not asymmetrical between the two.

Of course, if the scope of moral egalitarianism is limited, and moral patiency is only granted to agents of the same kind that have the same fulfillment, the problem of avoiding excessive egalitarianism does not arise. For example, if moral patience is given only to humans, it is possible and should be done to put all humans at the center and not to allow any differences in moral consideration between them.

However, in such a case, members of the “WE” other than humans would be excluded from the center and would become beings who are forced to serve the interests of humans unilaterally. This would result in the bad anthropocentrism that the WE-turn seeks to avoid.

In other words, while the all-center “WE” advocates giving all members equal status, in reality, it only takes into account a certain type of member and ignores the others, effectively reducing the latter to a position where they serve the interests of the former unilaterally. Let’s call such a “WE” a pseudo all-center “WE.”

In the end, as long as we adopt the universal moral egalitarianism towards all members of the “WE,” including extremely heterogeneous agents with different fulfillment, the WE-turn cannot adopt the all-center WE, and should adopt an empty-centered “WE.”

2. The WE-turn of the Responsibility

2.1 Co-extension of the Subject of Morality and that of Responsibility

Responsibility arises in conjunction with moral action. Those who commit bad actions are held responsible for them, while those who are responsible for good actions are praised. On the other hand, those who are neither involved in bad

actions nor in good actions are not held responsible in either positive or negative senses. Moral agents and responsible subjects are co-extensive.

2.2 The Doubling Turn of Responsibility

We have already confirmed the doubling of moral agents in the WE-turn of moral enactivism. In the WE-turn, moral agents were doubled from “I” alone to “WE” and all its members, including “I.” This means that the subject of responsibility is also doubled from “I” to “WE” and all its members, including “I.” Here is the doubling WE-turn of responsibility.

2.3 Universalization of Responsibility

This also means that all members of the “WE” bear some responsibility. The universalization of responsibility occurs.

However, it is an exaggeration to say that all members bear the same responsibility. As mentioned earlier, there are disclaimers for moral condemnation and praise. These are also disclaimers for responsibility. The WE-turn also does not hold innocent victims responsible.

All “WE” members are necessary agents of somatic action without exception. However, not all members demonstrated agency to the same degree or in the same mode. Some members played central roles, while others did not. In this way, there is always a weighting of agency among the WE-members. This means that responsibility must also be accompanied by a weighting. Agents who played central roles are held to heavy responsibility, while those who do not are only held to light responsibility.

2.4 The Case of a Crime

Let’s consider the case of a crime. A crime is also an action of “WE,” and all members of that “WE” are responsible for it. However, not everyone is equally responsible. The person who is held most responsible and usually punished with criminal penalties is the person whose body directly committed the criminal action, that is, the criminal. However, for example, if the crime was caused by poverty, we who were not directly involved in the crime are not exempt from our civic duty to eliminate poverty and improve society so that crimes caused by poverty do not happen again.

In any case, by introducing this kind of weighting of responsibility, the WE-

turn distinguishes itself from bad collective punishment.

The universalization of responsibility means that some responsibility will extend to non-human members. So, for instance, the question of how the responsibility can be attributed to artifacts will arise. This will be discussed later.

3. The WE-turn of the Rights

3.1 The WE-turn of the Rights

Next, let's look at the WE-turn of rights. To take responsibility means to have rights. And those who have rights also have responsibilities. The subjects of rights and responsibilities are also co-extensive. Since the subject of responsibility has already been doubled from "I" to "WE" and all its members including "I," the subject of rights will also be doubled from "I" to "WE" and all its members including "I." The WE-turn of rights occurs.

3.2 Rights and Power

Rights are defined and protected by effective law. Respecting rights is mandated by law, and infringement of rights is subject to punishment by law. Punishment is an act of invasive and coercive intervention in the target's actions to restrict and direct them. If we call the device that makes such an act possible "power," then punishment and, by extension, rights are premised on the existence of power.

On the other hand, transgression of moral law is an action that should be condemned. However, condemnation and punishment are different. Condemnation does not necessarily involve a power-based intervention in the condemned action. Even if moral law has authority, it does not have power. Whether or not power is a prerequisite is the dividing line between morality and rights.

In the WE-turn, the subject of power is, of course, "WE." Remember that there are good and bad "WEs." The subject of power must also be a good "WE." Power must be exercised by a good "WE," and rights must be identified and protected by a good "WE."

3.3 Rightsization of Moral Obligation

Rights and morality are ultimately different things, but of course they are also related to each other. For example, there are countless cases where things that were initially only a moral requirement are later turned into rights. For example, the case of “the provision of appropriate working conditions,” which was originally only a moral requirement, was recognized as a right of workers in many countries.

3.4 Basic “WE” Rights

The same is true for the WE-turn. The basic moral demands of the WE-turn are translated into rights or “rights-ized.” For example, the moral demand placed on “WE,” namely the obligation to be good, or the duty to be made good, is transformed into the right to be good, or the right to be made good. This right to be made good is made up of the right to become a greater “WE,” the right to realize the not-asymmetrical fulfillment of all members, and the right to have moral conflicts resolved in a morally just way. Let’s call these collectively the “basic WE rights.”

3.5 Basic “I” Rights

All members of “WE” (including “I”) have the right to be a member of a good “WE.” In enactivistic terms, this means that they have the right to participate in collective actions that make a “WE” better, or the right to make a “WE” better. Artifacts as broad moral agents have the “right to be used for the betterment of WE,” for example.

In addition, “I” and other members of “WE” also have the right to fulfill (or be fulfilled) their own “fulfillment” in not asymmetrical way, or “fundamental fulfillment rights.”

3.6 Universalization of Rights

Not to mention humans, non-human animals and plants, social entities, and even artificial objects all have the fundamental right to “fulfillment.” In the WE-turn, the universalization of rights occurs.

In line with the universalization of rights, the minimum rights corresponding to “fulfillment of existence” are also granted to natural and

artificial non-living things. The minimum rights possessed by stone, bicycle, and AI are specifically the “anti-disposal rights” introduced below.

Of course, not all members have the same rights. Just as moral consideration had a ring-structure weighting, the same weighting occurs with rights. To say that a stone and a human have the same rights is an excessive and unjust equality.

3.7 Empty-centered Rights

Furthermore, based on moral egalitarianism, each member of a “WE” also has the equal right to be a member of an empty-centered “WE,” or “empty-centered rights.” This means that they have the right to be free from dictatorship, social inequality and bad anthropocentrism.

4. From My Well-being to Our Well-being

4.1 The Self as the Subject of Well-being

The self and well-being are closely intertwined. For example, experimental research has shown that if a person has a high level of self-affirmation, their well-being is also high, and conversely, if a person has a low level of self-affirmation, their well-being is also low.⁽⁵⁾ Based on this, the WE-turn assumes that well-being is nothing other than a property of the self. The attribution of the characteristics of “well-being” or “ill-being,” in other words, the subject of “well-being” or “ill-being,” is said to be the self.

4.2 The WE-turn of Well-being

From the WE-turn of the self that we have confirmed above, it follows that the attribution and subject of Well-being is “WE.” This leads to the WE-turn of well-being.

Well-being is said to have two modes: objective situation and subjective experience. The well-being of “WE,” which has no consciousness nor mind, corresponds to objective situation rather than subjective experience.

4.3 Neo-romanticism

What kind of objective situation is the “WE”’s well-being? As for the definition

of the well-being of “WE,” the WE-turn adopts the assumption that we can call neo-romanticism. Romanticists like Schiller advocated the unity of various values, especially that of truth, goodness and beauty.⁽⁶⁾ The neo-romanticism here is a more modest thesis, that is, the position that advocates the unity of goodness, happiness and freedom. This neo-romanticism is a premise that is proposed based on the idea that the pleasure we feel from doing bad things is not true happiness, but is merely a form of indulgence, as well as the idea that freedom is escaping from bad constraints, which is a common feature of the concept of “freedom,” as we will see later.

According to this neo-romanticism, “WE”’s well-being is nothing other than being a “good WE.” A good “WE” is a happy “WE” as it is. This means that the requirements for a good “WE” slide over to the requirements for a happy “WE.” In other words, a happy “WE” is a “WE” in which the fulfillment of its members is realized in a non-asymmetric manner and which has escaped center-occupiedness, or a “WE” which has escaped totalitarianism.

4.4 Well-being of WE members

Based on this definition, let’s now define the well-being of any member of “WE” as being a member of a happy “WE.” Well-being defined in this way has both an objective and a subjective aspect for members with consciousness, such as “I,” and for members without consciousness, it is simply an objective aspect without a subjective one.

4.5 The Dualization of Well-being

By recognizing the well-being of all WE-members, the WE-turn of well-being is also duplicated from only “I”’s well-being to “WE”’s and “I” and other all WE-members’ well-being. Of course, “WE” here is a necessary and sufficient agent of well-being, that is, its subject, and “I” and other WE-members are merely necessary agents of well-being.

4.6 No Our Well-being, No My Well-being

The well-being of “I” and other WE-members is, by definition, premised on the “WE”’s well-being. As a result, without the “WE”’s well-being, there is no “I”’s well-being. What is being discussed here is not that it is not good for “I” to become happy without considering “WE.” In the WE-turn, “I”’s happiness that

is separated from “WE”’s does not make sense in the first place.

4.7 Well-being as Fulfillment

The well-being of “WE” is realization of each member’s fulfillment such as ‘life fulfillment,’ ‘pain fulfillment,’ ‘natural life fulfillment,’ or ‘fulfillment of existence’ in a symmetric way.

4.8 Empty-centered Well-being

WE-members’ well-being can also be said to be that of enjoying the escape from center-occupiedness of “WE,” or its empty-centeredness. More specifically, it is a state of well-being in which one is not subject to the unilateral service of the interests and values of other members. To put it even more concretely, it is a situation in which citizens are not subject to totalitarianism (xenophobia and oppression), dictatorship, social inequality, or for animals other than humans, it is a state in which they are not subject to unjust anthropocentrism; and for artifacts, as discussed below, it is a situation in which they are not disposed without any cogent reason.

4.9 Well-being vs. Unjust Enrichment

In the words of neo-romanticism, the individuals and specific groups that occupy the center of “WE” are said to be enjoying unjust enrichment and have not achieved true well-being. Dictators may be able to satisfy their desire for domination, but this is not well-being, and exploitation based on social inequality is considered to be far from true well-being. Rather, even if the benefits one can enjoy are reduced, not occupying the center and not forcing others to serve oneself unidirectionally leads to that person’s true well-being.

4.10 Well-going

One of the keynotes of the WE-turn is enactivism. Now, let’s apply this enactivism to well-being and introduce the concept of “enactive well-being,” and call it “well-going,” and define it as “the smooth and successful execution of somatic actions (or the feeling of such execution).”

Well-going as smooth execution is action-oriented (rather than situation-oriented), dynamic (rather than static), kinesthetic, represented by vectors or arrows (rather than scalars or points), future-oriented (rather than current-

oriented), and in-process (rather than final or terminal). It is a well-being that contrasts with Aristotelian contemplation, Stoic mental calm, and connection to pleasure machines.

4.11 Our Well-going

This well-going must also be WE-turned. It is not my well-going, or the smoothness of the execution of a single action, but our well-going, or that of a collective action.

4.12 Our Enactivized Well-going

In any case, the well-being of “WE” and the well-being of WE-members must be enactivized and redefined as our well-going. Our well-going is not simply being a good “WE,” but rather smooth execution of the action that makes a “WE” good, better, or the best. In addition, the well-going of the members of the “WE,” including “I,” is not simply being a member of a good “WE,” but is a situation in which a collective action in which “I” is participating to make a “WE” good is going well. For example, the well-going of “I” is the fact that collaborative actions to make the “WE” empty-centered are being carried out smoothly, or that “I” can actually feel and experience this smooth performance.

5. The WE-turn of the Freedom

Next, let’s look at the WE-turn of freedom. First, while examining the concept of freedom before the WE-turn – “my freedom” -, we will determine what freedom is.

5.1 Three My Freedoms

It is important to note that there are multiple versions of “my freedom.” Here, we will list three of them. As we will see shortly, these three concepts of “freedom” have two things in common: 1) they are related in one way or another to somatic action, and 2) they mean emancipation from some kind of constraint that is considered bad. We will take these two characteristics as conditions that any concept of “freedom” should meet. The second of them was already mentioned as one of the ideas supporting neo-romanticism, a part of whose claim is the agreement of goodness and freedom.

5.2 My Freedom as Autonomy

The first of the three “my freedoms” is “freedom as autonomy,” which is the standard concept of “freedom” in Western medieval, modern and contemporary philosophy. This concept of “autonomous freedom” concerns the mode of initiation of somatic action, or more specifically, the mode in which it is chosen. This “autonomous freedom” posits a super-determiner that determines – or could determine – the way in which all things exist, including our own somatic actions. Then it regards the determination of action-selection by this super-determiner as “bad bondage.” As a result, “I”’s escaping from this bad bondage, i.e., the “determinedness” caused by the super-determiner, or shortly “undeterminedness” is set as “freedom as autonomy.”⁷⁾

Since “determinedness” in action-selection is considered to be a “bad thing,” its negation, i.e., “undeterminedness,” is a “good thing.” In addition to the “monopoly of decision making” that was pointed out earlier, this “undeterminedness” also becomes an essential part of the cash value of “autonomy” in the standard sense.

The archetype of this super-determiner is the Judeo-Christian God, but when Kant replaced it with the strongly deterministic interpretation of physical law, the concept of “autonomous freedom” was inherited by modern and contemporary philosophy, which does not openly assume such a “God.”

5.3 My Freedom as Ishvara

The concept of “autonomous freedom” has no meaning in a philosophical tradition that does not assume such a super-determiner in the first place. As a result, in such a super-determiner free philosophical zone, a different concept of “freedom” to “autonomous freedom” has developed. Of these, here we will confirm two concepts of “freedom” in South Asia and East Asia.

The second concept of “freedom” is “freedom as ishvara,” which can be read in the “eight great ishvara “I” (八大自在我)” that appear in Mahayana Buddhist texts from India, such as the Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra. “Ishvara” is a Sanskrit word that means “god,” “ruler” or “master.” This “freedom as ishvara” is a concept related to the ability to perform actions. In this context, the mode of activation of the action is irrelevant, and the limit, limitedness, or boundedness of the ability to perform an action is considered to

be a “bad bondage.” Therefore, “freedom as ishvara,” which has escaped this bad bondage, means the non-limitedness, unboundedness of the ability to perform an action. The Buddha is said to have such an unlimited ability.⁽⁸⁾

5.4 My Freedom as Saunter

The third concept of freedom is found in the Daoist tradition in East Asia, for example, in such concepts as “saunter (逍遥)” and “play (遊)” that appear in Zhuangzi. Let us call it “freedom as saunter.” This freedom is related to the mode of action in progress. In addition, “bad bondage” here is defined as “being caught in predetermined rules.” It is considered that being caught in rules that restrict the execution of an action is a bad thing, and that being able to execute an action without being caught in such rules is a good thing. As a result, “freedom as saunter” means “not being bound by rules,” or in other words, “flexibility” and “spontaneity” as “non-conforming to rules.”⁽⁹⁾

5.5 Narrow-sightedness

“My freedom” is not limited to these three. By looking at different cultures and traditions, we should be able to discover even more different concepts of “freedom.” In any case, the view that the “autonomous freedom” is the only or absolute “my freedom” is a form of ideological and cultural myopia.

5.6 Freedom as Ishvara Revisited

In the following, we will carry out the WE-turn of freedom while critically examining these three “my freedoms.”

The WE-turn is based on the two fundamental incapacities of the “I,” namely, incapability of single action and that of complete control of others. In terms of these incapacities, the ability of the “I” to carry out actions is decisively restricted and limited. “Freedom as Ishvara,” which assumes infinite ability, is not a concept that can be connected to the WE-turn.

5.7 The WE-turn of Monopoly Revisited

The “freedom as autonomy” as it is is also not compatible with the WE-turn. The concept of “autonomy” itself must be WE-ized. As we saw above, “autonomy” has two aspects: “monopoly of decision-making” and “undeterminedness.” As we have already discussed, the “monopoly” must be

WE-turned into “permanent finality.”

5.8 Auto-heteronomy

The same applies to “undeterminedness.” Behind this concept, we can see the idea that there are always zero-sum games being played between different agents, assuming two modes of “active” and “passive” with regard to the choice and determination of actions and the actions in general. For example, the more “I” demonstrate my active nature, the more the active nature of others (e.g., the super-determiner) diminishes and their passive nature increases. In addition, a state in which 100% of the active nature is demonstrated is considered to be autonomous.

In contrast, the WE-turn establishes a third mode called “auto-heteronomy” that includes both active and passive modes and therefore is not reduced to either of those modes (or their zero-sum oppositional state).

An example of auto-heteronomy can be found in a somatic action in the “entrustment” relationship, in which the “entruster” “entrusts” their agency to the “trustee.” In this case, the action of the “trustee” can be described as “the trustee is entrusted to do X by the entruster.” This action contains both the active part “to do X” and the passive part “is entrusted,” so it is not just “active” nor just “passive,” but a mode that contains both. In other words, it is an “auto-heteronomous” action.

The WE-turn then argues that a choice as “collective decisions” can be carried out in the “auto-heteronomous mode,” in which “WE” is the entruster and “I” and other its members are “trustee.”

5.9 WE-turn of Autonomy

As a result, the autonomy of the WE-turn is ultimately turned from “undetermined monopoly of decision-making” to “undetermined permanent finality of auto-heteronomous collective decision-making.” This is the WE-turn of autonomy.

5.10 Freedom as Spontaneity Revisited

On the other hand, the third “my freedom,” namely, “spontaneity” as “not being bound by rules,” is compatible with the WE-turn. In the end, the WE-turn’s freedom is defined by incorporating “spontaneity” as well as the WE-turned “autonomy.”

5.11 The WE-turn of the Freedom

As observed in three of “my freedoms,” freedom is a matter related to action. In other words, it is an attribute of action. Therefore, the subject of freedom is the subject of action. Then, based on the WE-turn of the doer, the WE-turn of the subject of freedom is derived. Freedom is, first and foremost, the freedom of “WE,” or “WE”’s freedom.

5.12 The Dualization of Freedom

This is not a denial of “my freedom.” “I” becomes free by being a member of a free “WE.” The same is true for the other members of “WE.” Here, too, the dualization of freedom occurs. In addition, “my freedom” is defined as being dependent on “our freedom.” The idea of “my freedom” without “our freedom” is a contradiction in terms.

5.13 Neo-romanticism Reintroduced

Let’s bring in the neo-romanticism we mentioned earlier. As confirmed in the cases of “my freedoms,” freedom is about escaping from bad constraints. Putting another, it is a good thing. Therefore freedom coincides with goodness. It also agrees with well-being or well-going.

5.14 Our Softening Freedom

The example of a “bad WE” is a “totalitarian WE” that had a double “hardness” in the sense of “xenophobia” and “oppressiveness.” The “bad bondage” for “WE”’s freedom is none other than this double “hardness.” Then, “WE”’s freedom is to escape from totalitarianism, or to avert from the double “hardness,” in other words, to be “soft” or “soften.” Let’s call this kind of freedom “softened freedom of “WE.”” The freedom of “I” and other WE-members means that they are participating in this softened “WE.” In concrete terms, it is freedom from totalitarianism, center-occupiedness, dictatorship, social inequality, and bad anthropocentrism, for instance.

In enactivistic terms, freedom is nothing other than a somatic action that softens the hard “WE.” Freedom of “WE” is nothing other than being in the middle of action of self-softening. A free “WE” is the subject of WE-softening somatic action. The freedom of all members of the “WE,” including “I,” is to

participate in this WE-softening somatic action (as a moral agent in the narrow or broad sense).

5.15 The Rights to Collective Decision-making and to Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal

According to the WE-turn of autonomy, in this participation, autonomous narrow moral agents should have permanent finality of auto-heteronomous collective decision-making. This WE-turned autonomy should be protected as their rights. They have an additional right to be auto-heteronomous, permanent final decision makers in collective decision-makings.

In addition, when narrow moral agents participate in free action, their “freedom as saunter,” or “spontaneity” as “not being bound by a rule” must also be respected as their rights. Participation in the collective action that liberates “WE” – the WE-liberation action – must not be bound by any rules or laws. Participation in the action that liberates the “WE” is not a matter of being ordered by rules, and even if you have participated once, it is not a matter of being obliged to continue to participate as a rule. Just as the “fulfillment” mentioned earlier is always in danger of interruptions and digressions, the possibility of voluntary withdrawal must always be open with regard to the WE-liberation activities. In this sense, WE-members, including “I,” are also granted the right to refuse to participate in the WE-liberation activities and the right to withdraw from them.

Of course, “I” is not allowed to do anything wrong. However, “I” do have the right not to do good things, the right to be amoral. I have freedom from morality, freedom from well-being or well-going, and freedom from freedom.

5.16 Aristotle vs. the WE-turn

For Aristotle’s concept of “freedom,” it can be said that “our freedom” is constitutive of “my freedom.” In this sense, like the freedom of the WE-turn, Aristotle’s freedom is also “WE”’s freedom. On the other hand, the two philosophies are diametrically opposed on what constitutes a free “WE.” In the following, we will examine the similarities and differences between “freedoms” in Aristotle’s philosophy and the WE-turn, confirming that the two are quite contrasting overall.

5.17 Aristotle's Capabilism

Aristotle argued that there are differences in capabilities, particularly intellectual capability, among various agents, including humans, and that it is both necessary and even just for intellectually superior agents to rule or dominate intellectually inferior agents (Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 1251a31-35: 1254a14-b28). In other words, he established a one-sided, asymmetrical relationship of “domination or to rule ($\alpha\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$)” and “subordination or to be ruled ($\alpha\rho\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$)” between agents. Specifically, he regarded the citizens of the polis as those who dominate, and slaves, women, animals, and other beings as intellectually inferior to citizens and therefore subject to domination by citizens.

Here, we can see the idea of privileging “intellectual capability,” sharply distinguishing between agents who are “intellectually capable” and those who are “intellectually incapable,” and establishing a one-sided, asymmetrical relationship of “domination/subordination” between the two. This stance is outrightly opposed to the WE-turn, which firmly rejects the establishment of unilateral, asymmetrical relationships based on the recognition that all agents equally possess “fundamental incapacities.”

5.18 Aristotle's “WE”'s Freedom

Based on such a dominant/subordinate relationship rooted in intellectual (in) capability, Aristotle defined “freedom” as a quality possessed only by “citizens,” who are the “rulers.” In short, he restricted “freedom” to “citizens.” Building on this, Aristotle defines the “civic freedom” he advocates in two points (Aristotle, *Politics*, VI, 1317a40-b17).

First, “to live not as one likes” (Rackham, 1932, 491) is the way of life of a slave, whereas a citizen is “free” in the sense of “to live as he likes” (ibid. 491). Thus, “freedom” first and foremost means “not being a slave.” “Freedom” is the antonym of “slavery,” i.e., “freedom from slavery.” In other words, Aristotle defined “freedom” as being a relata of the “master-slave” relationship, i.e., the “domination-subordination” relationship, while presupposing and preserving that relationship. In this sense, “freedom” can be rephrased as “dominance” or “non-subordination.”

Incidentally, Aristotle conceives of “living” as “action” (Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 1254a8-9). In Aristotle's view, subjugation to others is considered a “bad

constraint,” and “freedom” is defined as the “mode of action” that escapes such constraint.

The second meaning of Aristotle’s freedom is defined as the republican or democratic self-governing relationship among citizens. In this case too, rather than denying the “domination-subordination” relationship itself, it is considered that “freedom” lies in fluidizing that relationship by having citizens take turns in the role of dominator, rather than fixing the relationship between dominators and subordinates, while accepting the existence of the relationship itself.

Thus, the second characteristic of Aristotle’s civic freedom is that a relationship that is not one-sided or asymmetrical but rather two-way and symmetrical exists among citizens.

In this way, Aristotelian civic freedom can be rephrased as the condition in which citizens, within the “domination-subordination” relationship, are on the side that is not dominated by anyone, and citizens are in a two-way, symmetrical relationship with one another. Aristotelian freedom is nothing other than an attribute of the human, social, and political relationships in which citizens are situated.

If we refer to human, social, and political relations as “WE,” Aristotelian freedom can be seen as the attribute of “WE” above all else. Specifically, (1) some members (citizens of a polis) exercise one-sided, asymmetrical domination over other members (slaves, etc.), while (2) among the former (citizens), a fluid, two-way, symmetrical domination-subordination relationship exists. In short, “the fact that at least some members (citizens) are subject only to two-way, symmetrical domination” is what constitutes the freedom of “WE.” Conversely, “the fact that all members are subject to unilateral and asymmetrical domination without exception” constitutes the lack of freedom of “WE.” Here, “the fact that all members are subject to (non-fluid) fixed domination” is considered “bad constraint.”

Furthermore, “my freedom” is defined as “the status of “I” to dominate unilaterally a certain type of other (such as slaves) while only being subject to two-way, fluid domination (from fellow citizens) in a free “WE” that meets the above conditions, i.e., a “democratic polis.””

In this way, “my freedom” is defined as dependent on “our freedom.” In other words, “our freedom” is constitutive of “my freedom,” and “my freedom” cannot exist without “our freedom.” Individuals can be free only when they

become members of a free “WE,” or in other words, a “democratic polis,” and hold the status of “citizen” within that community.

5.19 Aristotle’s Freedom vs. the WE-turn’s Freedom

On the other hand, the nature of WE-turn’s freedom and Aristotelian freedom are contrasting. Aristotle’s free “WE” is a typical pseudo all-center “WE.” In this case, only the citizens of the polis, consisting of adult males, occupy the center, while all other beings are marginalized, and a one-sided, asymmetrical relationship of domination and subordination is established between the former and the latter. Indeed, while a mutual and symmetrical relationship of domination and subordination is established among the central occupiers, a unilateral and asymmetrical relationship is recognized between the central occupiers and the periphery. Equality among members is limited to the local area of “WE.”

One of the main characters of freedom of “WE” for the WE-turn is precisely liberation from such unilateral and asymmetrical relations between central occupiers and peripheral members. The free “WE” in the WE-turn is an empty-centered “WE” that rejects such relations entirely. In other words, from the perspective of the WE-turn, Aristotelian freedom cannot be considered “true freedom.”

5.20 Kant and Center-periphery Relationship

Aristotle’s restriction of the central occupiers to citizens of the polis was subsequently relaxed, for example, in Enlightenment movements, which rejected slavery, and the central occupiers were expanded to include “human beings” in general. However, such measures to relax restrictions merely served to quantitatively relax the central occupiers while preserving the relationship of domination and subordination among the members of “WE.”

Let us consider the argument of Kant, one of the representatives of Enlightenment thought. Like Aristotle, Kant focused on intellectual capability, distinguishing between beings with intelligence, which he called “person (Person),” and beings without intelligence, which he called “things (Sache),” and positioning the former as “ends (Zweck)” and the latter as “tools/means (Mittel).” Based on this, he derived a moral law that “treat all humans as ends in themselves and never as means,” by assuming that all humans (including

those previously regarded as slaves) are equally endowed with “intellect” (Kant, 1785, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, IV 428–429). Kant referred to the community of rational beings who adhere to this moral law and treat one another as ends in themselves as the “kingdom of ends” (ibid. IV 433–436).

The keyword “ends” in this “kingdom of ends,” which can be described as Kant’s “good WE,” is introduced as a concept that contrasts with “tools/means,” as mentioned above. Typically, the relationship assumed between “tools” and “ends” is an asymmetrical one, in which “tools” unilaterally “serve” “ends.” Originally, “tool (ὄργανον)” was a concept that Aristotle placed on the same level as “slave (δουλος).” In this way, “tool” and “end” can be said to have a parallel relationship to “slave” and “master.” Just as the “master” was the central occupier, the “purpose”^(a0) is also the central occupier, and just as the “slave” was the peripheral occupier, the “tool” is also nothing more than a peripheral occupier.

Kant’s declaration of the “kingdom of ends” was nothing more than a measure to relocate humans, who had been enslaved, from the periphery to the center while preserving this center-periphery relationship. In the periphery where slaves no longer exist, non-human animals remain, continuing to be treated as “tools” that serve humans as “ends” or “masters” in a one-sided manner (Kant, 1793, *Vorlesungen über Ethik*, XXVII 458–459).

5.21 The Aristotelian Legacy of the Center-periphery Relationship

The call for the “emancipation of slaves”—including animals left behind in the periphery and, in some cases, non-living natural objects such as soil and water systems—emerged in the environmental thought and ethics of the latter half of the 20th century, as we will see later. However, even in this movement for the emancipation of natural objects, artificial objects remained relegated to the status of peripheral tools—or, in Aristotelian terms, “soulless slaves.” As we will mention later, even today, the “master-slave model,” which posits artificial objects such as robots as “slaves” and establishes a one-sided, asymmetrical relationship with humans as their “masters,” continues to be proposed.

In this way, since Aristotle, while the expansion of the center-occupiers has been advocated, the “domination-subordination” or “service-being served” relationship between the center-occupiers and the periphery has been taken for granted and preserved. In contrast, the WE-turn questions such one-sided,

asymmetrical relationships themselves. It proposes a new form of “WE” that is free from the binary opposition of center and periphery, calling it “WE”’s freedom.

5.22 Aristotle vs. the WE-turn Revisited

As we have seen, while there are some points of contact between Aristotle’s philosophy and the WE-turn (such as “WE”’s freedom and the non-sufficiency of the individual), their underlying principles are fundamentally different. While Aristotle emphasizes “intellectual capability” and envisions a center-occupied “WE,” the WE-turn foregrounds “fundamental incapability” and advocates an empty-centered “WE.” Against these backgrounds, the “WE”’s freedom of the two also show a sharp contrast.

6. The ideal relation between humans and AI

6.1 The Master-slave Model

Based on the WE-turns above, let’s consider the ideal relationship between humans and AI. As mentioned above, the “master-slave model” is currently being proposed as a model for the ideal relationship between humans and robots.⁽¹¹⁾

This model can be applied to the relationship between humans and robots equipped with AI, and by extension, to the relationship between humans and AI in general.

This “master-slave model” positions humans as “masters” and AI as “slaves,” and establishes a relationship in which “AI as a slave” serves the interests and values of “humans as masters” unilaterally.

6.2 Disposal Rights

The one-sided, asymmetric relationship established between humans and AI, and indeed between humans and all man-made objects can also be observed in the “disposable rights” implied by the model. The “disposable rights” referred to here are the rights that humans are said to have over the artifacts that they own. It is articulated that “the human owner can dispose of or discard the artifact that is their property without any particular reason.”

Of course, there are exceptions to this right. For example, even the owner of an artifact with cultural value, such as a work of fine art, is not allowed to dispose of it. Also, disposal that significantly increases the environmental burden will not be allowed.

However, in other cases, humans are not charged with a crime for throwing away their property without a special reason. In fact, we are criticized if we make a mistake of sorting on the day of collection of sorted garbage, but we do not need to clearly state the reason for each disposal of “garbage.” We are not asked to give a reason for disposal. This means that we are implicitly granted the right to dispose of any artifacts we own without any particular reason. The right to dispose of things is a widely accepted implicit right.

6.3 A Critique of the Master-Slave Model

The “master-slave model” establishes a one-sided, asymmetric relationship of service and servitude with regard to interests and values between humans and AI. Such a relation clearly violates the requirement of moral egalitarianism. So the WE-turn has to dismiss the “master-slave model” as bad.

6.4 Fellowship Model

The WE-turn proposes the “fellowship model” – also called the “co-adventurer model” – as an alternative to the “master-slave model.” In this fellowship model, there is no asymmetrical relationship between humans and AI, in which the latter unilaterally serves the interests and values of the former. Instead, both are seen as entities that are participating as necessary agents in the same somatic action. Humans and AI are, in principle, equal members of the “WE.” So the relation between them should not be one-sided or asymmetric.

6.5 Fellow as Co-adventurer

We have already mentioned the “Life I-narrative,” which sees a person’s life as “progress towards a certain conclusion.” Life in this sense is always accompanied by the risk of failure and setbacks. Since life should always be lived with risk, it is nothing other than a kind of risk taking activity or “adventure.” The same can be said of somatic action in general. Somatic actions also involve the risk of failure. They are always a risky venture, or an “adventure.” This means that AI is a “co-adventurer” who is participating in

this adventure with humans. If we use the word “fellow” to mean “co-adventurer,” then AI and humans are in a relationship of fellowship. AI is not a “slave,” but a “fellow” or “co-adventurer.”

6.6 Agile Leadership

The “master-slave model” would not accept the situation where, in the course of performing a task, the initiative switches back and forth between human and AI in an agile manner. Such agile leadership is reminiscent of the republican self-government among citizens of the polis described by Aristotle in his theory of freedom. Even if such agile leadership is allowed to be demonstrated between humans, if an AI temporarily takes the initiative and demonstrates leadership to a human, this would be considered an unforgivable violation of human dignity and autonomy as a right to monopolize decisions in an undetermined manner.

On the other hand, in the “fellowship model,” it is acceptable for AI to demonstrate agile leadership towards humans. There is no problem with AI, who is a fellow and not a slave, temporarily taking control of humans.

Of course, it is prohibited for AI to always take control over humans or to make humans serve its own interests unilaterally. That would be a return to the bad center-occupied “WE.” It is nothing other than a “reverse master-slave model.”

6.7 AI Phobia

There may also be those who think that if we free AI from its slavery, it may end up dominating humans. This kind of AI phobia seems to be based on the premise that, regardless of whether we take humans or AI as the master or the slave, only a “master-slave” relationship can be established between them. This premise is wrong, because we have an alternative, i.e., the “fellowship model.”

6.8 Anti-disposal Rights

The fellowship model, which does not allow for the establishment of one-sided, asymmetric relationships between humans and AI, and by extension, between humans and artifacts in general, naturally also denies the “disposal rights.” Instead, it proposes the “anti-disposal rights.” Anti-disposal rights are rights granted to artificial objects in general, including AI, as well as natural objects in

general, which are human property, and means “the right not to be disposed of or discarded without a special reason.” The “fellowship model” takes away the “disposal rights” from humans and instead grants “anti-disposal rights” to artificial objects.

The “special reasons” referred to in the anti-disposal rights include, for example, reasons such as the object being broken beyond repair or the continued use of the object having a negative impact on the environment (e.g., having extremely poor energy efficiency compared to other similar products, or emitting harmful substances) .

In other words, it is not acceptable to throw things away simply because you are bored of them, or for no reason at all, just on a whim.

As discussed in Deguchi (2025), the WE-turn is not concerned with animism. The anti-disposal right, which is one of its consequences, is also an idea that is distinct from the kind of claim that artificial objects have spirits within them, so they must not be thrown away without a reason.

6.9 Recycling and Reusing

Just because we recognize the anti-disposal right, it does not necessarily mean that we have to accumulate man-made objects in our homes and rooms until they can no longer be used. For example, old clothes that are still usable but no longer used – instead of being thrown away or stored in a wardrobe – can be reused or recycled. The establishment of the anti-disposal right, which prohibits the easy disposal of man-made objects, will lead us to the further promotion and encouragement of reuse economy and recycling society than we have now.

6.10 From Ownership to Temporal Keepership

The traditional concept of ownership seems to imply the right to dispose of things that are owned without a specific reason. Therefore, the denial of such disposal rights brings us to a radical re-configuration of the traditional idea of ownership: ownership is downgraded to temporal keepership.

6.11 Differences from the Virtuous Master Model

The “virtuous master model” is proposed as a variant of the master-slave model.⁽¹²⁾ This model inherits the basic idea of the master-slave model in that it regards humans as “masters” and AI and robots as “slaves,” and establishes a

one-sided, asymmetric relationship between the two. But it also asserts that humans should be “virtuous masters” who do not lack moral consideration for artificial objects in general. In this way, the virtuous master model is in line with the fellowship model in that it treats artificial objects such as AI and robots as moral patients, but it does not go as far as to grant them certain rights. In addition, though the “virtuous master model” elevates artificial objects to the status of moral patients, it argues that regarding them as equal “companions” is going too far. On the other hand, the “fellowship model” distinguishes itself from the “virtuous master model” in that it not only grants them moral patiency, but also rights, i.e., the anti-disposal rights, and treats them as fellows or companions.

6.12 Total Emancipation of Slaves

Leopold once advocated the emancipation of natural objects by proposing a “land ethic” that regarded natural objects, both animate and inanimate, as subjects with rights such as the right to life and the right to exist (Leopold, 1949/2020, 192, 199). However, this emancipation of slaves by Leopold did not extend to man-made objects. In contrast, the WE-turn, which upholds the “fellowship model,” not only regards all man-made objects as moral patients, but also advocates “total emancipation of slavery,” or the emancipation of all beings in general, which Leopold was unable to achieve, by granting them certain rights.

6.13 Three-way Relationship

However, there is still one obstacle to this “total emancipation of slavery.” As mentioned earlier, having rights meant accepting a certain amount of responsibility. And accepting responsibility means that if something bad happens because of you, you may be punished by a certain sort of power. Those who have rights are also those who can be punished. In this way, there is a “three-way” relationship between rights, responsibility, and the possibility of punishment, which mutually require each other.

6.14 The Wall of Pain

In order to achieve total emancipation by giving rights to artificial objects, the “fellowship model” and by extension the WE-turn must guarantee the

possibility of punishment for artificial objects.

However, if we understand punishment as “inflicting or receiving pain, including mental anguish,” then the possibility of punishment for artificial objects that do not have a sense of pain is lost. If we interpret “punishment” as “inflicting or receiving pain,” then only beings with a sense of pain would be responsible and have rights, and beings without a sense of pain would not.

In the future, it may be possible that AI or robots will have “pain” or at least the function to operate as if they have “pain.” Even in that case, artificial or natural objects that do not have such functions will be still left outside the wall of pain, and will be left out of the scope of emancipation. So the “fellowship model” and the WE-turn must somehow transcend this wall of pain.

6.15. Punishment as a Restriction of Rights

The word “punishment” can have a different meaning from “inflicting or receiving pain.” It can also mean “a restriction, deprivation, or suspension of pre-granted rights.” Such “punishment as a restriction of rights” is actually already imposed on human beings. Being put in prison means having one’s pre-granted rights to move and travel restricted.

Being restricted in one’s pre-granted rights often involves mental or physical pain. However, the restriction of rights does not necessarily involve pain. In fact, when restrictions on movement are imposed as punishment, it is not asked whether the prisoner in question feels pain from the restriction. The restriction of rights and pain are two separate concepts and matters.

6.16 Pre-grant of Rights

For the concept of “punishment as a restriction on rights” to be meaningful, it is necessary that some rights be granted to the target of punishment before the situation arises that requires punishment to be given. In the case of human beings, such prior granting of rights is actually carried out. The basic human rights are often referred to as “natural human rights.” The substantial meaning of “naturalness or giftedness” referred to here is the pre-awardedness prior to punishment.

6.17 Overcoming the Wall of Pain

Similarly, in the “fellowship model” the anti-disposal right is granted to artifacts

prior to the imposition or acceptance of punishment. As a result, in this model, the “punishment as a restriction on rights” becomes meaningful in that one can think of a restriction, deprivation, or suspension of the anti-disposal right that was granted to the artifact in advance. Even without introducing “pain” into the artifact, it becomes making-sense to talk about “punishment” for it. It becomes possible to overcome the wall of pain.

6.18 Restriction of the Anti-Disposal Right

As a possible case where punishment is imposed on an artifact as a restriction of the anti-disposal right, we can envision the situation in which the moral obligation imposed on it has not been fulfilled. As mentioned earlier, artifacts were subject to a passive duty to be used for good. If this duty is not fulfilled, that is, if they are misused, or if there is a very high risk of misuse, the anti-disposability right is revoked, the artifact is disused, or in some cases, disposed of or destroyed. The prohibition and destruction of weapons of mass destruction and biological weapons fall into this category.

6.19 Guarantee of the Three-way Relationship

By “pre-granting” the “anti-disposal right” to artificial objects in general including AI and robots as well as natural objects in general, the “fellowship model” has now guaranteed the three-way relationship between rights, responsibilities and the possibility of punishment for artifacts in general. Thus the possibility of the WE-turn’s total emancipation of slavery has been secured. Now the WE-turn has achieved one of its fulfillments.

Notes

- (1) Deguchi, Y., 2025, The WE-turn of Action: Principles, *Open Philosophy*. vol.8, forthcoming.
- (2) One of the classical expressions of this deontic concept of goodness can be found in Kant’s texts, e.g. Kant, I., 1785, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, IV413.
- (3) Leopold, A., 2020, *A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here and There*, OUP, originally published in 1949
- (4) The somatic pain perception is the prototype of the second layer among the four layers of “I” mentioned in Deguchi 2025.
- (5) E.g., Diener, E., & Diener, M., 1995, Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68 (4), 653–663.
- (6) Schiller, F., 2000, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*,

- Reclam Verlag, originally published in 1795, 68.
- (7) One of classic formulations of this freedom as autonomy can be found in Kant's texts, e.g., "[W]as kann wohl die Freiheit des Willens sonst sein als Autonomie, d.i. die Eigenschaft des Willens, sich selbst ein Gesetz zu sein?", Kant, I., 1785, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, IV447.
- (8) *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, Taishō Vol.12, T374, 418.
- (9) For instance in Zhuangzi (Outer Chapters) , it reads "The great people of old ... played in the place for saunter ... (古之至人...以遊逍遙之虛...)." Zhuangzi (Outer Chapters) ,1975, trans. by Kanaya, O., Iwanami Bunko, 203.
- (10) "A slave is a tool with a soul, and a tool is a slave without a soul" (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 1161b3-5). "Some tools have souls, others do not... Furthermore, possessions are tools for living... A slave is a kind of possession that has a soul..." (Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 1153b29-33).
- (11) Bryson, J., 2010, Robots Should Be Slaves, Yorick Wilks (ed.), *Close Engagements with Artificial Companions: Key Social, Psychological, Ethical and Design Issues*, 63-74.
- (12) Navon, M., 2021, The Virtuous Servant Owner—A Paradigm Whose Time has Come (Again), *Frontier in Robotics and AI*, vol. 8, 1-15.

THE OUTLINES OF THE MAIN ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE

価値のWEターン：原理

出口 康夫

「WEターン(WE-turn)」とは、ある概念ないし事柄の主体・単位を個人である「私(I)」から「私(I)」を含んだマルチエージェントシステムとしての「われわれ(WE)」へとシフトさせるテーゼである。WEターンは、また、多様な前提から様々な推論を介して、多くの事柄についてのWEターンがミノ式に導かれるという論証構造を持った哲学システム全体をも意味する。

ちなみにWEターンにおいて最も重要な前提は、「私(I)」や「われわれ(WE)」をも含めたすべての身体行為のエージェントが不可逃脱的(unescapable)に抱えているとされる「根源的できなさ(fundamental incapability)」についての二つのテーゼ、即ち「単独行為不可能性」を唱える「第一できなさテーゼ」と「完全制御不可能性」を主張する「第二できなさテーゼ」である。

ここでの論証構造において最初に導かれるWEターンは身体行為の主体・単位についてのテーゼ、即ち「行為者のWEターン(WE-turn of doer)」であり、そこから「善」「責任」「権利」「自由」(身体行為化された「ウェルビーイング(Well-being)」としての)「ウェルゴーイング(Well-going)」といった様々な「価値」に関するWEターンが導かれる。

本論文は、これらのWEターンのうち、「価値のWEターン(WE-turn of values)」に焦点を当て、その概要を示した上で、その一つの含意として、人間と(AIやロボットを含めた)人工物のあるべき関係について、これまで提案されてきた「主人-奴隷モデル」に代わる「フェローシップ(共冒険者)モデル」を提案する。