



Gabriel Kolko. *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace*.
London: Routledge, 1997, 190p.

This book undoubtedly appeals to those who lament the demise of socialist economics in Vietnam as well as to the critics of a market economy. However, the supporters of *doi moi*, both within Vietnam and without, will find the author's anti-market philosophy objectionable and his analyses of economic change since the inception of the new policy confused or wrong. But they will find the part of the book dealing with anti-market forces extremely useful.

The major strength of this book is the author's knowledge of Vietnam, built over the past three decades. As an anti-war activist during the Vietnam War, he began visiting North Vietnam and got to know its leaders. However, since Vietnam opted out for a market economy about a decade ago, a decision he deplores, his relations with Vietnamese leadership seems to have become distant, but he has kept himself informed on them through mass media and his personal networks with the Vietnamese who share his socialist ideals. One of his interesting revelations is that in 1996, out of the eighteen Politburo members, only four were clearly identified with the market. The six members from the army and police were against it, and the rest went along with them on economic issues (p. 147).

According to the author, there are a few forces working against the present *doi moi* policy. One is public anger over leadership corruption which has arisen under this policy. He describes the pervasive influence of corruption as follows.

Corruption is becoming the scourge of the party and therefore the nation, depriving the leaders of the obedience they covet and making

it impossible to attain any type of rational, durable economy. It is now systematic and it has made access to political and state power, not creative economic entrepreneurship, the principal determinant of who becomes rich and, above all, how they do so. (p. 78)

Nepotism, probably even more than in China, has been the single most important (but certainly not the only) mechanism since the mid-1980s in defining the way the "market" is replacing the "socialist" economy. (p. 122)

The problem of corruption began as early as the 1950s. Under *doi moi* policy, corruption meant money. Before that policy, however, since there was not much money going around, corruption took the form of nepotism in cadre recruitment, promotion and educational opportunities.

The party after 1954 created a system that was both organized and informal for retaining social and political power in the hands of its original members, their families, and their descendants. The majority of the advanced educational opportunities were reserved for their children, and the second and third generations who eventually took over were qualified far less by their technical, bureaucratic competence, in the formally neutral Weberian sense, than by their social and family ties, which became a prerequisite for entering the bureaucracy. They were trained, of course, but this system gave mediocrity and nepotism a decisive preference over talent. When joining the party, children and siblings of existing members were admitted without investigation, and naturally they swelled its ranks. Separate schooling encouraged intermarriage, and the party in most locations, especially urban, is a distinct social, educational, and political caste. (pp. 121-122)

The corrupt leaders are, for example, party cadre at the village level who took advantage of land redistribution; urban party leaders who collaborate with businessmen (particularly in Ho Chi Minh City) in bending rules and stripping public property for them; Politburo members who promote market reform and unconscionably enrich themselves. Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, their leader, was publicly accused of corruption via his wife by his former boss Nguyen Van Linh (who promoted market reform under his prodding) (p. 141). Such a pervasive image of corruption has created many critics of *doi moi* policy.

The second source of anti-market forces is the intellectuals who share the socialist ideals with the author and lament the reemergence of the ills of capitalism the Communist Party fought to eradicate (p. 128). The market economy and capitalism refer to the same economic system which the Party wanted to destroy. By calling it a market economy (which, the author says, is “a euphemism for capitalism”: p. 13), the Party cannot change its nature: such ills as a class society are reemerging. The only way to restore the credibility of the Party, they argue, is to renounce *doi moi* and go back to a centrally planned economy. If market reformers argue that a planned economy did not work in the past, they would say that was because it was not given a real chance: the Vietnamese economy was too decentralized for central planning to work (p. 67). Many of these intellectuals belong to the party theoretical institute (the author does not say which institute, p. 130) and express themselves relatively freely through the media they control.

The third source of opposition is the army (and police). Of the three sources, it is the army which puts muscle into opposition. The author does not make it very clear why the army is against market reform. There is some discussion on this (e.g. pp. 131-132), but something seems to be missing. The author explains the army's opposition as follows.

There was nothing in the army's past that hinted they might challenge civilian authority, but *doi moi* severely tried them all personally. Apart from the way it neglected millions of veterans and their families, reform ruthlessly cut military pay to well below that of production and administrative workers. Career officers' pensions, in particular, were gutted, compelling many of them to remain beyond their twenty-five-year service obligation. Some were faced with up to fifteen or more years of additional duty. If anything could arouse their opposition, this was it. (p. 131)

Clearly, the material threat posed by *doi moi* to the army was an important reason for its opposition, but a much deeper reason seems to be involved. As the author says, the structure which was suited for winning a war became “counterproductive the moment it ended” (p. 148). The army was a very important part of the old structure. Even in postwar years, it played an important role for some time, for what had been won in the war had to be consolidated and the military situation in Cambodia stabilized. But over time, especially by the late 1980s when Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Cambodia, economic reconstruction had taken top priority, and the unproductive army became a burden. So the trend was to diminish the army's role as well as its budget. The author tends to emphasize the latter as the reason for its opposition, but the former seems to have been equally (if not more) important.

Certainly, the army's opposition is opportunistic, since it is the power, not ideology, that it is defending; but it commands a great weight when it wants to act politically: after all, a large number of soldiers died or were hurt in fighting for the socialist goals (the number of soldiers killed on the Communist side alone is estimated to have been around 900,000), so that the army is in a better position to question, if it wants to, why it is

necessary to adopt a market economy which negates such goals. The market reformers cannot offer a good explanation without calling into question the fundamental premises of Communist ideology. Besides, the army could rely on nationalistic sentiments by insinuating that the market reformers, who have to be internationally oriented because open economic policy is an important part of market reform, were the lackeys of the very imperialists the Vietnamese had fought against. When the "imperialist elements" such as the IMF and the World Bank request painful economic adjustment, anti-foreign sentiments win the hearts of many people, who suffer the consequences.

This is not the place to criticize the author's anti-market philosophy. To do so would take much space and not yield anything particularly new. The positive side of this book for the market-oriented economists is, as pointed out above, that it makes them reflect on the problems of market reform in Vietnam. Let me recapitulate by putting them in a comparative perspective. One problem is shared with China which, like Vietnam, promotes a market economy while retaining the Communist ideology: it is how to appease the opponents who argue validly that a market economy negates the basic tenets of Communism. Market reformers are vulnerable to the counterattacks of the old guard. The second is unique to Vietnam. Because it fought a long, difficult war, the army became a powerful organization, and it does not want to give up power when national priorities do not require it anymore. But by saying that the party is "on the verge of disappearing in all but name" (p. 165), the author seems to imply that market reformers will eventually win out. Even so, one wonders how fast (or slow) the pace of reform will be. But will the army really lose out? If so, what market forces will defeat it? Will money be a solution? These questions should be kept in mind in observing the future evolution of Vietnam.

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Henk Schulte Nordholt. *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics 1650-1940*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996, 389p.

呪文に憑りつかれたごとく権力が作用するその過程を正確に綴ること、それを目指したハンク・シュルト・ノルドホルトによる *The Spell of Power* が分析の対象にすえるのは、バリの王国のひとつムンウィの歴史である。王家の歴史を記したバリ側の文書から宣教師、貿易商人、旅行者、植民地政府の文書などヨーロッパ側の文書を踏破し、そのうえで自ら1年あまりのバリでの調査を行い、このオランダ人の著者は17世紀半ばの勃興からオランダの植民地体制が終結するまでこのヌガラがたどった「集団の伝記」を記述している。

文書資料への忠誠をつくすあまり、出来事の経過を単調に並べることに終始するきらいのあるオランダ人によるインドネシア歴史研究のなかで、この書物は明確な問題意識と事態をくっきりとした輪郭のなかに浮かびあがらせる記述力を持っている。一方、語られる事の経緯はわかりやすい枠組みへの還元を拒むきわめて錯綜したものであり、バリのヌガラがたどった歴史の複雑さを著者は描きえている。明解さと複雑さという両立し難いこのふたつの側面の記述を均衡を保ちつつ組織しえた繊細さこそ、この本の最大の価値であり、この本を読むおもしろさである。

希有のともいってもよいこの価値に著者がたどりつけたのは、手堅い事実関係の把握とともに王国論への反省にある。バリの歴史研究はもとより、王国論こそ彼の書物が貢献する分野であるわけだが、次のように従来の研究を整理して、自らの分析が依拠する立場を著者は明確に位置づけている。

ヨーロッパとアジアの出会いのなかで、王国のあまりの複雑さを前に、オリエンタリストたちが下した解決は彼らの歴史を静的なヴィジョンに吸収することであった。進歩なき停滞ないしは墮落の結果としてアジアの歴史を見るか、専制的な君主たる王が東洋的な搾取を企て、哀れな村落の民がそれに従っていると見るか、そのいずれかであった。植民地統治を正当化しながらアジアの歴史を代表=表象するこのヨーロッパ人による歴史観に反省が加えられは