
Kyoto University
Economic Review

MEMOIRS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
IN
THE IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY OF KYOTO

VOLUME X
1935

PUBLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF ECONOMICS IN
THE IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY OF KYOTO

AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POWER

I

What does "social power" or, more simply, "power" mean? The adjective "social" merely means "between men" or "among the people." Accordingly, power, as I use the word here, does not imply mere individual effort, potentiality or ability. It means the ability of a certain person or group of persons to act, in some way or other, on another person or group of persons. How, then, ought this action to be interpreted? On this point, opinions may differ.

Power means the ability of one subject to act in any way on another. This is the concept of power as it is viewed from the standpoint of the first-mentioned acting subject. When we view the same circumstance in the light of a mutual relationship—one side acting and the other side being acted upon—we are dealing with relations of power. In other words, when we refer to relations of power, it means that the same circumstance is viewed in the light of a mutual relationship; and when we speak of power, we are dealing with that side only which acts on the other. A relation of power, if viewed from one angle, means a relationship of superiority or higher status, while from the opposite angle, it means a relationship of subordination.

What action is it, then, which is under discussion? It is the action, conscious or unconscious, of one subject to influence the will of another subject in the direction of its own will; it is, so to speak, the action to shape the will of others. Power is thus no other than the ability to shape the will of others in the direction of one's own will. If it is obedience that one allows one's will to be determined by others, power means the ability to gain obedience. This

ability does not, however, represent empty probability. It is an ability which is based on a mutual emotional attitude¹⁾, or, in other words, a capacity embodying mutual preparation. "The determination of will" requires some analytic explanation. The will of others can be determined in two ways—one positive and the other negative. One method is to direct the will of others in such a way that it does not take any definite shape. This is, in a sense, an attempt to make others abstain from offering resistance to the execution of one's own will. It is to keep others from having the will to resist, or, in case they have such a will, to make them give it up. The other method is to cause others to have a will exactly such as one dictates. That is to say, they are sometimes required to leave their will indefinite, and at other times are required to shape it in a certain definite way. In the latter case, the requirement is not negative, but positive. When the requirement is thus positive, the will of others is dictatorially commanded to conform with the prescribed form. We have a typical case of the will of others under dictation where the relations inherent in ruling operate.

Now, let me examine representative theories on the nature of power. To quote Friedrich von Wieser, to begin with. Wieser, citing Spinoza's interpretation, contends that power means control over human sentiment. He says that the power of a man over his friend or the power of a man over one whom he loves which is nothing other than a kind of power in society, operates through the medium of sentiment. Legal power, the power of faith and knowledge, and moral power are all nothing more than pressure operating on sentiment. Even external power, such as military force, is no exception to the rule. It constitutes power for no other reason than that it controls the sentiment of the people by oppressing them, Wieser says²⁾. Is this interpretation of power acceptable, however? In my opinion, it is wrong to

1) Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 28.

2) Wieser, *Gesetz der Macht*, 1926, p. 5.

regard power as control over human sentiment. It will be impossible even for a despot or a conqueror to control the sentiment of his rebellious subjects or that of a conquered people who are bitter against him because of his despotic authority or his armed forces. In such cases, control over sentiment is impossible, though nobody will deny that the despot or the conqueror has mighty power. Control over the sentiment of other is very remarkable when, for instance, a very able actor is performing before an audience or when a beautiful woman is in the company of her admirers. Such an actor or beautiful woman will be able to excite in his audience or in her admirers any sentiment that he or she likes. But in such cases, we do not say that his or her social power is strong.

To translate von Wieser's words "die Herrschaft über das menschliche Gemüt" into "control over sentiment" is, perhaps, to put too narrow an interpretation on its meaning. He interprets internal power as "die Beziehung auf das Gemüt, auf das seelische Fühlen und Wollen."³⁾ Anyhow, it is indisputable that control over sentiment forms the nucleus of Wieser's concept of power.

Now as to Max Weber's concept of power, which has fairly wide support. According to him, power (Macht) covers all possibilities or capabilities (die Chance) of carrying out one's will in social relations in the face of opposition.⁴⁾ Ruling (Herrschaft), as against power, has attributes calling for more definite definition. Ruling is the ability to secure obedience to order. Weber's theory is open to criticism on the following several points. In the first place, the capacity he describes is not really one based on social relations. Social power must necessarily be based on social relations, and must consequently represent some definite adaptations or attitudes on the part of the individuals concerned. Next, whereas control (die Herrschaft) must be one form of power or one special manifestation of power, the connection between

3) op. cit., p. 5.

4) Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 28.

the two is not clearly defined. If ruling implies obedience, power must also rest on obedience. In Weber's theory, however, power is defined without reference to obedience, that is, the attitude of those on whom it operates: it is defined by exclusive reference to attitude of the acting subject. It is true that Weber's theory is free from the objection to which von Wieser's theory—which makes sentiment the centre of the concept of power—is open, but it is impossible to accept his contention that the action of power lies in its triumph over resistance. In the case of the so-called internal power (*innere Macht*), the party on whom power acts rather voluntarily desires the execution of his will on the part of the subject acting with power. In this instance, there is no resistance whatever. (The execution of one's will where there is no resistance is a thing of common occurrence between individuals who are on an equal footing). To define power as the ability to carry out one's will in the face of opposition is to put too narrow a construction on power. External power (*äussere Macht*) may be explained in this way, but not other power. Oppenheimer puts a narrow interpretation on the term "in social relations", in this case to attempt to exclude relations of military force, pure and simple.⁵⁾ Some other scholars interpret power in a more or less analogous manner. If, however, social relations are to be regarded as relations between men, that is, human relationship, it cannot be simple "relationship between things" (*Sachverhältnis*)—as Vierkandt named it—which exists where military force is used. No matter how intense mutual antagonism and hatred is, what exists there is always the relationship between men, not that between men and things. In the social relation, both sides are necessarily capable of understanding each other's sentiment, and each cannot help but treat the other as man. This is true even of what is called exogenous military force (*die exogene Gewalt*).⁶⁾ Suppose that one group of people resorts to military force against another for

5) Oppenheimer, *Machtverhältnis*. *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, p. 338.

6) *op. cit.*, p. 341.

conquest, there will still exist between them an understanding of some sort, and social contact though antagonism will be possible. It is, even in such circumstances, impossible to say that social relations are entirely absent. Further, suppose that one group uses military force against another. This military force is not the force of a synthetic community embracing these two groups, nor has it any foundation in such a community. It is, in a sense, exogenous armed force whereby the group may be conquered. Seeing, however, that the relations of these groups are, after all, relations between men, the military force in question cannot be regarded as a force existing outside social relations. From this point of view, the modifications or amendments which Oppenheimer attempts to make to Weber's concept of power can not be admitted. The same thing may be said of the restrictions which Simmel sets on mutuality in regard to mental interaction and Vierkandt in regard to social relationship.⁷⁾

Let me proceed to consider various forms or kinds of social power.

II

In considering the various forms which social power takes, it is necessary, to begin with, to make clear the distinction between social power and social pressure or social coercion. The latter may simply be termed social force. For society (society in its totality is meant here, and perhaps the term community, used by McLver, can be substituted for it) to be maintained and kept in existence, pressure of some kind or other must be exerted on its members, and the activity of individuals must needs be regulated so that it may be directed towards a certain goal fixed by society itself.

7) Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 2. ed. 1928, p. 169, 280.

Simmel tried to exclude some case of coercion from the sphere of the social (*seelische Wechselwirkung*), because of the fact that the oppressed can not react on the oppressor in any way. The same line of thinking can be traced in the thought of Vierkandt who, going further, has given systematic treatment, on the so-called „*Sachverhältnis*.“ Simmel, *Soziologie*, 1908, p. 135.

This pressure, of course, takes a variety of forms and is achieved by various means, legal, moral, conventional, or religious. This pressure is sometimes entirely anonymous and impersonal. Anonymity here means that pressure is not ordered, forced or supported by any particular person or persons, but is exerted merely as a public or popular requirement. Most manners and customs fall into this category. Sometimes the content of social pressure or coercion requires amenability to the will of a certain specified individual or group for the sake of the personality of the latter, and sometimes it requires not obedience to the will of any person but observance of the objective regulation fixed beforehand. When the latter is the case, we say that pressure is imposed impersonally. Social pressure is sometimes exerted denominatively, that is, *by* or in the name of the ruler or in that of the State, and personally, that is, *for* some persons explicitly.⁸⁾ In any case, all kinds of restraints or norms destined to maintain society constitute social pressure. Some forms of this pressure, irrespective of the anonymity or otherwise of its supporters, are personal, when, viewed with regard to the content, they are destined to secure subordination. The reverse side of submission or obedience to this personal social pressure forms the social power of the person in question. Of course, if some part of social pressure, though existent as fact, is not yet given the form of norm, for example as content of customs, morals or laws, social power which is dependent on it, can hardly be said to be supported by social norms. It must then be regarded as merely supported by social pressure *de facto*.

Of all forms of social pressure, the only one which constitutes social power is that which is attributable to a certain specified person, that is, which implies subordination to the person specified. If the former or the social pressure itself can be called "social force" (in the sense of power pertaining to society), the latter or the social power may

8) Wieser, *Recht und Macht*, 1910, p. 8.

well be called personal power in the sense that it belongs to that person. Social power in this sense may be classified in a variety of ways from various points of view. Firstly, it may be divided into internal and external power. In this regard, Wieser's interpretation deserves notice. He says that arms and fortifications are means of power (*Machtmittel*), not power itself. Those who make use of these means possess external power. External power means control over sentiment by the instrumentality of external means of power.⁹⁾ On the other hand, internal power means direct control over the sentiment of people in society, without the help of external means of power. The power of laws, morals, faith, knowledge, currents of thought, movements and conventions and customs, in which the potency of moving human sentiment is recognised falls under this category.¹⁰⁾ Of these two, it often appears that external power alone represents power, because its action is particularly visible. As a matter of fact, however, it is internal power, which is really fundamental. It is internal power which determines to whom a definite external means of power, should belong and for whose benefit it should be employed, and accordingly to whom the external power expressed by such external means belongs. Take, for instance, the case of the power of the conquerors in a conquered State, he goes on. It is a conglomeration of internal powers (*die innere Machtaggregat*), united by the national sentiment (*Volksgefühl*) of the conquerors, which can oppress the conquered people. It is internal powers, naïve though they are, which make up their solid association. The increase of the powers of conquerors means that their internal power gets infiltrated into the conglomeration of external powers of the conquered to serve the purpose of the conquerors.¹¹⁾ In line with my criticism of Wieser's interpretation as so far given, I may say that when Wieser describes external

9) Wieser, *Gesetz der Macht*, p. 5; ditto, *Recht und Macht*, p. 10.

10) Wieser, *Gesetz der Macht*, p. 4-5.

11) *op. cit.*, p. 6-7.

power as personal and internal power as impersonal, he is contrasting two things which cannot be contrasted. For even external power must be impersonal when it cannot be attributed to, or cannot belong to a person, while internal power includes something personal, seeing that the spontaneous obedience of people constitutes very often the superior positions of some persons. What Wieser describes as internal power is, after all, nothing but a kind of social pressure, to which reference has already been made. It means coercion (untrainte) which Durkheim mentions as a characteristic or social phenomena.¹²⁾ Accordingly Wieser's external power is to be reconstrued as external social pressure, which is nothing but social pressure through the instrumentality of external means.

Now, let the study be confined to social power, that is, power attributed to a certain specified person or a group of persons. This power can also be divided into internal and external power, while power, in this case, means the ability to determine the will of other subjects as explained above. The obedience, which is nothing else than this capability viewed from the standpoint of the other party, may be spontaneous. In other words, power may be founded on something internal. To give another expression to the same fact, obedience may be based on morality or customs or it may proceed spontaneously from a sense of respect. On the other hand, it may also be due to external coercion. In this case, power may be said to have an external basis. No matter how it is founded, power operates to determine the will of the party on whom it is brought to bear. If necessary in the fulfilment of this function, power can take various forms of outward expression.

One form of coercion it takes is military force. This force finds expression in the form of exacting obedience from those who refuse to obey, by dint of the external means of those who vow allegiance. Another form is spiritual

12) Durkheim, *Règles de la méthode sociologique*, sixième éd. 1912, p. 8.

restraint. This restraint operates either as suasion or as pressure, and consequently must be interpreted as having two sides, positive and negative. It forcibly shapes the will of others in a certain fixed direction by giving spiritual pleasure or pain such as honour, censure of disgrace. Further, there is material or economic restraints or sanctions, which has also two sides, positive and negative, that is to give material interest or to deprive of it. Thus viewed, it will be seen that military force does not in itself signify the fact of being obeyed, which means social power itself. It is merely one form of the action of this power. It is accordingly only one partial power or one form of partial expression of power. This proposition also applies to the power of wealth, which is economic by nature. It may be mentioned, however, that these things do not represent the form of action peculiar to the personal power or social power under discussion. Social pressure in general takes such forms of operation also. Especially spiritual restraint makes a particularly powerful form of operation in customs and morality.

Be the matter what it may, this form of the expression of social power brings into being a new power externally grounded. By a process which I have no time to describe in detail here, external power settles and crystallises into internal power. Consider the commonplace experience that a fact which has a definite cause becomes not seldom a custom after continued repetition. In its turn internal power furnishes a basis for the new external power, which, again in turn, transforms itself into internal power. In this way, power has a tendency to grow of itself. This is what I once called the law of the acceleration of power.

Social power is also divided into endogenic and exogenic. Whether it is the former or the latter depends on whether the power which is exerted on a certain group or its members has its foundation in this partial society, that is, whether the power is based on the obedience of the component members of this group or not. For instance, if a

State is composed of a number of different groups (for example, nations) and its authority is upheld chiefly by the unity of one of these component groups, this State power must, on the whole, be regarded by the other component group as exogenic power. On the contrary, where the members of one religious body are subject to the power of their religious body to the social power of a person who represents it, they are controlled by endogenic power. Power of internal origin (or endogenic power) and internal power are not necessarily correlated ideas, since power of internal origin in a partial society is not always internal power; the former may spring up as external power based on mutual armed compulsion between its component members. Furthermore, it may sometimes exert pressure from without, as a united power on an outside partial society. In this case, this power is an exogenic one for the outside society. Whether any particular social power is exogenic or endogenic depends on the degree or state of the association existing between the party which exerts power and the other party over which it is exerted. Even where A exerts its power over B, if A and B are so closely united that they may be regarded as forming one complete whole between them, A's power, if rightly thought to be supported by B, is not exogenic power for B. Otherwise, it is power of external origin.

III

Next, let me divide social power according to the form of its distribution. Society in its totality contains a number of partial societies,¹³⁾ and each partial society plays its part in the distribution of social power. Here, however, attention will primarily be directed to the distribution of power by the State, which is the most important of all. And then, the effects of the distribution of power by other partial societies will be considered. In this way, it is hoped the distribution of social power in actual life may be better explained.

13) McIver, *Community*, 1920, p. 138 et seq.

Since the functions of a State consist primarily in the defence of society, it must be provided with effectual means of defence against both internal and external opponents. This necessity leads it to demand the utmost obedience from its members, the obedience secured being formed into definite organisation. This organised obedience, as organised power, forms the State-power. The power thus concentrated in the possession of the State is distributed in a variety of ways, so that the power distributed goes to constitute the social power of each subject. To distribute power means to aid and protect each subject in the execution of its own will. Firstly, it is distributed according to functions. The State has many organs so that it may fulfil its functions. Those who operate as these organs, that is, the component parts of these organisations are given powers according to the functions which they are called upon to perform. These powers are regarded as belonging, to a certain extent, to the subject who discharges the appointed duties. To what extent it is so regarded depends, of course, on the degree of complexity in social circumstances. Where social life is extremely intellectualised and everything is subjected to a rational analysis, people will consider these two things as separate entities, in the consciousness that the subject concerned is given power by virtue of the official function which he is called upon to perform as an organ of society and that this power does not belong to him personally. Thus, in such a society functional power will not impress people as a thing belonging to an individual. This is especially so, if the term of office is limited and the occupant of the office is chosen by election. The extent to which the social life is rationalized being abstracted, the more inseparable the connection between the function and functioning members, the more liable is functional power to be regarded as the personal power of the individual who exercises it.¹⁴⁾ Setting apart this phase of the problem, the strength of functional

14) Simmel, *Soziologie*, 1908, p. 181, 569.

power depends on the extent to which public interests are affected by the manner of its exercise. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to say that the personal power derived from the functionally distributed power or pressure is of varying strength according to the position of function in the hierarchic system of organization exercising the State power.

A State also distributes power extra-functionally. In other words, it confers a certain position or status on some members according to their qualification and without regard to their function, though the distribution of function is influenced by the positions of members. To give a position to a person means to give a certain social power irrespective of his function and merit as if it were his own possession. He enjoys, so to speak, the protection of the State in a larger measure than other people do. That is to say, a privilege in a wide sense is bestowed on him. The privileges thus given may be of varying kinds. (1) A certain kind of authority which can be exercised over an extensive area or over an extensive sphere of social life is sometimes bestowed on persons, as witness the position of feudal lords, the conquering class in a conquest state, or in some cases, the religious aristocracy. (2) Special marks of honour (which serve to indicate the standards of obedience on the part of the members of society) or special rights are sometimes conferred on persons. The position of the present-day peers who are denuded of authority owes its existence to this cause. (3) In some cases, economic wealth may be conferred.

I have, now, reached a stage in my discourse at which I must consider the distinction between the original social power and the derived social powers.

Social power as the capacity to compel obedience is distributed in various forms, a circumstance which brings into being what may be called derived social powers. In some cases, the power conferred may be all-embracing in its sphere of operation, as, for example, the power which feudal lords possessed. In other cases, it may be functional power or the power possessed by the functioning agent, the

scope of the operation of which is confined to certain spheres of life. In some other cases, power may be certain rights which are possessed as positions and which are fixed in the degree and scope of their operation. In these latter cases, power is partial, since it means a chance or possibility which can compel obedience from others within specified limits, in regard to certain matters, and to a certain limited extent. In short, the derived powers which I have explained above are divided into those mentioned below. While, on the one hand, (A) comprehensive power as an authority is derived and maintained by the conferring of some parts of State-power, (B) partial powers as functional powers, which are concerned with certain specified functions, are also, on the other hand, conferred by the State on some individuals. (C) In addition to these, there are other partial powers in regard to special positions. (α) When honour or a special right is conferred, the position which enjoys it partakes of the nature of one derived partial power. (β) The wealth which is bestowed and protected by it (as, for instance, the stipends of feudal lords or the present-day salaries, though not any and every sort of wealth) forms a sort of partial power too, since, being guaranteed by State-power, it ensures obedience of some kind on the part of other constituent members of society.

{ Original power				
{ Derived power	{ All-embracing power			
	{ Partial power	{ Functional power		
		{ Positional power	{ Privileges (honour)	
			{ Economic power	
			(such as is distributed by central authority).	

These are social powers ramifying from State-power. The State not only distributes derived powers by its authority but makes the distribution of some kinds of power possible or helps in their distribution, though indirectly. I mean that as the private property system is maintained by the State, it makes it possible or inevitable for wealth to be distributed under the working of this system, though it does not undertake the distribution of wealth directly. In what

sense, then, does wealth constitute a kind of social power? On the one hand, wealth commands obedience, in a negative way, so that since it is placed in the hands of a limited number of people, it is protected from encroachment on the part of other members of society, while, on the other hand, it commands obedience in a positive way so that wealth makes all people who are in pursuit of wealth bow to the will of those who are in possession of it. Thus, there exists a sort of conditional obedience. In this sense, the possession of wealth forms a kind of partial social power, which either concentrates or dissipates in changing hands in the process of the free transactions of individuals under conditions recognised by the State. As the power of the wealth acquired in this way is brought into being independently of the will of the State. Though it presupposes the State-power as its prerequisite, it forms a kind of "wild-grown" power¹⁵⁾, if the power which is directly distributed by the will of an organisation called the State can be termed "public-grown" power.

Society in its totality contains a number of partial societies, and it is hardly necessary to say that the State occupies the central position among them. In the present state of civilised countries at least, the State is the decisive factor in the distribution of social power. At the same time, the fact must not be ignored that power is also distributed by partial societies other than the State. It is true that the Church, which competed with the State for the ruling position in the medieval age, has lost a considerable part of its influence to-day, but it, together with trade unions and other organizations, still wields no negligible sway over the distribution of power. How is social power distributed by these partial societies?

Partial societies, be they religious bodies, trade unions, co-operative societies or other associations, are internally organized, and perform their functions through the activity of their organs. These associations vary in the degree of

15) „die wildgewachsene Macht“ in the sense used by Wieser.

power they possess according to the sphere of life with which they are concerned, and according to the attitude adopted by the State towards them, but the fact always remains that they possess power in a greater or lesser degree. Towards the association which they make up, its component units stand in a relationship of subordination. The more an association partakes of the nature of community (*Gemeinschaft*),¹⁶⁾ the stronger is also the power of this group; while the weaker the control of the State, the stronger the obedience and power in like manner. In practically the same manner as in the case of the State, the functional and positional distribution of power is carried out by the authority which has its foundation in one association.

One who is responsible for the performance of any function in a partial society possesses power because of his function. The strength of his power varies according to the degree of authority of the association, which will be determined by the nature of the sphere of life which it controls. For instance, in the case of the Church of old days, sacerdotal power, which was in rivalry with secular power, not only occupied a position powerful enough so over-rule the State but even wielded secular power to a certain extent. The power distributed functionally by the Church must, then, have been as strong as that distributed by the State. It is not altogether impossible for a situation analogous to this to arise in the event of the power of trade unions growing in consequence of their development. As the State has become modernised, however, the functions of the State have gradually increased, while the sphere over which the power of a partial society holds sway has steadily diminished. As already mentioned, a partial society not only distributes power functionally but undertakes the distribution of certain positions. How far it is capable of this, however, depends on the extent to which hierarchical or class principles are adopted in the organization of the association

16) in the sense used by Ferdinand Tönnies in his famous work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*.

concerned. An association which is organized on extremely democratic principles will not recognise any distribution of power other than functional, viz., the positional distribution of power. In the case of a church which has an organization similar to that of the State, various extra-functional positions will be recognised within it, and the power of the association itself will be brought to bear in compelling obedience. At any rate, associations other than the State perform both the functional and positional distribution of power among their component units, and the various powers thus distributed, which submit to and centre in their respective subjects, operate to determine the positions or powers of each person or group of persons in the society in its totality. There is one thing which must be mentioned in regard to the positional distribution of power by partial societies. Most partial societies will do nothing in the way of the positional distribution of power, in so far as the positional power is regarded as a sort of privilege given to some members of the society concerned. It is, however, not only possible but rather usual for a partial society to give help and protection to all its members. The closer the association, and especially the more it aims at the promotion of the class position of its component members, the more conspicuous is the power which these members derive from its protection, that is, the power which they exert on the outside world. This is a phenomenon which is widely observable when the positional power given by a partial society is taken to cover this extensive field.

It must, however, be remembered that there is, besides the above, social power which, lacking any fixed form, is fluid. This is a power which has nothing to do with any particular association and is consequently not supported by any organization. It has its foundation in traditions, customs or morals, or it grows out of new currents of thought. For instance, traditions or customs often condition the attitude to be adopted by the public towards men of certain pedigrees or lineage; they guarantee these people obedience of a cer-

tain degree on the part of the members of society. The position of feudal lords and even that of the present-day capitalists may be regarded as founded more or less on such a basis. Again, when there is the growth of social consciousness as evidenced by new currents of thought and new movements, there springs up on the one hand obedience to those who lead such social movements, and, moreover, on the other hand, value is upset, according to the nature of the new social consciousness, so that there come into being things which newly claim public regard, while some things which have so far commanded general respect fall into discredit. We have personally seen such things occur during the past twenty years in the attitude of the public towards landowners, capitalists and soldiers.

Let me add something to what I have already stated regarding the power of wealth. I have already referred to the wealth which is distributed by the State directly. Not only does the State itself distribute wealth consciously but it distributes it indirectly, as it were, by the act of protecting the ownership of each individual. By the exercise of its authority, the State protects the wealth possessed by the people as the result of the process of free transactions between individuals. Thus, the possession of wealth embodies a kind of negative power in that any attempt to encroach on it is suppressed by the State. Nor is this all. Wealth represents a sort of negative power in transactions between individuals. That is to say, the possessor of wealth can secure the obedience of others to a certain extent by dispensing his wealth. In this sense, wealth constitutes a means of securing external power and consequently internal power too in many cases. How far wealth can act as an instrumentality for the securing of obedience, however, depends on the type of social association, on the one hand, and on the state of the class relation on the other. In the present-day utilitarian (*gesellschaftlich*) society, there exists the simple wage relation (*Lohnverhältnis*), in which labour only, and no more than that, is offered in return for the money paid as

wages. This, of course, does not mean that internal power and intimate (*gemeinschaftlich*) social relations are entirely eliminated from the enterprise concerned and that management (*Betrieb*) is put on a purely contractual and equal footing. Where the social association is generally on the social lines of community (*Gemeinschaft*), a different state of things prevails. The offer of labour in return for the money and commodities given or the compensation offered by personal service in return for economic gifts of some form or other tends to give birth to a close and intimate social association, in which a relationship of subordination, that is, of master and servant, easily springs up. This is especially so, when the sway of the State authority declines and new relations of powerful control in some form or other develop in consequence (as is seen in the birth of feudalism). Thus, although wealth is in itself a power which is indirect and conditional, it can easily govern relations of direct power or relations of personal obedience, according to the circumstances of the society in which it moves. We see instances of wealth engendering obedience or position, where those who own cannot pay their debts are reduced to slavery or where those who own land, with tenant-farmers on it who are inseparably bound up with the land, become lords of the manor. Contrary cases are seen where people possessed of enormous wealth are looked down upon as being of low character or low in the social scale (as witness a state actually existing in some parts of China or one phase of life existing in the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan).

IV

In what relation, then, does the power under discussion stand to violence or military force (physical, coercive force)?

Hitherto, the authority of the State or society has, almost always, been regarded by scholars as synonymous with military force. Is this interpretation acceptable? In my analysis of social power in an earlier part of this essay, I divided

such power into three kinds. Power implies obedience on the part of those on whom it is exercised. There are two ways in which the subject secures obedience: he either captures it or he finds it. In the latter case, obedience is voluntarily offered to the subject who does not necessarily solicit it. In the former case, the subject is in a position to compel obedience by some means or other. In other words, the one is external power and the other internal power. Military or economic power belong to the former, while dignity (which means the state of being obeyed on account of superiority of personality, as, for example, authority, prestige or *charisma* (*Χάρισμα*) in the sense in which the term is used by Max Weber) belongs to the latter. So long as power is classified in this way, it is impossible to find place for authority in this classification, unless it is regarded in the same light as military force.

But can the State-power sometimes expressed as State-authority (and also the power belonging to any organized society itself) be identified with military force? Of course, authority can make use of military force, if necessary for coercive purposes. Is it, however, possible to say, conversely, that military force means State-power? Can the military force of the conqueror be rightly called State-authority from the point of view of the conquered? Can the violence of revolutionaries be properly termed State-authority? In an ideal government, no military force whatever would be necessary, and yet there would naturally operate the forces necessary for perfect rule. There is no question but that these forces constitute State-authority. It seems that State-power is that which, though it is not military force in itself, can put military force into operation, if the occasion demands it. Military force is not State-power, nor is State-power *per se* military force. State-power is often expressed in terms of military force (as, for instance, division of authority is denoted by the term *Gewaltenteilung*). This is a mistake, however. How, then, ought the relationship subsisting between these two things to be interpreted?

State-power, or to speak generally, society-power, may be said to consist in organized obedience of members. When a society comes to have organization, obedience, either to the society itself or to the central figure of the society, becomes organized. The strength of this obedience or the sphere of life involves varies, as already pointed out, according to circumstances. This authority can exact obedience from those who are under the obligation to obey, that is, those whom the society calls upon to obey. That this compulsion takes three different forms I have had occasion to mention already. One is military force. Here, the physical power of those who obey is utilised. This is a form of direct compulsion. The other two embody indirect compulsion. In those cases, obedience is exacted by either giving to or taking from individuals what they hold dear. Indirect compulsion falls into two different categories according as the things which these individuals hold dear are spiritual, such as privileges or honour, or material. Since compulsion always means a sort of external power, each of these three forms in which it operates may be taken to be a partial power. To illustrate this by an analogy provided by physics, when energy generates heat and light as the result of its partial action, either heat or light is regarded as partial energy.

Thus viewed, it will be seen that it is a mistake to regard military force as identical with State power. Military force is merely one mode of expression or one of the forms which State power takes when it operates (and this is also the form of the operation of social pressure in general, to which reference has already been made). It is always included in State power in a latent or potential state. In most cases, however, it does not adopt such a mode of expression. It fulfils the function of social control while operating as internal power. As another form in which State power operates, I referred above to economic power or wealth, but this does not apply to all economic power. As stated elsewhere, if private ownership is recognised by the State, each individual can dispose of his wealth according to his

own free will, and, through its disposal, he can demand obedience of some kind from those who profit by such disposal. It is only in the wealth which is distributed directly by the State that the operation of the State-power under discussion can be seen.

I have hitherto analysed the nature of social power. Now I will proceed to describe the way in which this power is distributed to the members of society in its totality.

V

Social power is distributed in two ways. In one case, it emanates from society, and in the other case, it comes from individuals. In the latter case, an individual, in his personal capacity, is obeyed directly by the other component members of society. That is to say, he possesses social power originally.¹⁷⁾ Not that society confers on one of its component members the power which it has commandeered for the purpose of ensuring its continued existence, but rather it is that power arises out of the individual capacity of the component members of society in their mutual relationship and is put in his hands. Of course, the power formed personally loses its original character when it comes to form the content of social institutions or social consciousness (as, for example, customs or morals). It then acquires the character of power emanating from, and conferred by, society.

Power emanating from society may be divided into two kinds. One is denominative (not anonymous); it is distributed in the name of a certain definite personality (as, for example, the State, the monarch, the church or the city). The other is anonymous; it is distributed, not in the name of any definite personality, but in the process of social interaction. The former type of power is subdivided into two—one being the power which is given to persons who perform

17) cf. Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 136.

certain functions because of those functions, and the other that which is given as the concomitant of a certain special position, regardless of functions. The one is distributed functionally, while the other is distributed extra-functionally. By the power which is given in the process of social interaction, I mean support by social consciousness such as customs, morals or public opinion, that is, protection by the interaction of individuals, not by any organization or organized groups such as corporations, churches, etc.

Social pressure which society in its totality requires for maintaining its own existence becomes social power when individuals participate in it, as I have already explained. In order to form a comprehensive idea of the distribution of social power, the nature of power emanating from individuals must be studied. This is the power which is given to a certain individual in his personal capacity by those around him, personally and differentially, so to speak, and not one which society confers on him. Here, I shall analyse the latter and then consider the nature of relations of power.

The power which is given to individuals by society, that is, the power which society distributes among its members, stands out conspicuously. But this is not the only social power; there is social power which emanates from, and is formed in, individuals as has been said above. But this kind of social power originating from individuals may of course, after taking its place in social consciousness, be transformed into power distributed by society. This is, however, irrelevant.

Each individual has his own ability. I do not mean his personal talent only, but also that ability which is due to the power distributed socially. Because this ability is respected (or held in contempt, in negative cases) in personal relationships, there comes about a relationship of super- and subordination. In a sense, a tendency to subordination naturally exists among the people, and it flows to the possessor of might, so that people hold in high regard a powerful man (a person who has a large potential capacity to enforce his demands). In this case, we say that such a person has

a certain dignity.¹⁸⁾ The extent to which dignity characterizes personal talent which is unaccompanied by social power varies according to the state of social organization. If the disparity between social classes is very great, dignity will attend social power almost exclusively, so that it may attend personal talent only slightly. In any case, individuals receive the regard due to their respective ability, and they will be assigned their respective positions in the hierarchy of values established on this basis. The viewpoint shared by the general public will eventually be incorporated in customs and morals. Where the public regard is not so strong as to be taken into such social norms, the dignity remains only fluid so to speak.

Personal dignity possessed by some person is of special distinction. Such dignity is what is commonly called authority or prestige according to its peculiar nuance. Among all kinds of dignity recognised in individuals on account of their ability, it seems proper to regard such dignity as one with a peculiar nuance, rather than as an isolated phenomenon.

Now, let me explain two groups of facts with special reference to this dignity. One refers to the positions of the people belonging to different categories of society (occupations, for instance), and the other concerns prestige, authority, etc. I shall first explain the former. We hear that in India hundreds of partial groups exist (or existed, at least) in the shape of different castes, with their respective social positions, high and low. This fact shows that in all societies there is a tendency for relations of social strata to appear, to a larger or lesser degree, if not in such a fixed shape as castes. The organization of castes in India seems to embody this tendency settled into fixed shape. A similar tendency appears to rule more or less even between labourers of all kinds who would appear, at first sight, to stand on exactly the same footing with one another. All occupations in all sections of society need talent, discipline and education peculiar to

18) I owe this term to James Mill; it was also used in Bouglé's "Essai sur le régime des castes" in the expression "dignité des professions."

themselves. They have different morals and customs. They are also accorded different traditional treatment and have different niveaux of property. People are prone to fix the degree of regard for each category or group, in due consideration of these facts, and their common appraisal becomes interwoven into customs or usage. When any change occurs in the power of any of these groups, this public estimation is subject to amendment, personally at first and then socially. For instance, changes in the thoughts of the times or in the requirements of society invest the activity of this or that occupation with special importance. In short each group carries its scale of public regard, as "a phenomenon of dignity," according to its ability, and these scales ultimately become interwoven into social consciousness. Such being the case, even in present-day society, in which there exists no system of fixed personal status and all people are accorded equal rights, members belonging to different categories or groups have their respective positions of power. These positions are not, of course, definitely fixed, and are subject to constant changes as social conditions alter, but at the same time the fact cannot be denied that they are traditional to a certain extent.

Some scholars (such as Gustav Schmoller) take the view that the scales in social estimation agree with social utilities of professions in the sense of satisfying social needs or demands, and that the former are determined by the latter, but this view is mistaken. It is true that according to the intensity of social utilities of services done, the respective degree of some social power is conferred on the members of each group (as witness the different incomes of various professional groups), nor can it be denied that the social power thus conferred affects the scales of respect, but in principle it is the strength of social power, not social utilities, which fixes the degree of respect accorded to each group. Even if it is granted that regard represents a sort of value phenomenon, its degree is not fixed by utilities, as I have had frequent occasion to point out in the past.

VI

Some dignity, as power emanating from individuals, is linked to superior individuality or eminent power. Such dignity is not possessed by any members of a certain group in common; it belongs to superior persons among them only. Prestige is one thing, and authority is another. Authority is defined as the confidence which others put in the belief that something objective lies in him. If the work done by a certain person in a cultural field is of a specially high order, when judged by an objective standard, he is trusted, apart from this or that work done. When people see that the will of a man in some powerful position always sets the rule by which all measures in society are framed, they become persuaded that he has something objective in him. In such cases, they recognise authority in him. Authority waits, in the first instance, on a high appraisal of value. For it, of course, spontaneous regard, and accordingly obedience, is shown. As authority waits on judgment of value, it is conditional to that extent, and it sometimes happens that a man with authority is criticised, if the surrounding conditions necessitate criticism. On the contrary, prestige is unconditional. The impression that a certain subject has incalculable ability and that his ability springs from sources which cannot be easily understood or grasped causes people to adopt towards him an attitude of unconditional subordination. This ability is, as already mentioned, social power possessed by an individual, on the one hand, and his personal cultural ability, on the other. Towards a man who has incomparably great authority or wealth, people feel a sort of awe. He strikes them even as something inviolable or sacred. The prestige of such a man issues from the incalculable amount of ability which is derived from the social power given to him. This phenomenon is observable not only in regard to the social power of a certain subject, as already explained, but in respect of the individual ability of some persons whose religious, martial, or other cultural or secular faculty is

supreme or stands so high that it is unattainable by common people. Because of their immeasurable ability, they become objects of subordination. Such subordination cannot be regarded as merely personal by nature. There is a tendency for the same respectful attitude adopted by the majority of the component members of society to stimulate even greater general regard until it develops into the content of social consciousness so that supreme social power is put in the hands of the possessor of prestige.

This tendency yields three results. (1) The upholders of the power distributed socially very often elevate its strength by this prestige. The action of this prestige makes the law of the acceleration of power operate more strongly. (2) Social power is sometimes distributed in accordance with rational principles and at other times it is distributed by the policy of class egoism. In so far as the mode of distribution is not affected by the principle of class egoism, men of ability are put in positions with important functions, so that, those in whom a certain prestige is socially recognised because of their ability can easily attain a leading position. In this way, power which attends on position and prestige which is possessed by an individual reinforce each other. (3) If this prestige gains in strength until it forms the content of social consciousness, though within a certain group, there springs up a social power which is independent of the power of the group, and which is sustained by the will of the whole community. This social power becomes especially strong when the prestige is associated with a certain current of thought or a certain movement in the background. Even though this social power is created by a certain current of thought and movement so that it may play the leading role in them, the fact remains that it acquires special strength when it is combined with personal prestige.

Prestige means unconditional obedience which owes itself to the unfathomable ability possessed by a certain subject—no matter whether it represents social power or personal talent. This subordination may be sometimes related to a

certain sphere of culture or it may concern personal relationship only, and is consequently not restricted to some sphere of life. In any case, the personality itself forms the object of obedience. For example, a person who is accorded prestige in the field of magic, religion and art, is respected and obeyed unconditionally without examining the objective value of his achievements, directions and assertions. Moreover, apart from these cultural considerations, his personality itself forms the object of obedience to a certain extent. The extent of this obedience depends on how far the social organization is fixed and how far all positions are hereditary. Sometimes a person is endowed with prestige, in personal relations, on account of his strength of will or power of personality, apart from the consideration of any cultural content.

As mentioned above, prestige embodies the reverse side of subordination to one with inestimable power. It is, therefore, entirely ascribable to personality; it is implicit belief in, and tacit devotion to, something which is beyond all understanding. Although prestige can be of varying degrees, it has nothing whatever to do with the rational attitude which dictates obedience to whatever is found of high value on simple appraisal.

In this respect, a distinction is often made between authority and prestige. Subordination to authority is regarded as subordination to something objective. Simmel gives two instances of authority. One is where authority is due to the status which super-personal influences such as the State and the Church bestow on an individual personality. The other is where it is due to the circumstance in which, confidence in an individual becoming general, privileges and axiomatic confidence are given to him. He lays stress on the fact that in any case there is discernible agreement between objectivity and personality. On the other hand, in prestige there is a lack of agreement between personality and objective norms and power. There is only unconditional obedience to the centre of personality. Whereas authority,

which is dispassionate by nature, leaves room for criticism, prestige simply attracts and absorbs us.¹⁹⁾

The authority of an individual is born of the firm public belief that he has something objective in him. With regard to authority of cultural content, it means full public confidence in a man because his achievements in the past have been shown to be of high value, when judged by certain standards. He is so trusted that his individual works are not subjected to any close scrutiny. Regarding the aspects of control, it may be said that because he occupies a certain powerful position, the public believe that final decision on all social rulings lie with him. Authority springs up where personality is believed to combine with something objective, while the prominent feature of prestige is unconditional subordination based on the belief that his ability is inestimable, as was stated above. Theodor Geiger is presumably right when he says that prestige, in the sense in which Leopold interprets it, is identical with what Max Weber calls charisma.²⁰⁾

From this point of view, authority may be said to signify rational, (to be exact, indirectly rational) subordination; that is, subordination based on rational judgement, which is made in this case in postulating the unification of personality and objectivity. But it is not directly rational because it is not examined in the light of one's own standards. Prestige is essentially irrational as well as personal; it is concerned with the whole personality. Vierkandt divides relations of power into two, leading and ruling. He describes the former as personal and the latter as institutional, and further asserts that whereas the former is based on purely internal power, the latter permits of the interposition of external power. So far, he is quite understandable.²¹⁾ But when he says that subordination in the former is founded on authority and in the latter on prestige, asserting that

19) Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 139-137.

20) Theodor Geiger, *Führung*. *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, p. 137; Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 124.

21) Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, p. 280-290.

while the power of authority is rational, that of prestige is irrational and magical, it is difficult to follow his line of argument. He leaves unelucidated the point as to why institutional norm and personal prestige are inseparably united.

By Max Weber authority is identified with ruling (*Herrschaft*). Seeing that charisma is taken to be one type of ruling, if my understanding is right, it seems only fair to conclude that prestige constitutes one kind of authority. I shall discuss Weber's concept of ruling later on.

In an analysis of prestige, Leopold's interpretation is often cited. Leopold's interpretation is very elaborate, but in effect he interprets prestige as something emotional; he construes it as a mood which recognises superiority of value in a person (*Mehrwertstimmung*). According to him, there is prestige where the sentiment of value superiority of a person is such that it does not permit of personal judgment of value objectively, if it is conceived to be permitted in his consciousness. The value recognised by experience cannot constitute the source of prestige.²²⁾ That object of our interest which is beyond our comprehension, and which accordingly excites in us the feeling that we cannot gain access to it, possesses prestige. Not so with authority. People are in a position to pass judgment on it. They can also set a rational value on it. Authority is always confined to certain special spheres. In these respects, there is a disparity between authority and prestige. Prestige does not postulate such appraisal, nor is it accompanied by it. It embodies a frame of mind, and it is engendered unconsciously. It is no other than the personification of immeasurable superiority recognised in the other party. Leopold attempts to detach prestige from the instinct of obedience, but it is doubtful whether this is right. It seems proper to regard it as one of the instances where this instinct comes into play. Vierkandt, while interpreting authority in the light of subordination to superiority in value, admits that it is the action of

22) Leopold, *Prestige*, 1916.

the instinct of obedience.²³⁾ Is it impossible to admit this in regard to prestige and also regarding all that dignity covers?

Let me, however, return to my own view. In short, "public-grown" power represents that power only which is distributed by the will of the State. All forms of social power which are distributed either in the process of social interaction between individuals or according to the conditions in partial societies other than the State, even though the authority of the State, and accordingly the order of the State are postulated, embody "wild-grown" power. And revolutionary changes in the State organization invariably take place when there is a sharp discrepancy between the distribution of wild-grown power and that of public-grown power.

Between the various kinds of social power referred to, there operate the law of attraction and the law of absorption. There is a tendency for those who have acquired certain power in certain relations to be given power in other relations also. That is to say, all kinds of social power have a tendency to attract each other in seeking their common subject. Two reasons may be given for this tendency. One is the effort made by a man with power to gain other power by utilising his present position. The other reason is that unless there is special need for distributing functional power according to talent, new power is apt to go to a man who has already power in other relations; he is given new power commensurate with his position, that is, power already possessed. The social consciousness of partial societies always approves such a tendency. This is called the law of attraction. When one and the same subject is given various kinds of social power in various relations, one position is, so to speak, absorbed by another position, if these powers have different objectives and consequently they cannot be put in operation in the same direction. Just as the value of a commodity determined by the highest use to which it can be put, when it has many uses, the strongest among the

23) Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

various powers with different objectives determines the social position of the subject. Only where these powers are of a nature to be operated in the same direction, their cumulative strength forms the power of the subject and determines his social position. As a general rule, we find that various social powers have their different objectives and that consequently the process of absorption operates between them. Such relations are called the law of absorption.

VII

The distribution of various kinds of power under the circumstances already described means, from one point of view, the creation of various relations of power. Relations of power come about where the powers distributed act on each other. I shall now consider the various forms of relationship of power. To begin with, let me divide relations of power into those outside of organization and those inside of organization.

Relations of power inside of organization are divided into relations of ruling and relations of leadership, according as the organization itself forms or does not form the basis of power. Relations of leadership means a relationship in which an individual can have others follow his lead as he pleases because his personality carries either dignity of some kind or a certain authority. In this case, those in subordination have the consciousness of voluntarily seeking after value. Under this category falls the relationship of subordination to leaders in the primitive societies or that relationship of subordination in a group which is formed with the leading personality as the centre and in which there is no occasion for the exercise of coercion by the organization because the organization naturally springs up on account of its leading figure, but is hardly so solid as to impress its members. Inside a State which already has a gigantic organization, leaderships can exist in a particular sphere of the cultural field, while in undeveloped communities, leader-

ship can cover, comparatively speaking, wide spheres of life and activity. In short, the prominent feature of relations of leadership is that, besides their being based on personality and value, the organization is supported by personal social power, instead of personal power ramifying from the organization.

Where the organization itself forms the basis of power and accordingly the power attending the organization can exert coercion, if necessary, relations of power are those of ruling. The relation of power inside of organization, is that in which the essence of the will of those subordinated is positively determined by power; if that is the relation of leadership, there is felt no pressure by the organization because in them the subordinated members recognise the superiority of value in the leader. If that is the relation of ruling, a certain definite will is forced on those in subordination by the power of the organization. The will of one side constitutes an order, while obedience to this order characterises the attitude of the other side. Ruling in this sense is divided into military or illegitimate ruling and legitimate ruling, according as coercion, which may be exerted if necessary, is based chiefly on the so-called external power or on internal power. The latter may be subdivided into emotional ruling and legal ruling. The former includes what Max Weber calls charismatic ruling and traditional ruling. The difference between charismatic ruling and leadership lies in the fact that whereas in the former, pressure which can be forcibly exerted is inherent, no matter whether the organization owes its existence to a personality or not, and it can force the will of the ruled, in leadership, those in subordination are allowed to act voluntarily. In this case, therefore, subordination is simply found; it is not forced. In legal ruling, it is executed in accordance with definite laws and regulations or agreements, and subordination is secured because it is legal. Ruling in this instance is divided into two forms, formal-legal and rational-legal. Under the system of legal-ruling, the contents and directions of regulations are of intrinsic value judged by the objective standard

so that the subordination is shown to be spontaneous, and then power is exercised only to the least extent necessary for the controlling function. Ruling of this kind may be called rational-legal. This is sometimes described as a form in which coercive utilisation of men by other men ceases, or it is called simple administration (St. Simon). It may also be described as the conversion of ruling into management. Even in this case, however, coercion, if it is not actually exerted, is in a state to be exerted whenever necessary. In this sense, ruling is present. It would be wrong to say that ruling then becomes converted into control which is not ruling. There are thus five kinds of ruling: external or military, charismatic, traditional, formal-legal and rational-legal. This classification is due to the different motives underlying subordination in relations of ruling.

Whereas the power relations inside of organization are relations of ruling or leadership, that is, a relationship of positive determination of will, those outside of organization constitute a relationship of negative determination of will, in other words, a relationship of subordination to the subject in such a way as not to obstruct the execution of his will. It is a relationship in which the will of people is so regulated as not to disturb the subject in the execution of his will. Such a relationship is formed, not inside of organization, but in interaction outside of organization, namely, in mutual interaction which individuals within society in its totality carry on, supported by their respective positions or social power. A certain relationship of power comes about where they come into contact with each other as upholders of the social powers which they respectively possess. Those who have superior power make use of such power (utilise their privileges or consume their wealth) and at the same time gain the general regard of others. One side predominates, and the other side goes into subordination. Let me, for convenience' sake, call this a relationship of social strata. This relationship exists between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In former days, it existed between peers and

commoners. It is commonly called class relations. Where they contact with each other as such, relations of ruling are non-existent, except in a very indirect sense.

In case the class will of the bourgeoisie, that is, the group will or the will of the representative individuals of those who belong to the bourgeoisie, determines the policy of ruling the organization, it may be said that it is ruled by the bourgeoisie in an indirect sense. Again, those belonging to different classes can associate to form partial society and establish an organization within it. Formally, this organization is often based on equality, but, in reality, inequality rules. For instance, propertied men and proletarians can easily associate to form the same partial society called an enterprise. Although they are nominally on an equal footing within this enterprise, they are not in practice. In an enterprise in which big business interests take part, a kind of relationship of ruling is brought into being. The organization of a big enterprise possesses a strong binding force, partly because of its financial power and partly because it is no longer dependent on the will of individuals. All employees are ruled by the leaders who bring this binding force to bear on them. In this sense, it may be said that there is a certain latent relationship of ruling between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It is possible that the relationship that existed between "static peers" (Bluntschli) and the common people in former times was something analogous to this. At any rate, there exists a kind of superiority relationship (Uebermachtverhältnis) between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, though not the relation of ruling.

When those belonging to the same social stratum—especially those who have interests in common—are bound together by the consciousness of a community both of interests and of position and form an association, prompted by the consciousness of hostility to those whose position and interests are irreconcilable with theirs, we say that there exist class relations (Klassenverhältnis) in a narrow sense. In such cases, those who belong to different social strata form

their respective groups, which are hostile and antagonistic to one another. Here, a class means a group. Although antagonism marks their relationship, there still subsists a relationship of superiority between them. This class relationship in a narrow sense is no other than the class relationship in a wide sense, such as relationship of social strata, which has developed the aspect of group hostility; it is very far from being a matter of pure interest, so that it is entirely erroneous to take a class for an interest group.

Relations within an enterprise are said to be of equality, in so far as form is concerned. They are founded on the basis of demand and supply of labour. As a matter of fact, however, as the leaders gain power through their wealth, or on account of the important positions which they hold in management, they can deal with the employees with a certain dignity. Nor is this all. As the employees are very often so circumstanced that they cannot easily obtain employment elsewhere, they develop a strong sense of dependence. In consequence, relations within the enterprise, which are formally equal, can be transformed into relations of command and obedience, being unable to remain as relations of management or the execution of will. The bigger the organization of the enterprise and the more difficult it is for the employees to obtain similar employment elsewhere, the more pronounced is this tendency.

VIII

In the light of what I have so far written, let me now examine what social position the proletariat and middle class people in the present social organization occupy and what social power they possess.

In the present organization of the State, the proletariat are given certain power, but they get practically nothing from the functional distribution of power. It is true that people belonging to this class enter various branches of the Government service, but the positions which they hold are

of the lowest order in the hierarchy of the bureaucratic organization. Their official duties are merely routine and trivial and so it is impossible to say that they have any definite power connected with their official duties. This is the view which I take of petty police officials and subordinate clerks in Government offices. These officials can force us to do certain things, but it is too well known that they are simply acting at the bidding of their superiors in officialdom. On the other hand, they are all given certain rights by the State, irrespective of occupation. I mean the rights which are guaranteed them by laws and regulations and those which political usage recognises them to have. But these things do not by themselves univocally determine their social position. These rights merely indicate the scope within which their position or their general relations of power settle or they roughly point to their likely place in society. Exactly what relations of power they can build up within the scope thus determined depends on the operation of various other circumstances.

Some sections of these people at least organise unions in order to protect their position and interests, as witness trade unions and political parties designed to promote the interests of the proletariat. Of course, the power of these organizations is not sufficiently strong to bring about a revolutionary change in the State organization, but the degree of obedience on the part of these people to the authority of the State must necessarily lessen to the extent to which they submit to a partial society which they themselves organize, and also to the extent of the vigour with which they try to press their demands on the State through this society. If no change occurs in their formal attitude towards the State, some alteration will nevertheless be noticed in the substance of their obedience. As they come to share in the power of their respective partial societies, the power which they exert on the people of another class is bound to increase. Even if only a section of the class belong to this organization, those who are not organized will also have their

power increased, provided the demands of the organization principally concern the position and interest of their class.

Thus far concerns power which is based on an organization and distributed in some ways by it. But what forms the dominant part of their power is rather power or position which is given them in society in the process of man-to-man interaction between people, or extra-organically, or, to put in still another way, through the intermediation of manners, customs and morals. For instance, in a society it is ordained by usage, by morals, and by custom what honorifics people belonging to a certain class (retail dealers, tenant farmers, etc., for example) should use in addressing those of another class, in what way they should greet them, what attitude they should adopt and how and when they should exchange presents. They are not allowed to exceed the limits of these unwritten rules. Besides, there are the trends of thought, public opinion and social movements to be considered. When these trends are favourable to them, who belong to a certain social group, the majority of the general public give them their moral support, with the result that their social power rises above what all norms guarantee them. At any rate, the power which the public gives them is conditioned by the attitude towards them on the part of the public which is enjoined by tradition and other circumstances and by their own requirement of a certain attitude which they expect to be adopted. Various factors go to determine such attitudes, actual and expected. Regarding the proletariat only, their social position is of varying grades. Society or rather the general public adopts towards them an attitude which is different according to their respective ability (which means their personal ability, or the ability—talent and competence—common to their group, and their social power also), and they, on their part, adopt a variety of attitudes towards those in different positions. The attitude which is determined by this ability, power, and sometimes by other cooperating factors (such as their native districts and pedigrees), is fixed in tradition, and it becomes modi-

fied by current thoughts and movements. Their abilities and accordingly their powers are of different degrees. They differ between skilled and unskilled labourers, between manual labourers and mental workers, and among mental workers of various kinds. Because of these inequalities, different labourers have different positions assigned them, chiefly by tradition, and these positions are modified in various ways by the workings of their organizations and by the ruling trends of social thought and movements.

It cannot, of course, be denied that economic factors in the shape of their wages and their property, insignificant though they are, play their part in determining their social position. The action of such factors may actually be interwoven into traditions and morals. The contention that the social position, which is influenced to some extent by wages, as was explained above, determines wages may sound like arguing in a circle, but it is not so, as a matter of fact. What it means is that their extra-economic power determines their economic conditions, and that the latter react on the former. When we analyze the extra-economic power of various sections of labourers, we see that the extent of the privileges given by the State (if they are given at all), the amount of the support or power given by partial societies other than the State, the degree of regard or contempt for them which is dictated by traditions and customs, and the extent of support by current ideas, as well as their training, education and mental ability operate together to determine it. Thus, there arise relations of relative strength of power among them.²⁴⁾ Those of different occupation, skilled and unskilled labourers, and mental and manual workers have their respective powers which, though analogous, are different from one another, and accordingly the relations of power corresponding spring up between them. Such relations exist among various classes of labourers, of course, but it must

24) cf. Carl Brinkmann, *Wirtschaftsform u. Lebensform*, 1932, p. 7 et seq. What I have explained here is the starting point of my power theory in economics.

be remembered that these relations reflect one aspect of the relations of power existing between these labourers and people of other classes. That is to say, while representing, on the one hand, the relations of power between different sections of labourers: $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots$, such relations reflect one aspect of relations of power between these sections of the proletariat and other classes: B, C, etc. From these circumstances, we can judge the social position of the proletariat, and in exactly the same way, we can also see what the social position of middle-class people or that of capitalists is like.

When society is of an exceedingly fixed nature, its component members form numerous but definite strata according to their occupations and birth. The caste system in India affords a most remarkable example of this. Even in feudal days, relations of such strata, that is the relations of estates were fairly fixed. In present-day society, the so-called system of the equality of all classes before the Law is believed to rule. In form, this is indeed the case, but seeing that the caste system and the phenomenon of social strata in feudal days are traceable to the fundamental circumstances connected with the existence of society and to human nature, the tendency to form such strata is always present, if it is very weak. In the interior of present-day society too, there exist, besides property privileges, the hierarchy of occupations, or something like professional strata, though almost imperceptible in ordinary circumstances. The difference in the degree of regard attaching to occupations is a case in point. Herein, in my opinion, lie the fundamentals of the requirement which determines the wages of labourers and intellectuals.

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