

A Consideration on the Category of Transitivity in Russian¹

This article does not pretend to offer a universal theory of grammar, but only to take up a few phenomena concerning a particular category of a particular language. Yet it is obvious that a theory, if it is a theory at all, cannot exist without general suppositions which are derived from a general conception concerning the nature of the object investigated. This is, of course, true for the ideas presented here.

§1 I wish to discuss the verbal category of transitivity in Russian. However common and self-evident it may seem, it is by no means a clear-cut category, and there still exist many problems which wait solution. Traditional grammarians have, for example, explained that transitive verbs require a complement in the accusative because they are felt to be semantically imperfect without one. This explanation seems quite natural and accords well with the language instinct of the native speaker. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the question arises why transitive verbs must necessarily be accompanied by complements. If we do not raise this question it would seem that the rôle of grammarians does not go beyond simply confirming the instinct of native speakers. What must be investigated is why a speaker feels something is missing when he hears a transitive verb used without a complement.

§2 The reason why this problem has been avoided by grammarians is, I think, primarily because in seeking its solution we are inevitably lead into perplexing considerations of lexical meaning. However, the situation may not be as chaotic as it seems; we may discover that some elements behave in like fashion owing to their similarity in meaning, giving rise, under favourable conditions, to a new grammatical category with its own formal characteristics.

Words belonging to the same part of speech may perhaps be considered to have fundamental similarities of meaning, and as the category in question here is that of verbs, we must consider first, in a general way, what are the specific features common to all verbal meanings.

¹ 『人文』 第20集 昭和49年1月 44-54頁。

§3 Verbs are usually defined as the part of speech denoting action or state. But closer examination will reveal that “go”, “read”, “write” etc. are not “actions” in the sense that “butterfly”, “beetle”, “mosquito” etc. are “insects”, because the word “action” is in itself a noun and not a verb, and thus belongs to the level of metalanguage. What we want to know is on what basis can we distinguish “action” as “action” from “actions” conceived of as a noun.

In my conception, difference in part of speech corresponds in principle to the difference in the manner of cognition at the level of formation of lexical meaning rather than directly to the lexical meaning itself. A. A. Shakhmatov, too, seems to have shared the same conception when he said that “a noun is a part of speech corresponding, in the first place, to the notion of substance, and in the second, to the notion of quality or action-state, which are conceived of as *having no connection with the notion of bearer or actor*. Accordingly, the noun is a part of speech, corresponding in its independent form to the independent notion without any dependency upon other notions” (Italics by I.Y.). It is regrettable that the epistemological bases of his definition of a part of speech have not been given due consideration.

§4 If we take, for example, a typical expression denoting a physical action such as “to cut a tree”, we have a situation, in which there exist at least a “man”, an “axe” and a “tree”. The positional relationships of these objects one to the other are such that a “man” has an “axe” in his hand and stands in front of a “tree”. Then the hand moves repeatedly upwards and downwards or to the left and to the right so that the “axe” strikes the “tree” at a certain place until the “tree” is finally divided into two. If the “division” is not intended or not realized, it would not be a case of “cutting”. Instead it would be conceived of simply “striking” the tree, or, if the “axe” does not actually make contact with the “tree”, as merely “shaking” the axe at the tree.

It follows from this observation, that one and the same “action” may be conceived of as different “actions” depending upon the presence or absence of certain conditions. In other words, we choose a set of conditions from the outer, extralinguistic reality and, so to speak, stylize them into a pattern and apprehend, that there was, is, or will be an “action”. Which of all the possible conditions are taken as relevant differs from language to language and varies from case to case even within the same language.

§5 Thus, we cannot but come to the conclusion, that a physical concrete “action” such as “to cut” is, despite our firm conviction to the contrary, no more visible to our eyes than mental “actions” like “to think” etc., because “action” denoted by verbs

does not exist but on the level of language.

When we use language we perceive a set of *relevant changes of situations* in conformity with existing patterns of "action" and recognize that there did, do, or will take place this very "action".

However, it is not always sufficient to specify a given "action" in terms of *changes of situations* alone: sometimes additional conditions must also be specified (for example, the way in which we move our feet in the case of "to run" and "to walk" etc.). We will call *changes of situation* primary features and additional conditions secondary ones.

§6 On the other hand, these relevant features, primary or secondary, do not constitute a given verbal meaning with equal importance. We distinguish between relevant features common to a series of similar "actions" and those features which specify and distinguish one "action" from the others belonging to the series. We will call the latter principal features and the former basic.

In the case of the example I gave above, it is not the change in the position of the "axe", but the change in the state of the "tree" that makes the "action" distinct from other similar "actions".

The entirety of basic features corresponds to that of distinct features in phonology, which are common to both members of an opposition, or as Prof. N.S.Trubetzkoy put it, to the "*Vergleichsgrundlage*" of phonemes, whereas the principal feature corresponds to that which distinguishes the marked member of a privative opposition from its unmarked counterpart.

Finally we will refer to the object, which undergoes a change relevant to the recognition of a given "action" as a *recipient of change of situation*, or, in short, as a *recipient of change*.

§7 Now, we are able to define transitivity and intransitivity as follows:

D0 An action is called intransitive when a set of primary features of a recipient is sufficient by itself for specifying this action, and transitive, when some further primary features belonging to another recipient are needed beside those of the main object.

It is evident from this definition, that it is only primary features that have significance for the distinction between transitivity and intransitivity.²

² cf. 補足。

§8 It follows immediately from D0 that:

D1 the accusative complement denotes the recipient of change of situation necessary for specifying a particular verbal action.³

This definition is, it is true, well suited to such cases as *rubít' dérevo* "to cut down a tree", *vzorvát' skalú* "to blow up a rock" etc., but is not appropriate to explain such cases as, for example, *pisát' pis'mó* "to write a letter": in this case "a letter" cannot be the object, to which the action "to write" is directed — as the letter being formed as a result of writing (resultative meaning).

Though both these meanings are similarly expressed in many languages by means of an objective complement, they are too heterogeneous to consider them functions of one and the same linguistic form.

§9 From the point of view of our new definition, however, *pis'mó* etc. can be regarded as a recipient of change just as *skalú* in *vzorvát' skalú*, whereas the latter denotes a recipient of change in its process of extinction, the former expresses it in its generation.

Recognition, that the result produced by an action is, or should be, a "letter", is the necessary condition for identifying this action as *pisát'* and not as *risovát'* "to draw" or *carápat'* "to scratch".

§10 If we consider such examples as *videt' góru* "to see a hill", or *čitát' knígu* "to read a book", we come upon cases, which do not satisfy either the traditional definition, or D1: in these cases the object denoted by the complement remains unaffected during the action denoted by a verb.

Thus it is evident that D1 is too narrow to explain these examples. From the traditional point of view of Academy grammar, these verbs are also transitive verbs although the degree of transitivity in them is weaker.

However, this explanation is hardly acceptable in so far as the author does not make clear, what is meant by "transitivity" or "weakness" of transitivity.

A broader definition would be as follows:

D2 The accusative complement denotes the object, the presence of which is considered as a necessary condition for specifying a particular verbal action.

³ cf. 補足。

According to D2, the accusative complement may not necessarily denote the recipient of change of situation. cf. *čítát' knígu* "to read a book" etc. (that *knígu* is here considered as a necessary condition, is clear from the existence of pairs as *čítát' molítvu naraspév* "to read prayers in a singing voice" and *pét' pésnju* "to sing a song" etc.)

§11 In addition to the classes cited above, there exists still another sort of accusative complement (the so-called *schwachregierter Akkusativ* in contrast to the former, *starkregierter Akkusativ*). According to Prof. R. Jakobson, it is divided into two sub-groups such as *ožidát' god* "to wait for a year", *ittí verstú* "to go a verst" etc. on the one hand, and *góre gorevát'* "to grieve a grief", *šútki šutít'* "to joke (a joke)" etc. on the other. The former is usually explained as the accusative "which denotes the time or the space occupied by the action concerned". The latter corresponds to the "cognate object" in English.

Because verbs of motion are perhaps the most typical of the verbs which accompany the accusative having spatial (and sometimes temporal) meaning, we will consider them first. It seems that the semantic feature common to all these verbs is that they deal with the positional change of the subject in a certain period of time. Apart from this "nucleus" of meanings, however, it may sometimes be important for the speaker to express explicitly the spatial or temporal situation of the action as if it were a necessary component of the action he has in mind.⁴ If so, the use of this kind of complement will be a subjective and arbitrary one. This is perhaps the reason why these accusatives are apt to have emphatic meanings. e.g. *vsju dórogu* "all the way", *vsě vrémja* "all the time", *célyj den'* "all day long" etc. (Emphatic nuances are always felt also in the case of cognate objects. cf. to sleep a sound sleep, to dream a strange dream etc.)

§12 Accusatives with temporal meaning are often used with verbs which have primarily statal or processual meaning. Here, too, length of the process or state is more or less emphasized. e.g.

- a. *Vsě vrémja* oná smotrélá na menjá s ljuboopýtstvom.

(All the time she was looking at me curiously).

- b. *Vse éty Ánny, Mávry, Pelagéi ... vsju žízn' drožát za golódnýx i bol'nýx detěj.*

⁴ cf. 補足.

(All their lives all these Annas, Mauras, and Pelageyas live trembling for their hungry and sick children).

c. Anecdót o trěx kártax ... *cěluju noč* ne vyxodíla iz jegó golový.

(All night he could not abstain from thinking about the anecdote about the three cards).

§13 At first glance, the use of these *schwachregierte Akkusative* may seem to conform to D2, but they differ from accusatives of the D2-class in the arbitrariness of their usage compared to the obligatory character of the former. hence it is necessary to broaden D2 once again, so as to make it applicable to these examples as well. Thus:

D3 The accusative complement denotes the object, the presence of which is subjectively required by the speaker as a necessary condition for specifying a particular verbal action.

The sort of things that constitute such conditions vary from language to language and even within the same language from period to period. For Example, the destination of an action was often indicated in Latin by an accusative. e.g. *Romam* eo. In Old Russian, too, this use of accusative is sometimes observed. e.g.

e. nyn(e) že poědi *Vyšegorod* svoi. (Hypat. Chr.)

(Now thou shalt go to thy Vyšegorod(acc.)).

f. i molvi jemu tako, ože xoščeši poslati mužī svoi i vorotitsa *Volodimerū* to vdamŭ ti kotori ti gorodŭ ljubŭ. (Laur. Chr.)

(And tell him that "if thou wantst to send thy men to and return (from) Volodimer'(acc.), then we will give thee whatsoever city thou likest").

g. Poidučē ze Rusī, da emljutī u carja našego brašno . (Laur. Chr.)

(And when they come to Russia, let them receive food from our Czar).

§14 Now let us consider here an interesting phenomenon of Russian verbs in order to demonstrate the validity of our theory. Some verbal prefixes are said to strengthen the "transitivity" of root verbs or, under favourable conditions, to turn intransitive verbs into transitive ones. The Academy grammar of historical syntax says, for example, that "the addition of prefixes to verbs of motion did not deprive them of their ability to govern the accusative case, but in some cases strengthened the transitivity of these

verbs". Of course, this phenomenon is by no means restricted only to verbs of motion as is clear from examples like *žít'* "to live" / *pro-žít'* + acc. "to live through", *teč'* "to flow" / *ob-téč'* + acc. "to flow round" etc.

However, the traditional view does not explain, apart from the use of undefined terms like "transitivity" or "to strengthen" the transitivity, the reason why only some prefixes can strengthen transitivity and not others and why these do "strengthen" transitivity.

As typical "transitivizing" prefixes, we can name, for instance, *pro-* "through", *pere-* "across", *ob-* "round" etc. e. g. *pro-žít'* *god* "to live through a year", *pere-jít'* *most* "to go across i. e. cross a bridge", *ob-téč'* *górod* "to flow round the city", *pere-žít'* *svojego múža* "to live across, i. e. outlive her husband" etc.

§15 Now if we take *pere-ít'* "to go across" and *obo-jít'* "to go round" as examples, difference in meaning of these verbs from the root verb *ít'* "to go" consists in the existence of something to be crossed or encircled. Hence these object *must* always be indicated by means of an accusative complement as a necessary condition in spite of the obvious intransitiveness of the action itself (cf. D0). The same is true also with other cases of this kind.

These accusatives indicating a necessary condition for specifying an action on the one hand do not refer at the same time to the recipient of change of a situation and, on the other hand, they differ from those used with root verbs in their obligatory character. Hence we can conclude that the accusatives of intransitive root verbs changed from D3-class to the more narrowly defined D2-class due to the addition of prefixes.

If we posture that the degree of transitivity equals the strictness of definition of the governed accusatives, we can say that the "transitivity" of these verbs is "strengthened" by the addition of prefixes.

§16 The fact, that the accusative complements of verbs like *perejít'* etc. correspond to D2, seems to explain the instability of these accusatives. e.g. *perejít'* *most* / *perejít'* *čerez most* "to cross a bridge", *pereplýt'* *móre* / *pereplýt'* *čerez móre* "to cross the sea", *projít'* *stánciju* / *projít'* *mímo stánciju* "to go by, i.e. pass a station" etc.. cf. E. *cross* / *cross over*, *reach* / *reach to* etc. This perhaps owes to the logicalizing tendency of language development in general.

On the contrary, no accusative of root D2-class can be used with verbs which consist of prefixes *pere-* etc. and transitive root verbs, if these verbs are followed by

an accusative of the D1-class. e.g. *perevestí detěj čerez úlicu* “to take children across the street”, *perebrósit’ šal’ čerez plečó* “to throw a shawl over her shoulder” etc.

From a purely theoretical point of view, however, *úlicu* and *plečó* in these examples must be considered as indicating conditions required by the presence of the prefix *pere-* and must, therefore, stand in the accusative without a preposition.

In fact, such examples are known from the materials of Old Church Slavonic. e. g.

h. *Povělē rabomŭ převesti e řěku Savu.* (Savv. kn.)
(He told slaves to take them across the river Sava (acc.)).

i. *Prěveze ixŭ řěku.* (Mikl.)
(He took them across the river (acc.)).

Thus, constructions with adverbial phrases in Modern Russian can be considered as an innovation of the language parallel to the case of prefixed transitive verbs derived from intransitive root verbs.

§17 If an accusative required by a transitive root verb is the same as that required by its prefix, the force of this verb will become, so to speak, twofold, and in this sense it is possible that the transitivity is “strengthened”. For example, whereas *čítát’* “to read, be engaged in reading” can be used either with or without the accusative, *pročítát’* “to read through” is scarcely used without it. e. g. *On dólgo čítál.* “He was engaged in reading for long while”, *Xorošó on čítál.* “He could read well” (without acc.) or, *On čítál knígu* “He read, was reading a book” (with acc.) / *On pro-čítál knígu* “He read, has read a book through”.

However, we must always keep in mind that this “twofold” force consists of two elements of somewhat different nature. In some cases the object denoted by the accusative of a prefixed verb may be different from that of root verb by virtue of the prefix. e. g. *pit’ čaj* “to drink tea” / *výpit’ čášku čáju* “to drink off a cup of tea” / *propít’ vsju noč’* “to spend all night drinking” etc. It is clear that the accusatives of *výpit’* and *propít’* are those of D2-class.

Sometimes there may also be the possibility of a choice between D1-class accusatives and D2-class accusatives, according to which of the two meanings gets the upper hand. e. g. *pročítát’ knígu* “to read through a book” / *pročítát’ celýj den’* “to spend a whole day reading” etc.

§18 In connection with this theme a relevant phenomenon is observable in Swahili — the phenomenon of so called prepositional form. This is the form which indicates that it includes beyond the basic meaning of the root a relational meaning something like “for”, “to”, “on account of” etc., usually denoted in English by prepositions (hence also the name of the form).

For example, in contrast to *andika* “to write” in *andika barua* “to write a letter” its prepositional form *andikia* “to write to” can take, besides *barua*, another complement denoting a person to which the letter is written. e. g. *tu-li-mw-andikia mzee barua* “we-past-him-write an-old-man a-letter”.

Simiarly, proper intransitive verbs may have a complements in the prepositional form. e. g. *endea* “to go to” from *enda* “to go” in *Ni-li-mw-endea m-toto w-angu*. “I-past-go-to child of-human-mine”.

Thus we find in this phenomenon a striking similarity with that of Russian. Whereas in Swahili it is grammaticalized and systematized, in Russian it still remains cocealed by a rather obscure form of word-formation.

РЕЗЮМЕ

На основании гипотезы о познавательной особенности семантики глагола, автор пытается определить понятие переходности в связи с различием в характерах прямого дополнения и показывает, что есть три ступени переходности в соответствии со степенями строгости определений сочетающихся с глаголом прямых дополнений. Вместе с тем оказывается, что эта теория тоже имеет объяснительного силу и для явления, которое традиционная грамматика оставила без объяснения, т. е. явления, в котором переходность усиливается присоединением некоторых приставок к глаголу-корню.

[補足]

これは動詞についての論文の最初のものである。当時、動詞というものがどのようなものであるのかについて、基本的な作業仮説が必要であった。その前に、もちろん言語をどのようなものと考えるかという問題があったが、これについては、いわゆるフンボルト・サピア・ウォーフの仮説と同じくらいの強いものを考えていた。すなわち、われわれの住む世界は、変幻極まりない現象世界であって、そこには何一つ確かなものはなく、色も姿も絶えず変化しつつあるものである、という認識を持っていた。これについては後になっ

て若干修正が必要になってきたが、それはともかく、たとえば空には大小さまざまで、形も一つ一つ違い、色も違うようなものがある方向に流れている。目の前には、似てはいるがよくみれば微妙に異なった色と形をしたものが、右左に揺れている。皮膚の上には、絶えず何か時には強く、時には弱く、感じるものがある、といった具合である。しかしこの中から、ひとたび人がよく似たものを探しだし、これにあるいは「雲」、あるいは「草」、「木の葉」などという名をつけたならば、それらが突然確固としたもののようになり、現象世界を抜け出し、われわれの眼前に立ち上がってくる。秩序が導入されたのである。また「風」という言葉が、先ほどのしばしば相伴う現象に対して与えられたときにも、突如として混沌の中から、あるものが凝縮して、生まれてくるにちがいない。言葉というものをこのように考えるとすれば、古代ギリシャで、「言葉」を意味するロゴスが、同時に「秩序」をも意味したというのも、よく肯づける。もしそうとするならば、言葉を離れ、言葉に先だって「行為者」とか「動物」とかが存在していたとは、到底考えられなくなってくる。むしろ言語が現象世界をどのようにして「意匠化」ないしは「様式化」しようとしたのが、重要になると考えた。そしてこれを私はあえて「現象学的」方法と称したのである。もしそうとするならば、動詞とはどのようなものであるかが、次に問われるべきことである。その際に私に不思議に思われたのは、多くの場合、動詞が主語を必要とするということであった。もちろんいわゆる非人称表現のあることは承知していたが、これがなぜ主語を必要としないのかについても、よくわからなかった。「現象的に」考えれば、いまここに「犬」がいるとし、それが「足」と称する四本の「突起」を交互に動かして部屋の片隅から、別の隅まで移動したとする。このとき「実体」としては「犬」がいるだけであるから、その移動の間も、また移動し終わったときにも、「犬」、「犬」、「犬」……であるに違いない。これが正しい立言の筈である。もしこれを「犬が歩く」というとすれば、それは「犬」なる実体の上に生じた状態の変化に基づいてなされた「様式化」であるに違いない。少なくともこのとき、私にはそう思われた。再びもしそうであるならば、それは「犬」のような対象に名前をつける仕方とは異なっていると考えなければならないであろう。動詞もまた命名の結果であることは明らかであるが、両者の間には範疇的な相違があり、それが実は言語の品詞に投影されていると考えたのである。ところで動詞が状態の「変化」を様式化したものであるとするならば、そこには必然的に時間が介入しないではおかないであろう。またその変化の生じる実体を捨象することもできないであろう。しかし行為の認定に要する時間は恐らくは比較的短いであろう。はじめに言葉を創造する場合ではなく、すでに「様式化」ができていばあいにはなおさらである。そうすればこの認識の仕方は、初歩の微分に見られるようなものであると考えてもよいのではないか。

これがこのときの仮説の要点である。

その後エルンスト・マッハが1865年にいわゆるマッハ帯といわれているものを発見したことを知った。これによれば、光の強度が高く、かつ一定であるものが、だんだん低くなり、その後また定常状態に移行するという場合に、強度が弱くなる部分、従って強度曲

線が上に凸になっている場所においては、目は実際の強度よりも強く光を感じ、逆に減衰しつつあった光の強度が定常状態に移行するとき、すなわち強度曲線が上に凹になっているときには、実際の物理的な強度よりも弱く感じるというのである。

いうまでもなく、二次微分係数は曲線乃至曲面が上に凹である時には正の値をとり、逆に上に凸であるときには負の値をとるから、その符号を変えれば、おおよそ上に述べたことのようになる。このことによってもものの輪郭が感官の上に生じることになる。そうでなければ、輪郭はもともと存在しないのであるから、われわれは、物体の存在を認識することができないことになる。

渡辺慧氏によれば、マッハはこれを次のように表したという。

$$K = I - c \frac{\partial^2 I}{\partial x^2}$$


さきにフンボルト・サビア・ウォーフの仮説に関連して、私が後に現象世界と言葉の関係について、若干の修正を必要とすると考えるに至ったことを述べたが、それは我々が言葉に先立って、一定のものの姿を認識しているという事実に関してである。しかしそれらのもののどれを選んで様式化するかということは、またおのずから別問題である。

カントが「先験的」といったものも、たとえそれが種の発展によって獲得されたものであっても、生得的に備わっているということになる。しかしここで述べたいと思ったのは、人間を含めた動物には、微分的な認識乃至感知のメカニズムが、生得的に備わっているらしいということである。動詞的な認識がそれに当たるという証明は、私のよく為し得るところではないが、一つの傍証とはなるかも知れない。

註2について

このときには当然のことながら、内容的類型学についての知識はなく、従って他動詞と自動詞の区別は、言語に共通の、普遍的なものとばかり思っていた。内容的類型学の観点からすれば、両者の区別は言語に必須のものでなく、むしろ「現象学的」には、活格言語 active language type のほうが、言語外的な世界をより直感的に把握するものであると言える。デスニツカヤが論証しているように (К истории развития грамматической категории винительного падежа в индоевропейских языках. Функции винительного падежа гомеровской «Илиады», в кн. *Сравнительное языкознание и история языков*, Л. 1984, pp. 81–124)、対格は本来動詞のみではなく、分詞にも形容詞にも自由につくことができ、これと密接に結びついて全体として一つの概念を表すようなものであったとすれば (ibid. p. 96)、むしろ逆に定義の3 (D3) が本来の機能であったとすることができる。

渡辺慧『認識とパタン』
(岩波新書)、46頁より



註3について

この定義も結局は対格言語の立場からなされたものである。なぜならば、動詞が主として意味上の主語と文法的に一致する、人称変化を前提としているから、このような定義がなされ得たのである。対格言語では、自動詞と他動詞の区別が行われるから、たとえば「死ぬ」と「殺す」とは、全く異なった事態であると考えられる。しかしよく考えてみれば、どちらも共通するのは、ある人物あるいは動物の身体の上に「死」なるプロセスが進行し、やがて完了することを意味している、ということである。

してみれば、いずれの場合でも、このふたつの「行為」にもっとも密接な関係を持つのは、死にゆく人物ないし動物でなければならない。これに対し、この人物乃至動物を死に至らしめる人物乃至動物は、たとえ眼前で殺人が行われたとしても、その関与の仕方は、認定の仕方によることが大きい。これは当該言語の文化にも依存していると思われる。極端な場合、たとえば呪詛が有効であるとみなされている社会においては、離れたところにいる人物が、死に至らしめた人物とみなされることも、大いに有り得ることである。

いずれにせよ、活格言語においては、いわゆる「相」 diathesis を除けば、原則として自動詞と他動詞の区別はなく、従って「死ぬ」ことと「殺す」こととは、同一の言語外的な事態と考えられるのである。そうとすれば、この種の言語にあっては、行為者が有標的な格をもって現れるにしても、動詞がまず殺された人物乃至動物と文法的に一致を行うのは、一つの論理的必然である。

以上のような考えにたてば、この定義の不十分なことは明らかである。少なくとも対格言語においては、という限定が必要となろう。

註4について

クリモフは「単数的」及び「複数的」行為を表す動詞がもつばら活格動詞に現れ、これは「行く」、「走る」、「飛ぶ」、「死ぬ」、「座っている」、「立っている」、「横たわっている」、「泳ぐ」、「漕ぐ」、「導く」、「留まる」、「跳ぶ」、「倒れる」、「取る」などの意義を持つ動詞に多いことを指摘し、オストホフがこれを人間と密接に関連する動詞を細かく表現しようとするためであるとしていることを述べている。(cf. Г. А. Климов, *Типология языков активного строя*, М. 1977, p. 99; H. Ostohoff, *Von Suppletivwesen der indogermanischen Sprachen*, *Akademische Rede*, Heidelberg, 1899, p. 42.) ロシア語もまたこの種の現象をもっている。この種の動詞が対格を伴うことが多いのも、身近な行為として、これに細かい限定を加えようとするためであるとするれば、上述のデスニツカヤの述べている対格の機能から、この種の動詞が対格を伴うことが多いのも、よく説明することができよう。