




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Front Cover: The Buddha, in a meditative pose, symbolizing hope for the suffering pretas [ghosts/ancestors] who await compassionate acts of merit transfer from their surviving kin

From East Asia Back to Asia Pacific

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What kind of Southeast Asia are we going to see 10 to 20 years from now on? I want to take this opportunity to talk about the coming challenges rather than the current problems we face. Future issues will be shared ones that need to be dealt with not just by Japan, but collectively with other Southeast Asian countries. In this article I want to focus on how political and economical changes are reconfiguring geo-political relations in the region and reflect upon the combined future role of Japan and ASEAN.

There is no doubt that there are presently momentous changes taking place in East Asia. If we look back at the history of the area including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the ten ASEAN countries, this area started to be called East Asia towards the end of the 1980s. The region assumed its current identity in the wake of the Plaza accord in 1985. At that time, the 1985 exchange rate of the dollar was \$1 to 260-270 yen and after the accord the yen appreciated drastically to 110-120. This enormous appreciation drove Japanese firms abroad to do business and set up production facilities in industrial centres such as Bangkok, some of the major cities of Malaysia, some areas of Cebu and Manila in the Philippines, as well as Indonesia and so on.

As a result of this, by the end of the 1980s, discussion on the idea of integration in region arose, with people starting to see the region as meaningful. It was at this time that at the end of the 80s, Dr Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia called for the creation of East Asia economic grouping, but this call was, shot down by the Americans, Australians and Japanese. This did not put off people realizing that there was an awareness of some kind of vision of East Asia being created. In part, as a counter move to Dr Mahathir's initiative to call for an economic grouping, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was formed in 1989 at the suggestion of the Japanese and Australian government and over the following 10 years, APEC served as the cooperative regional framework. Yet, we should not forget that during this period, specifically in 1997, a crisis engulfed the region, hitting Thailand first, then Indonesia, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries.

This Asian crisis marked a major turning point in the history of this region as many countries became acutely aware of the dangers of globalizing financial capital. Many countries suffered heavy-handed American intervention at that time. As such the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a collective mechanism to establish a zone of currency stability, was initiated in the year 2000 in response to global finance capitalism. The ASEAN +3 summit which had first been held in 1997 became regularized in 1998. The East Asian Summit (EAS) and ASEAN +6 also started in 2005. What we can say here is that the '97-'98 crisis crucially marked the creation of a regional architecture with ASEAN as a hub.

However, the last two years have also seen some interesting

developments as a result of the Lehman shock. We can now see that the pendulum has swung back from East Asia to Asian Pacific. For example ASEAN +6 has now expanded to become ASEAN +8 to include Russia and the United States. Transpacific partnerships have started to emerge this year as a major pathway to the creation of free trade and investment areas even though some of ASEAN countries are divided among themselves. Some are keen to ratify the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) while others are still mulling over whether to join or not. Furthermore we can also observe the emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Senior Official Ministers Meetings (ADSOM). These are major fora for discussing issues and clearly show a swing in the pendulum. But, what is clear here is that this swing does not occur without the impetus of the major financial crisis that occurred in the world global economy as well as China's new assertiveness especially in the Eastern and Southern Chinese seas over the past two years. In this sense, we must keep this historical context in mind when we try to think ahead and gauge the coming relationship between Japan and ASEAN nations over the next 10 years.

To make the above clearer, I want to introduce two sets of data (see tables 1 & 2). The first shows the urban population in East Asia with data taken from the World Bank Report published in 2007. We can see that East Asia does not include figures from Japan (this is not my omission but the World Bank's). However we can see that the ratio of urban population to the total population stands will reach 62% by 2030. In the case of China 61% of the population will be urbanized, with 68% in Indonesia's case, 76% in the Philippines, 43% in Vietnam, 86% in South Korea and so on. Considering the data, all cases highlight several interesting points. Firstly, depending on the composition of the urban-rural population there are three patterns we can identify. The Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia will become mainly urbanized: like a large version of Singapore. For these countries the type of politics that will dominate will be urban politics. Secondly, China

Table 1 Urban Population in East Asia

	Urban P. (1000000)		Increase (%)	Total P.	Urbanization
	2000	2030		2030	
China	456.5	877.6	90	1438.6	61
Indonesia	88.9	188	111	276.3	68
Philippines	44.3	86.6	96	113.9	76
Vietnam	19	46	142	106.9	43
S. Korea	37.3	43.1	16	50.2	86
Thailand	18.9	35.4	87	75.4	47
Malaysia	14.2	27.3	92	35	78
Cambodia	2.2	8.7	291	23.5	37
Laos	1	3.5	248	9.3	38
EA Total	803.2	1468.8	83	2369	62

Figures from Japan Economic Research Center, 2007

and Indonesia will continue to rapidly urbanize. However, one third of the population—a large number, considering the total population—will remain rural. In these countries politics will revolve around not only urban politics but also crucially around urban-rural politics.

Thirdly, mainland countries such as Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos will urbanize but the rural-urban gap, as well as the gap between urban middle classes and the urban poor, will play a defining role in their political landscapes.

What this tells us is that with the exception of a few nations such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, most of these countries will not be predominantly middle class even though their numbers will grow over the coming years. An income gap between the middle classes and the urban poor will persist. This is going to be a major issue that will remain with us for the next 20 years. This raises the next question that needs answering: how do ASEAN nations go about reducing this gap between the urban middle classes and rural/urban poor? Here, it seems that the only solution is economic growth, creating growth and reducing poverty. What is necessary is a kind of politics that can deliver economic development and create jobs. As a corollary of these politics, most countries need to be able to improve their investment climates and also train human resources so that they can deliver better economic growth.

One thing we need to consider is that despite all these efforts, economies grow unevenly. Let's consider some hypothetical situations: Metropolitan Bangkok growing faster than rural Thailand, with the Thai economy growing faster than Myanmar or Cambodia's. This kind of situation could entail people from these countries emigrating to Thailand, which would see not only the persistence of a dichotomy between the urban middle class and the poor, but also the introduction of foreign labor into the equation, and the problems that accompany cross-border migration such as human trafficking, mafia, money laundering, and other transnational crimes. Therefore, as important as economic growth is, we must also bear in mind the flip side, the dark side, of economic development. In order for us to have a better future together, we need to seriously consider the negative aspects of global capitalism.

The second table presents data on long-term global economic forecasts first published in 2007. This table shows the year 2000s purchasing parity of the American dollar. The estimates have been reduced with Japan as the unit of comparison to gauge how big Japan will be in relation to other nations. What this compara-

tive table shows is that China's economy will be 5 times that of Japan's in 2030; South Korea's will be about 40% of the Japanese economy; India 2 times larger; ASEAN combined larger than Japan; the American economy 4.5 times larger and the EU 3.5 times larger. We do not need to ask if these statistics will become reality as past forecasts have often come to nothing. What is most likely is that 20 years from now, China will be twice as large as Japan's and ASEAN countries combined may be as large as Japan's. This means that the regional and global distribution of wealth and power are going to radically change. And as certainly predicted, the growth of India and China is going to vastly reconfigure the political and economic landscape of this region. The implication for Japan is clear. 20 years ago we can say that Japan was seen as Gulliver in Lilliput with 90% of investment in the region. But, 20 years from now, Japan will only be as big as ASEAN combined. Japan will no longer be a Gulliver, but a reduced player in the field. This raises a crucial question: what does Japan need to do? When distribution of wealth and power radically changes the possibility of a break in the international order can occur but it is important that this kind of change does not happen in a revolutionary kind of way as it would not be in anyone's interests. However, preparations and contingencies must be taken in order to face up to the fact that international orders do undergo change. The point to keep in mind is to make sure that change is evolutionary and does not negatively or adversely affect any country or group of people.

Combining these two forecasts allows us to understand what kinds of ideas inform Japan's long-term policy. On the one hand, whatever the party affiliation of the politician (whether Liberal Democratic Party or Democratic Progressive Party), people in Japan are greatly aware that it will not continue to be the major power in the region. 30 years ago, Japanese talked about Japan being a super-power in the region. There was even an article entitled 'After Hegemony' in which people tried to imagine who will take over the hegemonic role of America after its decline in the region.¹ Yet now, thinking is shifting to the challenge of ensuring the prosperity and stability in the region. Here, ASEAN is crucial for Japan's foreign policy thinking. Firstly, if you look at Japan's business strategies, market matters as Japanese firms provide a lot of power to the Japanese government itself. In that sense, if we look at Japanese businesses it is clear that they have been pursuing a China +1 investment policy investment. That is, they invest in China, but do not place all their eggs in one basket. Instead, they also place some of their eggs in one other country, usually somewhere in Southeast Asia. Firstly, given that these economies are growing, many businesses now see ASEAN countries as a launching pad to make investment in India. Thus, ASEAN now plays a crucial role for Japanese business. Secondly, as I am serving as the executive member for the council of Science and Technology Policy, let me explain what initiative the Japanese government has been taking in this area. Earlier in 2010, the Japanese government under the then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, came up with a set of policies to promote East Asia community building.

One area that was very much emphasized was the East Asian Science and Innovation on Area, proposed by the Japanese gov-

Table 2 Long-term Global Economic Forecast

Country/region	2020	2030	2040
GDP			
Japan	1	1	1
China	4.1	5.3	6.1
S. Korea	0.4	0.4	0.4
India	1.7	2.2	2.9
ASEAN	0.9	1.2	1.5
US	4	4.5	5.4
EU	3.4	3.5	3.6

Figures from Japan Economic Research Center, 2007

1. 村上泰亮「あふたあ、へげもにい一日米経済摩擦への対応策」『中央公論』1985年11月号 Murakami, Yasusuke. "After Hegemony: How to Deal with Japan US Trade Conflicts," in Chuokoron, Nov. 1985.

ernment at the fifth EAS summit in Vietnam which may be approved by next year. What I want to make clear here is that we are now facing a series of challenges, including climate change, energy issues, disaster prevention, management and mitigation. To address these issues, it will be useful for all nations to work together in confronting them. Japan will establish research facilities to deal with these issues in ASEAN countries. Also, given the fact that ASEAN will play such an important role in Japan's future the development of human resources is also of the utmost importance, especially in the training of scientists and engineers and so forth. This initiative will need to look at how human resource development can be fostered. Japan can no longer be the sole provider of funds, but now needs to work in partnership with other ASEAN + 8 nations towards scientific innovation to overcome common challenges. Thirdly, in the realm of security, I served as deputy chair on Japan's security and defence panel in providing input on Japan's new defence policy approved in late 2010. Japan has called for not only the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance system in the region, but also strategic partnerships with other nations such as South Korea and Australia, as well as ASEAN partners if they are willing to strengthen them. Securing the sea lanes from Japan to the Middle East is especially important. We are keen to develop partnerships with South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam as well as other nations. On a final note, it is important to create norms and codes of common conduct in the region. In community-building especially in East Asia, we need to agree on common norms and code of conduct, not only in the realm of security, but also in other realms such as ODA, trade, investment and so on. In all these areas, ASEAN is crucial, not hopes that it can work closely together with ASEAN to achieve the common good in the region.



Southeast Asia in the History of the East

Asian Miracle

Sugihara Kaoru

Professor CSEAS

The East Asian miracle in global history

Accounting for the “East Asian miracle” has become an important global history question. Ten Asian countries (Japan, NIEs, 4 ASEAN countries and China) increased their share in world GDP from 10 per cent in 1950 to more than 30 per cent by the early 2000s. This regional surge has inevitably changed the course of global history at least in two fundamental ways.

First, the perception of global inequality has changed. In 1950 a small number of rich countries in the West were contrasted with a vast number of poor ones in the rest of the world. The technological and institutional superiority of the West took effect with the industrial revolution in England and the diffusion of industrialization in Western Europe and the United States. The expansion of the West also resulted in the acquisition and de facto monopoly of vast natural resources, especially in the New World, by a relatively small number of the population. Thus the divide between the high-wage Atlantic economy and the low-wage economies in the rest of the world was clearly drawn. Even Japan, the first industrial nation in the non-Western world, remained a relatively low-wage country, compared to the participants of the Atlantic economy. By contrast, in discussing poverty today we focus on what Paul Collier calls the “bottom billion”, those who live mainly in Africa and South Asia, as against the majority of the world’s population. The ten Asian countries now belong to either developed (high income) or emerging (middle income) economies. And many others followed, making the middle income category ever larger. Thus, while the bottom billion firmly reminds us of the unsolved issues of poverty and inequality, the long-term tendency towards global inequality has been arrested, if not reversed. This is a “miracle of distribution”, whose significance is arguably comparable to the “miracle of production” which begun in England two centuries ago.

Second, the pattern of international division of labour has radically changed. In 1950 the majority of manufacturing industries were located in the West, while the rest of the world was typically integrated into the world economy as exporters of primary products. Meiji Japan proceeded with labour-intensive industrialization, which was followed by interwar China, but most of the non-European world was under colonial rule, and the systematic policy for industrial development was absent. It was after 1945 that countries in Asia and Africa achieved independence and began industrialization, by taking advantage of the availability of competitive labour. In particular, the successful transformation of East Asia into the “factory of the world” meant the emergence of a new pattern of international division of labour. In contrast to the previous system where a small number of Western countries exported manufactured goods to the rest of the world, while the latter exported primary products to the former, East Asia began to ex-

port labour-intensive manufactured goods to the West, while importing capital-intensive manufactured goods (as well as primary products) from there. Furthermore, both regions imported primary products from other parts of the world. Thus a three-tier division of labour emerged where advanced Western countries specialized in capital-intensive industries (and finance), East Asia in labour- (and human resource-) intensive industries, and other developing countries in resources and primary products. While the distinction between labour-intensive and capital-intensive industries has become blurred in recent years, as Japan and NIEs moved to high-wage economies, the region as a whole remains distinctively labour-intensive, sustaining the majority of the world’s manufacturing employment. And the labour-intensive path of industrialization has been followed vigorously by other regions, especially in South Asia.

Transformation of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia as a region experienced perhaps the fastest structural transformation in global history from the export economies of primary products to industrialized countries. In 1950, four countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand; hereafter ASEAN 4) and Singapore (territorial changes were adjusted wherever possible) were all exporters of primary products par excellence. By the end of the twentieth century they became exporters of labour-intensive manufactured goods and importers of capital-intensive manufactured goods. Following the lead of South Korea and Taiwan, a rapid shift took place in the 1970s and the 1980s. Figure 1 and 2 suggests a fundamental change in the five countries’ position in the international economy. The shares of manufacturing output and employment to their GDP show essentially the same trend, with time lags and variations.

The transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy, which began in Western countries and Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, usually took much longer and it was interwar depression that slowed the process of industrialization in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yet, even with the restoration of free trade and an expansion of the world economy after the Second World War, other developing regions, mostly with colonial heritages, found it difficult to achieve import substitution industrialization for a number of reasons; a stable polity and a competent bureaucracy had to be created; the physical infrastructure such as railways and ports were built primarily for exports of primary products rather than for local production and trade; the tasks of controlling epidemics and ecological disasters, and securing water and energy for local communities in the tropical or semi-tropical zones, were largely unfinished and remained a major challenge; there was little investment in primary and secondary education, and skilled and educated labour was not readily available; and

Figure 1 Commodity Composition of 4 ASEAN Countries and Singapore, 1950-1997





Figure 2



Source: Kimio Takanaka, *Gaikoku Boeki to Keizai Hatten*, Keiso Shobou, Tokyo, 2000.

in the 1950s the terms of trade were not favourable for primary producers. However, above all, the predominant ideology of the early post-war period, import substitution industrialization, aimed at a comprehensive form of industrialization as a symbol of national autonomy, which was largely a reaction to colonialism and worked against full economic contacts with advanced countries.

There are at least three reasons why Southeast Asia managed to transform itself so quickly. First, the region successively found the market for their products in the post-war period relatively smoothly, by first exporting primary products to the expanding American market, then by participating in the commodity chain of labour-intensive manufactured goods initiated by Japanese, American and other foreign companies, and finally exporting competitive labour-intensive manufactured goods by themselves (or in corporation with multinational companies). After the second half of the 1960s, it was able to benefit from foreign investment and, through it, the transfer of technological and managerial knowledge for industrial development. Although the region suffered many wars and conflicts, and many other Southeast Asian countries were left out of this dynamics of economic linkages for a long time, ASEAN slowly expanded its membership and steadily increased its economic influences.

Second, against the background of population growth, there was a growth of labour-intensive industries, which absorbed labour. In 1974, Indonesia for example, had manufacturing employment of around four million, mostly in very small establishments in rural areas engaging in food processing and other traditional industries. This was too big a sector for the capital-intensive manufacturing sector to absorb. In 1970, Harry Oshima argued for a systematic effort to make these small industries internationally competitive, with a fuller and the more efficient use of labour, training of skilled labour, better marketing and more detailed government support for information gathering and export promotion. This was a strategy close to the East Asian (especially Japanese) path, signalling a clear departure from the heavy industry orientation the earlier orthodoxy had advocated. On the one hand, labour, both rural and urban, was absorbed into sweat shops and modern factories as unskilled labour, with low wages and terrible working conditions. It was under such conditions that society became unequal in many ways. At the same time, there was social mobility, the increasing availability of a large numbers of primary and secondary school graduates with better health which led to an improvement in the quality of the workforce. This was a major reason why the pace of industrialization of ASEAN 4 accelerated by the 1980s, overtaking early industrializers such as India.

Third, it was on this basis that export-oriented industrialization strategy diffused rapidly. In many respects the strategy looked "shallow"; it was externally induced (often with export processing zones and other government measures to promote investment of multinational companies); the sequential upgrading of an industrial structure, typically seen in earlier industrializations from light industry to heavy industry with all "basic" industries and complicated linkages, was missing; land reform was incomplete, and rural inequality remained a macroeconomic issue. But it was not a shallow kind of industrialization, in the sense that it was supported by competitive labour (cheap labour able to produce goods in a competitive market). It was natural that NIEs and ASEAN 4 countries with smaller populations, were keener on

export-orientation than the United States or Japan (both with a low ratio of trade to GDP). The growth of a relatively homogenous market for cheap, labour-intensive manufactured goods across East and Southeast Asia made regional industrialization possible.

The core ideology behind this process was "developmentalism", which was created to pool all the resources for economic development. It advocated both regional and international economic cooperation through trade, capital flows and technological transfer in strong terms. Part of this idea came from Japan and diffused to NIEs to ASEAN countries, and, helped by Australians, took the form of "open regionalism". It argued for a free trade within the region, but without discriminating against outsiders. Southeast Asia played a key role in the diffusion of this principle. And its economic success, linking intra-Asian dynamism to world trade, would eventually persuade China and India to join forces. Developmentalism was distinct from both the principle of unfettered free trade without national and regional considerations, and socialism with emphasis on planning and autonomy. Although its practice suffered from authoritarian rule and the Cold War divide, it was committed to raising living standards for the ordinary people, and survived the criticisms of liberal democracy and "market fundamentalism". Developmentalism was not only the guiding principle of the "East Asian miracle"; it largely created a regional order.

Beyond Developmentalism

Throughout the process of structural transformation in Southeast Asia, deforestation and other environmental degradation induced by industrialization and globalization have been a serious concern for both local communities and environmentalists. More recently, deforestation also attracted attention in the context of climate change. Yet these concerns have not featured largely in the discourse of developmentalism.

Did Southeast Asia figure badly in comparison to the historical experiences of other regions in these respects? In contrast to advanced Western countries, which used coal for household use from early on, ASEAN 4 used a lot of biomass energy for non-commercial use during the process of industrialization, in addition to exporting forest and plantation products. These resources were used, often without concerns for environmental sustainability. Meanwhile, the use of commercial energy (coal, oil, natural gas and electricity) has progressively become more efficient. The energy efficiency (measured in terms of commercial energy consumption divided by GDP) of ASEAN 4 has now become quite respectable. A combination of these, however, was insufficient to cater for the rapid growth of energy demand, and Southeast Asia's imports of oil from outside the region steadily rose. In energy and resource use terms, the region is becoming less and less self-sufficient.

As such, in none of these respects does Southeast Asia's performance look particularly extraordinary, when the rapid pace of transformation is taken into account. Yet, what is unique is that, after that happened, the region is still endowed with remarkably rich biomass and unparalleled bio-diversity. Whether or not we can establish the notion that environmental sustainability must be the basis of economic development is a big question. An answer to this question will determine the future of the region, as well as the shape of human development.

Caring for the Dead Ritually in Cambodia

John Clifford Holt
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In the study of religion undertaken from the perspective of the human sciences, Max Weber's classic essay, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, has proved to be an enduring theoretical influence. Not only did Weber's insightful analysis reveal how assent to cardinal doctrinal beliefs has generated a significant effect upon social and economic behavior historically, especially in European and American contexts, but it also stimulated subsequent studies by social scientists such as Robert Bellah and S.J. Tambiah, scholars who attempted to find a corollary relationship between religious thought and social behavior in the predominantly Buddhist cultures of Japan and Southeast Asia respectively. Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*, published 40 years ago, remains a standard example of how Weber's theoretical approach, highlighting the socio-economic consequences of religious dispositions, is relevant beyond Western/Christian contexts. Tambiah's studies helped us to understand how concern for karmic consequences in Theravada cultures has generated rational economic activity.

While the Weberian approach to understanding the relationship between religion and society has proved very insightful, it has also tended to privilege the importance of abstract ideas or beliefs at the expense of ritual and ethical practice. Within thoroughgoing Weberian approaches to the study of religion, ritual and ethics have sometimes been treated as if they are the silent cousins of myth and philosophy, and are sometimes eclipsed in the analysis of expressive religious culture. However, if the relationship between thought and practice, and the relationship between religion and society, are understood as fundamentally reflexive in nature, and if we are cognizant not only about how religious ideas affect behavior, but also about how forces of social change, especially within the context of political economy, affect the nature of religion, then we gain an enriched and more nu-

anced understanding of the dynamics of religious culture.

For instance, in studying the origins and spread of Buddhism in the ancient Indian world, we should be aware of not only the substance of the new philosophical perspectives that Gautama advanced in his more doctrinally oriented teachings preserved in the Pali Suttapitaka, but also of the fact that historically socio-economic processes of urbanization and trade were creating new existential conditions, and new social classes of people who were confronted with new social and psychological problems to solve. The spread of Buddhism can be understood as a consequence of a new religious consciousness that appealed to a new set of people who were experiencing new types of problems. That is, Buddhist thought evolved, in part, in response to changing social, economic and political conditions.

It is precisely this theoretical perspective, one that observes the reflexive relationship between religion and society, and thought and practice, that governs my current research. The basic maxim I am working with is this: historical changes in types of social experience foster changes in religious culture and further, that religious culture itself becomes a medium for articulating social change, which is often conveyed through ritual performances. Thus, while ritual is often regarded as a means by which religious traditions are reified or preserved, it can also be a means for the expression of significant changes that have occurred within society.

I am attempting to illuminate this continuing reflexive process between religion and society through a comparative study of ritual in the Theravada Buddhist traditions of contemporary Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. I remain concerned with religious ideas, but I am now also focused on how and why certain rites gain and sustain popularity and relevance. The book I am currently writing contains chapters about how social, economic and political changes have resulted in the increased popularity of certain rites in Sri Lanka [the annual *asala perahara* ritual procession of the *dalada* or "tooth-relic" of the Buddha that takes place in Kandy, Sri Lanka], Laos [the annual *pi mai* ritual ablutions of the *phrabang* image of the Buddha, the palladium of traditional Lao polity], and Thailand [the merit-making occasion that consists of the recitation of the *Vessantara Jataka*].

I am writing two other chapters of the book while in residence at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. One chapter focuses upon the annual fifteen-day ritual of *pchum ben* that is celebrated in Cambodia each September/October. The ostensible purpose of *pchum ben* is to assuage the sufferings of deceased family relations. The second chapter focuses upon the ancient and still enduring robe-giving ceremony known as *kathina* that is held every year in Myanmar [Burma] each October/November during which time Buddhist laymen and laywomen make merit through their material contributions of support to the monastic *sangha*.



Fig. 1 Vat Sampoy Meas in Phnom Penh depicting suffering petas asking for compassion.

In what remains of this brief article, I will write only about the contemporary Khmer practice of *pchum ben* in Cambodia.

In contemporary Cambodia, many monks will say in their *dhamma* talks to the laity that *pchum ben*, the current practice of assisting familial dead through merit transfer and the ritual feeding of rice at Buddhist temples over the fifteen-day “season,” is historically a rather recent Khmer cultural, and not necessarily Buddhist phenomenon, that dates to the paradigmatic actions of the renown and pious Khmer Buddhist king Duang, a pivotal political figure who ruled from Udong just northwest of Phnom Penh in the mid-nineteenth century. Duang is fondly remembered in Khmer culture as a pre-colonial ruler who reinvigorated Buddhist and Khmer traditions. Many orthodox-minded Buddhist monks support and participate in the performance of *pchum ben* rites, now widely regarded in Cambodia as the most important ritual season of the calendar year and an essential component of maintaining the economic health of most Buddhist *vats* [temples]. They also assert that these rites are more the product of Khmer custom rather than an essential Buddhist religious expression. This is especially true of monks who promote a more philosophically rational and modernist approach to Buddhist thought; for, to them, belief in the vitality, or reality, of spirits is a matter of outdated folk superstitions. Despite these pious monastic assertions, the ancient Buddhist roots of this contemporary practice are quite demonstrable: they are very clearly reflected in an important Pali text entitled the *Petavatthu*, a collection of stories attributed to the Buddha that aim ostensibly to illustrate the efficacy of karmic retribution. The *Petavatthu* is a text that likely dates to the very early phases of Buddhist literary activity, probably in the last centuries of the 1st millennium BCE. It is referred to in the Pali chronicle, the *Mahavamsa*, as the second text preached by the great Indian emperor Asoka’s monastic missionary son, Mahinda, when he is said to have converted the Sinhala king Devanampiya Tissa and the masses of laity on his arrival in Sri Lanka. These conversions, according to the *Mahavamsa*, led to a monumental moment in history: the establishment of the Buddhist *sangha* in Lanka. So begins the heritage of Buddhist history in Sri Lanka that is shared by all lineages of the Theravada in Southeast Asia, including the Khmer.

In each of the stories comprising the *Petavatthu*, a protagonist commits an immoral action generated by one of the unhealthy mental dispositions [*asavas*]: passion [*raga*], hatred [*dosa*] or delusion [*moha*]. Consequently, s/he is reborn as a *petā* [male] or *peti* [female] [hungry ghost] in *petaloka*, one of the six realms of *samsara* in which karma from actions generated as a human being is played out. In this case it is in horrific forms of suffering physically mirroring the nature of transgressions that propelled them into this unfortunate rebirth. Either the story ends here, with the lesson of karmic retribution graphically illustrated, or it continues with the *petā* appearing in a dream to a surviving kinsmen and making an emotional appeal for help (Fig. 1). Help is possible, so the *petas* aver to their family members, by making gifts of charity to the Buddha’s *sangha* and sharing the merit of those pious actions with the deceased. In one particular *Petavatthu* story that is often referred to during current *pchum ben* ceremonies held at Phnom Penh *vats*, an ancient Indian king at the time of the Buddha, Bimbisara, initiated the practice of offering rice balls [*pindas*] for deceased kin to help assuage their suffering



Fig.2 Yama sculpture located just outside of Vat Ounalom in Phnom Penh

from hunger. This is precisely what happens in the contemporary Cambodian cultic context where family members provide a ritual feeding of rice to the dead at as many as seven different temples in the early hours of pre-twilight mornings over a fifteen-day period. On each occasion, the rice balls are distributed during three circumambulations of the temple’s sermon hall. Most Khmer Buddhists believe that Yama (Fig. 2), the king of the dead, allows suffering spirits this brief window of release to receive the blessings for the benefit of their surviving family’s compassion (Fig. 3).

Pchum ben has become, arguably, the most important ritual in the Khmer calendar year rivaled, perhaps, only by the April New Year’s celebrations. At the time of this rite in September/October, hundreds of thousands of people, generally from younger generations now living in the urban areas of the country, especially Phnom Penh, travel back to their rural village homes to the temples where their most recently deceased ancestors, usually father, mother, siblings, grandfather or grandmother, have been cremated. There, a distribution of rice balls [*pinda*] at the home temple in the very early hours of the morning and the subsequent ritual chanting of *suttas* led by monks and sponsored by family members [*bansuko*] are performed as the penultimate culminating ceremony for the benefit of the dead on the final morning of the “season.” Usually in the afternoon, the spirits of the dead are then ritually returned to their abode via a ceremonial boat (Fig. 4) that has been constructed especially for this occasion. *Pchum ben* has become not only an important expression of familial religion, of ancestor veneration, but it also is a veritable contemporary form of pilgrimage. What has caused its spectacular rise in popularity in recent years?

While the world is now very well aware of the terrible suffering that was inflicted on Cambodians during the 3 years, 8 months, and 20 days of Khmer Rouge political hegemony, it is still difficult to convey to outsiders the intense degrees of impact that this collective experience of death and terror has made upon the Cambodian people and their culture. David Chandler, the leading student of Cambodian history, has described in this way the population’s condition that obtained after the Khmer Rouge were driven from power by the Vietnamese:

“Throughout 1979 and for most of 1980, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians crisscrossed the country looking for relatives, returning to their homes... [But] Villages had been abandoned or torn down; tools, seed, and ferti-

lizer were nonexistent, hundreds of thousands of people had emigrated or been killed; and in most areas the survivors suffered from malaria, shock or malnutrition. So many men had died or disappeared in DK that in some districts more than 60% of the families were headed by widows. Thousands of widows raised their families alone and with difficulty" [David Chandler 2007: 278-79].

Indeed, the immensity of the human carnage perpetrated upon Cambodia's people, not just Khmer but especially minority ethnic groups, is very difficult to fathom. What Chandler's comments emphasize is the massive blow that was struck to the primary social institution of the nuclear family. The sheer numbers of dead, estimated at 1.75 million out of a total population of 6 million, indicate something of the family's almost total devastation. Moreover, when it is recalled that the collectivization of agriculture enforced by the Khmer Rouge resulted in the separation of nuclear family members, it becomes clear that the consequences of revamping Cambodia's political economy comprised nothing short of a frontal attack on the institution of the family. Indeed, the family had been suspected by Khmer rouge hardliners as being the chief rival institution vying for the fidelity expected unconditionally by the state [*ankar*]. Families were in shambles by the end of the socialist "experiment."

While the Khmer comprise about 85% of the total Cambodian population and are overwhelmingly Theravada Buddhist in religious disposition, the bedrock indigenous religion that co-exists and is now interwoven with Buddhist practice is spirit and ancestor veneration. Notwithstanding the protestations of elite educated Buddhist monks, Spirit and ancestor veneration permeates all levels of Khmer society. It does not take much of an imagination to understand how the massive occurrence of death would have impacted such a population, especially since how and when most people died remained unknown to their family survivors. The very basic question that must have been ubiquitous throughout Cambodia in the wake of the Khmer Rouge rule was this: What has become of the spirits of all of these dead? What has become of my father's spirit? My mother's? My grandparents'? Did they suffer violent deaths? Did they, very unlikely, receive a proper funeral? How can we comfort them in their now dire conditions

of sufferings? How do we address them without answering these questions first? That the dead would now be in conditions of suffering would have been assumed by most Khmer Buddhists, given the popular and widespread Buddhist belief that the experience of violent death conditions the quality of ones' immediate after-life and rebirth. To die violently in a frightful condition of suffering is, therefore, an awful fate to endure.

In this context, it almost goes without saying why *pchum ben* has become so important in the "post Pol Pot era." *Pchum Ben* is a ritual that is primarily concerned with bringing the family together, at least once every year, to express solidarity and collective well-being, a well being that includes both the living and the dead. And in Cambodia, as in so many other Asian cultures, references to the family do not mean only the nuclear family, but the extended family as well. Moreover, it has always been the case in Asian Buddhist cultures that the young people of the family have a duty to care for the old, to compensate, as it were, for the debt of being given life. It is but an extension of that ethic that the living meet their duties of caring ritually for the dead. The degree to which this ethic of care is now being emphasized in Cambodia, as evidenced from the spectacular popularity now attached to *pchum ben*, would appear to be a direct consequence of the radical convulsions suffered by the social and political economy of Cambodia a generation earlier. *Pchum ben* is nothing short of the family's attempt, as well as society's, to heal itself from the traumas of loss, and in many cases to cope with the spiritual legacy of unknown and unaccounted for deaths.

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Fig. 3 Laity at Vat Kokos venerating their departed kin in front of a spirit shrine located on a surrounding walkway adjacent to the monastic sermon hall.



Fig. 4 Spirits of the dead ritually returned to their abode via a ceremonial boat.

Origins and Rise of the "Anglo-Chinese"

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Over the past three decades, it has become chic to be "Chinese" or showcase one's "Chinese" connections in Southeast Asia. Leaders ranging from president Corazon Cojuangco Aquino of the Philippines, to King Bhumibol Adulyadej, prime minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand, and president Abdurahman Wahid of Indonesia have proclaimed their Chinese ancestry. Since 2000, Chinese New Year (Imlek) has been officially celebrated in Indonesia, after decades of legal restrictions governing access to economic opportunities and Chinese-language education, use of Chinese names, and public observance of Chinese customs and ceremonies. Beyond elite and official pronouncements, popular culture has been instrumental in disseminating positive images of "Chinese" and "Chineseness," as seen in Thailand's *Lod Lai Mangkorn* (Through the Dragon Design, 1992), the Philippines' *Mano Po* (I Kiss Your Hand, 2002), Indonesia's *Gie* (2005) and Malaysia's *Sepet* (Slit-eyes, 2005).

The term "re-sinicization" (or "resinification") has been applied to the revival of hitherto devalued, occluded or repressed "Chineseness," and more generally to the phenomenon of increasing visibility, acceptability, and self-assertiveness of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The phenomenon of "re-sinicization" marks a significant departure from an era when "China" served as a model for the localization of socialism and propagation of socialist revolution in parts of Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, and Southeast Asian "Chinese" were viewed and treated as economically dominant, culturally different, and politically disloyal Others whom nation-building discourse and policies sought to de-"sinicize."



Riri Reza's bio-pic *Gie* is based on the life of Indonesian activist Soe Hok Gie.

The geopolitical, economic, and social conditions for this "Chinese" renaissance were laid down by a confluence of events: the US-China entente in the early 1970s and establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the countries belonging to America's hub-and-spokes security system of "Free Asia" (which included communist-free Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia); rapid economic development that led to the creation of substantial middle classes in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, (and less successfully) the Philippines, as well as three of the four "Dragons" (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore), within the context of Japan-led regionalization in East Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s; the civil rights movement in America and the global circulations of mainly American-mediated intellectual and institutional forms of multiculturalism and postcolonialism; the transformation of mainland China into a "socialist market economy" in the 1990s; and, finally, China's emergence as an economic powerhouse and a regional and global power in the past decade.

For want of a better word, the term "re-sinicization" has served as an expedient signpost for the variegated manifestations and revaluations of such Chineseness. Its use, however, does not simply affirm the conventional understanding of sinicization as a unilinear, unidirectional, and foreordained process of "becoming Chinese" that radiates (or is expected to increasingly radiate) outward from mainland China. Since the "Sinosphere" (as Joshua Fogel calls it) was inhabited by different "Chinas" at different times in history, the process of modern "sinicization" cannot be analyzed in terms of a self-contained, autochthonous "China" (itself a term of foreign origin) or "Chinese" world, let alone "Chinese" identity. These "Chinas" were themselves products of hybridization and acculturation born of their intimate and sometimes contentious cultural, economic, and military contacts with populations across their western, continental frontiers, most notably Mongols and Manchus, and with Southern Asia (India and Southeast Asia) across their southern frontiers.

More crucially, the collision between China and the "West" in the late 19th century took place on a regional, maritime stage. The flows of people and modes of transmission of new ideas of politics and culture as well as new conceptions of politics, culture, society, and community that entered and circulated in China from the west ran through pathways and networks created in the east. The making of "China" in the modern period is, for that reason, mediated

by two non-Chinese communicative spheres, Japanese and English (both British and American), which were created by the regional system in the east where British, Japanese and Americans competed for dominance. Its cultural matrix was one in which Japanese was an important linguistic mode of transmission of western concepts, while English served as the de facto regional and commercial lingua franca. More than half of the total loan words in the Chinese language are from Japanese. An early political form taken by these "translingual practices" (to use a term by Lydia Liu) was Asianism, for which Tokyo/Yokohama served as the main hub, with smaller hubs in San Francisco, Singapore, Siam, and Hong Kong. Here, a kind of Sino-Japanese kanji/hanyū communicative sphere helped create a network that linked, at different times, personalities such as Kim Okgyun of Korea, Inukai Tsuyoshi and Miyazaki Toten of Japan, Sun Yat-sen of China, and Phan Boi Chau of Vietnam. But it is also instructive to note that English became the second lingua franca of this Asianist network. It connected Suehiro Tetchō to Jose Rizal, and Sun Yat-sen and An Kyong-su to Mariano Ponce.

In fact, along with his connections with Japan and Korea and Vietnam through the medium of written Chinese, Sun also exemplifies a specific kind of "modern Chinese" that first emerged in port cities such as Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton and Amoy as well as sites of Chinese immigration in Southeast Asia (Singapore, Java, Manila, Penang) and America. "Anglo-Chinese" (a phrase coined by Shiraishi Takashi) were part of the British formal and commercial empire in the region. In colonial Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, Anglo-Chinese—who, along with a smaller number of their Japanese counterparts, were often educated by Christian missionaries—staffed the bureaucracy and constituted the nascent middle classes of professionals (such as doctors) and scions of Chinese merchants. Educated in both Chinese and English and sometimes only in English, and interpellated as "Chinese" by the colonial policies of their respective domiciles, these Anglo-Chinese were proficient in Cantonese, Hokkien, Cantonese, Malay, Javanese, Tagalog, and other local languages. Their multilingualism (and especially proficiency in the commercial regional lingua franca) gave them the cultural resources to move across social and linguistic hierarchies in their polyglot colonial societies and beyond.

These multicultural/hybrid Anglo-Chinese include the Straits-born Lim Boon Keng (1869-1957), a doctor by profession who was educated in Edinburgh. He was an associate of Sun Yat-sen and later president of Xiamen (Amoy) University, and a key figure in the propagation of Confucianism in Singapore, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. As Wang Gungwu has pointed out, Lim's advocacy of Confucian education was complemented by support for a modern curriculum that included the teaching of science. Famously delivered in English at his presidential address at Xiamen University on October 3, 1926, his vision of revived Confucian teachings for the present time offered a distinctive platform for modernization in China.

Sino-Japanese-English translingual practices had a widespread impact on modern Chinese culture, politics, and mili-

tary organization. Their political impact is readily apparent in the crucial role they played in the introduction of socialist thought into China, via translation from Japanese. Ishikawa Yoshihiro's study reveals that, between 1919 and 1921, thirteen out of eighteen Chinese translations of texts by Marx and Engels, and other Marxist figures—including *The Communist Manifesto*—were based on Japanese translations. Writings by Japanese anarchists and Marxists such as Kotoku Shusui, Osugi Sakae and Kawakami Hajime also were read in China, Korea and Vietnam, and influenced the development of socialism in these countries. Where political surveillance of and crackdowns against Bolshevism restricted its transmission from Japan to China, Bolshevik thought, including its visual imagery, entered China via translations from English and especially America through the treaty port of Shanghai. Shanghai itself is a spatial representation of this Sino-Japanese-English hybridization. It was a port city where the British provided the policing and administration; the Japanese constituted the largest foreign contingent; and the gray zones created by the administratively segmented settlements enabled nationalists and communists from Asia and beyond to flourish, allowing figures such as Tan Malaka, Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh), Hilaire Noulens, and Agnes Smedley to meet, mingle and organize their respective political projects in the name of the nation and international solidarity.

Beyond mainland China, the Sino-Japanese-English cultural nexus was an enabling ground not only for the revolutionary movement in the Philippines, but also for the political awakening of the Indies Chinese, whose activities would provide models and inspiration for Indonesian nationalist activism. The first social and educational association established in 1900, Tiong Hwa Hwee Koan taught not only Chinese but also English. Its teachers were recruited from Chinese students sent to study in Japan, and its textbooks, which were published in Japan and later Shanghai, had originally been designed for use by Chinese students in a Yokohama school run by a Yokohama Chinese; its opening had been graced by Sun Yat-sen and Inukai Tsuyoshi. The Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer would memorialize the Chinese influence on Indonesian nationalism through the revolutionary Khouw Ah Soe—a graduate of an English-language high school in Shanghai. Although Soe does not



Best-selling author and cultural entrepreneur Chitra Konuntakiet was educated in Thailand and America.

publicly admit to it, he had in fact lived for some years in Japan and was sent from Japan to do political organizing among the Indies Chinese. In *Anak Semua Bangsa* (Child of All Nations, 1980), the protagonist Minke learns from Soe about anticolonial struggles in the Philippines and China. In a little over one generation, this political awakening and educational trend would produce Anglo-Chinese Indonesians such as Njoo Cheong Seng (1902-62), whose popular Gagak-lodra series of martial-arts fiction features the eponymous half-Chinese, half-Javanese protagonist, and who typified a new generation of Indonesian Chinese who were comfortable not only with Indonesian and Dutch but in particular with English.

In the late 20th century, this form of hybridization became a widespread phenomenon that reached beyond the elites and professionals and scions of rich merchants of the earlier period to encompass the growing middle classes and urban populations.

It involves nationalization that incorporates elements and languages of Southeast Asia's indigenous cultures. The product and agent of this process is the "Anglo-Chinese" (and, in the case of the Southeast Asian Chinese, "Anglo-Chinese-Indonesian," and so on). As mentioned above, the term "Anglo-Chinese" was originally applied to schools (sometimes run by western missionaries) where sons and later also daughters of ethnic-Chinese businessmen received the kind of education that prepared them for business and/or professional careers. A version of the Confucian classics was taught in Chinese (*Guoyü*) alongside English and practical subjects such as accounting. "Hybrid" schools of such kind were established in the Nanyang territories (mainly in the British colonies of Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya, but also in Indonesia and the Philippines), and in the port cities of Tientsin, Canton, Amoy, and Shanghai; some of their graduates went on to pursue higher education either in China or, more commonly, in England and America.

A term that originated in the maritime-Asian world under British hegemony can thus be fruitfully applied to the contemporary regional context of East Asian hybridization of Chinese, which is occurring at a time when, structurally, there is a tension between an East Asia regional security system based on a hubs-and-spokes system of treaties between America and its "allies," and a triangular trade system involving America, China, and the rest of East Asia. The crucial linguistic continuity from British to American English that accompanied the transition from British to American hegemony helped promote the use of English as a regional and commercial lingua franca in the postwar period. What followed was the widespread dissemination of Hollywood films, and, in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the Americanization of bureaucratic elites and professional middle-classes, and their worldviews in East Asia. Like their forefathers in this region the Anglo-Chinese are the kind of people who: are at least bilingual (with English as one of their major languages); received a western-style education (that normally includes secondary or tertiary or graduate education in America or Britain); have some grounding in the school systems in their respective countries and intend

to educate their children in the same way; are well-versed in "international" (mainly Anglo-American) norms and values; and have relied on their hybrid skills (whether linguistic or cultural) and connections to go into business and work as professionals. One can also speak of comparable processes of Anglo-Japanization of Japanese, Anglo-Koreanization of Koreans, Anglo-Sinicization of Taiwanese, and comparable phenomena among segments of Southeast Asian middle and upper classes.

Far removed from the context of anti-imperialist nationalism that was the engine of sinicization in the first half of the twentieth century, "re-sinicization" is today more a component of, rather than an alternative to, ethnic Chinese Anglo-sinicization. Where earlier efforts at sinicization centered on activist and state projects on behalf of "China," the process of becoming-"Chinese" is now primarily market-driven, propelled as much by economic incentives for learning mandarin Chinese and seeking jobs in a rapidly growing China and East Asian region as by the desire to learn "Chinese" culture in a more hospitable political environment. The mainland Chinese nation-state is an important, but by no means only, source of cultural identification and validation. The process of selective Anglo-hybridization involves not only ethnic Chinese (including those in the mainland), but non-Chinese Southeast Asian elites and middle classes. It prepares the ground for the creation of an encompassing and inclusive cultural frame of reference and communicative meeting ground for interaction among the Southeast Asian middle and upper classes and between these classes and their counterparts in other areas of the world. Along with fellow Anglo-hybrid elites in their respective countries, Anglo-Chinese parlay their proficiency in local and regional languages as well as the global *lingua franca* and their familiarity with Anglo-American norms and codes into cultural, social, and material capital.

Contrary to the idea that mainland China is currently remaking the region and the world in its image, parts of mainland China—particularly its urban, middle- and upper-class populations in the coastal areas—may actually be undergoing a form of Anglo-sinicization that makes specific groups and communities more like the modern hybrid "Anglo-Chinese" that emerged, in the course of 150 years, out of the region we now call "East Asia" (which includes Northeast and Southeast Asia). These mainland Anglo-Chinese have more things in common—in terms of lifestyle, upbringing, education, mores and values—with urban, educated, middle-class "East Asians" than their rural and impoverished compatriots in China, East and Southeast Asia.

Envisioning a Different Southeast Asia from a Non-State Perspective: An Introduction to Professor James Scott

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On January 18 2010, CSEAS welcomed Professor James Scott and other renowned Southeast Asianists to the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University to participate in an international workshop entitled “Radically Envisioning a Different Southeast Asia: From a Non-State Perspective”. As one of the conveners of this seminar I would like to briefly introduce the overall theme and objectives.

The central question of this workshop was to ask to what extent can Southeast Asia be re-conceptualized, researched, and rewritten, if we considered non-state-centered perspectives and as such all participants joined in a deliberative discussion on these perspectives in the region and engaged in James Scott’s most recent work *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2010). A cursory glance at ethnographies concerning social formations in the region highlights how the nation-state-centered perspective has long generated a discussion on center-periphery dichotomies. In Southeast Asia, it has been both in the symbolic domain of civilization and in the territoriality of the state where suppositions and questions have emerged in engaging what is the spatially uneven expansion of the power from the center.

To take one example, the geo-ecological juxtaposition between hills and plains, has laid the basis for a social model reinforcing the stark differences between the two niches in terms of their political and economic status, agricultural mode, social mobility, the civilization’s worldview, religion, and kinship system.

As such, in this conventional binary view on Southeast Asia, the upland tends to be seen as a fixed periphery vis-à-vis river-mouth state formations. This dichotomous model is an archetypal case of lived essentialism in Southeast Asian scholarship and is regarded as problematic, as this simplifying narrative neglects regional complementarity and dynamism which inevitably constrains scholarly analysis. Not only have ethnographies been produced under the fixity of an upland-lowland binary, but also the history of Southeast Asia has been produced under statecraft inclination. In a sense, modern history was born and developed in the era of nationalism within which the modern discipline of history arose. These have both served each other, marginalizing the peoples who predated the state or fell outside of its dominion. In other words, history has traced the lineage and legitimacy of modern states.

What needs asking here is whether a balanced ethnography and history of Southeast Asia can be written, recognizing that before the 20th century the majority of its people lived outside the effective control of bureaucratic states. This is a crucial question to raise for a substantial number of people still live in uplands, border zones between nation-states, and maritime frontiers. Recent scholarship on Southeast Asia has suggested that the state-centered view often fails to investigate the dynamic responses to the center by the periphery itself as well as active agencies on the ground. It is here where the understanding of upland-lowland interaction requires an alter-

native framework, which goes beyond a one-way diffusion of power, something this workshop has tried to tentatively address.

This workshop arose out of an interest to engage in the attention that scholars have begun to give to non-state centered perspectives over the past 10 years. These have included choice [Reid 1998], Zomia [Van Schendel 2001], hill-plain continuums [Hayami 2004], Colonial arcs [Tagliacozzo 2005], Southeast Asian massif [Michaud 2000, 2006], non-state space [Scott 2009] and border zones [Ishikawa 2010]. Among these new takes on the uplands of Southeast Asia, Professor James Scott’s recent work presents us with a point of no return: we all know that the innocent belief in the state’s magic power has somehow been eroded and can no longer guide us as it once did.

To engage in how the theoretical idea of Zomia plays out in Southeast Asia, our workshop explored different empirical case studies, with the aim of further refining and improving our understanding of Southeast Asian societies. The principle undertaking was to set out to correct the distortion imposed upon the past and present by re-reading the history of people without a history by critically examining state-centered historiography and ethnographic works on non-state space such as borderland and maritime frontier. It is in this context that James Scott, the keynote speaker presents his thoughts on how this re-reading can critically allow us to explore new avenues in relations between various actors and tease out the nuances that exist in state and non-state spaces.

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The Art of Anticipating Criticism

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It has been a privilege to be with people who have found my book good to think with as well possibly think “against.” I am also proud to be treated as an honorary anthropologist here; this is important for me as I have been thrown out of my original political tribe, the “political science tribe.” Therefore, I am orphaned. I am only too proud to be included in this tribe if anthropologists chose to adopt me. In this connection, I would like to offer some afterthoughts on my most recent work, *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009).

In general, I feel that I should apologize for trading in binaries and dichotomies such as hill/valley when in fact there are foothills and piedmont and other places in between state space and non-state space. I would like to suggest a few modifications of the following kind: instead of “state-space” and “non-state space,” we should possibly discuss places that have *advantageous state potential*, that is to say high state- or kingdom-building potential. If we use this term, we must be aware that it is not connected with altitude. As can be pointed out, in the Andes all the great states are at high altitudes. In the Americas, Peru can be taken as an example where all arable land was at elevations above 6,000 feet. In the Andes, traditional states are midway up the hills with non-state peoples located in the valleys near the coast. So, everything is more or less “upside down” in the Andes when compared with Southeast Asia. The key here is the existence of a sizeable alluvial plain, a place where intensive fixed cultivation is possible and therefore favoring a concentration of grain and people in one location. This is an important point to make as it also happens to be the case in parts of Zomia, where we find substantial alluvial plains in the hills. This is the case throughout much of the Shan Hills in eastern Burma, where large, potentially “state-making” alluvial plains, such as the one around Chaing Tung (Kengtung) may be found. States that have arisen in such hill areas have generally been connected with these alluvial plains at higher elevations. The areas of high potential for state making, in maritime Southeast Asia would often be located on the choke points of a river

trading system or at a river estuary, strategic locations favoured by the small Malay states. These don’t have so much to do with concentrations of grain or population, but more with the capacity to control and monopolize trade and to tax it at a particular place.

By contrast, we can also talk about places that are difficult to access and govern and have low state making potential, what we can describe as “state repelling places.” Many of these places are in rugged hills, however they need not be there nor even at high elevations. For example, in maritime Southeast Asia, swamps, marshes, mangrove coasts and deltas –which have accumulated vast amounts of silt over the past 400 years, are places that are, until relatively recently, difficult for states to access and often zones of refuge for people who want to maintain a certain distance from the state. Another point that merits mention is that the Southeast Asian state is seasonal. Historically, during the monsoon season the state shrunk to a smaller area than it could control during the dry season. As such, efforts to project state control into the countryside very much depended upon the dry season and came more or less to a halt in the rainy one.

I should also plead guilty to the geographical determinism that is embedded in my argument. Arbitrarily, I declared that my analysis made no more sense after 1945. However I had reasons for choosing this date as the cut-off point in my book. I realize that this had unforeseen consequences, in that anthropologists who worked on the area around this time are no longer here to question my decision! Yet, it seems to me that so massive changes in the range of state technologies governing movement and control, admittedly occurring at different speeds in different places, have made my argument difficult to extend beyond this point.

First, we need to consider distance demolishing technologies. We have all-weather roads, railroads, steamboats, dynamite (to create navigable rivers that weren’t so before), earth moving machineries, chainsaws, telegraph, the telephone-- then the cell-phone; and helicopters, military movement and military hardware. These technologies make it possible for states to project

themselves to the periphery; even the most inaccessible borders that they have been unable to control until now. In addition, although products were always brought from the periphery to the trading centres, they tended to be products of great value compared to their volume and weight, such as Bezoar stones, rhinoceros horns, camphor wood (*Cinnamomum camphora*), Gutta-percha (*Palaquium gutta*) and so on. These valuable products were important sources of incomes in trading centres yet, what has happened since 1945, more in some places and less in others, is that the access to different kinds of economic products in the hills has become possible due to the new distance demolishing technologies. Examples of these are hydroelectric sites along the upper reaches of rivers, the extraction of previously inaccessible timber that can now be moved more successfully, mining in which it is possible to extract low grade ore, and of course plantations where the landscape of the hills is transformed by products that can be brought out by river or by truck via modern technological means of transportation that were impossible before. Under mature capitalism, the hills have become a place of much more value for extractive purposes and the technologies now available allow for this to take place at a rate that was not possible before and to move products of relatively low value per unit, weight and volume over long distances.

One of the most important changes we can see is the way in which the majority lowland populations have moved or have been moved into the hills by lowland states. Vietnam is one such example where there has been a campaign to do so, as well as the long Indonesian *transmigrasi* experiment to the outer islands. These forms of movement have been common in Thailand, Burma and north eastern India where we see lowland populations moving into the hills and a similar phenomenon can be observed in south west China with a Han population moving into the region. All of this movement points to a process that may be largely voluntary, yet it has a political objective. That objective is, to replace and perhaps, engulf a population that is considered to be less loyal, reliable or allegiant; a population of farmers judged more politically reliable that will grow cash crops while upholding state and lowland cultural values in the hills. This seems to be a huge difference and reminds us of something Peter Brosius once wrote about the Punan in Sarawak. He claimed that for them, they preferred the British to the Dutch as the British stayed at the mouth of the river and never ventured up river. This suggests that historically, states have stayed in the lowlands in the lower reaches of the river and it has been only very recently that they have been able to penetrate into the upper reaches of river systems.

The last point concerns my discussion on state space and non-state space: a dichotomy that is in most respects unsustainable, an issue which I have tried to address in the latter half of my book. I have tried to distinguish the reach of the state in different respects, and when I focus narrowly on state space, what I intend to convey is the Weberian strong state exercising effective coercive control over concentrated populations and grain and the ability to tax that population through both manpower and the confiscation of its grain. We can imagine a centre where the zone of direct administrative control would not be circular or mandala-shaped but rather 'distorted' to take into account land topography and waterways—that is to say, the relative ease of travel.

The second aspect of the reach of the state that needs to be highlighted, is the trade and exchange of products. Depending on how valuable the products are in terms of weight and volume,

as well as the distances they can travel (the existence of the silk-road is an example of this), we can note that hills and lowland centres have always been intimately connected in a symbiotic relationship of trade and exchange. Furthermore, this relationship is one in which complimentary products were exchanged in different ecological zones. An example of this is the first tribute mission of the Thais' to Beijing which essentially consisted of forest products collected by the Karen and then presented to the Thai Crown and deemed suitable for a tribute mission. This kind of movement suggests that the reach of the state as a centre for the in-gathering of products that enter international commerce and are consumed in the lowlands, resides in a much larger area. We can also state here that it is a zone that is outside the direct physical coercive control of the state. Exchange in this context, is essentially voluntary, where people who are engaging from the periphery, can withdraw if they like; where in the Malay world, actors can choose a different river system to deliver their goods and have a series of choices about where and with whom they trade. Here we should pause to emphasize that while the traders were free to trade or not, their "commodities" were frequently human captives. We must note that the most important product traded from the hills to the valleys and traded in Malay commerce centres to non-state areas, were human beings—captives,

In the above context, the third zone of state influence that merits consideration is the *charisma of the state*, as a symbolic entity with an imperial centre and its idea of kingship. Symbols weigh nothing and they transport easily (!) thus, we can argue that the symbolic reach of the state extends throughout the hills. Generally speaking there is no idea of power beyond local confederations of villages in the hills that does not derive from lowland models of charisma and kingship. Wherever we look in the hills we see seals, charters, regalia, dress and paraphernalia that represent the symbolism of power and majesty, and of extra-village authority. This kind of symbolic reach of the state is extremely attractive, charismatic and links all of the highlands to the states. It is, however, symbolic power and not physical control.

The last and by no means least interesting point is that of religious conversion. This conversion can seem to offer an alternative kind of modernity that differentiates the hills from lowland models of modernity. It offers a connection to a different kind of charisma and lowland centre, and it is not insignificant that in many cases it offers a written script, a new kind of literacy that is not the same as the lowland script. One of the most important things in the hills, particularly through Christian missionaries, is a distinct script by which an oral language can be written, allowing for the creation of a literature that rivalled the lowland centres in the acquisition of literacy of texts. A book and script of one's own! All of this points to the important ways in which hill peoples, knowing they are held to be in low-esteem by valley elites, endeavour to rebalance relationships of dignity and cultural hierarchy.

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The Practice of Language: Linguistic Diversity and Multilingualism in Southeast Asia

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On July 27, 2010, as many as 2,000 Cantonese-language speakers took to the streets of Guangzhou to protest the Chinese central government's efforts to stop Cantonese-language television broadcasts during the Asian Games. Apparently the government wanted to spare visitors to the Games the inconvenience of hearing a Chinese language other than the official Mandarin. Interestingly, most of the protesters were young people who are also fluent speakers of Mandarin, having been schooled in that language and coming into adulthood in an age of Chinese economic success at home and abroad. Despite the fact that more than 55.5 million people speak Cantonese globally, and the existence of a vibrant Cantonese cultural scene, the protesters felt enough of a threat to their cultural identity that they would risk the ire of the government at a high-profile time. The news of the Cantonese protesters reminded me of the importance of language to peoples' feelings of security, belonging and confidence, no matter how large a population of speakers the language has.

This story highlights the cascade of pressures from the global to regional to national, and down to peoples' daily lives. It also reflects concerns expressed by elders of the ethnic minority villages of northern Laos, where rapid and profound changes in economic livelihoods are under way. The constitution of Laos starts by asserting a multiethnic nation. But in the day-to-day business of implementing development policy, the tremendous ethno-linguistic diversity of the country is seen more as an obstacle to national progress. One striking characteristic of Laos' human diversity is the prevalence of small ethno-linguistic groups, speaking upwards of one hundred languages. Even the majority people speaking dialects of the Lao language comprise only 55 percent of the total population.

Southeast Asia is an area of mega-diversity – both human and natural. On the mainland, five major language families – Sino-Tibetan, Austroasiatic, Tai-Kadai, Hmong-Mien and Austronesian – contribute to a view on high phylogenetic diversity, reflecting the distinct cultural origins and histories of their people. In the islands, the vast majority of languages belong to one large family – Austronesian – which has spread across a staggeringly wide area of maritime geography. The historical processes of linguistic divergence that created the linguistic diversity of the Indo-Malayan archipelago has nevertheless maintained an important layer of shared cultural heritage among different ethnic groups. In both cases, dense networks of interaction have produced mutual influences within and across language families, further contributing to the complexity of the region's linguistic mosaic.

It is interesting to note that there is a high level of geographic correlation between linguistic diversity and biological diversity at the global level. Demonstrating this with maps based on global databases was part of a larger effort bringing together linguists, anthropologists and biologists that led

to the formation of a research community defined by a common interest in what they termed biocultural diversity [Maffi 2005]. It is believed that 96 percent of the world's languages are spoken by a mere 4 percent of the population, and much of this population lives in the tropics, where much of the world's most bio-diverse areas are located as well.

Of the more than 6,000 languages spoken in the world today, almost one third are found in East and Southeast Asia [Crystal 2000]. Globally it is estimated that languages are disappearing at a rate of one every two weeks. Ethnologue, a frequently cited source on the world's languages, estimates that there are currently 84 endangered languages in Asia [Ethnologue website 2010]. But this is probably a gross underestimate. Only one language is listed for Laos, but within the area of my own work in northern Laos, there are at least four languages with just a few hundred speakers that may be lost within the lifetimes of my friends' grandchildren.

In Southeast Asia area studies, language is not a major framework for understanding the diversity and dynamism of society. Interest in language has largely focused on the role of language policy within the post-colonial nation-building project. The creation of Bahasa Indonesia and Filipino as national languages within newly independent states where hundreds of other languages are spoken exemplifies the type of attention that researchers typically give to language. More recently, the current waves of globalization and regionalization have prompted some researchers to consider the pressures working on national languages and how these reflect national culture.

The global-regional-national nexus is a conceptual space in which area studies researchers exert much of their intellectual efforts. It is within this limited space that most work on lan-



Fig. 1 A Pa San recites funeral rites for deceased community leader in northern Laos, using Pana language that has borrowed heavily from Chinese. Throughout the three days funeral Pana, Khmu and Lao were used freely by community members.

guage has been done. This is surely an important framework of analysis that is highly relevant for understanding the past and present of the region's diverse people, but it seems to overlook two of the main strengths of area studies conducted at CSEAS. First is the firm belief in the centrality of fieldwork and empirical foundations for analysis. Second, is the importance of using local languages that is institutionalized in our work. If we are concerned with the present and future of the region's vast human diversity, the daily milieu of language use becomes a largely unexplored area of investigation for Southeast Asia area studies.

Given all the pressures on the linguistic diversity of Laos, one hypothesis would be that the Lao language, and perhaps Chinese, would assume new positions of dominance in societies, displacing smaller languages. However, observation of the interactions between social change and linguistic change can be extremely illuminating. For example, Bo Piet village, located 10 km from the Chinese border, is an interesting and perhaps counter-intuitive case. The village was founded by the Pana, a small Tibeto-Burman group that abandoned shifting cultivation in favor of salt-production when they arrived in the area from China in the late 1800s. Subsequently, the Pana have been joined by families from other ethnic groups, such as Khmu, Hmong, Lue and more recently Phunoy. Interestingly, despite its weak social position vis-à-vis Lao, Chinese and other larger languages spoken in the area, Pana is spoken widely among the villagers, regardless of ethnicity. Inter-marriage is common, and children of mixed parentage are being raised multilingual.

The Pana are known locally as polyglots, and have been successful in maintaining their small language in an increasingly cosmopolitan and multilingual environment. For them, using several languages over the course of a day is a part of daily life. At the same time, they enthusiastically explain how the ability to speak many languages is the main reason they have been able to navigate through a history migration, competition for resources, and negotiation with more powerful people. Nevertheless, the children of the village will have more chances to get a Lao education, and more opportunity to engage with the dynamic regional economy. The long-term viability of Pana seems suspect, even as the language enjoys a position of surprising prestige, practical use and resilience in the village today. With just one other Pana-speaking village in Laos, which faces its own linguistic and cultural pressures from surrounding groups, there is a fear that the Pana may disappear into the dust of national development and regional integration.

In fact, the Bo Piet case might not be as rare as it seems. Laos has embarked upon a development strategy that aims to relocate many mountain villages to roadsides, ostensibly in order to increase access to government services and opportunities to shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture. After the upgrading of Route 3, a major highway running through Bo Piet village to connect the Chinese and Thai borders, villages started to gather along the road through a mixture of government relocation and spontaneous migration. The resulting movement of people is bringing about a major spatial restructuring of Lao's ethno-linguistic diversity. Previously it was easier (but still somewhat problematic) to identify a village with one ethnic group, but now villages with three or more ethnic groups living together are increasingly common.




Fig. 2 Page from dictionary of Sino-Mun in Laos, giving pronunciation and meaning. The Mun are a Hmong-Mien group that use Classical Chinese writing for ritual and other purposes.

The project's social action plan, prepared in 2001 identified 114 villages living along the stretch of 230km. At the time of the study, 16 ethnic groups were identified along the road.

Twenty-five of the villages were recorded as being of mixed ethnicity. Of the 14 villages I am familiar with along the road, all were classified as single ethnicity. Currently 12 of these are mixed, most with three or more ethnic groups. While this may be increasing proficiency in Lao and producing disturbing breakdowns in community cohesion and cultural confidence, it seems that new patterns of multilingualism are emerging as a first stage of establishing new social relations.

As 'good Zomians', these people have typically maintained multilingual social settings that perplex the monolingual mainstream. But research has not even begun to scratch the surface of the new social conditions created along these communication arteries. An excellent starting point is the language use of the local people and how it effects not only expressions of identity, but also raises other important questions about the creation of networks of information exchange, negotiation with the market, access of resources, distribution of wealth and inter-group power relations. Interestingly, James Matisoff, a linguist with unparalleled breadth and depth of experience in the linguistic landscapes of Southeast Asia, has stated that "ultimately, the answer to the problem of language extinction is multilingualism" [Gibbs 2002]. Multilingualism is the norm for the majority of the globe, and the same can be said for Southeast Asia. What can we learn from how people use languages in these new social settings of 'development', and what does this tell us about the role of language in society more broadly?

These are the questions I presented to the Hakuraku Council last year at the interview with the Hakubi Project to Foster and Support Young Researchers. Since taking up my position at CSEAS in May, I have begun to implement a project to explore how the linguistic strategies of local people are reflected in the multilingual landscapes they live in. Ethnographic approaches to language use amidst rapid social change, such as that going on in the mountains of Laos, should open new windows onto other areas of interest in the Center as well. The warm welcome I have received has been an encouraging indicator of interest from a range of perspectives. In addition to the familiar area of the socio-economic aspects of livelihood transition in mainland Southeast Asia (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) No.

22241058), I am broadening my own regional experience to explore multilingualism and the creation of social capital in riverine Borneo society under the framework of human-nature relations in high biomass society (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) No. 810104300001). Furthermore, the G-COE re-examination of global sustainability paradigms (Global COE Program In Search of Sustainable Humanosphere in Asia and Africa) has been



Fig. 3 Chinese and Kayan people listen to an Iban-language radio broadcast in a multi-ethnic river basin in Sarawak, Malaysia.

a fertile area to begin discussing linguistic diversity as a view on the interface between the humanosphere and biosphere.

A disinterested observer may still doubt the importance of these language questions. What does it really matter if small languages follow the path of so many flora and fauna that have gone extinct, not to mention the countless languages that have disappeared over the millennia? Many scholars and activists concerned with the loss of languages are driven by the provocative assertion that “any reduction of language diversity diminishes the adaptational strength of our species because it lowers the pool of knowledge from which we can draw,” made not by a linguist, but a cultural anthropologist [Bernard 1992]. Drawing on a pool of shared knowledge also implies a cross-fertilization of ideas. Thus stopping safely short of cultural and linguistic determinism, the question is one of networks of mutual influence between culture, language and thought. Yet, only 25 percent of the world’s countries recognize two or more official languages. Even in places like Japan where monolingualism has simultaneously been a source of pride and phobia, the need to manage, nurture and thrive in a multilingual society has to become a key question for the new millennium.

This view stresses the need to see language not simply as a collection of tools for communication, but as a collective embodiment of all human intellectual heritage. Framing language in such terms opens up myriad avenues of investigation for Southeast Asia area studies. To many, linguistics is an impenetrable fortress of narrow investigation of the minutiae of languages. But the many sub-disciplines of linguistics – sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, anthropological linguistics, linguistic ecology and others – offer frameworks and methods that can be of use to us non-linguists as well. Opening the door to language as an analytical framework also challenges us to look beyond the specific language we use in our field activities, to step back and see the

languages we encounter in the field as a lens on society.

Bringing the story back to northern Laos, my Pana teacher, a 26-year old male who works for a government office in the provincial headquarters, exemplifies many of the dilemmas that local people face in the management of multiple linguistic repertoires. At first he was merely entertained by the idea of a Lao-speaking foreigner wanting to learn his language. Now, he clearly prefers to speak Pana when we are together in public. But what shapes his decisions about language use – a question of identity, strategy, or convenience? The answer is of course a combination of these. The ‘practice of language’ must also reflect the complex networks of social interaction, not to mention the multifaceted pressures from the layers of globalization and nation building, that converge on local settings. The study of language cannot be separated from the daily lives and decision making processes of the people who speak them. Uncovering the motivations, interests and strategies in language use at the most local level of daily practice will surely have application at other levels of analysis in the region and globally. In the end, it is the decisions that he, his friends and relatives make which will determine the fate of Pana.

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Burmese Migrants to Thailand: Vignettes from the Border as In-Between Space

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“Taung-bon tetde” (climbing up the hill in Burmese) was a phrase I often came across during my frequent research visits to Pa-an, the capital of Karen State in eastern Myanmar between 2004 and 2008. It referred to labor migration to Thailand across the eastern border hills. Up until the 1980s, the movement had been in the opposite direction, going westward to Yangon with migrants seeking opportunities in the old capital. In 1988, Prime Minister Chatchai of Thailand declared the border areas to be transformed “from battlefield to market.” Since then, the border has become a hub of economic activities, bringing migrant laborers and goods both legal and illicit, in addition to refugees. What is the nature of such border space, and how do the migrants cope in this in-between space? This is a part of my on-going research on both sides of the border.

The Myanmar Side: Paan

In my research, I was pursuing religious practices centered around a cluster of pagodas in and around Paan, involving the Buddhist Pwo Karen population. Newly-wed couples visit the pagodas to make wedding vows on auspicious days according to the lunar calendar. As many as one hundred couples visited one of the central pagodas on the most auspicious days, which provided a wonderful opportunity to conduct interviews. Here, I found that 70% of the men and 60% of the women I interviewed (all together 40 couples) had either experienced migrant labor in Thailand in the past, or had come to make vows to confirm a marital bond they had started during their sojourn in Thailand. Many of the laborers acquired one-year work permits, worked in factories, marine industries, construction, or as domestic workers. Some laborers stayed around Mae Sot, while the more ambitious moved on to Bangkok and further south. Wages were lower in the border zone such as Mae Sot where illegal laborers without permits could

work for daily wages as low as 60 baht, or 3–4,000 monthly for those with permits, and higher in Bangkok and its vicinity, going up to a stable monthly 4,000 to 6,000.

I was invited to a “wedding feast” held in a house near the pagoda. The 34-year-old “groom” who had just taken a vow at the pagoda had migrated to Thailand with his parents in his early childhood. Now, both he and his father work in a factory in Tak (near Mae Sot), extending work permits every year. He married a Thai woman five years ago and already had one child. This time, he returned with his parents and child to make the wedding vow, and to visit his father’s mother, who had been tending their house. It was upon the strong recommendation of his grandmother and aunt that he came back for this ritual wedding vow. His wife was terrified to cross the border, and refused to come with him, so instead he had brought a piece of her clothing to take along with him during the ritual vow. Now that he has paid his ritual dues, it might be a long time before he ever comes back again. His father, on the other hand, hopes to come back after he makes enough money to rebuild his house and make sure he has enough savings for his life in old age. The pagoda worship and wedding vows provided an important pretext for the migrants to come back.

In the same neighborhood, I found a completely out-of-place house under construction—also the product of labor migration (Fig. 2). There were only construction workers around, so I picked up some gossip, according to which, the owner couple were still working in Thailand to complete their house. They remitted the construction fee, and sent orders for the house via their parents. The gossip was that it would cost a total of 5 billion Kyat. The figure seemed even more outrageous than the building’s out-



Fig. 1 Dong dance performed by students of migrant children’s school in Mae Sot



Fig. 2 A migrant-laborer’s house under construction

look, since it would take a hard-earning couple more than 25 years to gain that amount even in Thailand. During a festival at the pagoda, a woman approached me, speaking in Thai. She had been working in Thailand for 15 years and now owns a tiny hair-salon shop near Saphaan Khwai in Bangkok. She came back as her mother passed away, leaving her mentally disabled brother alone. She planned to take her brother to a hospital in Bangkok, and then to come back and live with him in the village.

Migrant labor is thus daily fare in the region, and the money saved was used in important family rituals, house construction, medical fees, and daily living of the family members left on the Myanmar side. The migrants make use of the economic and other opportunities provided across the state boundary, and yet strangely for me, the sense I gained from these interviews and encounters was that the space beyond the boundary was imagined more as continuous space, rather than as something beyond a tall boundary. I thus decided to see how things looked from the other side of the border.

The Thai Side: Mae Sot

Since 2006, I started visiting Mae Sot on the Thai side, the first destination for most of the labor migrants from the Paan area. In 1992, the Thai government started issuing work permits to illegal migrants, to regularize their presence. When the Thai government launched a campaign for registering laborers for work permits in 2001, there were 40000 registered in Mae Sot. Even though at the time they had to pay 4500 baht for the process, it did not mean that labor conditions had improved for the migrant laborers who took up 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) that Thais were no longer willing to take. Often, the work permits were kept by the employers, immobilizing the workers. Some workers went on strike, but this was extremely risky, since it meant they would go on a black list and this could lead to an increase in risks of unemployment and deportation. While having work permits may not seem to be much of an advantage, illegal workers without permits are even worse off. They may be paid as little as half to one-third of the standard local wage.

Some lived in Mae Sot town and worked in factories, resorts, and homes, while others lived in outlying villages as agricultural labor. According to local common knowledge, in terms of health and educational facilities and the general standard of living, there is a hierarchy from the refugee camps at the better end, to illegal workers without work permits working in factories, and the illegal agricultural laborers at the lowest end. Illegal non-permit workers live constantly under fear of deportation, and their wages are extremely low, whether they work in farms or factories. These are usually workers with small children who cannot risk moving to other areas, and prefer to have their children study at the migrant laborer's schools. Yet, even this, they would say, is better than their life back home.

In the border areas, volunteer educational institutions called "learning centers" (schools outside the formal curriculum) are set up for the children of migrants, mostly with foreign aid. Such "schools" had been founded since late 1980s, and in 1999, the Burmese Migrant Workers Education Committee was set up by an association of such schools. At the time of interviews this as-

sociation covered 46 schools with 6,000 children and 300 teachers. While the students, as children of migrant laborers, had no immigrant status, their school student pass provided them a form of identification, at least in Mae Sot and vicinity. Among such schools I found one run by Mahn Bala Sein, a Pwo Karen from Paan since 1990. The more than 200 students were mostly Karen, and the languages used in teaching were Pwo and Sgaw Karen, Burmese, English, and Thai. Many of the students were boarders, as their parents either worked elsewhere, or remained on the other side of the border sending only their children. Life in Mae Sot, even without proper immigrant status, would be much better than being constantly under threat of harassment and/or recruitment by one of the ethnic armies in the border area on the Myanmar side. After finishing their studies, children go on to seek employment either with or without work-permit.

Mahn Bala Sein, along with other such schools with Karen students promoted the teaching of Karen cultural practices. I happened to visit him at the time of the annual dong dance competitions. The dong dance is a distinct cultural feature in the Karen State and a well-known Karen cultural marker in Burma. It is performed at various State gatherings, Karen national events, as well as local events such as temple festivals. Annual competitions are held, and innumerable troupes participate from all over Karen State as well as from the border. Every year, the students at this Learning Center participate in the competition and go to dance at the Karen New Year festival, both of which take place on the Myanmar side of the border. These Learning Centers are indeed in-between spaces, where the students study according to an officially unrecognized curriculum which hopefully prepares them to adapt to either side of the border while reaffirming their cultural ties.

What these vignettes from the field show is that the border area constitutes an in-between and fluid space even though it is firmly within Thai territory so that the Thai authorities can move them out any time. It is a game with no end, since the Thai employers cannot do without the migrants' cheap labor, and the laborers are better off even in spite of the hardship. It is a cat-and-mouse chase where deportees expelled to Myawaddy just as soon turn back to Mae Sot. In this in-between space, the laborers rely on social networks and cultural activities across the border, providing a fluid zone of contact. We can also see that state control and citizenship are never a given but constantly under negotiation. As such, the everyday life of the migrants is founded on the continuity of social and cultural space. Yet at the same time opportunities are different on the two sides thereby luring the laborers to cross the border. How migrants make use of this continuity and difference in the fluid in-between space demands further analytical inquiry.

Caring for the Present Future: Reconfiguring Migrant's Affective Labor to Care for Japanese Elderly

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In recent years, care for the ageing in Japan has become an area of intense concern for academics and the public. Huge questions loom, and the implications are significant – who will provide care, how can it be valorized, and what framework should it be organized in? With these issues taking the center stage of public and policy debate, academics have taken up a keen interest in the challenges of meeting Japan's social welfare needs. Furthermore, this framework has been showing strong tendencies to mesh into a growing global economy for care.

At present, a deficit of caregivers and home helpers has been leading to subtle, yet concrete transnational expressions of social relations as the ratification and implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with both Indonesia and the Philippines have seen the introduction of foreign nurses. On the radar, this has taken place quite publically, yet domestically, another movement has run parallel to this: the creation of prefectural-level care-giver courses for long-term resident foreign nationals of whom Filipino nationals have been predominant. In this context, I want to briefly look at and introduce specific conjunctions that tie together two nations, Japan and the Philippines, and discuss how transnational relations are located within what I will call curoscope, a transnational sphere of administering and managing care at not just a local state level, but also a trans-regional and global one. The formation of this sphere is in part due to demographic and societal change in Japan which plays a role in changing the conceptualizations of the capacity of migrant residents, leading to the reorganization of relations within Southeast Asia and further beyond.

Japan has undergone great demographic shifts leading to transformations in intergenerational relations within the nation. As Japanese put off birth, and the present welfare system has extended life, internal changes have acted as a trigger to structure relations with surrounding nations. Japan's present day social landscape is riddled with anxiety over the high stakes involved in care for a burgeoning aging and invalid population. Over 22.1% of the population is now over sixty-five¹, and this population is projected to rise to 40.5% by 2055. In light of this present sobering prognosis, the health sector has seen a surge in demand for affective labor, of which there is currently a shortfall. This is in part due to the fact that care-giver salaries and the status of care work are low in comparison to other occupations: even where there is a sense of satisfaction for care-givers in their work, many nevertheless quit due to the inadequacy of wages to support everyday life². These domestic changes have seen Japan realign its economy to express new relations with the

Philippines, which in turn has strategically realigned its economy to supply workers for new emerging markets. Yet, to a certain degree this relation has resided upon producing an image of nations and what they can supply. Furthermore, these images are feminized by the international commodification of the reproductive labor of care givers (predominately female) and their potential outsourcing to regions which require nurses or careworkers.

What factors have been involved in re-determining relations? In the case of both countries, one backdrop has been an ambivalent relationship over the past 30 years. Various erroneous articulations of images of Filipinas have ranged from those of mail-order bride to entertainer; from victims to gold-digger; and as a source of exoticism and otherness. External 'third party' influence has also been crucial in locating female others in Japan. Up until 2005, a steady flow of 'entertainers' from the Philippines had continued to enter Japan on short-term visas whereby the Japanese government under pressure from the U.S. reformed the Immigration and Control and Refugee Act. This led to a sudden sharp decrease of women (approx 42%) entering from the Philippines under the category of entertainer. This change also took place through advocacy for reform in the deployment of Filipino entertainers and pressure from the U.S. Department of State's publication of its annual Trafficking in Persons Report which pointed out that Japan had yet to comply in improving the situation of persons trafficked to the country. However, this should not be seen as a foreclosure, for it operated as a form of gradual inter-regional restructuring not only due to demographic transformation in Japan, but also macro-level processes between both countries, mainly the need to investigate the possible management and transfer of foreign workers. As such, in the public sphere, the shift from 'entertainer' to 'carer' came to be partly represented under the rubric of an EPA which in terms of human capital promoted "the trans-border flow of goods, persons, services and capital between Japan and the Philippines³" in the case of nurses. However this change of focus framed in supposedly mutually beneficial terms has elided the foundations upon which the relations are built: labor export, the subsequent alienation of individual members of families in one country and the reconfiguring of their global care potential directed for other overseas markets.

What needs to be made clear here is that we can see a pattern whereby an export-orientated strategy rests on capitalizing on the notion of service in which the transfer – or in this case care

1. *Heisei 21 nen Koreishakai hakusho* (White Paper on Ageing) Japanese Cabinet Office Policy on Ageing Society (2009)

2. As of 2007, the official monthly wage for care workers stood at 214,886 yen (\$2318). This has subsequently increased to 231,366 yen (\$2564) as of 2010. *Heisei 21 nendo kaigo jujisha shogun joukyo nado chosa no kekka. Shakai hoshu shingikai kaigo kyuufuhi bunkakai* (2010).

services-- leads to what the academic Lise Isaken has described as 'externalized costs' [2008]. These costs are the provisioning of fundamental 'affective care' for others but at the expense of developing it with close kin, family and children in home countries. This re-packaging of a relationship (from entertainment based services to care based services) is not however, purely the result of macro-level forces. The EPA acts as an interface between two nations, expressing a relation within a wider global care chain expressed within a complicated curoscope where management and the administering of care for/by the nation takes place. But, it has done so alongside a movement within Japan that uses local Filipino residents as part of a litmus test. Research in late 2007 showed that nationwide there were 10 courses which were targeting Filipino residents [Takahata 2009]

In order to understand how a curoscope can operate it is worth understanding the concept of global care chains developed by Arlie Hochschild. Care chains is a concept that refers to the personal links developed between people across the globe in both paid and unpaid labor, particular affective and caring labor [Hochschild 2000]. This leads to not only displacement of individuals from families, but their very capacity to develop empathy-affecting relations with close kin as they tend to other's kin. Care chains, have often described as the outsourcing of labor, yet it should also be understood as a form of in-sourcing. In Japan's case, long-term migrant residents with linguistic and affective social capital perceived to be readily available for care, can be seen as a form of in-sourcing. How Japanese actors who run courses or care homes re-orientate themselves vis-à-vis foreigners who provide care for elderly Japanese nationals needs to be understood as not just part of a local care chain, but also a regional one. Long term residents in such a context can come to bear a triple burden of caring for families in Japan, Japanese nationals in care homes and supporting family members in the Philippines. These local (Japanese) actors also react to changing notions of care in their sphere of reciprocity and empathy-affecting relations transnational actors can bring with themselves. My own research with a local care giver course run exclusively for Filipino nationals suggests strongly that actors (Japanese nationals providing training courses and care managers who employ them) high up in this hierarchical chain do recognize the flight of care from one intimate space to another, yet they genuinely desire to participate in their own understanding of what constitutes a 'socio-emotional commons'.

The flow of transnational care sources, when grounded and re-imagined in new contexts, can suggest that in Japan's case, previous encounters on the global arena, the rise of international marriages through the presence of Filipinos in Japan from the early 80s, laid tentative groundwork. Actors 'affect', something that can be deployed as a service, has become a factor in re-orientating perceptions of and toward Filipinas and their supposed latent capacity to be the 'good carer'. To give an example of this perception as recently as 2008, one of Japan's best selling tabloid magazines Shukan Post, carried an article on Filipinos in Japan with the following title 'whose hand are you going to hold when you depart?' - Filipino hostesses attend the final moments'. The subtitle underneath continued, 'words of grati-

tude continue for the Filipinas who commit themselves for less than 200 thousand yen a month'. In a corner of the article an undated photo from a previous decade shows four Filipinas, microphones in hand gazing into the camera from a stage with the caption underneath stating 'one-time hostesses from the Filipina pub boom are now becoming helpers'. The article in the magazine then shows Filipinas dressed in nursing clothes working with the elderly in a home. The continuity here suggests is that it will be Filipinas who bear a shift which in name (as carers) does seem to offer new chances, but in form, is a repetition of offering a reworking of previous image of caring, gentle females. Now, as carers, female migrants are re-appraised through needs to respond to demographic change and offer care under a new mantle. This sets one perceptual backdrop in understanding how some foreign nationals in Japan are reoriented as a resource for procurement for caring for an elderly population. Previous relations inevitably inform new ones with a discursive reallocation of a new set of categories creating a new series of relationships.

The ties between two nations suggests the deepening of an intimate and complicated relationship that will continue to evolve. Beyond Japan, improving lifestyles across the Asia-Pacific region will undoubtedly see other nations mesh into a regional curoscope as careworkers and nurses circulate themselves, and their affective labor will potentially produce new configurations of care in the process. The flow of actors will need detailed research to better understand micro-macro level relations evolving through specific nation-state interactions. And, the curoscope that I have suggested here also needs a more critical and detailed inquiry from multiple directions. To do so will allow us to better define its dimensions especially when actors histories and conceptualizations form part of the political battleground over the care of ageing bodies within global capitalist production.

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For Better or for Worse, More Are Coming Every Day; Economic Development and Migration Flows to Riau Province, Sumatra

Retno Kusumaningtyas
G-COE Researcher CSEAS

I first visited Riau Province in early 1998 and it was immediately apparent that this province was not like other Indonesian provinces I had visited. More than anywhere else, the hustle and bustle of big business emerges all around. This was again confirmed two to three years later, when I strengthened my fieldwork experience by visiting other Indonesian provinces such as Jambi, South Sumatra, Lampung, and several provinces on Kalimantan. Compared to those provinces, Riau's business environment was far more advanced, particularly in natural resources-related businesses.

Since then, the question as to why Riau Province is so different to other provinces that on paper have similar conditions concerning their position within the Indonesian republic and their natural resources, has lingered in my mind. Neighboring provinces such as Jambi and West Sumatra for instance, lack a similar business environment. At a symposium at Riau University in November 2010, I was asked exactly this question: why the difference? The logical answer I felt, was its geographic position close to one of the major trading hubs in Asia, namely Singapore, as well as the important fossil fuel mining businesses in the province, which have combined in not only opening the door to the province, but also putting it clearly on the map, and allowing it to grow faster than its neighbors in terms of (outside) investment and infrastructure. Though not verified in great detail, it is a hypothesis that seems highly plausible.

In demographic data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics in 2010, the population growth of Riau Province topped all provinces in Indonesia in the 2005-10 period, with an average annual growth rate of 4.11 % versus a national rate of 1.57%. This percentage is also quite striking because it is some 1.36% higher than the number recorded for the second province on the list, Central Kalimantan. However, this high growth rate did not come about until the early 1980s, growing from about 2.1 million in 1980 to 5.4 million in 2010. This growth has primarily been generated by migration flows from neighboring provinces and Java.

It appears that in the last few years, Riau Province has become increasingly attractive for migrants. According to data released by the Provincial Government of Riau, migrant communities compose a large portion of the population in most districts. In 2000, the migrant population aged 5 years or more was 44.7% of the district population on average. Most of these migrants were found to be Javanese (about 25%), while the rest were made up predominantly of ethnic Minang, Batak, Banjar and Chinese. It has been more than a decade since these numbers were recorded, and currently they are assumed to be much higher.

The attraction of Riau Province for migrants cannot be separated from the strong business vibe that can be felt there. This assumption was confirmed by several conversations I had within migrant communities. They prefer to move to Riau Province, be-

cause they hear from other migrants going before them that it is easy to make money and start a new life there. But is it true that it is indeed easier to make money in Riau Province and start a new life there? From my field studies thus far, it appears that this assumption can be said to be true for about three out of four people. Most of the migrants coming to Riau are either young adults that have just started a family and see few good options for building a long-term future in their place of origin, or people who have for some reason fallen on hard times in their place of origin and seek a new beginning.

The two types of migration flowing into Riau Province are that of government-sponsored migration (commonly known as "transmigration") and self-initiated or spontaneous migration. Government-sponsored migration is most often associated with the development of oil palm plantations, industrial timber plantations or rice production. Meanwhile, spontaneous migration is most commonly associated with a search for agricultural land or labor work.

The flow of migrants to Riau Province cannot be seen separate from the various commodity development schemes that have been implemented in the province. Initial development is linked to the beginning of oil exploitation in Riau Province around 1936, when the colonial government began issuing concessionary rights for petroleum drilling in Minas. At that time, only South Sumatra had seen similar developments. At present, Riau Province is the largest contributor to national fossil fuel production in Indonesia.

In the records of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia over 2010, Riau province accounts for more than 46% of national oil production, or an average daily production of 380,807 barrels. However, the relatively limited number of laborers involved in the industry does not allow for it to absorb a substantial part of the newly arrived migrants into the province. Indirectly on the other hand, the influx of oil money greatly supports the region's rapid economic growth. High revenues for the provincial government for instance, allow for a more rapid devel-



Smallholders transporting their harvest to a nearby crude palm oil mill

opment of infrastructure and other facilities. This effect has been even greater after Indonesia implemented a policy for increased regional autonomy in the late 1990s, resulting in a greater stream of revenue from the oil production staying in Riau Province rather than flowing to the national government in Jakarta.

In the forestry sector, a massive exploitation of forest wood began around 1975, when the Indonesian government began issuing large-scale logging concessions. In 2000, 77 logging companies were active in extracting timber from the province's natural forest. Supporting these logging companies, there were some 312 related plants or facilities, such as sawmills, plywood mills, and chip mills. At that time, roundwood production in Riau Province was also considerable, until the early 2000s it contributed to around 35% of the national roundwood production tally. These combined industries not only accommodated the arrival of migrant labor into Riau Province, they also opened up previously isolated areas by constructing a web of logging roads through the province, allowing for new settlements inside the forested areas to appear.

This role of the forestry industry in attracting migrants from outside the province became more formal when the government introduced programs combining forest plantation development and transmigration. These began to bloom in the early 1990s. For the year 2002 for example, the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration recorded 6 projects that combined the development of forest plantation companies with transmigration projects involving some 2,250 households.

Another type of commodity development that has significantly influenced the flow of migrants into Riau Province is the palm oil industry, starting in the early 1980's. Since then, development of oil palm plantations has been very fast, from about 2000 hectares in the 1980s to over 2.3 million in 2010. This large number shows that oil palm plantations are responsible for more than 26% of land use in the province. Half of these plantations are managed by smallholders, while the rest are under management of companies or investors. This massive level of crude palm oil or CPO production has made Riau Province one of the major players in the world market for palm oil. In the year 2010, the Riau Government claimed that the province produced 7 million tons of CPO, equal to almost 12% of total world production.

In this context the widely publicized global demand for palm oil has attracted investors both large and small, as well as smallholders and migrants, to take part in this industry. Various government policies are also in place to boost the development of the palm oil industry, pushing it to become the principle industry over the province in the last few years. Incentives include infrastructural improvements, such as roads and harbors, and provisions allowing for a so-called tax holiday for investors.

To support its industry, Indonesia has developed a special system for managing oil palm plantations involving smallholders, known as PIR (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat/Nucleus Estate Smallholders). It is a production system that combines an estate plantation (nucleus) managed by big investors with smallholder plantations managed by local communities, and it has become a common vehicle for migrants to settle in Riau Province. In 2007, the Office of the Governor of Riau stated that PIR Plantations in the province covered 901,276 hectares, with 555,543 hectares being owned by the estate plantations and the rests by smallholders represent-



Acacia timber on its way to a pulp and paper mill

ing some 172,866 households.

Visiting Riau Province you cannot help but be overwhelmed by the images set forth by the sea of oil palms. They have spurred growth and migration, and will likely continue to do so as long as the industry keeps promising lucrative profits and livelihood security for its smallholders. Considering the provincial minimum wage in Riau Province stands at IDR 1.2 million a month, the eagerness for people to get involved in the industry is understandable: at the current market price, even a 2 hectares oil palm plantation (2 hectares being the smallest unit a smallholder can obtain through the government-sponsored programs) can earn a household on average between IDR 2 and 3 millions a month.

Naturally questions can be raised on whether this seemingly unbridled growth and opportunity in Riau Province can persist. Pressures on natural resources have always been high in the province, but as land availability and land quality are diminishing, will the province continue to be able to absorb the continuing migration of people looking for a better future?

With the long-term prospects of the oil industry in Riau Province and Indonesia as a whole in question due to diminishing supplies and lack of investment, the traditional backbone of the Province's wealth is clearly under threat. This raises the question of whether the lucrative natural resource based industries that are now surpassing it, most notably the oil palm industry, can provide sufficient impetus for the province to fully adapt to its changing reality. With rotation times of the nutrient-hungry oil palm plantations at about 25 years, there is no real experience with the consequences on soil quality and future production levels of implementing a second rotation at the current large scale. These leaves us with worrying questions about future viability.

Thus, it is apparent that the current economic model in Riau Province will have to undergo vast change, and in its wake so will the social and industrial premise of its society. How the province will address these issues in a time of relative boom is of great significance to its future prosperity. If opportunities in the province dry up, the continued influx of highly motivated migrants may become little more than an additional nail in its coffin, but if new opportunities are sensibly developed, these same migrants may form the basis for a truly interesting experiment in change, development and sustainability in Indonesia. Either way, Riau Province will be among the first to experience first hand.

CSEAS is accepting applicants semiannually for about 14 positions for scholars and researchers who work on Southeast Asia, or any one of the countries in that region, to spend 3 to 12 months in Kyoto to conduct research, write, or pursue other scholarly activities in connection with their field of study. Since 1963, more than 200 distinguished scholars have availed themselves of the Center's considerable scholarly resources and enjoyed the invigorating atmosphere of scenic Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan and the main repository of the country's cultural treasures, to pursue their interests in Southeast Asian area studies. The Center's multi-disciplinary character and the diverse research interests of its faculty offer visiting scholars an ideal opportunity for the exchange of ideas and the cultivation of comparative perspectives. The highly competitive selection process has brought to the Center in recent years researchers from Southeast Asian countries, Bangladesh, China, Korea, and western countries including the United States and France. The visiting fellows represent various basic disciplines in their study of Southeast Asia, and their official posts in their home institutions include teacher, researcher, librarian, journalist, and NGO


worker. Information and Technology (IT) experts who conduct research on Southeast Asia are also joining the Center, not only to manage various database systems but also to construct academic networks for area study throughout the world. Successful applicants receive an appropriate stipend to cover international travel, housing, and living expenses in Kyoto. Research funds will also be provided to facilitate his/her work. Funds will also be allocated for domestic travel, subject to government regulations, and a number of other facilities are available to visiting scholars. Fellows will be expected to reside in Kyoto for the duration of their fellowship period. Fellows are normally invited to deliver a public lecture during their term at the Center and encouraged to submit an article for possible publication in the Center's quarterly journal, *Southeast Asian Studies* and to contribute to the online journal *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*. CSEAS also received researchers, both Japanese and foreign, who visit on their own funds or on external fellowships.

Name	Period	Affiliation	Research Topic
Islam, Tazul	10.01.2010~ 03.31.2011	Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, American International University- Bangladesh	Microfinance in Myanmar: Potential for Future Growth
Holt, John Clifford	11.01.2010~ 04.30.2011	Professor of Humanities in Religion and Asian Studies, Department of Religion & Asian Studies Program, Bowdoin College	Theravada Traditions: Overcoming Dukkha in the Religious Cultures of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia
Holt, Sree Padma	11.01.2010~ 04.30.2011	Executive Director, Inter-collegiate Sri Lanka (ISLE) Program, Lecturer, Asian Studies Program, Bowdoin College	Origins and Transformations of Goddess Cults in Andhra Pradesh, India
Sitepu, Apallidya	11.01.2010~ 04.30.2011	Librarian, Center for Scientific Documentation and Information, Indonesian Institute of Sciences	Compilation of Bibliography on Indonesian Religious Publication at CSEAS library
Fuady, Ahmad Helmy	11.26.2010~ 03.31.2011	Researcher, Research Centre for Regional Resources, Indonesian Institute of Sciences	Elite and Rural-Agricultural Biased Development in Indonesia and Nigeria
Bahadur Kc, Krishna	11.28.2010~ 11.27.2012	Researcher, Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, University of Hohenheim	Livelihood Mapping of Mainland Southeast Asia using GIS and Living Standard Criteria
Hoskins, Janet Alison	12.01.2010~ 05.31.2011	Professor, Anthropology Department, University of Southern California	Indigenous Vietnamese Religions in Transnational Perspective
Jintrawet, Attachai	12.01.2010~ 05.31.2011	Associate Professor, Crop Sciences and Natural Resources Department, Faculty of Agriculture, Chiang Mai University	Impacts of Climate Changes Scenarios on Rice Production Systems in Thailand and Its Implications to Food Security
Bahdad	10.01.2010~ 12.31.2010	Doctoral Student, Marine Science and Technology, Bogor Agricultural University	Comparison of Marine Resources Management between Japan and Indonesia
Dao, Truong Minh	01.14.2011~ 01.30.2011	Researcher, Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University	Five Decades of Interaction between Land and Forest Resources and People in Vietnam Northern Mountain Region
Thiry, Martin	01.20.2011~ 05.18.2011	Researcher, East-West Center, University of Hawaii	Colonial Policing in the Dutch East Indies, The Case of Ambonese
Fabros, Alinaya Sybilla Lactao	01.22.2011~ 07.21.2011	Researcher, Focus on the Global South	Re-imagining citizenship under Globalization: Perspectives of Global Workers in Malaysia and Japan on the Discourse and Practice of Political Agency
Nguyen Van Chinh	03.01.2011~ 04.30.2011	Vice Director, Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Vietnam National University	The Growing Presence of China in the Mekong Region and Its Influence
Sripama, Thanyathip	03.01.2011~ 08.31.2011	Senior Researcher and Lecturer, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University	Ho Chi Minh in Thailand: The Struggle for Vietnamese Independence




Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in Japanese) No. 22
Living with the Risks: Risk Responses of the Lower-classes in Bangkok
『都市を生きる人々——バンコク・都市下層民のリスク対応』
Tamaki Endo, 2011. Kyoto University Press.

In the era of globalization, uncertainty and insecurity is increasing. This book analyzes risk managing process of urban lower-class by focusing on two dimensions: residence and occupation. What is role of “individual,” “household,” “community” and “society” in the risk management process? What are the “successes” and upward mobility of the urban lower-class? What do the dynamics of the Informal Economy mean for the city? This inspiring volume cuts in the core of disparity issues, taking advantage of a combination of multi-disciplinary framework and diligent fieldwork. It succeeds in depicting people’s survival in the wake of diverse risks in Bangkok.



Transborder Governance of Forests, Rivers and Seas
Wil de Jong, Denyse Snelder and Noboru Ishikawa, eds. 2010. Earthscan.


This book illustrates the diversity of transborder natural resources, the pressures that they experience and the opportunities for monitoring and enforcement through multinational regulatory regimes. It presents ten cases of transborder natural resources that are of interest to two or more neighbouring countries, and that are subject to or in need of bilateral or multinational coordination. The cases include the exploitation of marine resources in international waters, rivers travelling through several countries and contiguous tropical forests across national borders, and where commodities, nature conservation or even territorial integrity are at stake. They are drawn from across the globe, including flood management in Western Europe, tropical forests demarcation and conservation in the Western Amazon and Central Africa, hydropower development in the Mekong region of South-east Asia, and marine resource and fisheries exploitation in the waters of Japan, South-east Asia and Australia.



Southeast Asian Studies

Published since 1963, this peer-reviewed journal carries the results of important research on Southeast Asia by scholars from Kyoto University and other institutions. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies accepts submissions all year round that contribute to the development of Southeast Asian Studies. Access to the journal is free.

For more information please contact the editorial office, or visit our editorial office homepage.
http://www.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/edit/publications/seas/index_en.htm



Award

The Vietnamese version of *Farming with Fire and Water: The Human Ecology of a Composite Swiddening Community in Vietnam's Northern Mountains*, edited by Tran Duc Vien, A. Terry Rambo, and Nguyen Thanh Lam, received the silver (second) prize in the Vietnamese Publishers Association annual national book awards, 2010.

Publications at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies

The Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University was established in 1963 and has led the way in conducting detailed and empirically valuable studies across a broad multidisciplinary field. Since its inception, researchers from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds have devoted themselves to the investigation of Southeast Asia within a multidisciplinary framework.

During a period of constant dramatic political realignment and global economic integration within and across the region, CSEAS has consistently dealt with the need to address diverse research agendas and deepen knowledge in changing times brought about by fresh challenges. As a center of excellence in Area Studies, CSEAS has promoted its commitment to its field through a solid history of publication activities that stretches back to the 1960s. At present CSEAS publishes five series which each aim to present original cutting edge academic research which contributes to the further development of Southeast Asian Studies.

The first monograph series was started in 1966 in conjunction with Hawaii University Press, and manuscripts were initially authored exclusively by faculty. However, since 2000 the series has been opened up to outside contributors both within and beyond Japan. This series has focused on topics such as tropical forests, rice production, paddy field cultivation and so on. The other series, *Kyoto Area Studies on Asia* (English) jointly published by Trans Pacific Press and Kyoto University Press, has also allowed researchers to demonstrate the depth of their commitment to Southeast Asian Studies and share their rigorous empirical results. Most recent titles in this series have dealt with timely topics such as the impact of agrarian development programs on rural class structure in Bangladesh; the discourse of adat landownership that played an important role in peasant resistance against Indonesia's state development programs; a 15 year research project of composite swiddening in Vietnam's northern mountains; a comparative analysis of middle classes in Southeast Asia; and an analysis of the ways in which East Asia has grappled with ongoing regional integration of economies in the area. In 2009, CSEAS also started a new English language series in collaboration between Kyoto University Press and National University of Singapore Press. This series was created to deal with the increasing demand for effective outlets of scholarship on Asian Studies by Asian scholars. This series has been set up as a new step toward securing paths for scholars both within and outside Japan, to showcase high quality Asian Scholarship and appeal to a wider audience.

Aside from the English language series, CSEAS also publishes in Japanese. The first series in Japanese was the *Kyoto Area Studies on Asia* (Chiiki Kenkyu Sosho). This was superseded by a new series started in 1999 to showcase Japanese scholars work through the Kyoto University Press.

Recent publications include a detailed study of the effects of modernization upon nature and environment under the Javanese colonial government in the first quarter of the 19th century; a rich analysis of state-military relationships and the power structure of military Burma; religious practices in the peripheries of mainland Southeast Asia; the formation of multi-ethnicity in Southeast Asia within the framework of modernization and colonization; and an empirically rich ethnography that analyses the emergence of national space through fieldwork conducted on the borderlands between Malaysian Sarawak and Indonesian Borneo. What all of these series aim to do is place the importance of empirical fieldwork, its write-up and presentation to both a specialized and multi-disciplinary academic audience. To process publications CSEAS has a dedicated publications committee composed of faculty members of varied disciplinary background which accepts manuscripts all year round. These are carefully checked and then sent out to academic specialists who peer review all submissions. This is done to assure the high quality of all manuscripts that make each series.

CSEAS also produces a quarterly journal *Southeast Asian Studies* (SEAS) which has been published continuously since 1963. SEAS is bilingual, and reflects the CSEAS principle of fieldwork based, multidisciplinary, and contemporary approaches toward research and publishes work from various fields of study on Southeast Asia including the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. Peer reviewed by a broad range of specialists, the center accepts articles for review all year round.


Finally, CSEAS has also recently launched "International Program of Collaborative Research, CSEAS [IPCR-CSEAS] as one of the Japanese Ministry of Education's Joint Use/Research Centers. One of the IPCR-CSEAS objectives is to aim at publishing world class academic journals and monographs and offers a grant for supporting publications aimed at an international audience. At present two titles are in preparation for publication in 2011. CSEAS is constantly looking for new opportunities to expand its publishing activities and hopes to play a central role in developing new questions and paradigms for the 21st century by bringing Southeast Asian Studies to a broader audience over the coming years.

For authors with any potential manuscripts for Southeast Asian Studies or for our book series please contact the Editorial Office for more information.

editorial@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp

In Memorium: Donna J. Amoroso

1961-2011



CEAS deeply mourns the untimely passing of *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia* founding editor Donna J. Amoroso on January 22, 2011. She was fifty years old.

In her years at the Center, Dr. Amoroso was instrumental in planning, launching and editing the multilingual online journal, the first of its kind to showcase review articles, commentaries, and features by Southeast Asia specialists and public intellectuals in English, Japanese, Thai, Filipino, and Bahasa Indonesia (with Chinese as the most recent addition).

She was a first-class editor who helped bring out the best in other scholars in the Center by working with them to produce English-language articles and books that were not only lucid and substantive, but also well-written.

But she was also a scholar in her own right. She wrote her doctoral dissertation in Southeast Asian History from Cornell University on "Traditionalism and the Ascendancy of the Malay Ruling Class in Colonial Malaya," and published thoughtful articles on colonialism and nationalism in Southeast Asia, on Malay historiography, and on comparative politics in Malaysia and the Philippines. With Patricio Abinales, she co-authored *State and Society in the Philippines* (Rowan and Littlefield), a Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2006 that provided a new perspective with which to understand Philippine history and current events.

Not just editor and scholar, Donna was friend and colleague to many people in the Center. For visiting researchers from Southeast Asia and elsewhere, she provided warm hospitality and intellectual camaraderie. For students, she provided

friendship and much-needed advice on scholarly and personal matters. For colleagues, she was the moving force behind *KRSEA* and many other publications that showcased the Center and its activities. For those of us who are privileged to have gotten to know her over the years, she was witty, sharp, broad-minded, widely read, an excellent cook, a loving wife and mother, a good friend, a companion of the heart. We shall greatly miss her.

*Do not stand at my grave and weep
I am not there; I do not sleep.
I am a thousand winds that blow,
I am the diamond glints on snow,
I am the sun on ripened grain,
I am the gentle autumn rain.
When you awaken in the morning's hush
I am the swift uplifting rush
Of quiet birds in circled flight.
I am the soft stars that shine at night.
Do not stand at my grave and cry,
I am not there; I did not die.*

-Mary Frye, date unknown

Remembering Donna

Rufa Cagoco-Guiam
Visiting Research Fellow CSEAS

Donna and I were introduced to each other long before we met in person. Her husband, Jojo Abinales, a long time friend and associate in doing Mindanao studies, had already mentioned her to me several times. I knew that Jojo was quite fortunate to have met his match – in intellectual pursuits, in music, in art, and in films. Meeting her, and staying with them in their home in Tokyo and in Yokohama was for me a distinct privilege of having been close to and on personal terms with two great scholars, as far as Philippine, Malaysian and Southeast Asian studies are concerned. Everyday interaction in the Donna-Jojo household was always a delightful intellectual exercise, sparked most of the time with Donna's smart remarks as counterfoil to Jojo's verbal antics.

But it was Donna's gentle but firm maternal ways that really struck me. As a mother myself, I could relate to Donna's oft-repeated concerns about raising a headstrong daughter: trying to find the "best" ways for disciplining without being too harsh, balancing love with firm grips on constant and consistent "rules of engagement." We shared all these concerns over our breakfast coffee in Yokohama, or when we were cooking some Filipino vegetable dishes, like pinakbet (stir fried assorted tropical vegetables, traditionally cooked in fish sauce) and adobong kangkong, (stir-fried leafy vegetables, cooked in a combination of vinegar and soy sauce) which she relished so much.

Like the scholar that she was, she always brought a pen and a notebook in front of the stove and recorded all the things I did to cook a certain dish. She said she wanted to know in detail the "secrets" of my cooking so she could replicate the taste of the dish when she cooks it! But it was not only in cooking where she showed her scholarly attitude. With a special maternal pride, she showed me her small books about Angela after she and Jojo first got her: Angela's first English words, which later on proved to be unwieldy because of the speed of Angela's progress in speaking English; Angela's many "firsts". All these she recorded painstakingly, in handwriting, in different small notebooks.

In late 2008, Donna was diagnosed to have Stage 1 breast cancer (this was in Japan, but actually it was Stage 3 already, according to her doctor in the US). It came as a shock to me, since at that time I was just recovering from grieving over the death of my only brother – also to another type of cancer- that of the liver. My brother was only 48 when he died, and Donna was also of the same age at that time. She immediately asked me, "Maybe I will go too, at this age?" I argued that my brother had an unhealthy lifestyle since he was a teenager and his cancer was discovered when it was at its terminal stage, when there was no turning back. I told her in the most reassuring way that I could, that she was far healthier than my brother was, and except for the cancer, she was otherwise a very healthy person. She could very well lick

it, like all other women cancer survivors I know, I told her.

With my stay in Japan about to end, I had to bid goodbye to Jojo, Donna and Angela, in January 2009. Little did I expect that it would be my last physical interaction with Donna, whom I have considered not only as a friend, but also a part of my extended family. Despite the distance, Jojo, Donna and I continued our interaction through e-mail, and Jojo once visited my home in Mindanao early last year. Jojo had shared that Donna was fast recovering through a combination of chemotherapy and radiation treatments, and he never indicated any possibility of relapse. When Donna knew I would be a paper presenter in the forthcoming AAAS conference in Honolulu this March, she immediately wrote to invite me to go to Washington DC to visit them there. So it was a tremendous shock to me when I got news of Donna's passing. It was even sadder to note that it was not cancer that got her, it was something unexplainable – like a lighted candle burning the last part of its wick, or a power switch turned off. It was like her life force was just gently removed from her body. Looking back, it was typical of her: to go quietly, gently into the night, without much ado, but with light shining bright, like the "soft stars that shine..."

Donna will forever be etched in many people's hearts, including mine, and I am fortunate to have been touched, albeit briefly, by Donna's sincerity, honesty, sweetness and gentle ways. Deep friendship is not measured by the number of years as friends – I think it is the quality of interaction that defines one's kinship with another person. And I am lucky to have enjoyed that with Donna. Farewell, Donna...you will forever be missed...But I will always remember you are still around, in the rain, in the gentle wind, in the soft stars that I see at night, wherever I am...

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