

Synecdoche Everywhere: Synecdochic Shifts in Polysemy, Vagueness, and Sub-senses

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Abstract: This paper argues that synecdoche, defined as a conceptual transfer based on hierarchical inclusion between categories (Seto 1999, 2003), is far more pervasive in everyday language than previously acknowledged. The author examines four types of lexical phenomena—polysemy, vagueness, microsenses, and local sub-senses—and demonstrates that each involves GENUS-FOR-SPECIES synecdochic shifts. Words such as *dog* show polysemy in which both the superordinate and subordinate readings are entrenched. Vague words like *friend* display only an entrenched superordinate reading, with subordinate readings generated contextually. Words with microsenses, exemplified by *knife*, have multiple subordinate readings and a weakly entrenched superordinate meaning. Local sub-senses, as in *teacher*, arise through membership categorization devices and occupy an intermediate position between established senses and ad-hoc interpretations. The paper proposes that these phenomena form a cline based on the degree of entrenchment of their superordinate and subordinate readings. Diachronic evidence from the semantic change of *deer* supports this gradient view. Finally, the paper suggests that the abundance of GENUS-FOR-SPECIES synecdoche is closely related to the cognitive salience of basic-level categories, which strongly influence the choice of lexical items in reference.

Keywords: synecdoche, polysemy, vagueness, microsense, local sub-sense

1. Introduction

In the tradition of Western rhetoric, where synecdoche is viewed as the “substitution of part for whole, genus for species, or vice versa” (Lanham 1991: 148), the following examples all fall under synecdoche:

- (1) a. *America* for “United States”

b. *England* for “Great Britain”

(Kövecses and Radden 1998: 50)

(2) a. *the pill* for “birth control pill”

b. *aspirin* for “any pain-relieving tablet”

(Kövecses and Radden 1998: 53)

Some cognitive linguists, however, have argued that synecdoche is included in metonymy and, therefore, it has not been treated as an independent phenomenon (e.g., Lakoff 1987; Kövecses and Radden 1998). In this view, both (1) and (2) are analyzed as instances of metonymy.

Others, including Sato (1978/1992), Seto (1999, 2003), Nerlich and Clarke (1999), and Koskela (2011), advocate distinguishing synecdoche from metonymy. They all agree on limiting synecdoche to categorial shifts such as (2). One of their definitions of synecdoche is as follows:

- (3) Synecdoche is a conceptual transfer phenomenon based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive category.

(Seto 1999: 92)

In this paper, we argue that synecdoche, as defined in (3), is pervasive in our everyday language use, and that many linguistic phenomena have been studied without being recognized as synecdochic. In addition, we show that these phenomena vary in the degree of entrenchment and attempt to place them along a single scale of entrenchment.

2. Terminology

Several terms need to be introduced to ensure the entire discussion flows smoothly. First, it is necessary to clarify what “the semantic inclusion” in (3) means. For this purpose, the present paper adopts the following definition:

- (4) Comparing two categories, one is semantically included in the other if and only if every member of the former belongs to the latter, and not every member of the latter belongs to the former.

To describe the same situation, it is also possible to say the former category is subordinate to the latter one, and the latter superordinate to the former.

Now, let us consider the relationship between the category CHAIR and the category FURNITURE. Obviously, every chair is indeed a piece of furniture, but it is not true that every piece of furniture is a chair. A table, for example, can be a good exception to the latter statement. Consequently, it is safe to say that the category CHAIR is semantically included in the category FURNITURE, which means that FURNITURE is superordinate to CHAIR, and that CHAIR is subordinate to FURNITURE (Taylor 2003: 48-49). Figure 1 summarizes the explanation so far.




Figure 1. Conceptual hierarchy of FURNITURE

Finally, to mention words or lexical units (rather than their concepts or senses), the present paper employs the alternative terminology. Out of any given two words, the word whose concept or sense is superordinate to that of the other is described as a hypernym, and the word whose concept or sense is subordinate to that of the other is described as a hyponym. Thus, the word *furniture* is a hypernym of the word *chair*, and the word *chair* is a hyponym of the word *furniture*. Besides this, the words *chair* and *table*, which have the common hypernym *furniture*, are said to be co-hyponyms of each other.

Based on these terms, we can divide synecdoche into two subtypes according to the directions of the transfer, each of which is summarized as follows:

(5) a. **The {GENUS-FOR-SPECIES} synecdoche:**

A hypernym is used to designate at least one of its subordinate categories.

b. **The {SPECIES-FOR-GENUS} synecdoche:**

A hyponym is used to designate its nearest superordinate category.

The first subtype is exemplified in (2a), and the second in (2b). Among the two subtypes,

this paper focuses only on the first to avoid confusion.

3. An overview of synecdochic phenomena

In this section, we will show several synecdochic phenomena. They are polysemy, vagueness, words with micro-senses, and words with local sub-senses. Although these have not been explicitly treated as synecdoche, we claim that they fall under synecdoche according to Seto's definition.

3.1. (Vertical) polysemy

Polysemy is a lexical property of having multiple senses mutually associated (e.g., Lyons 1977: 550ff.; Lakoff 1987: 316). One traditional example is *leg*, which has at least two distinct senses: THE LOWER PART OF THE BODY and THE SUPPORTING PART OF A PIECE OF FURNITURE. In this case, the latter sense derives from the former one in virtue of metaphor.

When synecdoche is involved, a single word has two senses, one of which is subordinate to the other. This type of polysemy is termed "autohyponymy" in Horn (1984b: 110) or "vertical polysemy" in Koskela (2011). Among such polysemous words is *dog* (e.g., Zwicky and Sadock 1975: 7-8; Kempson 1980: 11-14; Horn 1984b: 110ff.; Cruse 1986: 59-61). Consider how it is interpreted in each of the following contexts:

(6) Arthur breeds dogs.

(Cruse 1986: 59)

(7) John prefers bitches to dogs.

(Cruse 1986: 60)

In (6), it is used to refer to a domesticated canine in general as a co-hyponym of *sheep*, *horse*, *lion*, and so on. In (7), on the contrary, it specifically refers to a male canine as an antonym of *bitch*. As is shown in the figure below, the general sense in (6) is superordinate to the specific one in (7). Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that this polysemy is the result of synecdoche. In addition, Cruse (2011: 116) notes that the default sense of *dog* is the general one, which suggests that the direction of transfer is from GENUS to SPECIES, not vice versa.




Figure 2. Conceptual hierarchy of DOMESTICATED CANINE

This type of polysemy is by no means restricted to *dog*. Kempson (1980: 15) provides additional examples as follows (see also Horn 1984a: 34):

(8)	Hyponym ₁	Hyponym ₂	Hypernym
	a. duck	drake	duck
	b. cow	bull	cow
	c. cow	calf	cow
	d. line	curve	line
	e. rectangle	square	rectangle

3.2. Vagueness

In contrast with polysemy, vagueness is a lexical property of having a single unspecified sense (e.g., Kempson 1977: 125-126; Ruhl 1989)¹. An oft-cited example is *friend* (e.g., Croft and Cruse 2004: 127-128; Murphy 2010: 84-87). Consider what the word refers to in the following contexts:

- (9) a. Ben is my friend. He's a fine fellow.
 b. Georgia is my friend. She's a wonderful woman.

(Murphy 2010: 85)

The construal of *friend* in (9a) is probably different from that in (9b): A MALE FRIEND and A FEMALE FRIEND, respectively. This contrast, however, would be neutralized in the absence of contextual supports as in (10):

- (10) Sue is visiting her friend.

¹ This property is otherwise called “generality” (e.g., Cruse 1986: 51).

As is clear from Figure 3, the neutralized reading of *friend* is superordinate to both of the sex-specified ones, which suggests the vague word at issue is synecdochic based on the current definition in (3).




Figure 3. Conceptual hierarchy of FRIEND

3.3. ‘Intermediate’ cases

In this subsection, some words with sub-senses will be examined. Sub-senses are “alternative readings of words which show evidence of discreteness, but which in suitable contexts are unifiable” (Cruse 2011: 104; see also Croft and Cruse 2004: 116). Cruse (2011) distinguishes them into four: facets, microsenses, local sub-senses, and spectral sub-senses. Relevant to synecdoche are the second and the third, which will be explained in detail.

3.3.1. Microsenses

Microsenses are defined as “distinct sense units of a word that occur in different contexts and whose default construals stand in a relation of mutual incompatibility at the same hierarchical level, rather like, for instance, the names of animals such as *cat*, *dog*, *sheep*, *cow*, *pig*, *horse*” (Croft and Cruse 2004: 126-127).

A typical example of words with microsenses is *knife* (e.g., Cruse 1995: 39-40, 2001: 40ff., 2011: 107-109; Croft and Cruse 2004: 126ff.). For example, *knife* (or precisely *knives*) in (11a) certainly refers to a table knife, whereas it probably refers to a more lethal knife in (11b).

- (11) a. When you set the table, make sure that the knives are clean.
 b. The intruder threatened me with a knife.

(Cruse 1995: 39)

Not only that, but *knife* can also designate the superordinate category that includes all

these specific knives, as in (12):

(12) You can buy any kind of knife there.

(Croft and Cruse 2004: 127)

The hierarchical relation among these readings is summarized in Figure 4, which suggests that the word *knife* would also fall under synecdoche against (3).




Figure 4. Conceptual hierarchy of KNIFE

Other words with microsenses include *card* (e.g., Cruse 2001, 2011; Croft and Cruse 2004). Consider the different readings in (13a-c):

(13) a. The box was full of cards of various sorts.

b. Jim is on holiday in Brittany—we got a card from him yesterday.

c. Here's my card; if you have any problems, let me know.

(Cruse 2011: 108)

As the modifier phrase *of various sorts* explicitly indicates, (13a) exemplifies the superordinate reading of *card*. On the other hand, the different subordinate readings are realized in (13b) and (13c): What the addresser got in (13b) is a postcard, and what the addresser is handing over in (14c) is a visiting card.




Figure 5. Conceptual hierarchy of CARD

3.3.2. Local sub-senses

At first glance, local sub-senses are quite similar to microsenses. According to Cruse (2011: 110), however, “local sub-senses differ from microsenses in that their superordinate construal is rich and robust, and in many contexts can function as a basic-level item and participates in lexical fields.”

Cruse (2011: 109-110) takes the following scenario. A mother goes to a school on an errand and enters the school building. But she does not know which room she has to go to. Then, she approaches a man walking in the hallway and asks:

(14) Excuse me, are you a teacher?

There are at least two interpretations of (14), depending on how to construe the word *teacher*. Firstly, one can understand that she is asking the man whether he teaches at the school. That is, “a teacher” means a teacher at the particular school at issue, functioning as a co-hyponym of *student*, *parent*, and others. Secondly, one might think that she is asking him about his occupation as part of small talk. In this case, “a teacher” means a teacher at any school, functioning as a co-hyponym of other names of professions like *lawyer*, *carpenter*, and so on. Since the first, which limits the belonging to a particular school, is semantically included in the second, which does not, their relation is also concluded to be synecdochic.

4. Comparison of synecdochic phenomena

In the previous section, synecdochic phenomena have been detected in various sorts of words (i.e., polysemous words, vague words, and intermediate words between them). In this section, we will consider their distinction.

4.1. Entrenchment in synecdochic phenomena

Polysemy and vagueness are often said to be continuous (e.g., Tuggy 1993; Langacker 1999: Ch. 4; Murphy 2010: 91-93). The main parameter of this continuum is how entrenched the distinct interpretations are. The more deeply entrenched a particular interpretation is, the more highly automated its activation is (cf. Schmid 2007: 118-119; see also e.g., Langacker 1987). Similarly, Croft and Cruse (2004: 112) propose the notion of autonomy, which is defined as “the ability of a unit to behave independently of other units that might be construed in the same context.” Leaving trivial differences aside,

what is essential is whether a particular reading is freely possible or conditionally possible. In other words, a more entrenched or autonomous meaning can be realized without any support, while a less entrenched meaning cannot.

Cruse (2011: 103) proposes a frame to test autonomy: “Can a context be imagined in which a *Yes/No* question containing the relevant word can be answered truthfully with both *Yes* and *No*?” Suppose that two individuals are looking at a bitch at a pet store, and that one says to the other, “Is that a dog?” In this situation, the questionee can answer both positively and negatively, as in (15):

- (15) a. Yes, it’s a spaniel.
b. No, it’s a bitch.

(Cruse 1986: 61)

If the questionee interprets “a dog” in a superordinate way, the answer will be like (15a). And if the questionee interprets it in a subordinate way, the answer will be like (15b). To answer the question properly, one needs to determine how to interpret the word *dog*. This process is referred to as “contextual selection” by Cruse (1986: 52).

On the other hand, one needs to choose either the positive or the negative when one is asked, “Do you have any friends?” The only factor that affects the answer is whether one actually has friends. It is irrelevant to the answer whether one has male friends or female friends. Moreover, consider the following adjacency pair:

- (16) A: Grace and Penny are my friends. Do you have any friends?
B: #No, I don’t have any friends, but Mark and Paul are my friends.

(Murphy 2010: 86)

Even though the questioner refers only to female friends, B’s answer sounds strange. Consequently, as for *friend*, only the superordinate reading is entrenched, and the other sex-specified readings are just pragmatically produced ad hoc. Cruse (1986: 52) calls this process “contextual modulation.”

The distinction discussed above is illustrated in Figure 6. The italic represents the formal aspects of each word, and the boldface represents the semantic aspects (i.e., the meanings). The darkness of the letters and lines roughly corresponds to the degree of entrenchment. Based on the assumption that polysemy and vagueness are continuous,

words with microsenses and local sub-senses will have to be placed somewhere on the scale.




Figure 6. Polysemy vs. vagueness

Cruse (2001: 41-43) examines the status of microsenses and concludes that microsenses are not pragmatically generated. Imagine that a child, Johnny, is playing with his meat with his fingers at the table. The following utterances occur there.

(17) Mother: Use your knife to cut your meat, Johnny.

Johnny: I haven't got one.

(Cruse 2001: 42)

Of course, it is possible to assume that Johnny answers so because he has no knives with him. However, as Cruse (2001: 42) argues, his answer remains the same even if he has an envelope knife in his pocket (see also Croft and Cruse 2004: 128; but see Cruse 2011: 109). If *knife* were vague like *friend* discussed above, he could not answer, "I haven't got one."

In addition, Cruse and Cruse (2004: 127) describe that "the words *knife* and *card* show what may be termed default specificity, that is, when we encounter them, our first assumption is that one of the specific construals is intended, and we look for evidence as to which one." Due to this feature, (18a) sounds odd.

(18) a. #Do you have a knife?

b. Do you have a knife of any kind?

(Cruse 2001: 44)

On the other hand, (18b), which is accompanied by the linguistic support (i.e., *of any*

kind), conveys the intended meaning. This contrast demonstrates that the superordinate sense of *knife* is not as deeply entrenched as that of *dog*.




Figure 7. Entrenchment in microsenses

As regards a word with local sub-senses, it seems that the hyponymic readings are less heavily entrenched than microsenses. Consider (19), which is identical to (14):

(19) Excuse me, are you a teacher?

As is stated above, this utterance has at least two readings. This enables a teacher working at another school to answer the question both positively and negatively (Cruse 2011: 110). The negative answer is based on the subordinate interpretation of *teacher*, whereas the positive answer is based on the superordinate interpretation. This indicates that these two readings are well-established, as is *dog*.

However, the subordinate reading of *teacher* is a little bit complicated. Indeed, if a mother says (19) at a school named X, “a teacher” probably means a teacher at a school named X. But let us say (19) is uttered by another mother at another school named Y. Then, “a teacher” probably means a teacher at a school named Y. In this way, the subordinate readings of *teacher* are countless. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that these are equally entrenched and contextually selected.

Rather, *teacher* has two autonomous senses, as in (20). Importantly, TEACHER₂ focuses on a role within a certain school, but does not specify which school it concerns.

(20) Two senses of *teacher*

- a. TEACHER₁: a kind of occupation, a teacher at any school
(a co-hyponym of *lawyer*, *carpenter*, etc.)
- b. TEACHER₂: a role in a school, a teacher at a certain school
(a co-hyponym of *student*, *parent*, etc.)

However, since it is a membership categorization device (e.g., Sacks 1972a, 1972b), selecting *TEACHER*₂ accompanies with clarifying which school is on the topic.

In Conversation Analysis, a categorization device consists of two components: “a collection of membership categories plus rules of application” (Sacks 1972a: 332). An instance of a collection is ⟨family⟩, which contains categories such as ‘baby,’ ‘Mommy,’ ‘Daddy,’ and others. Unlike other collections such as ⟨age⟩, this collection forms a kind of team, and this property is termed “duplicatively organized.” Sacks (1972a: 334) formulates the following rule of application: when a duplicatively organized device is used on a population, “what is done is to take its categories, treat the set of categories as defining a unit, and place members of the population into cases of the unit.” Let us take (21) for illustration:

(21) The baby cried. The mommy picked it up.

(Sacks 1972a: 330)

Because of the rule at issue, those who read these sentences will infer that the categories ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ define a particular family unit, even though it is not explicitly stated there. Namely, they hear the baby and the mommy as members of the same family, not from two separate families.




Figure 8. Entrenchment in local sub-senses

The same rule of application works in the hyponymic readings of *teacher*. The category ‘teacher’ goes together with ‘student,’ ‘parent,’ and others, which forms a duplicatively organized device. Thus, categorizing the addressee as ‘teacher’ and the

addresser as ‘parent’ with (20)² leads to regarding them as belonging to the same school unit. This is how the hyponymic *teacher* is contextually modulated.

4.2. A cline of synecdochic phenomena

Following these observations, the distinctions among the four synecdochic phenomena are summarized in Table 1. A plus sign represents the property of being established and entrenched, and a minus sign that of pragmatically produced. The combination of both stands for intermediate cases.

Table 1. Comparison of synecdochic phenomena				
	<i>dog</i>	<i>friend</i>	<i>knife</i>	<i>teacher</i>
superordinate reading	+	+	–	+
subordinate reading(s)	+	–	+	+/-
(+: entrenched, – : pragmatically generated, +/- : intermediate)				

If one rearranges this table so that each item forms a cline, one possible answer is Table 2. The entrenchment of the superordinate readings increases from *knife* to *friend*, whereas that of the subordinate reading(s) decreases in this order.

Table 2. A possible cline of synecdochic phenomena				
	<i>friend</i>	<i>teacher</i>	<i>dog</i>	<i>knife</i>
superordinate reading	+	+	+	–
subordinate reading(s)	–	+/-	+	+
(+: entrenched, – : pragmatically generated, +/- : intermediate)				

This cline is supported from a diachronic view. Let us take *deer*, which is often mentioned in the literature on the history of English (e.g., Bradley 1904, Whitman 1907, Williams 1975). The ancestors of the present-day *deer* originally referred to a wild

² The former categorization is achieved explicitly, but the latter implicitly.

animal in general. In fact, (22) would sound strange if the references of *dear*, *dær*, and *deor* were limited to the Cervidae.

- (22) a. fe cumal þ micla dear
 “the camel that big animal”

(*The Lindisfarne Gospels*)³

- b. Paif he makede men 7 dær.
 “He brought peace to men and animals.”

(*The Peterborough Chronicle*)⁴

- c. For lamb iff foffte 7 stille deor.
 “For lambs are soft and gentle animals.”

(*Ormulum*)⁵

In a 13th-century manuscript, however, the word was used to refer to the Cervidae in particular as well as animals in general. For example, (23a) is where it stands for SPECIES; and (23b) is where it stands for GENUS. In other words, the original and present usage coexisted at that time.

- (23) a. Alþo deþ mani dor 7 man. þeo of hspucche napiht ne con.
 “As do many animals and men who know nothing about such things.”

(*The Owl and the Nightingale*)⁶

- b. To huntien after deoren; Werfore he deð þolede.
 “To hunt after deer, he therefore suffered death.”

(*Layamon's Brut*)⁷

Although it is unclear until when the original usage survived, the word is normally employed to designate the Cervidae in the 15th to 16th centuries, as in (24).

- (24) a. ...and there he chaced at the rede dere armed at all pecis full lyke a good
 kny3t...

³ British Library Cotton MS Nero D IV, fol. 185v

⁴ Bodleian Library MS. Laud Misc. 636, fol. 88v

⁵ Bodleian Library MS. Junius 1, fol. 20v

⁶ British Library Cotton MS Caligula A IX, fol. 242v

⁷ British Library Cotton MS Caligula A IX, fol. 16v

“...and there he chased the red deer, armed at all pieces full like a good knight...”

(*Le Morte d'Arthur*)⁸

b. How like a Deere, stroken by many Princes,
Doft thou heere lye?

“How like a deer, stricken by many princes, do you lie here?”

(*The Tragedie of Ivliivs Cæsar*, Act 3, scene 1)⁹

Nevertheless, Bradley (1904: 200-201) states that “the older sense survived only in the expression ‘small deer’ for rats and mice.” A famous example is in another Shakespearean drama:

(25) But mife, and rats, and fuch fmall Deere,
Hath beene *Toms* foode for feuen long yeare-

“But mice and rats, and such small animals, have been Tom’s food for seven long years.”

(*The Historie of King Lear*, Act 3, scene 4)¹⁰

In other words, the superordinate sense was not completely wiped out but could be realized under contextual pressure at that time, just as today’s *knife*.




Figure 9. Semantic change of *deer*

Figure 9 is a rough sketch of the semantic change of *deer* based on the succeeding paragraphs. One will notice that this is quite similar to Table 2, which provides some evidence for the cline we propose in this paper.

⁸ British Library Additional MS 59678, fol. 291v

⁹ The Bodleian First Folio, kk6v – Tragedies, p. 120

¹⁰ British Library C.34.k.17, p. 46

5. Basic level of categorization

In what follows, we will discuss a factor that makes synecdoche flourish. The key notion here is what is called “basic level of categorization” in Cognitive Psychology (e.g., Rosch et al. 1976).

Taylor (2003) explains basic level categories in the following way (see also Ungerer and Schmid 2006: 70-76; Schmid 2007: 122-125; Geeraerts 2017):

- (26) Basic level categories maximize the number of attributes shared by members of the category; and minimize the number of attributes shared with members of other categories.

(Taylor 2003: 52)

To put it another way, they are neither too specific nor too general; therefore, the most balanced categories. Let us take the conceptual hierarchy below:

- (27) FURNITURE—CHAIR—DINING ROOM CHAIR/ KITCHEN CHAIR/...

Among the three levels of categorization above, it is the middle (i.e., CHAIR) that would display the feature in (26). That is, its subordinate categories (e.g., DINING ROOM CHAIR, KITCHEN CHAIR, etc.) share as many attributes as possible, and it is sharply differentiated from its sister categories (e.g., TABLE, BED, etc.).

Similarly, all the hypernymic readings of the words we mainly examine in this paper—*friend*, *teacher*, *dog*, and *knife*—are at the basic level of categorization. See the following hierarchies:

- (28) a. PERSON—FRIEND—MALE FRIEND/FEMALE FRIEND
 b. PROFESSION—TEACHER₁—TEACHER₂
 c. ANIMAL—DOG—MALE DOG
 d. TOOL—KNIFE—TABLE KNIFE/COMBAT KNIFE/...

Crucially, the basic level terms, which designate basic level categories, “have to do with what things are called” (Taylor 2003: 53). For example, when one is shown an object designed for someone to sit on and is asked what its name is, he or she will answer, “it is a chair.” Answers like *it’s a piece of furniture* or *it’s a dining chair* will

sound strange. In other words, one is strongly forced to choose a basic level term to refer to one of its subordinate concepts. This tendency is by all means synecdoche itself.

6. Conclusion

To summarize the whole paper:

- i. Synecdoche as a categorial shift is pervasive in our everyday language use.
- ii. Synecdochic phenomena include a certain type of polysemy, vagueness, micro-senses, and local sub-senses.
- iii. These synecdochic phenomena display varying degrees of entrenchment and constitute a cline of it.
- iv. The ⟨GENUS-FOR-SPECIES⟩ synecdoche is highly influenced by the nature of the basic level of categorization.

On the other hand, the other subtype of synecdoche, SPECIES-FOR-GENUS, remains untouched, which is a future issue.

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日常にあふれるシネクドキー： 多義語・単義語・中間事例の分析を通して

角出 凱紀

本稿では、シネクドキーをカテゴリーの包摂関係に基づく転義現象に限定する Seto (1999, 2003) の立場にしたがって、シネクドキーが日常の言語使用において多用されているということを指摘する。分析対象となるのは、一部の多義語 (e.g., *dog*)、単義語 (e.g., *friend*)、*knife* に代表されるマイクロセンス (e.g., Cruse 1995, 2001, 2011; Croft and Cruse 2004) を持つ語、および、*teacher* のようなローカル・サブセンスを持つ語の四つである。これらの語には意味解釈においてシネクドキー的な転移が起きることを指摘する。また、これらのシネクドキーは、それぞれの語が有する意味の定着度が異なっており、その定着度に応じて一連の連続体を形成していることを主張する。そのうえで、通時的な観点から件の連続体の検証を行う。最後に、シネクドキー（特に、類で種を表すタイプ）がそれほどまでに豊富である背景について、基本レベルカテゴリーの観点から簡単に考察を行う。