

Resolution Patterns of *Again*'s Presuppositions

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Abstract: This paper examines the interpretation process of a presupposition trigger *again*, especially the recognition of certain propositions in the context as presuppositions of *again*, and suggests an interpretation model covering a wide range of patterns of resolving presuppositions. Tiemann et al. (2014) hypothesizes an interpretation process of *again*, which consists of the following two steps: check if a proposition invoked by *again* is entailed by the context and, if so, establish the temporal connection between the event of the proposition in the context and that of the proposition of the sentence with *again*. It will be argued, in this paper, that in the first step of the model of Tiemann et al. (2014), there exist various patterns of how a proposition invoked by *again* is regarded as entailed by the context. This paper, furthermore, mentions the possibility that factors for regarding propositions invoked by *again* **not** as those in the context depend on cases. These will be exemplified by three cases. The analyses of the three cases will be integrated with the hypothesis of Tiemann et al. (2014), followed by suggestion of a detailed model of interpreting *again*. The model suggested here is **provisional** in that it does not encompass all the patterns of interpreting *again*. However, it will serve as a basis for a more sophisticated model that can be constructed through further analysis.

Keywords: *again*; presupposition; trigger; resolution; accommodation; rejection

1. Introduction

One of the aims of this paper is to provide an insight into the mechanism whereby certain propositions are established as presuppositions of *again*, by suggesting various ways of recognizing propositions as presuppositions. The other aim is to construct a **provisional** interpretation model of *again*, which can be developed into a more sophisticated model through further analysis. Tiemann et al. (2014) suggests a two-step model for the interpretation of *again*, and the first step for its interpretation is that hearers check if propositions invoked by *again* are included in the context¹. The current paper examines this way of checking, by considering three cases where a sentence with *again* is interpreted by hearers. Taking the analyses of the three cases and the model of Tiemann et al. (2014) into account, we will construct a detailed, although provisional, interpretation model for *again*. This model will contribute to revealing the characteristics of interpreting 'soft presupposition triggers' (cf. Abrusán 2016, Kripke 2009). In the next section, several researches on presuppositions and an interpretation model for *again* in Tiemann et al. (2014) will be briefly summarized. In Section 3, interpretation of a sentence with *again* in three different sit-

uations will be discussed, and the detailed analyses of these cases will be integrated to construct a new model for *again* in Section 4.

2. Theoretical Background

This section introduces several researches on presuppositions. We will briefly review researches by Levinson (1983) and Domaneschi (2016). Then, the characteristics of *again*'s presuppositions will be summarized with reference to Heim (1990) and Beck (2007). In the final subsection, an interpretation model for *again* in Tiemann et al. (2014) will be explained.

2.1 Presupposition and Trigger

Levinson (1983) defines presuppositions as follows²:

- (1) An utterance A *pragmatically presupposes* a proposition B iff A is *appropriate* only if B is *mutually known* by participants.

(Levinson 1983: 205)

Levinson (1983) introduces the term 'pragmatic presupposition' in order to put his emphasis on its pragmatic aspect³. This is reflected in the two terms 'appropriateness'⁴ (cf. Stalnaker 1973, Glanzberg 2003) and 'mutual knowledge' (cf. Lewis 1969, Schiffer 1972, Clark and Marshall 1981) in the definition above. For example, (2a) presupposes (2b).

- (2) a. John stopped beating his wife.
b. John had been beating his wife.

(Levinson 1983: 181)

Stop in (2a) demands that the proposition of (2b) should be mutually known by the participants. If this condition is not satisfied, the use of *stop* will be inappropriate. Several lexical expressions such as *stop* and *even* demand that certain propositions should be in mutual knowledge. Karttunen (n.d) terms them 'presupposition trigger,' and classifies them into 31 groups. Levinson (1983) recategorizes the triggers into 20 groups⁵, and includes the trigger *again*, the main topic in this paper, in the group of iteratives.

2.2 Resolution, Accommodation and Rejection

According to Domaneschi (2016), there exist three ways of interpreting presupposition triggers.

- (3) Three ways of interpreting presupposition triggers
 - a. **Resolution**⁶: identify the propositions invoked by triggers as those in mutual knowledge.
 - b. **Accommodation**: accept⁷ the propositions that are not in mutual knowledge as presuppositions, unless they are inconsistent with mutual knowledge.
 - c. **Rejection**: reject the propositions that are inconsistent with mutual knowledge⁸.

Resolution is achieved in interpreting (4). The utterance is appropriate because the presupposition invoked by the cleft construction is involved in the context.

- (4) Context: Hearers assume that John said something to his parents.
 Utterance: *What John said to his parents was that he was going to Japan.*

In contrast, interpreting (5) does not lead to resolution.

- (5) Context: Hearers do not know that John has a dog.
 Utterance: *John's dog is cute.*

In (5), what takes place is either accommodation or rejection. If hearers do not consider it to be odd that *John has a dog*, this proposition will be accepted as a presupposition (accommodation); otherwise it will be rejected (rejection).

2.3 Heim (1990) and Beck (2007)

Next, the characteristics of presuppositions of *again* that are dealt with in Heim (1990) and Beck (2007) will be briefly reviewed. Heim (1990) argues that *again* refers to a specific time.

- (6) a. We will have pizza on John's birthday, so we shouldn't have pizza again on Mary's birthday.
 - b. We will have pizza on John's birthday, so we shouldn't have pizza on Mary's birthday.
- (Heim 1990: 7)

(6a), unlike (6b), implies that *Mary's birthday* follows *John's birthday*. In this case, the proposition *we will have pizza on John's birthday* becomes a presupposition of *again*, and *John's birthday* is referred to by *again*. Heim (1990) asserts, from this fact, that *again* refers to a specific time⁹.

Beck (2007) examines this example in order to characterize accommodation. The presupposition of *again* in (6a) can be divided into two parts (event part and time part) as in (7). For the sake

of clarity, the current paper names them Presupposition 1 and 2 (hereafter P_1 and P_2), respectively. The variable t in P_1 and P_2 refers to a specific time¹⁰.

- (7) Presupposition (P) = we have pizza before Mary's birthday
- a. Presupposition 1 (P_1) = we have pizza at t
 - b. Presupposition 2 (P_2) = $t < \text{Mary's birthday}$

P_1 is included in the context, and P_2 does not exist in it. In (6a), however, it is implied that *Mary's birthday* follows *John's birthday*, which can be gained from the existence of P_2 in principle. This entails that only P_2 is the target of accommodation. Beck (2007) terms it 'partial accommodation' (cf. 'presupposition justification' by Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994)). (6a) illustrates that if a certain part of a proposition invoked by *again* exists in mutual knowledge, the rest of the proposition will be accommodated.

2.4 Tiemann et al. (2014)

'Partial accommodation' is discussed in Tiemann et al. (2014) as well¹¹.

- (8) Last week, Linda bought Judith a pink lamp for a room. Two days ago, Linda received a pink lamp again.

(Tiemann et al. 2014: 57)

There are two possible ways of interpreting *again* in (8): (i) accommodation and (ii) rejection. The meaning resulting from (i) is that *Linda received a pink lamp sometime before two days ago*, while the specific time of the event is not known. (ii) leads to the meaning that *Linda received a pink lamp two days ago*, and no more information on *Linda's receiving a pink lamp* is provided. In contrast, resolution of the time and accommodation of the event do not take place at the same time. Therefore, hearers do not interpret that *last week Linda received a pink lamp*. This fact needs to be considered along with the presupposition structure in (9)¹².

- (9) a. Presupposition 1 (P_1) = Linda received a pink lamp at t
- b. Presupposition 2 (P_2) = $t < \text{two days ago}$

P_2 is included in the context, while P_1 is not. As mentioned above, resolution of the time and accommodation of the event do not take place at the same time. Considering this, Tiemann et al. (2014) concludes that resolution of P_2 does not lead to accommodation of P_1 .

In addition, Tiemann et al. (2014) asserts that (ii) tends to be adopted more often than (i). In an experiment in Tiemann et al. (2014), participants were asked to read (8) and answer the question “How many pink lamps did Linda receive?” by choosing from the followings: “cannot be answered,” “one” and “at least two.” As a result, more participants chose “one” than “cannot be answered” and “at least two.”¹³ Clearly, this means that the participants prefer the adoption of (ii) to that of (i). All these considered, Tiemann et al. (2014) constructs the following model.

(10) Two-step interpretation model for *again*:

- a. Step one: check if relevant proposition is entailed by the context. If not, ignore trigger.
- b. Step two: if the relevant proposition is given, assign value to the free time variable via the variable assign function.

This model is compatible with inference of P_2 from P_1 . However, the reverse is not true; it does not suppose inference of P_1 from P_2 . Regarding (8), Tiemann et al. (2014: 57) states as follows:

In principle, since *last week* is prior to *two days ago*, one could assign the free variable the value of *last week* and consequently the first part of the presupposition [namely, $t < \text{two days ago}$] would be fulfilled. But this is obviously not what happens. The interpretation of the presupposition of *wieder* [or *again*] really hinges on the relevant proposition being true at some other time. Only if the context furnishes this, will the temporal connection be made.

(Tiemann et al. 2014: 57)¹⁴

This does not entail that P_2 cannot be a factor in inferring P_1 . In the experiment by Tiemann et al. (2014), participants tend to think that all of what happened *last week* was the event *Linda bought Judith a pink lamp for a room*. This event is different from the event *Linda received a pink lamp*, which is invoked by *again*. According to Gazdar (1979a,b), if propositions in the context conflict with those carried by presupposition triggers, the latter will be rejected (cf. Levinson 1983). Therefore, the following scenario can be imagined: when participants interpret (8), they infer P_1 from P_2 , but P_1 is inconsistent with the context, and thus they do not accept the proposition that *last week Linda received a pink lamp*. If this hypothesis is true, in cases where the propositions invoked by presupposition triggers are **not** inconsistent with the context, P_1 may be gained from P_2 and other clues. For example, if noise interrupts hearing event information of the first sentence of (8), it will be possible that hearers infer from (8) that *last week Linda received a pink lamp*, owing to P_2 . In this sense, P_2 may serve as a key factor in inferring P_1 .

It should be still open to discussion what kind of role P_2 plays in inferring the whole presupposition of *again*, while P_1 -to- P_2 inference exists without doubt (as illustrated by Beck (2007)).

Therefore, the model (10), which is based on P_1 -to- P_2 inference and resolution of P_1 and P_2 , is effective in revealing the whole picture of interpreting *again*. The next section suggests several patterns of judging whether relevant proposition is entailed by the context or not.

3. Resolution of *Again*'s Presupposition

This section suggests various ways of judging whether the context includes certain propositions or not.

3.1 Various Resolution Patterns

Beck (2007) discusses how hearers interpret (11).

- (11) In January 2000, we were skiing in Grafton. In January 2001, we were skiing in Vermont again.

(Beck 2007: 20)

Even if hearers have not heard of *Grafton* or *Vermont*, they infer that *Grafton* is located in *Vermont*¹⁵. Beck (2007) takes this fact into account and hypothesizes the following process of interpretation.

- (12) [Resolution: P_1 and $P_2 \rightarrow$ Accommodation: $P_3 \rightarrow$ Inference: I_1]
- a. Presupposition 1 (P_1) = we were skiing at t (January 2000)
 - b. Presupposition 2 (P_2) = t (January 2000) < January 2001
 - c. Presupposition 3 (P_3) = we were in Vermont at t
 - d. Inference 1 (I_1) = Grafton is in Vermont

Beck (2007) proposes that resolution of P_1 and P_2 enables P_3 to be accommodated. This can be rephrased as follows: although the context does not seem to furnish all the parts of the proposition invoked by *again*, hearers realize that part of it is already entailed by the context, and the part encourages the whole proposition invoked by *again* to be identified as knowledge in the context. This entails that resolution does not require the whole proposition invoked by *again* to be included in the context. In this case, even though P_1 and P_3 work as a united event part of the presupposition, a proposition corresponding to P_3 does not need to exist in the context.

(13) is different from (11) in place modifiers. In this case, if hearers know that *Japan* is not located in *the U.S.*, the scope of the presupposition of *again* covers *we were skiing* but not *in the U.S.*¹⁶ In (13), the event part of the presupposition (like P_1 in (7a)) consists of information

shared by the two sentences. *In the U.S.* lies, in contrast, out of the scope of *again*. This way of interpretation entails the following: *we were skiing in January 2000 and in January 2001*, and in this sense this event happened at least twice. Therefore, it can be asserted that in spite of inconsistency between the context and a sentence with *again*, shared information serves as the event part of a presupposition of *again*.

- (13) In January 2000, we were skiing in Japan. In January 2001, we were skiing in the U.S. again.

As illustrated by these examples, different cases lead to different ways of resolution. The following three subsections discuss three different resolution patterns (Case A, Case B and Case C), providing details of what is regarded as a presupposition and what makes resolution difficult. Case A is a common situation, and the other two cases (Case B and Case C) are uncommon ones.

3.2 Case A

Case A is a situation where event information in a sentence with *again* is completely included in the context. This case is exemplified by (14).

- (14) I bought a book on linguistics last week. Today, I bought the same one again.

The presupposition of (14) consists of P_1 and P_2 as follows.

- (15) a. P_1 = I bought a book on linguistics at t (last week)
b. P_2 = t (last week) < today

All the parts of event information in the second sentence exist in the first sentence, and they become P_1 . In this example, time information is included in the first sentence, and P_2 is resolved. This pattern of establishing presuppositions can be generalized into the following formulation.

- (16) a. Context: *Proposition A* (at time t_1)
b. Utterance: *Proposition B* (at time t_2)
c. Resolution: $P_1 = B$ (event information shared by *A* and *B*) at t_1
d. Resolution or Accommodation: $P_2 = t_1 < t_2$

The following two subsections concern uncommon cases.

3.3 Case B

Case B is a situation where the context or a sentence with *again* includes participants unfamiliar to hearers.

- (17) In January 2000, we were skiing in Grafton. In January 2001, we were skiing in Vermont again.

(= (11))

As shown above, Beck (2007) supposes the following interpretation process.

- (18) [Resolution: P_1 and $P_2 \rightarrow$ Accommodation: $P_3 \rightarrow$ Inference: I_1]

- a. Presupposition 1 (P_1) = we were skiing at t (January 2000)
- b. Presupposition 2 (P_2) = t (January 2000) < January 2001
- c. Presupposition 3 (P_3) = we were in Vermont at t
- d. Inference 1 (I_1) = Grafton is in Vermont

(= (12))

This interpretation model includes hearers' inference from P_1 and P_2 via P_3 to I_1 . The idea of this inference is based on the assumption of the following scenario: event information shared by the two sentences, namely *we were skiing*, enables hearers to assume that the proposition of the first sentence (*we were skiing in Grafton*) entails the one of the second sentence (*we were skiing in Vermont*).

Beck (2007) states that P_3 is accommodated, although details of how it becomes part of the presupposition do not appear. Note that if hearers consider the proposition of the first sentence to entail the one of the second sentence, accommodation of **only** P_3 will **not** take place. They utilize **clearly shared** event information first to understand this relationship: the proposition *we were skiing in Grafton* entails the one *we were skiing in Vermont*. In this step, hearers do not take unfamiliar participants or settings (*Grafton* and *Vermont*) into account in considering the proposition of the first sentence to entail the one of the second sentence. Then, they **update** shared event information to *we were skiing in Vermont*. This proposition, all at once, becomes part of the presupposition. Therefore, the proposition corresponding to P_3 does not become part of the presupposition in isolation from the one corresponding to P_1 . Now the presupposition structure given in (18) can be restated as (19).

- (19) a. $P_1 = \text{we were skiing in Vermont at } t \text{ (January 2000)}$
 b. $P_2 = t \text{ (January 2000)} < \text{January 2001}$

The generalization of this pattern of establishing presuppositions is as follows.

- (20) a. Context: *Proposition A* (at time t_1) / unfamiliar participant = x
 b. Utterance: *Proposition B* (at time t_2) / unfamiliar participant = y
 c. A without x is equal to B without $y \rightarrow A$ (with x) entails B (with y) $\rightarrow$
 $P_1 = B$ (shared by A and B) at t_1
 d. Resolution or Accommodation: $P_2 = t_1 < t_2$

It should be noted that increase in the number of unfamiliar participants makes it harder to detect the relationship: *Proposition A* entails *Proposition B*. This will be a barrier that prevents resolution, and therefore can be considered to be one factor for “ignoring trigger” in Step one of the model of Tiemann et al. (2014). In addition, it is possible that what semantic roles are attached to unfamiliar participants has an influence on whether resolution takes place or not. For example, in an event of going somewhere, goals will play a more important role than agents, and unfamiliarity of goals will make it harder to achieve resolution than that of agents. This paper will not delve further into this possibility.

Now what needs to be considered is another way of interpreting (17). In this example, it is possible for hearers to assume *Grafton* to be different from *Vermont*. In this case, the interpretation process is equal to that of (13). The next subsection deals with this kind of case, where there is inconsistency between the context and a sentence with *again*.

3.4 Case C

Case C is a situation where the participants in the context are different from those in a sentence with *again*. Consider the following example.

- (21) Otto opened the door again.
 a. (21) presupposes that Otto had opened the door before. Then, it is true iff Otto opened the door.
 b. (21) presupposes that the door had been open before. Then, it is true iff Otto opened the door.

(Beck 2007: 17)

(21) illustrates that the scope of *again* does not always cover the whole event described by a sentence with *again*. As can be observed in (22), inconsistency between the context and a sentence with *again* inevitably narrows its scope.

- (22) a. On Monday, John cooked rice.
b. On Tuesday, Mary cooked rice again.

(Tiemann et al. 2014: 51)

Tiemann et al. (2014) states that if (22b) follows (22a), the proposition *AGENT cooked rice* will be the target of *again*'s resolution, a specific agent *Mary* being forced out of the scope. The presupposition structure is as follows.

- (23) a. $P_1 = \text{AGENT cooked rice at } t \text{ (Monday)}$
b. $P_2 = t \text{ (Monday)} < \text{Tuesday}$

Event information shared by the context (the first sentence) and the sentence with *again* (the second sentence) becomes P_1 . Time information is given, and thus P_2 is resolved. This presupposition structure can be generalized into the following.

- (24) a. Context: *Proposition A* (at time t_1) / a participant = x ($\neq y$)
b. Utterance: *Proposition B* (at time t_2) / a participant = y ($\neq x$)
c. $x \neq y \rightarrow A \text{ (with } x) \neq B \text{ (with } y) \rightarrow$
 $P_1 = \text{event information shared by } A \text{ and } B \text{ at } t_1$
d. Resolution or Accommodation: $P_2 = t_1 < t_2$

The next thing to be considered is that inconsistency leads to the difficulty of resolution, thereby resulting in rejection or accommodation of the whole presupposition. That is, in Step one of the model of Tiemann et al. (2014), it will become more difficult for relevant propositions to be entailed by the context, as illustrated in the contrast between (25) and (26). The standard interpretation of (25b) is that *John bought a flower for Amy* at least twice. In this case, the whole event described by the second sentence is treated as the target of *again*'s resolution.

- (25) a. John bought a flower for Amy.
b. Two days later, John bought a flower for Amy again.

In (26), the event that happened at least twice is *John bought a flower for BENEFACTIVE*, which comes from resolution of the proposition in question. Inconsistency of the benefactives, however, makes it hard for hearers to (subconsciously) choose resolution, and therefore facilitates accommodation (the event *John bought a flower for Beth* happened at least twice) or rejection (*again* is disregarded).

- (26) a. John bought a flower for Amy.
b. Two days later, John bought a flower for Beth again.

Moreover, increase in the number of inconsistent participants estranges hearers farther from resolution. In (27), what is shared by the context (the first sentence) and the sentence with *again* (the second sentence) is the abstract proposition *AGENT bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE*. In this case, accommodation or rejection will be chosen much more often than in (25) and in (26).

- (27) a. John bought a flower for Amy.
b. Two days later, Kent bought a book for Beth again.




Figure.1 Hierarchical Structure of Abstractness

As exemplified above, inconsistency of participants lessens shared parts of two events, thus abstracting the shared proposition. If it is postulated that resolution requires propositions to be

specific to a certain degree, abstraction devalues them of the right to be the event part of a presupposition. It is reasonable to hypothesize that specificity functions as a key to resolution. This is because specificity of presuppositions makes a sentence with *again* informative, in that specific events like *John bought a flower for Amy* are more unexpected to happen twice than abstract events like *AGENT bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE*.

Figure.1 shows the hierarchy of abstractness (or specificity) of propositions shared by the context and a sentence with *again*. Propositions in a higher position are more specific than those in a lower position. The former are more likely to be established as part of a presupposition of *again* than the latter. If shared propositions are the latter, accommodation (the event of the sentence with *again* happens/happened at least twice) or rejection (*again* is disregarded) will be more likely. For example, in Figure.1, the proposition *John bought a flower for Amy* becomes part of a presupposition of *again* more easily than any other propositions illustrated in the diagram. The proposition *AGENT bought a flower for Amy* will be more likely to be treated as part of a presupposition than the three propositions in (28).

- (28) a. AGENT bought THEME for Amy.
 b. AGENT bought a flower for BENEFACTIVE.
 c. AGENT bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE.




Figure.2 Hierarchical Structure of Abstractness

The four propositions in Figure.2 can be compared to one another in terms of the degree of abstractness. Specific propositions (located in a higher position) are more likely to be the target of resolution.

One essential thing to be noted is that, in Figure.3 and Figure.4, propositions cannot be compared with one another by the criterion of abstractness. When comparing propositions, it is checked if one proposition includes abstract participants (e.g. *AGENT*) that correspond to specific participants (e.g. *John*) in the other proposition.




Figure.3 Hierarchical Structure of Abstractness

Therefore, it is not proper, at least by the criterion of abstractness, to compare the two propositions in Figure.3. The proposition *AGENT bought a flower for Amy* has an abstract participant (*AGENT*) and two specific participants (*a flower* and *Amy*). In contrast, the proposition *John bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE* has a specific agent (*John*) and two abstract participants (*THEME* and *BENEFACTIVE* corresponding to *a flower* and *Amy* respectively). In this case, each proposition has abstract participants that correspond to specific participants in the other proposition. This makes it impossible to compare two propositions by the criterion of abstractness. The three propositions in Figure.4 cannot be compared with one another, either; each proposition includes different abstract participants.

In this subsection, it has been claimed that inconsistency between the context and a sentence with *again* makes it hard for hearers to choose resolution. In actual conversations, what kind of semantic roles unshared specific participants have can influence the difficulty of resolution. It will




Figure.4 Hierarchical Structure of Abstractness

be reasonable to consider that numerous factors including abstractness function altogether for the choice of an interpreting way.

3.5 Summary of Resolution Patterns

Section 3 introduced three different situations where resolution takes place. Each case requires hearers of a unique way of inference. As can be easily found out, the three cases above **do not** encompass all the possible resolution patterns, because analyses in this section only deal with the situations where the number of semantic roles in the context is totally the same as that of semantic roles in a sentence with *again*. However, analyses of other patterns can be achieved with reference to the analyses here. Thus, it can be said that the analyses in this section can play an important role in consideration of other cases.

4. Interpretation Model for *Again*

Finally, in this section, the analyses of the three cases will be integrated, and a new interpretation model for *again* will be constructed on the basis of the model suggested by Tiemann et al. (2014). Figure.5 illustrates how *again* is interpreted. There are things to be noted on the following two steps: "Does A include (at least parts of) B?" and "Is there any inconsistency between A and B?" The former is the step to check if the context includes a proposition of a sentence with *again*. In

this step, information invoked mainly by the verb in the sentence is considered to be the target to be checked, but this will not be discussed further in this paper. In the step of “Is there any inconsistency between A and B?” inconsistency can be observed in the following case as well: there are participants unfamiliar to hearers in the context (or in a sentence with *again*) and they are regarded as different from the participants in the sentence (or in the context). Therefore, the step of “Are there any unfamiliar participants in A or in B?” concerns the cases without inconsistency.




Figure.5 Interpretation Model for *Again*

Figure.5 reveals an important characteristic of interpreting *again*. If relevant proposition is entailed by the context (Step one in Tiemann et al. (2014)), event information shared by the context and the sentence becomes part of a presupposition of *again*. However, this requires a

further investigation. As stated in Section 3, the cases dealt with in this paper **do not** encompass all the patterns of *again*'s resolution. This model is, therefore, provisional and open to discussion. Further analysis of resolution patterns will be needed, and it will contribute to the revelation of characteristics of interpreting presupposition triggers.

5. Conclusion

This paper has discussed three patterns of resolution, followed by suggestion of a provisional interpretation model for *again*, as illustrated in Figure.5. Note, again, that this paper analyzes just some of possible resolution patterns, and the model suggested here is yet to cover all of them. Considerations of various examples observable in everyday conversations will lead to a more elaborated model.

Furthermore, the suggested model is based on Tiemann et al. (2014), which hypothesizes that the existence of P_1 (event part of a presupposition) in the context enables hearers to infer P_2 (time part of a presupposition)¹⁷. As discussed above, the way in which P_2 contributes to inferring P_1 is still open to discussion, and it is not reflected in the model suggested in this paper. Thus conducting an investigation into the roles of P_2 in inferring P_1 will be required, leading to grasping the entire picture of *again* interpretation.

Notes

1. *Context* here is replaceable with *common ground* (Clark and Carlson 1981).
2. Lambrecht (1994) defines 'presupposition' by contrast with 'focus.'
3. Keenan (1971) discusses a pragmatic aspect of presuppositions.
4. Glanzberg (2003) refers to it as 'felicity.'
5. Domaneschi (2016) adds focal adverbs to the list.
6. This term is used for a different concept in Tiemann et al. (2014).
7. The degree of acceptance is influenced by the situations where hearers encounter triggers (cf. Stalnaker 2002).
8. This leads to ignoring presupposition triggers.
9. This is discussed in Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994) and Beck (2007) as well.
10. Heim (1990) and Beck (2007) do not express the presuppositions as P_1 and P_2 .
11. The term 'partial accommodation' does not appear in Tiemann et al. (2014).
12. Tiemann et al. (2014) does not express the presuppositions as P_1 and P_2 .

13. Tiemann et al. (2014) mentions the possibility that the participants understand the scope of *again* not as the whole event but as the event without agents.
14. [] parts are not in Tiemann et al. (2014).
15. As will be mentioned, there exist other ways of interpreting (11).
16. As will be discussed, hearers can interpret (13) in other ways.
17. What Tiemann et al. (2014) mentions is that resolution of P_1 precedes that of P_2 , and resolution of P_2 does not take place before that of P_1 . This means that P_2 -to- P_1 inference does not exist. In contrast, the existence of P_1 -to- P_2 inference is hypothesized. Tiemann et al. (2014) states that temporal connection can be made by means of accommodation.

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Again の前提認可パターンの多様性について

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本稿は、文脈に含まれる特定の命題がいかにして *again* の前提として認可されるのかという観点から、*again* の解釈プロセスについて考察した上で、*again* の前提に相当する命題を聞き手が文脈中に見出す多様なパターンを踏まえた *again* の解釈モデルを構築することを試みるものである。Tiemann et al. (2014) は 2 段階から構成される聞き手による *again* の解釈プロセスを仮定している。はじめに、*again* により喚起される特定の命題が文脈に含まれているのかが確認され、含まれていると認識されたのであれば、文脈中の該当の命題が表す事象と、*again* と共起する発話の命題が表す事象との間に時間関係が確立される、というものである。本稿ではいくつかの事例から、ここで想定される第 1 段階において、*again* が喚起する命題が文脈に含まれていると聞き手が認識するプロセスは場合により異なるものであることを示す。同時に、文脈中の命題が前提として認識されない要因も多様であり、場面毎に別の要因がはたらいっていることについても言及する。本稿の最後に、これらの分析を統合し、Tiemann et al. (2014) で提示される *again* の解釈モデルを基盤としたモデルを提示する。このモデルは、想定される全てのパターンを網羅してはいないという点で暫定的なものではあるが、場合により異なる前提構築が行われていることについて踏み込んだものであるため、前提解釈プロセスについてのより多様なパターンを包含するモデルを構築する際の土台となることが期待される。