

The Awakening of Reason: *Rede, Vernunft, and Geselligkeit* by Christian Thomasius

Yuki TAKAKI

Introduction

In 1687, at the conservative University of Leipzig, Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) posted a lecture announcement on a bulletin board that included a declaration that he would lecture in German. This sensational event is said to have marked the beginning of the early German Enlightenment. Thomasius lectured in the language of the people. In his *Discours von der Nachahmung der Franzosen* [1687/1701], the lecture announcement, he announced a program of transition from Latin to German, and at the same time, he sought to publish his works in German, which he accomplished with his *Monatsgespräche* [1688–1689] and *Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre* [1691]. He opened philosophy to the world. Thus, he came to be known as the “father of the German Enlightenment.”

However, was this incident alone sufficient to make Thomasius the father of the German Enlightenment? Of course, the Enlightenment is not a phenomenon that can be explained in a single word, nor is it a single phenomenon in the first place¹. It is also a strict fact that Thomasius did not use the noun *Aufklärung* (Schneiders [1974:14]). Insofar as this is the case, there are difficulties in attempting to discuss Thomasius’ Enlightenment thought.

Against this background, in this paper, I identify Thomasius’ Enlightenment thought in an attempt at eclectic philosophy in *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam* [1688] (hereafter, *Philosophia aulica*). Since eclectic philosophy has been interpreted in previous studies as constituting the substance of Thomasius’ Enlightenment thought (Schröder [1999:21]), it would not be wrong to place it at the core of his Enlightenment thought. To preempt my argument in this paper, the project of eclectic philosophy is to spread the work of reason, of reasoning, to everyone in the world.

How, then, is this enlightenment of reason to be accomplished? How can reason be awakened? The current paper addresses this question. Section 1 briefly introduces Thomasius’ belief that reason is given equally to all people. Section 2 introduces the eclectic philosophy at the core of Thomasius’ Enlightenment thought. Section 3 examines the concept of reason in detail in *Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae* [1688] (hereafter, *Institutiones*), and positions reason as the protagonist of eclectic philosophy. Section 4 confirms Thomasius’ claim that the faculty of reason cannot be awakened without

¹ Robertson and Outram point out the variety of the definitions of Enlightenment (Robertson [2015:1], Outram [2013:1]).

communication. Section 5 examines the relationship between reason and sociability and defends the interpretation that sociability awakens reason because it evokes communication. Section 6 provides an answer to the question of how communication backed by sociability awakens reason.

1. Reason of the People and Enlightenment

In this section, I summarize Thomasius' Enlightenment thought in terms of the possibility of the use of reason by all people. In other words, the use of reason is not limited to a few elites, but is open to all, and Thomasius sought to emphasize this aspect in his Enlightenment thoughts.

In his *Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre*, Thomasius describes learnedness (Gelahrheit) as follows:

Die Gelahrheit ist eine Erkäntnüß/durch welche ein Mensch geschickt gemacht wird das wahre von den falschen/das gute von dem bösen wohl zu unterscheiden/und dessen gegründete wahre/oder nach Gelegenheit wahrscheinliche Ursache zu geben/umb dadurch sein eigenes als auch anderer Menschen in gemeinen Leben und Wandel zeitliche und ewige Wohlfarth zu befördern. (VIII 75-76)²

It is stated here that a learned person is able to distinguish between true and false and good and evil, but it is not clear what faculties the learned person relies on. Thomasius then connects learnedness to understanding.

Sie [=Gelahrheit] hat ihren Sitz im Verstande³ des Menschen/und weil dieser allen Menschen gemein ist/als sind auch alle Menschen fähig die Gelahrheit zu erlangen/ob gleich die wenigsten wegen vieler Ursachen dieselbige nichts besitzen. (VIII 76)

In other words, learnedness is not reserved for a few elite scholars but should be available to all as long as they have a common understanding⁴.

² When quoting from Thomasius' works in this paper, the volume number in the Selected Works of Thomasius (*Christian Thomasius, Ausgewählte Werke*, Georg Olms, 1993-) is given in Roman numerals and the page number in Arabic numerals. In some cases, there are Latin and German versions of Thomasius' work, but the German version is used in this study.

³ As Wundt points out, in this context, understanding and reason are not specifically distinguished (Wundt [1964:39]). This may be said of Thomasius' works in general. Therefore, in this section, we shall interpret reason and understanding as interchangeable. The exact relationship between the two is discussed in Section 3.

⁴ This idea is reminiscent of the famous passage at the beginning of René Descartes' *Discourse on the Method* [1637], which he wrote in French rather than Latin: "Good sense [bon sens] is the best

A similar perspective can be seen in the subtitle of this work.

Einleitung zu der Vernunfftlehre, Worinnen durch eine leichte, und allen vernünfftigen Menschen, wasley Standes oder Geschlechts sie seyn, verständliche Manier der Weg gezeiget wird, ohne die Syllogisticâ das wahre, wahrscheinliche und falsche von einander zu entscheiden, und neue Warheiten zu erfinden.

Learnedness is open not only to people of a certain status or gender but to everyone who has reason. This is why this work was written, first of all, in German, which everyone can read, and not in Latin, which only scholars can access.

The motif of reason and understanding open to all is also expressed in the final issue of *Monatsgespräche*. In the following passage, nationality and status are mentioned instead of gender and status, and it is said that sound reason (common understanding) is common to all, regardless of these differences.

Sie [=Respublica literaria] erkennt kein Oberhaupt/als die gesunde Vernunfft/und alle diejenigen/die darinnen leben/sind einander gleich/sie mögen von was Nationen oder Stande seyn was sie wollen. Denn sie haben alle gleiche *vota* in denen *affaires*, die diese grosse *Societät* angehen. Ja die *vota* können hier nicht gezehlet/sondern sie müssen allemal nach dem Maßstab gesunder Vernunfft abgemessen/und in der Wage des allen Menschen gemeinen Verstandes abgewogen werden. (VI 1149)

Monatsgespräche was the first monthly magazine written in German for a general readership and was a precursor to the later *Berlinische Monatsschrift* [1783–1796]. In other words, through this magazine, Thomasius sent messages not only to scholars and colleagues but also to everyone in the world, regardless of nationality or status.

Furthermore, in *Einleitung in die Vernunfftlehre*, the characteristics of learnedness are summarized as follows (VIII 87-88).

- (1) Dieses ist keine Gelahrheit zu nennen/die weder in dem menschlichen Leben einigen Nutzen schaffet/noch zur Seeligkeit anführet.
- (2) Viel Sprachen wissen/ist der geringste Theil der Gelahrheit.
- (3) Zur Gelahrheit braucht man keines absonderlichen Beruffs.
- (4) Weibes-Personen sind der Gelahrheit so wohl fähig/als Mannes-Personen.

distributed thing in the world” (AT VI 1). As is well known, Descartes also refers to good sense as “reason” (AT VI 2) and “natural light” (AT VI 10). Descartes' influence on Thomasius is interesting, but I leave it as an issue here.

(5) Viel wissen macht nicht eben einen gelehrten Mann.

(6) Der ist nicht gelehrt/der es in der That nicht erweisen kan.

(7) Der ist nicht gelehrt/der das natürliche und übernatürliche Licht untereinander wirfft.

According to (2) and (5), being fluent in many languages and having a great deal of knowledge do not constitute learnedness⁵. Again, the point is Thomasius' belief that learnedness is open to all, regardless of occupation or gender⁶, as (3) and (4) indicate. In addition, although not addressed in this paper, (1) and (6) show the practical characteristics of early German Enlightenment thought, as is often said.

The “natural light” referred to in (7) means human understanding and reason, whereas “supernatural light” refers to divine revelation (VIII 80). Thomasius sharply distinguishes between world-wisdom (Weltweisheit) based on “human reason” (VIII 81) or “inner reason” (VIII 82) and theology based on divine revelation. Thomasius was one of the first thinkers to translate philosophy (philosophia) into the German word “Weltweisheit.” Thus, (7) implies that those who cannot distinguish between world-wisdom and theology are not learned. The “world” here refers to the general society that extends outside the school or university and the people who inhabit it. As noted in this section, all people are endowed with reason, and in that sense, world-wisdom is a philosophy for all people or the world⁷. The very theory of reason that is the subject of *Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre* and *Ausübung der Vernunftlehre* [1691] is a doctrine that teaches the people in the world how to use reason correctly⁸ (VIII 80), and it is the very foundation of Thomasius' Enlightenment thought.

2. Eclectic Philosophy in *Philosophia aulica*⁹

In this section, I turn to *Philosophia aulica* to introduce eclectic philosophy, which is often interpreted as the basis of Thomasius' Enlightenment thought. However, the relationship

⁵ Here, we may see the germ of Immanuel Kant's thought, which does not define the Enlightenment by “knowledge (Kenntnis)” (Ak VIII 146).

⁶ Kant had written to the effect that women tend to remain in a minor state (Ak VIII 35). In this sense, we can see a glimpse of Thomasius' advanced nature.

⁷ By world-wisdom, Thomasius also means, in contrast to theology, wisdom for a happy life in this world (not the afterlife) (VIII 82).

⁸ Thomasius' attempt at these works is reminiscent of the original title of Descartes' *Discourse on the Method*, “Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting one's reason and seeking the truth in the sciences, and in addition the Optics, the Meteorology and the Geometry, which are essays in this Method.”

⁹ The basic ideas of this and the next section have been discussed in my previous paper (Takaki [2024]). Therefore, these two chapters contain extensive translations of this paper.

between eclectic philosophy and reason is not clear in this work. Therefore, this relationship is explored in the following section.

In his *Philosophia aulica*, Thomasius contrasts the philosophy favored in schools and universities (Schule) with that favored at court (Hof), calling the former “Sectirische Philosophie” and the latter “Eclectische Philosophie” (II 53). It was then Thomasius’ intention to replace sectarian philosophy with eclectic philosophy.

A sectarian is one who clings to a particular doctrine of a certain teacher and defends it from feminine affection and blind obedience (II 49-50), specifically referring to Aristotelians and Cartesians. Aristotelianism was the dominant philosophy in Germany at the time. However, sectarian philosophy is not always necessary. This is because it goes against “fairness” and “modesty” by lifting up the central figures of the sect with great praise (II 51).

In contrast, eclectic philosophy is defined as follows.

Ich nenne aber eine *Eclectische Philosophie* eine solche/welche da erfordert/ daß man von dem Munde eines einzigen *Philosophi* allein nicht dependiren/oder denen Worten eines einzigen Lehr-Meisters sich mit einem Eyde verpflichten soll/sondern aus dem Munde und Schrifft allerlei Lehrer/alles und jedes was wahr und gut ist/in die Schaß-Kammer seines Verstandes sammeln müsse/und nicht so wohl auf die *Autorität* des Lehrers *Reflexion* mache/sondern ob dieser und jener Lehr-Punct wohl gegründet sei/selbst untersuche/auch von dem Seinigen etwas hinzu thue/und also vielmehr mit seinen eigenen Augen als mit andern sehe. (II 50)

What is important is to see with one's own eyes, and not with the eyes of others. To see with the eyes of others is to rely on their authority (Autorität)¹⁰. Eclectic philosophers seek to see for themselves whether a doctrine is well-grounded, without being misled by authority. Insofar as we seek what is right and good, we also seek the grounds. These philosophers seek the grounds, not an authority. In this respect, eclectic philosophy can be called an anti-authoritarian philosophy. Although easily misunderstood, eclectic philosophy is not about simply taking parts from different doctrines. Thomasius calls such a philosophy “syncretismus”¹¹ (II 49) and distinguishes it from his own eclectic philosophy. Eclectic philosophers are those who are not afraid to incorporate, if necessary, partially true points

¹⁰ In Thomasius’ Enlightenment thought, liberation from prejudgment based on authority has always been a serious theme. In *Philosophia aulica* and *Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre*, the main cause of error (Irrtum) is precisely the prejudgment toward authority (II 147, VIII 305-306). Schneiders [1983] elaborates on this point. Unfortunately, this point cannot be deepened in this paper.

¹¹ Thomasius points out that this kind of mixture of different doctrines only produces “Sophist.”

from different doctrines as a result of inquiry with their own eyes. Further, although treated vaguely, it should be noted that “understanding” is mentioned here in the expression “Schaß-Kammer seines Verstandes.”

Thomasius cites Pythagoras, Zeno, Plato, Democritus, Seneca, Cicero, Aristotle, and Descartes as examples of eclectic philosophers (II 52). Thomasius evaluates Descartes himself as an eclectic philosopher. Who should be called into question are the Cartesians who, following the authority of Descartes (or, more precisely, his works), have gathered together to form a sect and forgotten the attitude of looking at his doctrines with their own eyes.

This eclectic philosophy has been understood as the core of Thomasius' Enlightenment thought. In particular, eclectic philosophy has been regarded as a precursor to Kant's later Enlightenment idea of “thinking for oneself (Selbstdenken)” (Weigl [1997:43], Schröder [1999:22]). To think free from authority is also to think for oneself. In this paper, I want to understand this project of eclectic philosophy as the core of Thomasius' Enlightenment thought, even though he did not use the word *Aufklärung*.

Finally, I state a few words about the significance of Thomasius' eclectic philosophy. As Beck points out, throughout this work, Thomasius' belief is that philosophy is not just for theologians and scholars but also for all the people in the world (Beck [1969:249])¹². The same is true of eclectic philosophy. Although eclectic philosophy was favored at court, it was not just for courtiers. It must be open to all insofar as they have reason. Just as Thomasius, in his *Discours von der Nachahmung der Franzosen*, wanted Germans and German students to learn the French courtier's “galantry,” so he wanted the world to learn the courtier's philosophy.

3. The Concept of Reason in *Institutiones*

Despite Thomasius' claim to admit reason for all and his attempt at eclectic philosophy, the faculty of reason is not referred to when he explains eclectic philosophy in *Philosophia aulica* and “understanding” is only mentioned once in an ambiguous way, as pointed out in the previous section. This circumstance makes it difficult to discuss eclectic philosophy in terms of Enlightenment. Therefore, in this section, I focus on *Institutiones*, which was published at the same time as *Philosophia aulica*. I focus on *Institutiones*, because in this somewhat scholastic work, Thomasius explains the basic concepts relatively clearly. Specifically, in this section, I review the scope of the concept of reason in *Institutiones* and

¹² Wundt also calls court-philosophy a “world-philosophy” in opposition to school-philosophy (Wundt [1964:33]).

explore the faculty of reason that Thomasius intended as the object of his Enlightenment.

Institutiones is Thomasius' first major work on natural law. Let me summarize Thomasius' intentions in *Institutiones* as much as is necessary for this paper. Although he had opposed Samuel Pufendorf's separation of natural law and theology before *Institutiones*, Thomasius defends Pufendorf in this work. In other words, Thomasius himself separates theology from natural law and constructs natural law using, as his cue, the faculty of "reason," which God has given to human beings as their very nature. Whether this detachment is successful or not is not addressed in this paper, but here, I focus on the concept of reason in this work.

Thomasius refers to "understanding and will" as the two functions of reason that are usually mentioned, and he includes understanding in the broad sense of reason (IV 12). Certainly, there does not seem to be a principled distinction between reason and understanding in Thomasius' works. Here, however, let me clarify the relationship between the two faculties in detail according to *Institutiones*.

According to Thomasius, human faculties (Kunst-Verfassung, habitus) are divided into understanding (Verstand, intellectualis) and will (Wille, voluntarius) (IV 3). The function of understanding is twofold (IV 14-15). The first is the function of absolutely (schlechtweg) grasping the object of external sensibility. It involves the formation of propositions and ideas (Bildungen) about the nature or goodness of that object. The second is the function of reasoning (raisoniren) through further contemplation (nachdenken) of the truth of these propositions, the goodness of the object and its idea through discourse (Discurs¹³). Both functions are in a multilayered relationship. Namely, the second function of understanding builds on the first.

On this basis, according to Thomasius, the first function deserves to be called "understanding," whereas the second function is called "intellective memory (verständliches Gedächtnis)." The former is the primary function of understanding, and the latter the secondary. It is the first function that is essential to understanding. Thus, understanding in the broad sense includes intellective memory, whereas understanding in the narrow sense does not (IV 14). Thomasius adds that if one wishes to call the first function "reason (Vernunft)" and the second function "rational inference (Vernunft-Schluß)," there is no objection¹⁴.

Meanwhile, Thomasius also gives an independent account of reason. The following

¹³ Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with in detail, the expression "Discurs" as often used by Thomasius should not be understood in the 20th century sense of "debate" as "Diskursethik" by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel.

¹⁴ The above functions of understanding are summarized in Table 1.

description is noteworthy:

Die Vernunft des Menschen bestehet in den *Gedancken*. Gedencken heißt einen terminum mit dem andern und eine proposition mit der andern verknüpfen/welches letztere vernünffteln (*ratiocinari*) genant wird. Wir können aber nicht vernünffteln/ohne durch Worte/welche wir entweder im Sinn behalten/oder mit dem Munde aussprechen/daher ist auch bey den Griechen *λόγος* entweder *ἐνδιάθετος* (eine innerliche Rede) oder *προφορικός* (eine eußerliche Rede). Die Worte aber/wie wir unten sehen werden/werden den Dingen gegeben von den Menschen/welche in einerlen Gesellschaft leben. (IV 117)

In this quotation, Thomasius raises word-for-word and proposition-for-proposition connectings as functions of reason. The connecting of words forms propositions, and the connecting of propositions produces reasoning. It should be noted here that Thomasius calls only the connecting of propositions, not the formation of a proposition, “reasoning”¹⁵.

I have thus far reviewed the two functions of each of understanding and reason in *Institutiones*. Note that the two functions of each are congruent. The first function of understanding—the formation of propositions and ideas—is also the function of reason, the connecting of words or formation of a proposition. In contrast, the second function of understanding—contemplation and reasoning, “intellective memory” or “rational inference”—is also a function of reason, the connecting of propositions, or reasoning¹⁶.

However, the two faculties differ in terms of which function they emphasize. The first function is “understanding” itself, while the second function is removed from its narrow definition and called “intellective memory.” In contrast, only the second function, not the first, can be called “reasoning” from the standpoint of reason. The first function is not seemingly important for reason and is not explained much. Thus, it may be interpreted that understanding is an expression used with emphasis on the first function and reason on the second.

Table 1: Two functions of understanding (IV 14-15)

(1) Formation of propositions and ideas	Verstand	Primary function of understanding	Vernunft
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¹⁵ The above functions of reason are summarized in Table 2.

¹⁶ It should be noted that “raisonieren,” or the second function of understanding, and “vernünffteln,” or the second function of reason, are considered identical in expression.

(2) Contemplation and reasoning on propositions and ideas	Verständliches Gedächtnis	Secondary function of understanding (This is not included in the narrow sense of understanding)	Vernunft-Schluß
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Table 2: Two functions of reason (IV 117)

(1) Connecting of words	— —
(2) Connecting of propositions	vernünfteln, ratiocinari

In this paper, then, I focus on the second function, which I simply call “reason.” This is because I believe that the second and primary function of reason, namely the faculty of reasoning, is the protagonist of eclectic philosophy. Eclectic philosophy is an attitude of seeking by oneself the grounds for given propositions, looking for what is true and good. This should involve not only the formation of a proposition but also the connecting of propositions. For example, only by connecting the proposition “organ transplantation should be allowed (organ transplantation is a good thing)” with the proposition “helping others is a good thing” and the proposition “organ transplantation involves helping others” would one be able to arrive at the ground for the proposition “organ transplantation should be allowed.”

This interpretation is supported by Thomasius' definition of thought as “internal speech (Rede)” in his other works. In the above quotation in this section from *Institutiones*, a distinction was made between internal and external speech, but his intention is not clear in this passage, nor is this distinction explained in the later sections of *Institutiones*. In other works, however, Thomasius clearly defines thought, the work of reason, as “internal speech.” This point is closely related to the rest of the discussion in this paper and is briefly explained here.

For example, in *Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre*, Thomasius states as follows.

Die Rede ist eine Anzeige der menschlichen Gedancken/und sind diese beyde stets während mit einander verknüpfft/weßwegen auch die Gedancken von denen Alten sind eine innerliche Rede genennet worden. (VIII 100)

[...] weil wir oben behauptet/daß die Gedancken in einer innerlichen Rede bestehen [...]. (VIII 290)

Here, “the ancients” may refer to Plato. Plato defines thought (*dianoia*) as the self-dialogue of the soul (*Theaetetus* [189e-190a], *Sophist* [263e], *Philebus* [38c-e]).

Socrates: By “thought” I mean the account (*logos*) which the soul goes through with itself about anything that it considers. Don't imagine that I know this, but here is the picture that I have of the soul when it thinks about something. It is doing nothing other than conversing with itself (*dialegesthai*). The soul asks itself questions, and answers them with affirmations and denials¹⁷. (*Theaetetus* [189e-190a])

For example, one might ask oneself, “Should organ transplantation be allowed?” The person may respond, “No, we should not donate the body we were endowed by our parents,” and deny the earlier answer, or may affirm, “Yes, we should donate our organs because it is more important to save lives than take care of our dead bodies.” At this very moment, the person is thinking. What is being done in this case is precisely the reasoning or connecting of propositions.

In the explanation of eclectic philosophy in *Philosophia aulica*, it was discussed that we should think with grounds about whether a certain doctrine is true or good. For example, when I question the proposition (given by one sect) that “organ transplantation is right,” seek for its true grounds, and finally find its grounds on the proposition that “organ transplantation is helping people,” I am using reasoning. This is the practice of eclectic philosophy. In his *Philosophia aulica*, Thomasius, as in *Theaetetus*, defines thought as follows.

Der Gedancke ist eine solche Verrichtung des Gemüths/im Gehirn/wodurch der Mensch oder das Gemüthe/von den Schematibus¹⁸, welche vermittelt der Bewegung der äusserlichen Körper durch die Organa der Sinnen dem Gehirn sind eingedrückt worden/etwas durch einen Discurs oder aus Worten bestehenden Redens-Art vorbringt/fraget/bejahet/oder verneinet. (II 99-100)

From the above discussion in this section, we may conclude that the work of “self-inquiry” in search of the grounds of a doctrine in eclectic philosophy is the function of reason, thinking, intellective memory, reasoning, or internal speech. Thomasius argues that because this reason is present in everyone, eclectic philosophy is also possible for everyone.

One final note should be made before concluding this section. It is true that both external

¹⁷ The translation is from Chappell [2004:167].

¹⁸ “Schema” is interchangeable with “Bildung,” which I translated as “idea” in this paper (e.g., IV 96, 100).

and internal speech require words. However, let me note that, according to the above definition, external speech is not thought in itself. Internal speech is a “dialogue” with the self and presupposes a self that talks and is talked to. External speech, however, is not a thought in itself, for external speech is only a one-sided speech to another. In this sense, external speech is not reasoning. In this case, the relationship between external and internal speech would be questioned, because Thomasius does not make it clear in *Institutiones*. This issue is addressed in the next section and beyond.

4. Reason and Communication

Thus far, I have analyzed the concept of reason, which, for Thomasius, is the target of the Enlightenment. However, this alone cannot explain the awakening of reason. From this section onward, I discuss Thomasius' claims regarding this very awakening of reason.

Thomasius makes a noteworthy claim about reason and thought. Following are the passages from *Institutiones* that follow the long passage quoted in the previous section:

Ferner mögen die Cartesianer sagen was sie wollen/so ists gewiß/daß die kleinen Kinder wenn sie auff die Welt kommen/nicht gedencken/sondern nur eine Geschicklichkeit zu dencken haben. Diese *Geschicklichkeit* aber kan gemeiniglich *ohne Umbgang mit andern Menschen* nicht zum Wercke kommen. (IV 117)

Die Sache kurz zu fassen lasset uns mercken: *Die Vernunfft ist niemahls ohne Rede/Die Rede ausser der Gesellschaft hat keinen Nutzen/und die Vernunfft giebt sich ausser der Gesellschaft nicht hervor*. Demnach werden wir nicht irren/wenn wir sagen/die Geschicklichkeit/die bey dem Menschen vor der Ausübung der Vernunfft ist/sey nichts anders als eine Neigung/mit andern Menschen zu raisoniren. Eine jede Geschicklichkeit ziele aufs Werck (ad actum) als auff ihren Endzweck. (IV 117)

Let me discuss two issues concerning these quotations.

First, the difference between the predisposition (*Geschicklichkeit*) to reason (think) referred to in the first quotation and the use or exercise (*Ausübung*) of reason referred to in the second quotation should not be overlooked here. We are born with reason, but we are not immediately capable of using it. Predispositions are thought of as something we are born with but must “manifest (zum Werke kommen)”¹⁹. Although the meaning of the term “*Geschicklichkeit*” is not clearly defined here, I will elucidate this concept from other passages in *Institutiones*. While the term is often understood today in the sense of

¹⁹ In *Institutiones*, Thomasius also states: “[...] er aber diese seine *Geschicklichkeit* [=freie Wille] ins Werck richten müsse [...]” (IV 101).

“skillfulness” (as it is in Kant, for example), it is understood to have a different meaning in Thomasius’ works.

A passage from *Institutiones* explaining the concept of “right (Recht)” gives us a hint. Thomasius, following the vocabulary of Hugo Grotius, distinguishes two kinds of rights. First, perfect rights are called “faculties (Vermögen, facultas).” Second, imperfect rights are called “predispositions (Geschicklichkeit, aptitudo)” (IV 29). On the basis of the former we can compel others, but not on the basis of the latter. Certainly, in the relevant passage of Grotius' *De jure belli ac pacis* [1625], Book I, Chapter 1, Section 4 (Grotius [1646:2]), the right/law is defined as moral quality (qualitas moralis), and then this is further divided into two parts, namely, “facultas” and “aptitudo.” Grotius adds that when this distinction is translated into the affairs of nature, the former is “actus,” and the latter is “potentia”²⁰. Accordingly, it can be interpreted that the predisposition to reason means the imperfect or possible state, which must be developed toward the perfect or actual state (“Ausübung” or “Werk”)²¹.

Furthermore, Thomasius rephrases the distinction between predisposition and use or exercise more accurately and clearly as “Vermögen (potentia)” and “Kraft.”

Durch die *gesunde Vernunft* verstehe ich alhier eine natürliche Krafft zu raisoniren/oder warhafftige Schlüsse aus warhafftigen Grundsätzen herzuleiten. Es hat aber der Mensch/wie jederman bekant/diese Krafft von seiner Geburt an/in gestalt eines *Vermögens* (protentiæ) welches geschickt ist seine Kräfte auszulassen/wenn zuvor durch Darreichung der Sinne die Bildungen von dem Verstande formiret seyn/und dasselbige hernach in menschlicher Gesellschaft ausgeübet wird. (IV 65)

Thomasius distinguishes here between faculty (Kraft) and potential (Vermögen, potentia), although he does not use the expression “Geschicklichkeit.” Furthermore, this distinction is used in connection with reason, and sound reason. The faculty of sound reason is only given by birth as a potential, and its use or exercise must be aimed for. Thus, it is seen that predisposition corresponds to potential and use or exercise to faculty²².

Now, the term “sound reason” was also used in the passage quoted from *Monatsgespräche* in Section 1 of this paper. There, it was said that the truth of things is determined only on the basis of sound reason. This sound reason is not the reason that only some people can

²⁰ However, in the first German translation of this work, to which Thomasius contributed a preface, they are paraphrased as “Fähigkeit” and “Geeignetheit,” or “Wirklichkeit” and “Möglichkeit” (Grotius [1707:48]). The latter corresponds to “Geschicklichkeit” by Thomasius.

²¹ In another passage, “Fähigkeit” is paraphrased as “Geschicklichkeit” (IV 470).

²² The above two modes of reason are summarized in Table 3.

have, but also the reason that all people are supposed to have. The discussion thus far in this section further shows that sound reason is not yet used or exercised, but is merely a predisposition, or potential, possessed by all. Thomasius' claim described in Section 1—that everyone is endowed with reason—does not mean that everyone actually uses or exercises reason, but rather that everyone is endowed with the potential to reason and is open to the use or exercise of reason. This implies that the potential to reason must be drawn out and cultivated in order to use or exercise it. How, then, can the potential to reason be awakened?

Table 3: Two modes of reason or right

IV 117	Geschicklichkeit	Ausübung
IV 29	Geschicklichkeit (aptitudo)	Vermögen (facultas)
IV 65	Vermögen (potentia)	Kraft
IV 470	Fähigkeit	---
Grotius	Aptitudo, potentia	Facultas, actus
	Geeignetheit, Möglichkeit	Fähigkeit, Wirklichkeit

The answer to this question concerns the second issue. Thomasius believes that the predisposition to reason and think can be awakened by association (Umgang) with others. Here, we see his peculiar conception of reason. As we saw in the previous section, reason, or thinking, is not possible without language and speech, and speech is useful and exists only in society²³. Indeed, by definition, reason must exist regardless of one's association with others, because thinking simply means internal speech. However, reason requires society as its condition. Thomasius further states that the predisposition to reason is the “inclination to reason with others (Neigung mit andern Menschen zu raisoniren).” This predisposition or inclination to reason is awakened to its exercise through association with others. Here, among internal and external speech, reasoning with others is an external speech or communicative practice.

This means that, for humans, speech is temporally first and foremost external speech, and external speech is a condition for internal speech. This is because, as mentioned in the previous section, thought is nothing but internal speech. Thus, external and internal speech have different values. The predisposition to reason cannot be expressed without external

²³ It is the interpretation of this proposition that is important in the next section.

speech, that is, without communication with others²⁴. In fact, as I examine in more detail in Section 6, Thomasius reiterates in his works after *Institutiones* that internal speech presupposes external speech. This is synonymous with saying that communication makes reason possible. Recall that in the previous section, internal speech was defined as thought.

In this section, I have shown that in Thomasius' view, in contrast to the faculty (Kraft) of reason, the predisposition to reason in individuals needs to be awakened, and that the predisposition to reason is the inclination to reason with others, which is to be awakened by communication with others. His claim that one cannot think without communicating with others has often been cited in previous studies (Beck [1969:250], Schröder [2001:137], Vollhardt [2001:174-175], Zurbuchen [2003:284-285]). However, the relationship between communication and reason, between external and internal speech, remains unclear. In other words, we must go one step further and ask: How can communication make reason possible? Without answering this question, we will not be able to explain the awakening of reason.

5. Reason and Sociability

As noted above, although external and internal speech are distinguished in *Institutiones*, their exact relationship has not been clarified. Therefore, this section focuses on the concept of sociability in *Institutiones* and clarifies the relationship between reason and sociability. Thomasius' passages on sociability suggest that it contributes to the awakening of reason. Specifically, this section proceeds under the interpretive hypothesis that sociability facilitates communication and external speech and enables internal speech.

As is well known, Thomasius closely links reason and sociability just after the passage quoted from *Institutiones* at the beginning of the previous section. The relationship between sociability and communication should be questioned here.

Darumb wenn wir sagen/der Mensch sey vernünfftig/ists eben so viel/als wenn wir sagen/er sey *gesellig*. Die *Geselligkeit* aber ist eine allgemeine dem menschlichen Geschlecht von Gott eingepflanzte Neigung/wodurch der Mensch verlangen trägt mit andern Menschen ruhig und glücklich zu leben. Warumb aber ruhig? Dieweil wir im unruhigen Stande/so ferne er unruhig ist/nicht vernünffteln. (IV 118)

Thomasius also expresses this almost identically in the following way.

²⁴ The art of social intercourse discussed in *Discours von der Nachahmung der Franzosen* can be interpreted as an attempt to make possible this awakening of reason precisely through good communication.

Es bleibt demnach unumbgestossen: daß die *vernünfftige* Natur des Menschen nichts anders ist/als die *gesellige* Natur des Menschen: Und daß folglich durch die Ubereinstimmung mit der vernünfftigen Natur eben die Ubereinstimmung mit der Geselligkeit des Menschen verstanden wird. (IV 119)

Thomasius thus submits natural law based on human sociability (Geselligkeit). The highest natural law is stated in the following principle: “*Thue dasjenige/was nothwendig mit dem geselligen Leben des Menschen überein kömpt/und unterlasse dasjenige/ was damit nicht überein kömpt*” (IV 119). From this principle, Thomasius derives various obligations. However, the relationship between sociability, natural law, and individual obligations is not dealt with here, since Thomasius’ theory of natural law itself is not a topic of interest in the current study.

What then can we say about the relationship between reason and sociability from these passages? Even though it has been said that the condition for the use of reason is communication, in these passages, reason and sociability are closely linked to each other, as if being rational and sociable were the same. However, being rational, or thinking, and being sociable must be independent in definition. Without clarifying this relationship, it would be impossible to explain the awakening of reason.

Regarding the relationship between reason and sociability, Grunert questions, “Unklar ist aber dennoch, ob die Vernunft tatsächlich das die Geselligkeit fundierende Prinzip ist [...]” (Grunert [2000:195-196]). Here, Grunert cites Schneiders as the very person who “favored” the interpretation that reason grounds sociability. Let me first examine Schneiders’ interpretation.

Schneiders states that “Vernunft ist schon als eine bloße Potenz zu denken eine Neigung zur Kommunikation in der Gesellschaft” (Schneiders [1971:110]), since reason cannot exist without language, even common language. In other words, according to Schneiders, reason has a sociable quality in itself.

Doch kann diese durch die enge Verknüpfung von Vernunft und Geselligkeit ermöglichte Bestimmung des Naturrechts nicht darüber hinweg täuschen, daß auch Thomasius’ Naturrecht der Geselligkeit im Grunde ein Naturrecht der Vernunft ist. Geselligkeit ist zwar ein Hauptmerkmal der Vernunft, und Vernünftigkeit kann folglich durch Geselligkeit näherhin bestimmt werden; dennoch ist Geselligkeit eben nur eine Eigenschaft der Vernunft, die selbst das letzte, wenn auch nur formale Prinzip des Naturrechts bleibt. Geselligkeit ist vernünftig, weil Vernunft gesellig ist. (Schneiders [1971:111])

Schneiders interprets sociability as a quality of reason, and even regards sociability and reason as identical. This interpretation is consistent with an earlier passage by Thomasius stating that rational human beings and sociable human beings, rational nature and sociable nature, are the same.

In contrast, Grunert interprets sociability as more fundamental than reason. He points out that sociability is grounded without reason. Let me explain Grunert's interpretation. First, reason requires speech and language, and this language is always social. In other words, without the assumption of society, there is no language, and without language, reason cannot function. Grunert states that language can only function meaningfully within a "Kommunikationsgemeinschaft" (Grunert [2000:195]). Grunert understands Thomasius' passages quoted in the previous section²⁵ to mean that reason presupposes language as a social system²⁶. Hence, "Die Vernunft zielt daher immer schon notwendig auf Gesellschaft als die Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit [...]" (Grunert [2000:195]).

Next, according to Grunert, it is this society as a linguistic community that is created by sociability. Here, Grunert appeals to the following definition of sociability:

Die *Geselligkeit* aber ist eine allgemeine dem menschlichen Geschlecht von Gott eingepflanzte Neigung/wodurch der Mensch verlangen trägt mit andern Menschen ruhig und glücklich zu leben. (IV 118)

Based on this definition²⁷, Grunert interprets that no direct connection between reason and sociability can be found here. In other words, Thomasius does not explain sociability through reason. In this sense, reason merely presupposes rather than grounds society.

²⁵ "Die Vernunft ist niemahls ohne Rede/Die Rede ausser der Gesellschaft hat keinen Nutzen/und die Vernunft giebt sich ausser der Gesellschaft nicht hervor" (IV 117).

²⁶ Indeed, Thomasius believes that the language on which reason relies is a social system. In *Institutiones*, it is stated "Die Worte aber/wie wir unten sehen werden/werden den Dingen gegeben von den Menschen/welche in einerlen Gesellschaft leben" (IV 117), but the expected explanation is finally given in the Book 2, Chapter 8: "On the Obligations of Human Beings Concerning Speech" (IV 213-214). Let me explain this part briefly. The signal (Zeichen) of things intended for communication, can be either natural or arbitrary. As an example of the former, it is stated that smoke is a signal of fire. The latter, meanwhile, is based on a general agreement among human beings. The arbitrary signal of the human mind is the use of speech, or language. It includes those common to several nations and those specific to some nations. In this sense, as Pufendorf had already pointed out, language is always a system based on social agreement. When Grunert states that reason is social, he means that reason is based on the social system of language, not that it prefers to communicate with others. Incidentally, Thomasius' claim above implies that, as long as one can use at least one language common in a certain society, one can also use reason. It does not mean that one must learn Hebrew, Latin, or Greek to use reason.

²⁷ A similar definition of sociability is found in *Monatsgespräche*: "Socialität/oder die dem Menschen eingepflanzte Zuneigung mit andern Menschen in einer friedlichen und ruhigen Gesellschaft zu leben" (VI 220).

Therefore, reason is not sociable, nor is sociability a quality of reason. Grunert concludes as follows:

Insofern ist die Geselligkeit ein eigenständiges Vermögen, das ohne die Vernunft begründbar ist und daher nicht als bloße »Eigenschaft der Vernunft« aufgefaßt werden darf. Vernunft und Geselligkeit sind zwei miteinander eng verknüpfte und dennoch - auch in naturrechtlicher Perspektive - voneinander geschiedene Prinzipien. (Grunert [2000:196])

Certainly, Grunert has a point in his interpretation. No references to reason actually appear in the previous definition of sociability by Thomasius. Then, reason and sociability are separated, and the passage stating that reason is sociable loses its point. It is thus possible to be sociable and not rational. Reason does not have a sociable quality, and reason and sociability are, so to speak, separate and distinct faculties. Thus, in Grunert's interpretation, there remains the possibility of explaining the awakening of reason. This is because his interpretation avoids the circulation around the idea that sociability, which is supposed to explain the awakening of reason, if it is already rational, can no longer explain the awakening of reason, for this sociability always accompanies reason. In other words, if reason and sociability refer to the same thing, then it will no longer be possible to explain the awakening of reason. That is, according to Grunert, reason does indeed presuppose a society, but this society is to be explained by sociability, not reason.

However, there is a problem here. According to Grunert's interpretation, reason presupposes only society and sociability as a very distinct inclination. This would mean that reason itself is not always sociable, which would seem to be a departure from Thomasius' intention. Then, I would have to offer an interpretation that encompasses reason as being sociable. In this regard, Schneiders' interpretation of sociability as a quality of reason has a point.

I therefore offer an interpretation that rescues the intimate connection between reason and sociability. It is true that "reason" is not included in the definition of sociability cited by Grunert, but it must be noted that sociability is not stated to be the "desire for a tranquil and happy life with other human beings" itself. Rather, what Thomasius is saying is that humans desire this kind of life *through* (wodurch) a certain inclination called "sociability." How, then, is sociability explained? If it is an inclination, what kind of inclination is it? We should recall here that the predisposition to reason was described as "the inclination to reason with others." It is this inclination that Thomasius calls sociability. Because of this inclination to reason with others, humans desire a tranquil and happy life. This

interpretation would be supported by the passage, “Da nun der Hauptzweck der *Rede* dieser ist/daß die Menschen untereinander raisoniren/dieses aber einen ruhigen Stand erfordert [...]” (IV 213). The *means* by which we reason with each other is a happy and tranquil life with other human beings, namely “society (Gesellschaft)” (IV 118).

Therefore, I interpret this inclination to reason with others as “sociability”²⁸. In this interpretation, reason remains the root of sociability²⁹. Surely, reasoning with others is not internal speech. In this sense, this inclination is not the use or exercise of reason itself. This is because only external speech is important for this inclination. Nevertheless, this sociability deserves to be called a quality of reason or the predisposition to reason because it is still related to reasoning. One may not be able to think for oneself, but one can think with others and desire to do so. This is not the use of reason on a full scale, but still its beginning. Thus, there is no sociability independent of reason; rather, it is also called the predisposition to reason.

Moreover, sociability is not a relative but a universal inclination and is given to all humankind. This sociability is a necessary condition for the use of reason. This interpretation of sociability as a universal inclination is consistent with the fact that all people are born with reason in the form of predisposition. Thus, I can defend the interpretation that sociability, the inclination to reason with others, facilitates communication and possibly enables internal speech.

However, the discussion in this section does not address how this sociability, or the inclination to reason with others, makes thinking and internal speech possible. This is the final question that needs to be addressed.

6. Internal Speech and External Speech

The answer to the question of how this sociability makes thinking possible relies on how to interpret “reasoning with others.” No further explanation of this concept is given in

²⁸ In *Kurtzer Entwurff der politischen Klugheit* [1710] Thomasius states: “Der Mensch ist ein zahmes und geselliges/nicht aber ein wildes noch zur Einsamkeit geschaffenes Thier. Der Grund aller Gesellschaften ist die Conversation [...]” (XVI 108). Here, sociability is not said to be the desire for a tranquil and happy life, but it is connected to conversation that relies on words or a mutual external speech. In this sense, this passage would also support the interpretation of sociability as rational. However, offering a further argument is beyond the scope of this paper.

²⁹ However, the problem arises here that if speech and language already depend on social agreement, then the inclination to reason with others, which still requires external speech, also presupposes society. Such a problem arises especially when sociability is linked to reason, as my interpretation suggests. Although it is not possible to settle this problem here, I propose the hypothesis that sociability can work without the sharing of language. Thomasius states that language, or an arbitrary signal, enables the maintenance (Erhaltung) of human sociability (IV 214), which seems to show that although sociability cannot be maintained without language, it can work without language.

Institutiones. Therefore, in this section, I focus on works after *Institutiones* to elucidate how reasoning with others, or external speech and internal speech, are related.

As mentioned earlier, although *Institutiones* introduces a distinction between external and internal speech in explaining reason, his intention is not clear and the relationship between the two is not explicitly stated. In *Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre*, this point is taken further.

Doch die Papegone reden auch. Du irrst dich. Die Rede ist eine Anzeigung der menschlichen Gedancken/und sind diese beyde stets während mit einander verknüpfft/weßwegen auch die Gedancken von denen Alten sind eine innerliche Rede genennet worden. Aber ein Papegon braucht sich nur einerley Lauts mit der Rede des Menschen/und schrenet denselben ohne Verstand her. (VIII 100)

First, let me reiterate that thought is clearly defined here as internal speech. Thinking is the internal speech with the self.

Furthermore, the following passage regarding the relationship between the two types of speech is suggestive.

Ja die *Seele* selbst kan sich ohne Zuthuung anderer Menschen so zu sagen nicht fort helfen. Und wir erkennen wohl/daß sie bey denen kleinen Kindern etwas thun müsse; aber ehe sie reden/oder zum wenigsten anderer Menschen Reden verstehen /können wir nicht sagen/daß sie gedencken/weil wir oben behauptet/daß die Gedancken in einer innerlichen Rede bestehen/welche innerliche Rede eine eusserliche Rede praesupponiret. (VIII 290)

Here, all “speeches” as conditions for the child's thinking are external speeches. In other words, the premise of internal speech, which is thought itself, is external speech. A naïve interpretation of this passage would be that a child cannot talk to himself without talking to others.

Here, however, I want to analyze this carefully. External speech here is twofold. It is the child's own external speech or the external speech of others. Let me generalize this idea. First, it means one's external speech. In this case, one cannot talk internally without talking externally. Second, it means the external speech of others. In this case, one cannot talk internally without understanding others' external speech.

Preliminarily, I would like to resolve two questions here. First, regarding the interpretation that one cannot talk internally without talking externally, the question arises as to whether external speech is not already thought itself. If, as was stated in the quotation

at the beginning of this section, speech is a sign (Anzeigung) of thought³⁰, then one is already thinking at the time of talking, whether internally or externally. If external speech is a sign of thought, it must presuppose internal speech. However, there must be cases in which external speech is also a sign of thought, and cases in which it is not. Thomasius did not claim that every external speech is a sign of an internal speech or thought. As discussed in Section 2, any human being can imitate the thoughts of another, like a parrot (Papegone), on the authority of another. Thomasius' intention here is not that every external speech presupposes an internal speech, but that external speech, when seen from the outside, indicates the possibility of internal speech. As we cannot directly perceive the internal speech of others, we can only understand the external speech as a sign of it. In this light, the proposition that one cannot talk internally without talking externally remains valid without falling into tautology. Thus, the first interpretation of external speech could still be valid.

Second, with regard to the interpretation that one cannot talk internally without understanding the external speech of others, this might mean that one can only acquire language from the external speech of others, since, as Grunert noted, language, which reason presupposes, is a social system. In other words, just as children first learn language from their parents, humans can only acquire language through the external speech of others in the society in which they were born and raised. Furthermore, only after one has learned to understand the external speech of others can one practice it oneself, thereby making internal speech possible. Certainly, learning the external speech of others is a necessary condition for the use of reason. However, this is not a sufficient condition. As discussed in the previous chapter, I interpret sociability as the inclination to reason with others; therefore, I attempt a different interpretation in this section.

Here, I focus on the expression “at least (zum wenigsten)” in the previous long quotation. This expression would mean the following. Indeed, if one cannot talk externally, one cannot think in the first place. However, there is an exception: it is possible to think without being able to talk externally. In this sense, one's external speech is not a necessary condition for one's internal speech. In fact, it is often said, “Think before you talk!”; it is possible to

³⁰ Let me elaborate a little on the thesis that speech is the sign of thought. Thomasius believes that speech is specific to human beings. Speech is defined as follows: “Die Rede ist abgetheilte *Stimme* (vox articulata) [...]” (IV 212). Thomasius distinguishes between “sound (Dohn),” “voice in general (*Stimme*),” and “speech,” and considers speech to be specific to humans (IV 212). The uppermost concept is sound. If a window breaks, what is heard is a sound. When this sound is emitted by a living being, it is called a voice. When a dog barks, “Woof!,” it is a voice. However, the dog's bark is not called speech. The voice is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for speech. This is because the voice does not reflect thought. Thus, human speech is distinguished from animal voice.

talk externally without talking internally. Therefore, external speech is not always the sign of thought. We can talk externally without thinking. However, one cannot think in the first place without “at least” understanding the speech of others. In other words, understanding others’ external speech is a necessary condition for internal speech. Given this interpretation, the second interpretation is the one we should adopt, even though, as noted earlier, I do not adopt this interpretation only in terms of the acquisition of language as a social system.

In fact, elsewhere in *Einleitung in die Vernunftlehre*, it is not the external speech of the person, but the external speech of the other that is raised as a condition for internal speech. Let me cite two passages:

Es ist wahr/Kinder und von Natur taube³¹ Leute können nicht mit sich selbst reden.
(VIII 103)

Dieweil aber die eusserliche Rede eine Anzeigung ist der Gedancken anderer Menschen/so folget daraus nothwendig/Daß die Kinder erst begreifen/was andere Menschen von den Wesen der Dinge gedencken/ehe sie selbst davon eigentlich zu reden etwas gedencken [...]. (VIII 290)

That is, we can think only after we understand and grasp the speech of others. The final question, then, is why is the external speech of the other a condition for one’s internal speech? The following passage from the same work is suggestive.

Den ob wir gleich gerne zugeben/daß in der menschlichen Seele ein *natürliches Vermögen* sey zu gedencken, und das wahre von dem falschen zu entscheiden/so würde doch solches Vermögen ihm nichts nützen/wenn es nicht durch Hülffe anderer Menschen angefeuret würde. (VIII 291)

As introduced in Section 4 of this paper, Thomasius distinguishes between “Vermögen (potentia)” and “Kraft.” According to this distinction, “Vermögen” in the present quotation should be understood as “potentia.” Therefore, Thomasius states here that reason, as a predisposition, cannot be exercised unless it is ignited by others. In other words, communication with others and, more precisely, the external speech of others, ignites and inspires one’s internal speech and awakens one’s reason.

³¹ Here, “taub” would not mean “hearing impairment.” This is because it would have been necessary to mention not only “hearing impairment” but also “visual impairment” if Thomasius wanted to indicate a situation in which a person is unable to understand the external speech of others due to a physical impairment. Therefore, I interpret “taub” here as not listening to the opinions of others.

The same claim is made in *Einleitung zur Sittenlehre* [1692].

Ein Mensch wäre kein Mensch ohne andere menschliche Gesellschaft. Was wären ihm die Gedancken nütze/wenn keine andere Menschen wären? [...] Die Gedancken sind eine innerliche Rede. Worzu brauchte er diese innerliche Rede/wenn niemand wäre/mit dem er seine Gedancken communiciren sollte? Diese innerliche Rede praesupponiret eine äusserliche. Und wo wolte er also innerlich mit sich reden/wenn nicht andere Menschen/mit denen er in Gesellschaft lebet/durch ihre äuserliche Rede seine innerliche auzündeten? Was brauchte es aber endlich wiederumb aller äuserlichen Reden/wenn keine menschliche Gesellschaft wäre. (XI 89-90)

What is discussed here is not the social nature of language, which Grunert focused on. Rather, one's internal speech is initiated by the external speech of others, and one's internal speech is used to communicate one's thoughts to others.

This implies a particular situation, elaborated as follows using an example. My thinking about organ transplantation is triggered by a friend's statement, "I recently completed a donor card to consent to an organ transplantation," or perhaps by a friend's question, "Did you fill out a donor card for organ transplantation?" I am inspired by this speech and would try to answer this question. I then use my internal speech about organ transplantation and the donor system. After thinking about it, I would try to share my thoughts with others. People do not often think alone, but they start to think because there are others around them to talk to. This is a manifestation of the inclination to reason with others, which I have identified as sociability in this paper, and it is this inclination that awakens reason.

Thomasius describes the purpose of speech as follows.

Die Rede ist eine abgetheilte Stimme (vox articulata) dadurch die Menschen einander dasjenige was sie im Sinn haben zu verstehen geben/und unter einander raisoniren. (IV 212)

Da nun der Hauptzweck der Rede dieser ist/daß die Menschen untereinander raisoniren/dieses aber einen ruhigen Stand erfodert [...]. (IV 213)

Indeed, speech may be considered the transmission of some thought or will. However, this is only part of the purpose of speech. Speech is intended to facilitate reasoning with others through the transmission of each other's thoughts. As already discussed in this section, it is important that the other's speech is not just a sound but a sign of thought, or at least it is received as such. No internal speech would be inspired by the sound of rain or the barking of a dog.

I now summarize the argument presented in this section. External speech as a condition for internal speech means that it is not one's external speech, but rather the external speech of others that inspires one's internal speech. In this sense, reason (Vernunft) is the faculty to "hear [the other's speech] (vernehmen)" (II 118). Of course, one would respond to the external speech of the other with external speech. In this way, one does "reason with others," and thereby an internal speech is developed. Certainly, the external speech of others is a condition for one's internal speech. Additionally, even the condition of one's external speech is the external speech of others. From the above perspectives, I conclude that "the inclination to reason with others," or sociability, is a condition for the use or exercise of reason.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have undertaken a textual interpretation aimed at explaining the awakening of reason by Thomasius. In Section 1, I briefly reviewed Thomasius' belief that reason is equally given to all. In Section 2, I turned to *Philosophia aulica* and introduced eclectic philosophy, which is the core of Thomasius' Enlightenment thought. In Section 3, I examined in detail the concept of reason in *Institutiones* and unraveled the relationship between understanding and reason, positioning reason or a faculty of reasoning as the protagonist of eclectic philosophy. In Section 4, I confirmed Thomasius' contention that the faculty of reason cannot be awakened without communication. In Section 5, I defended the interpretation that sociability awakens reason by examining in detail the relationship between reason and sociability. In Section 6, I answered the question of how communication, backed by sociability, awakens reason. To put it simply, even though one cannot reason on one's own, one's internal speech is inspired by listening to the external speech of others through the sociability or "inclination to reason with others."

The above account of the awakening of reason by Thomasius resonates precisely with Kant's later Enlightenment thought. Kant described the awakening of thought as follows:

Allein wie viel und mit welcher Richtigkeit würden wir wohl *denken*, wenn wir nicht gleichsam in Gemeinschaft mit andern, denen wir unsere und die uns ihre Gedanken *mitteilen*, dächten! (Ak VIII 144)

The belief that Enlightenment should always be achieved through communication with others may be a common thread running through modern German philosophy.

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The Awakening of Reason:

Rede, Vernunft, and Geselligkeit by Christian Thomasius

Yuki TAKAKI

Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), often regarded as the “father of the German Enlightenment,” is considered to be the first to deliver a German university lecture in the German language. However, this single historical event alone did not make Thomasius the father of the Enlightenment. Although he did not use the word *Aufklärung* (Enlightenment), previous studies have made various attempts to discuss his “Enlightenment thoughts.”

I focus on Thomasius’ concept of reason and his eclectic philosophy to construct his Enlightenment thoughts. I aim to explain how, according to Thomasius, Enlightenment can be achieved through reason and how reason is awakened.

This study uses textual interpretation to explain the awakening of reason. Section 1 provides a brief review of Thomasius’ belief that reason is equally given to all. Section 2 examines *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam* and introduces eclectic philosophy, which is the core of Thomasius’ Enlightenment thought. Section 3 conducts a detailed examination of the concept of reason found in *Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae* and clarify the relationship between understanding and reason, positioning reason as a faculty of reasoning and the protagonist of eclectic philosophy. Section 4 confirms Thomasius’ contention that the faculty of reason cannot be awakened without communication. Section 5 defends the interpretation that sociability awakens reason by examining the relationship between reason and sociability. Section 6 answers the question of how communication, backed by sociability, awakens reason. Simply put, even though I cannot reason on my own, my internal narrative is shaped by listening to the external narrative of others through sociability, or the “inclination to reason with others.”