

ETHNICITY, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA

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ABSTRACT Ethnicity relation in Africa is a sensitive issue. Tanzania is no exception to this. She has, however, been able to unite about 120 different ethnic groups to form a nation.

In Tanzania ethnicity alliance is an asset rather than a hindrance to the development of the country. Ethnicity is the basis for the political constituencies. All elected members to the Parliament must come from a recognized constituency, which unfortunately, is along the ethnicity lines. Ethnicity is also used for the mobilization of financial resources for the self-help programs in the rural areas. People from a certain ethnic-group who happen to live in urban areas meet among themselves to collect money for the building of a dispensary or school in their perspective rural areas.

This article, describes, however, a problem which occurred during Nyerere time. That is, most of the high offices were held by people from his area-Mara Region. Although not all from the same ethnic group as that of Nyerere, but since they are from the same zone or region, this strengthened the regional or zonal identity and power structure.

At another level this article shows that due to ethnicity and regional/zonal identity, the gap of development will widen because some ethnic group will take advantage in the allocation of resources depending on who is in power at high level.

INTRODUCTION

In 1969, P. H. Gulliver edited a collection of essays entitled: *Tradition and Transition in East Africa*. In his introduction he spoke of unity and identity as two crucial problems facing East Africa States. The central issue of his discussion was that, in many new states in Africa, people's identification is foremost with their ethnic, racial, religious or regional grouping rather than national identity. Ten years later, Mazrui (1980), in his discussion on African condition singled out ethnicity as one of the problems facing new states. This is what he says:

'In the ultimate analysis, ethnicity is a more serious line of cleavage in black Africa than religion. Africans are far more likely to kill each other because they belong to different ethnic groups than religion' (1980: 69).

Doornbos (1970), has identified correctly that most of studies in ethnic relations in Africa have mainly remained structural in nature. Most of the studies from the early anthropologists to the modern Africanists have focused on two main problems which are rightly referred to under the headings of: vertical and horizontal relations.

While studies of vertical relations, typically concern themselves with potential conflict between ethnic identity and national loyalty, analysis of horizontal relations concern with the conflict between ethnic groups. While Mazrui's analysis concerns with both horizontal and vertical problems, studies by Mbilinyi (1974), Grohs (1974), and Puritt (1974), may be rightly identified as those dealing with horizontal relations.

The aim of this paper is to explore and expose the Tanzanian situation mainly during Nyerere's time, taking into consideration the historical development of ethnic identification and relation in the country. Its thrust is to show that ethnic identification does not necessarily become a negative phenomenon in a country if well utilized for development. The paper aims

at showing that ethnic identification exists and persists in Tanzania politics in a subtle way which may be viewed as positive or negative in development since it widens the gap of development through self help programs.

Many of the examples will be drawn during the time Nyerere was the Head of the State, for Mwinyi's presidency since last year does not warrant us to make an objective analysis. It is too early to assess.

1. Ethnicity as a Political Base

Puritt (1974: 121–123), identifies three stages through which ethnic (tribal) relations have existed in Africa. First, there is the Pre-colonial period where the ethnic relations and identification was very fluid. People moved from one area to another; there are incorporation and amalgamation of various ethnic groups and sometimes separation. The studies by historians like Kimambo (1969), among the Pare people of Northeastern Tanzania and Sutton (1969), on the peopling of Tanzania attest to this.

Second, came the colonial period where the colonialism process made tribes to be static, demarcated strict boundaries which stopped the constant drift of people except in matters of labour migration which was a clear political and economic determinant factor. It ensured the successful colonialism where a political and social organization could be effectively carried out for exploitation of the African resources. Boundaries sometimes were arbitrary made and were moulded according to the European preconceptions and political requirements. Many of the ethnic studies carried out during colonial times aimed at facilitating smooth running of the colonial machinery. Studies by people like Hans Cory on various ethnic groups in Tanzania show this. The existing collection of Cory's files at the University of Dar es Salaam main library contains many materials of this nature.

Third, there is a nationalist period in which nationalists who were fighting for independences used the ethnic base for their political power. Sometimes, even the political parties were developed along the ethnicity line like those of Zimbabwe—ZAPU—predominately Ndebele and ZANU—predominately Shona and other small ethnic groups.

An interesting phenomenon is that, the same nationalists after independence, they had to fight against ethnic identification in order to build the unity and identity required of a modern nation.

Tanzania boasts of good ethnic relation in spite of having more than 120 big ethnic groups hence the languages too. From its beginning as a nation, it has maintained the principle of national unity and has sustained a record of harmonious relations among its 120 plus ethnic groups. This can be explained in terms of the historical development of the ruling Party and the policies adopted by President Nyerere as the architect of modern Tanzania.

When the *Tanganyika African National Union* (TANU) was founded in 1955, it inherited the legitimacy of a central organization structure to which many local social clubs and unions under the auspices of the *Tanganyika African Association* (TAA) were affiliated. The TAA itself was founded in 1929 by groups of African civil servants and businessmen who were concerned with social and welfare issues rather than politics as such. It was more or less an urban oriented movement, though it led to the development of a territorial political consciousness which cuts across many different ethnic groups (Kaniki, 1980: 344). As Lonsdale points out:

'By 1940 minority (The groups of civil servants and businessmen) and its successor in the Tanganyika African Association...had practical experience of political unity not shared by their counterpart in Kenya until 1944' (1984: 863).

Between 1955–1959, Nyerere seized the opportunity and transformed this social organiza-

tion (TAA) into a political party with mass as the base. At one stage TANU utilized the existing social formation and conflicts. For example, in Ulanga area of eastern Tanzania, TANU was introduced by Ndamba ethnic group which was militant seeking independence from Bena Chief Towegale. Chief Towegale of Ukena (Malinyi) and Sultan Mtohanje of Kiberege saw TANU as another *Majimaji* uprising, thus were opposed to it and said they preferred British rule (Iliffe, 1979: 534).

At another, TANU utilized anti-colonial sentiments to mobilize the masses and different ethnic groups for unity. People in various places were discontented with colonial rule (Maguire, 19: 242). Anti-colonial protests like those among the Chagga and Haya in 1937, among the Pare in 1944–45 and among the Sukuma in 1958 were live in the memories of the masses (Iliffe, 1979).

The antagonist relationships that existed between the chiefs and the masses also were utilized by TANU for the benefit of mobilizing and building the party. For example, among the Chagga people of Kilimanjaro, in 1957 Nyerere saw that mass support was no longer a problem. In the following year 1958, Nyerere saw that the duty of the Party was to reach every village (Iliffe, 1979: 557–558).

The spread of TANU as a national Party was a threat to the British rule and its agents for indirect rule. It is reported that in 1957 Governor Twinning while addressing at Chief's first convention, warned that:

'The tribal system and the office of the Chief were threatened by those who base their appeal on the emotional attractions of extreme nationalism, which in effect is nothing more than racialism' (As quoted in Iliffe, 1979: 535).

In spite of this warning by the Governor who was "head of state" some chiefs joined Party and were popular among their people. They identified themselves with their ethnic groups. For example, Chief Fundikira among the Nyamwezi of Western Tanzania became so popular that he succeeded as a TANU candidate for the parliament election in 1958 for Western Province. Chief Anna Gwassa became TANU chairperson in Kasulu in 1959: Chief (Mwami) Theresa Ntare of Heru became Kasulu legislative councillor in 1960 and Chief S. R. Kasusura of Rusubi-Biharamulo became branch chairperson from the very beginning of the Party mobilization and later has become Deputy Speakers of the National Assembly.

However, at independence in 1961, TANU was ideologically weak. It did not have a well formulated and articulated program besides "Africanisation" and a desire to achieve "African socialism", terms which were vaguely understood at that time. The strength of TANU as a national party lay in its large number of regional members and representatives, many of whom were key figures in their respective local areas or ethnic groups. People like Mwanjisi among the Nyakyusa, Kahama among the Haya, Bomani among the Sukuma and Eliofoo among the Chagga, became parliamentary candidates in 1960 because of the ethnicity factor (Kaniki, 1980; Iliffe, 1979). The new organizational structure of TANU presented them with an ideal opportunity for more inter-ethnic interaction.

At the stage of Tanzania political development, the immediate enemies were colonialism, imperialism and potential disunity among the people. Many Party and government statements were overtly nationalistic in tone. Members who were elected to the parliament, spoke of themselves as Tanzanians rather than as members of particular groups. In 1960 parliamentary elections, TANU won 70 out of 71 seats, a great victory for the organization whose political base transcended ethnic divisions. Zuberi Mtemvu who tried to establish a political party on the racial basis in opposition to TANU which was multiracial in nature, could hardly win without the mass support (Temu, 1969).

Nyerere took this opportunity to crash all possible factions which might have emerged on

the basis of religion, race or ethnicity (Omari, 1984). In 1962, for example, he abolished chieftaincy as a salaried administrative office, a legacy of the period of indirect rule. In 1964, he also dissolved the National Federation of Labour and in its place introduced an organization more closely supervised by the Party and the government, The National Union of Tanganyika Workers. In the same year a One Party State was introduced into the country.

Through such measures, Nyerere was able to close any door which might have been left opened for the development of an organized political opposition based on divisions. The short lived Mtemvu's African National Congress and United Tanganyika Party, never became a great challenge to the TANU (Temu, 1969; Kaniki, 1980).

Perhaps a serious challenge to the TANU was the petition put forward by *All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika* in 1959, that Tanganyika should not become independent until Muslims in the country had attained greater educational progress. The petition was not supported by all Muslims and the colonial government did not entertain it. As Kaniki (1980) says, this petition was wrongly timed and directed to a government which did not give them equal opportunity in education.

The main argument in favour of such steps being taken was that a multiparty system was unnecessary, luxury and potential divisive, while the same effort and resources could be better utilized and concentrated in a single Party for the development of the country.

The duty of those who formed the first political elite under TANU was to penetrate and mobilize the masses for the national development despite of ethnicity. Nyerere's early conception of TANU as a people's organization (Nyerere, 1968: 140); was the key to narrowing factional divisions and differences while at the same time it was a means of legitimizing his political program.

It must be noted here that, Nyerere himself was fully aware of the importance of the different ethnic groups and the role they played in the Tanganyika's political development. He knew clearly that in order to succeed in his political career, he must align himself with key figures from various ethnic groups. As he was not well known throughout the country, these key figures of local elites helped to make him more popular in rural areas. For example, among the Sukuma, Bomani was a key figure; among the Nyakyusa, Mwanjisi was another key figure and in Kagera, Kahama was one of the locally based key figures. In the coastal areas, and Dar es Salaam in particular, people like Tewa, Azizi and Sykes were very important and key people to Nyerere's success.

Nyerere's resignation as Prime Minister in 1961/62 to visit different rural areas was to test his popularity and acceptability in the country side. He could not have done this without the support of these local elites from various ethnic groups and regions. At the beginning, he even tried to incorporate some chiefs, who were among the traditional elites, into new elite group. For example, Chief Fundikira from Unyamwezi and Chief Kunambi from Uluguru. Perhaps with the support of these chiefs it was easy for him to mobilize the masses. He became very popular throughout the countryside and this is a result of the support of the people from various ethnic groups.

As mentioned above, at the beginning of TANU and his election to its Presidency, Nyerere was not known nationally. But through the regional representatives as shown below, he became known throughout the country.

At the Annual Conference of TAA which met between 7th–10th July 1954, in Dar es Salaam, the following regional representatives were elected as the founding members of TANU.

Mr. J. K. Nyerere

—Territorial President

Mr. J. Rupia	—Vice President-Eastern Province
Mr. A. W. Sykes	—Eastern Province
Mr. A. K. Sykes	—Eastern Province
Mr. G. H. Pacha	—Western Province
Mr. N. K. Kirilo Japhet	—Northern Province
Mr. Joseph Kimalando	—Northern Province
Mr. T. Said Tewa	—Eastern Province
Mr. C. O. Milinga	—Eastern Province
Mr. A. C. Iranga	—Lake Province
Mr. L. M. Bogohe	—Lake Province
Mr. S. A. Kondoro	—Lake Province
Mr. Kisungutwa Gabara	—Lake Province
Mr. S. M. Kitwana	—Lake Province
Mr. D. W. A. Aziz	—Eastern Province
Mr. G. P. Kunambi	—Eastern Province
Mr. J. P. Kasella	—Eastern Province

The new elites on which Nyerere depended for mobilization of the masses and penetration to the grass-roots level, became the backbone of his political power, especially in rural areas. Some of these had been known to him earlier, either as school mates or fellow teachers; some of them even became the first cabinet Ministers in the new nation and Party leaders in various areas. These elites disassociated themselves from the chiefs and aligned themselves with TANU: identifying with its objectives and aspirations. At the same time they remained closely in touch with the people and were accepted as leaders at local/regional level.

As Bienem (1967: 36), has shown clearly, the ideas of these elites became Party (TANU) ideology. This elite's ideology was transmitted to the workers and peasants via the key figures at the local level and the mobilization process took place swiftly. On one hand TANU was fighting against tribalism and was for unity. At the same time, in order to succeed as a mass Party, it had to rely heavily on the recruitment and mobilization of members from various tribal (ethnic) groups. Since the workers and peasants were generally tired of and against colonialism and its agents, the chiefs; the new elites were in a good position to propound the new ideology in a more effective way. Nyerere's resignation in 1961/62 as Prime Minister and the appointment of Kawawa in his stead, was at the one level a way to measure the acceptability of this new ideology in the rural areas and at another was to give a chance to someone more forceful to promote the idea of Africanisation (Pratt, 1976).

The Chief media of communication in political meetings was (and still is) Kiswahili language. This is a national language of coastal origin with a vocabulary which draws upon Bantu, Arabic, Portuguese and other languages. Since 19th century it has steadily spread as the official language of the government and main communication media of primary education and cannot now be said to belong to any particular ethnic group (Resinik, 1967; Cliffe, 1975). The promotion and use of Kiswahili helped very much to cement the nationalistic aspect of the ideology and bridge possible ethnic differences. It is said that Nyerere hardly needed an interpreter during his nationalist campaigns except in Usukuma, Mbulu and Masai areas (Iliffe, 1979: 530).

But what really made the new ideology more effective was that there were already ethnic unions and clubs such as the Chagga Union, Haya Union, Pare Football Club and the various cooperative unions, which were nationalistic in outlook and provided a good foundation on which a nationalistic political movement could be built. Despite being urban and

nationalistic in their outlook, the new elites depended very much on their ethnicity and ethnicity affiliation for their political support.

The Party had to depend on this ethnic base line because as the organ of an emerging class of elites had no economic base (Saul, 1979). Although, as it can be noted in Table 1 below, some ethnic groups had a high percentage of representative in important administrative positions at independence, they had no political or economic base in the Urban centres. These were bureaucratic and administrative class whose base was not in urban area at all. The same could be said of the new political elites. Their survival as a social class depended very much on how they could mobilize the workers and peasants in their respective home areas which were ethnically in nature. This was, however, a strategy rather than an end in itself in Tanzania's political development.

The problem which has constantly cropped up among the political elites from the very beginning, especially the elected members of parliament, has been to find a balance between national Party interests and ethnic or regional interests. As a one Party state, Tanzania is unitarian in its political development. The question before us is: How then can a local leader who is considered as a representative at national level represent both the local interests and national interests as embodied in the Party ideology without raising the problem of conflict in loyalty?

At times there seems to be a conflict between the two, especially among the elected members of parliament. At one level they could not have been elected by the people in their local constituencies and at another they could not have been recommended as candidates for election if they were not scrutinized and approved by the Party both at local and national levels. Many of the elected members of Parliament consider themselves as members of their respective constituencies and identify themselves with the Party ideology as a strategy to achieve their ambition—to serve the local masses and get into the class of the elites.

Dependency on ethnicity for the development of one's political career is not a new thing in African politics. Ethnic or regional groupings form a fertile ground for mass mobilization and the recruitment of electors. It is also well known that some of the liberation movements

Table 1. Back order comparison of ethnic composition of Tanzania leadership at independence in 1961.

Bank	Percentage leadership	Ethnic group	Population bank	Percentage of the total population
1	11.6	Chagga	6	3.7
2	10.6	Haya	4	3.7
3	6.6	Pare/Sambaa	5	3.7
4	6.4	Bondei	58	0.4
5	5.7	Sukuma	1	12.6
6	4.8	Nyamwezi	2	4.2
7	4.5	Nyakyusa	10	2.5
8	3.6	Ngoni	34	1.2
9	3.3	Zigua	19	1.5
10	3.2	Arab	74	0.2
11	2.5	Hehe	9	2.9
12	1.7	Zaramo	14	2.1
13	4.0	Non-Tanzania	—	2.8
14	3.8	Mixed	—	0.02
15	28.1	Other groups	—	55.7

Calculated from 1957 census: Africans—8,655,336; Arabs—19,088; Coloured—2,257.

Source: McGowan, P. and Wacirah, H. K. The evolution of Tanzania political leadership. *African Studies Review* Vol. XVII, No. 1, p. 193, April 1974.

in African like ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe were developed almost entirely on ethnic base.

Let me give another illustration on how ethnicity is very important in political development in Africa. In Nigeria, when the former Prime Minister, Alhaji Shagari pardoned Ojukwu, a man from Iboland who was the leader of the civil war in 1967, and welcomed him home from exile, it was a calculated political strategy based upon ethnic alliance. By doing so, Shagari hoped to win more votes from the Ibo people, one of the major ethnic groups (nationalities) in Nigeria. Unfortunately, Shagari did not live long enough to exploit and enjoy the fruits of this strategy (*Africa*, June 1982).

The Tanzania situation is very complex, with about 120 plus different ethnic groups of varying sizes in the country. Some are very large like the Sukuma with more than five million and have loosely organized class structures. Others are very small and still living in hunting and food gathering bands (Bali, 1985). Those ethnic groups which had developed form of centralized government with recognized Chiefs (kings) during the 19th Century like the Hehe, Nyamwezi, Shambala and Chagga, were not strong enough to dominate others on a large scale. Most of the ethnic groups in Tanzania were segmentary and non-centralized with recognized local leadership. They had some recognized boundaries though not rigid and static, some of which were set on the line of clan and kinship alliances or groups of several clans with one unified language (Kimambo, 1969). In the case of nilo-hamitic, pastoral people, their governments typically rested on the shoulders of the elders who as statesmen, ran day to day affairs in consultation with one another.

Whether one can usefully distinguish between a nation and ethnic group in pre-capitalist society as Mamdani (1983) does, is difficult to say. An ethnic group may consider itself as a nation and have a recognized leader(s) as head of state. On this Mamdani urges that:

'The theoretical context of the distinction between nationality and a tribe is that a nationality is differentiated along class lines, a tribe is not' (1983: 38).

It is clear that even in pre-capitalist societies there were social differences between both individuals and groups. The theoretical question to be discussed is whether such differences constituted the basis for antagonistic relation or not. And if they were, how far did they serve as means of exploitation in a given society?

Since I am not going to discuss this problem in this paper, it is very important to note that, the pre-capitalist societies, whose forms and structures were much utilized by the colonial powers to further their own interests, were nations and states in their own right. As such, at independence the new states, following the boundaries set by the colonialists, inherited smaller nations, which in many cases had existed for a long time. Of course, there were similarities as well as differences among them in any one particular nation. The strategy of the new political elites was to manipulate and mobilize these old nations (ethnic units), so that they could serve the stated social goals and objectives of the new nations. In the case of Tanzania the stated goals was to build one sound nation which would override existing ethnic differences in development.

In line with the above broad national goals, then, the introduction of a One Party system in the country meant that in every ethnic group there would be loyalists to the Party, hence the whole country could be united through it. The Party in this case, became a unifying force for all the people even though not all the people were members of the Party. Later on in the 1970s, the Party was confirmed in its role as the supreme organ for the politics and development of the whole country (Msekwa, 1976).

Consequently the elected members of parliament from each constituency are looked at as

representatives of the Party although the true picture may well be the other way round. The Party's election manifestoes and codes have been developed and prepared to prevent any ethnocentricity from getting into politics. All candidates for the parliamentary elections must first and foremost be active members of the Party and have to be scrutinized and approved by the Party.

This does not mean that elected members of parliament are never parochial and that there is no ethnopolitics in their election. Many of the constituencies in Tanzania have been established along administrative line which are mostly ethnic in nature; hence, even if the elected members of parliament are staunch Party members, ethnic (local) identification support is often a necessary component in their election process. The situation is the same in urban constituencies. Ethnicity affiliation and support matters to some extent. A good example comes from 1980 parliamentary election.

For the first time, in 1980, almost twenty years after One Party system had been introduced into the country, ethnicity got in the election and newspaper reported it from various constituencies. There were sporadic allegations and accusations among some candidates that some of them had used their ethnic identity and alliances in their campaigns.

In Arusha urban constituency which is a multi-ethnicity area, this became a serious issue and had to be settled in court. The issue was that a candidate born outside Arusha had stood for election and won against a locally born candidate. But this was an urban constituency where many non-local people lived and worked. The victorious Pare candidates won through an alliance of different ethnic groups: his votes coming from the Chagga, Nyiramba, Rangi and Pare themselves. The local candidates who is a Mwarusha, did not get many votes from his own ethnic group (the Waarusha) because they voted in the rural constituency where they lived and had registered to vote.

At another level ethnicity is displayed vigorously through development programs, especially those in rural areas. When discussing matters related to rural development, members of parliament always refer to the people whom they represent. During parliamentary debates and discussions in the house, ethnicity or regional affiliation is often the underlying factor in determining what are members opinions. Many members discuss and refer in their discussions to ethnic consciousness in varying degrees, because many of them represent more than one ethnic group. They consider themselves as representatives of the local people in the house and that their duty is to see that national resources distributed equally to all. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this.

When Mr. Jamal, the member of parliament for Morogoro urban and sometime Minister of Finance and Industry, influenced the government to build more industries in Morogoro town, he was playing this role of local identification with certain type of development. Or when Mr. Mungai, member of Parliament for Iringa rural and another Minister, influenced the government to build a wood pulp factory at Mufindi, and area of his constituency he was playing the same role. This is one of the ways on how a national member of parliament can bring about tangible development in his constituency. Of course, to succeed in this depends on factors other than influence.

There is nothing wrong with ethnic or regional identification in politics and development. To some people it neither contradicts their loyalty to the nation nor operates as a closed system. Take the example of myself. I am a Mpare and Tanzanian at the same time. I am working for my nation Tanzania. But I was a Mpare before. I become a Tanzanian for I came from a family which lived for generations past in the Pare mountains. My being a Mpare does not contradict my being a Tanzanian. On the contrary it cements and affirms my

nationality. When I am working for the government, I consider myself a Tanzanian and I defend the national interest. When I am helping my village to get a clean water or other developmental programs, I do so on the basis of my sentiments as a Mpare from that village. The two points of view do not contradict in myself, but are used as a departure for my participation in development. This seems to be the case with the Nyamwezi people (Abrahams, 1981: 130).

The problem for members of parliament and other civil servants, however, is to be able to balance between the two loyalties. To me ethnic or regional identity is dangerous when the following are apparent:

- Operate as a closed and isolated system.
- It is opposed to new ideas and innovation from outside.
- It fosters nepotism and the choices of leaders from the same areas even if they have no appropriate qualifications and commitments.

The above tenets are the core problems in some African states and the leaders of those states are all aware of them even if they turn a blind eye to them. For many, ethnicity has become, as Leys has commented:

'...a form a consciousness (false) but more than that, it is a specific form of consciousness through which the comprador regimes in many parts of Africa exercise a "Civil Hegemony" complementing the coercive use of state power' (1975: 252).

The above problem is more noticeable in countries where army recruitment also follows along ethnic lines as in Uganda. Mazrui (1980: 9), has singled out the Acholi group, which predominated in the Obote army as being inclined to persecute others, especially non-Acholi, if they are found to be against the government. Mazrui concludes that ethnic relations of this sort are more dangerous in Africa today than the religious divisions that exist.

2. The Appointment of Civil Servants and Ethnicity

The above brief analysis has centred mainly around members of parliament. Ethnic identification among civil servants is more difficult to analyse because of their status in society. At one level they are typically bureaucratic and bourgeois in their outlook and identity, and on another they still have some connections and ties with their home areas. Although they work in urban areas and interact among themselves, occasionally they go home for holidays and during other family festivals. For example, people from Kilimanjaro never celebrate their Christmas holiday in any place other than at their villages. People from West Lake invest in their villages by buying farms and building houses there. Likewise people from Iringa, Mbeya and Pare. Civil servants usually retain connections with their birth places (and ethnicity) in one way or another. Sometimes even a burial of a dead person at the birth place is an indication of this connection.

But how does this connect with politics? This question may be fully understood if we take two levels of analysis. First, to look at how civil servants can influence policy formulation and implementation. Second, to analyse their access to the centre of power through the appointments they control.

In Tanzania policy formulation is the duty of the Party through the collective efforts of the Central Committee and National Executive Committee. Sometimes civil servants and Ministers may be involved in the drafting of a policy but before it becomes a law or is implemented, it must be scrutinized and approved by the Party. In many instances parliament functions like a coffee shop where people discuss and argue over something which has already been approved by the supreme body (party) as a policy.

This overshadowing by the Party puts the civil governments and Ministers in a very difficult positions. They cannot formulate a policy or be identified with any of them even if they would like to. Even if a Minister is known to be to the left or to the right in his/her ideological inclination, he/she would not normally be explicitly identified with a particular policy. It is known, for example, that Mr. Ngombale Mwiru has had considerable influence in the development of Party structure, and in the formulation of the two Party guidelines (mwongozo) in 1971 and 1981; but none of the above are normally identified with him. They are all labelled Party products and acknowledged collectively.

Perhaps the former Governor of the Central Bank and one time Minister of Finance, Mr. Mtei may serve as another illustration on how ambiguous is the status of a civil servant in Tanzania. When in 1980s Mr. Mtei disagreed with President Nyerere on policy matters, he resigned from his post. Few can afford to disagree so openly with the President. Many decide to remain within the system hoping that by doing so they can influence policy formulation and implementation. For others, remaining in the civil service may be the only way of preserving their status.

How does this relate to the discussion of our paper? My contention is that appointment to the civil servants status hence access to the power structure, may lead to influence over policy formulation and implementation which may in turn help individuals to hasten development in their home areas. This is particularly true of those who sit in the Party Committees and Conferences which deal with policy formulation and with a direct opportunity to influence policy.

Once a policy has been formulated, it is a national matter. But when it is implemented especially that related to developmental programs; it becomes more or less a regional matter. It is on this level that those who have access to the power structure may become instrumental.

In Tanzania the majority of the Ministers are appointed from among the elected members of parliament and nominated by President himself. The majority of the Ministers are members of the Central Committee of the ruling Party as well as of the National Executive Committee. In this way they are in both the Party and the civil government structures.

Principal secretaries on the other hand are Presidential appointees. How they are selected, is not that clear to most of the people. Usually a short list is prepared by the Presidential advisors and the President himself makes the final selection. In this way, kind of ethnic or regional bias may appear in the appointment of Tanzanians civil servants.

Up to 1981/82 of 22 Union government Principal Secretaries, 11 (50%) were from Lake Zone. Of these 4 (18%) were Haya 4 (18%) were from Musoma Region alone and 3 (13%) were Sukuma. Among the 26 Union government Ministers holding their posts by December 1983, 8 (30.7%) were from Southern Zone, 7 (26.9%) were from Lake Zone; 6 (23%) were from Eastern Zone, 4 (15.3%) were from Northern Zone and 1 (3.8%) was from Central Zone. Up to December 1983 all the key posts like Army, Police, the Central Bank, including the Attorney General and Chief Justice were held by people from Mara Region, the home area of the President. These were not all from the same ethnic group since there are about 25 different ethnic groups in Mara Region.

When the above information is analysed critically in the light of what is happening in other parts of Africa, one sees that besides the key posts which are controlled by the "home boys" the majority of the high posts in the civil union government are controlled by the people from Lake Zone including Mara Region. The domination of Lake Zone is not along the ethnic lines, but is regional or zonal. This then, leads me to a discussion of the implications this has for Tanzanian politics and development.

In a country like Tanzania which is so ethnically diverse, ethnic identification submerges




Fig. 1. Map of Tanzania showing the birthplace of high ranking officers (1983).

Table 2. Party Secretariat Office as December 1983.

Department /Section	Head from
Ideological Department	Southern Zone
Mass Mobilization	Southern Zone
Propaganda	Southern Zone
General Secretary	Southern Zone
Social Services	Lake Zone
Finance	Eastern Zone
Foreign	Eastern Zone
Discipline	Eastern Zone
Military and Security	Northern Zone

and appears in different forms under the guise of zonal or regional identification. Whenever an MP is from a constituency which covers the territory of particular ethnic groups, will talk and identify himself/herself regionally or zonal and will not identify himself/herself with a particular ethnic group. But if he/she is from a constituency which covers a territory of one ethnic group, his/her identification is more strong for he/she is considered as home/village boy/girl.

In the case of civil servants, they will identify themselves with their ethnic group openly

when discussing development programs. Some civil servants will do all they can to influence policy implementation to benefit their respective ethnic groups or regional areas. But as a general rule, in public, they will defend national interests and objectives rather than ethnic ones, fearing the Party policy which explicitly discourages ethnic cleavages in development.

The relationship between elected members of parliament and appointed civil servants from the same area depends on two factors. First, whether or not both of them identify themselves positively with their ethnic or zonal background. Some civil servant nowadays may tend to think of themselves as Tanzanians first and members of an ethnic group second. Outwardly this is so especially in the urban areas among the bureaucrats than among the rural civil servants. This may have resulted from some of them being away from home for a long time, and working in urban areas where interaction with people from other groups is the norm. Or it may be it is their way of preserving their emerging class alliance and identification. The latter phenomenon helps to cut across ethnic cleavages and very often socialization takes place at that level rather than along ethnic or regional lines. This is, however, a new phenomenon and is not that strong except in some few urban areas. When we look at Party structure, things are different as shown in Table 2. The majority of the high offices within the Party are held by people from Eastern Zone, including the Island. Things have become more stronger after President Mwinyi took over, since he is from the Island himself.

Second, whether they knew each other or are familiar to the extent of socializing together. In other words, their ability to work together as a team for development may be determined by other factors than politics alone.

Whichever form their relationship takes place, my observation in Kagera, Kilimanjaro, Iringa and Musoma Regions, is that most of the Parliamentarians and civil servants from the same regions tend to talk about regional/zonal or district development matters rather than ethnicity. In the final analysis, however, the term "ethnicity" is "buried" or hidden underneath all talks with regard to development. This is a strategy for many, for in the case of Mara Region, a member of Parliament for Musoma rural will have to talk regionally for there is no one dominant ethnic group which covers the whole area in spite of the Kuria and Luo being the largest.

To me there is no difference between administrative district and ethnic development as long as most of the constituencies are divided along the inherited ethnic lines. If a member of parliament comes from a constituency belonging to a particular ethnic group, let us say Morogoro rural among the Luguru, and that member teams up with civil servants from his home areas (constituency) for the promotion and innovation of development programs, the end result is the same: ethnic development. As long as ethnic boundaries are identical to political and administrative units in Tanzania, development will continue to be based along those lines. The more progressive, aggressive, innovative and well developed ethnic groups, will continue to benefit from this situation. And that will widen the gap of development.

More interesting is the way some constituencies are "manufactured" along the ethnic lines. This is exactly the way it was done during colonial time so as to justify for the equal distribution of resources. This system may not be helpful to underdeveloped areas since they will still remain behind in matters of social development.

This is the reason, I believe, which led to the failure to properly utilize the regional fund in some regions in the early 1970s. The fund was established to counter-balance regional historical inequality in development and was distributed equally to all regions to support development programs. But as it happened, those regions which were already more developed like Kilimanjaro, benefited much more from the fund than the less developed ones like Singida

and Coast. While the less developed regions were busy in starting new projects and programs, the more developed regions utilized the fund to enhance and improve their already existing social services and communication infrastructures. In this way the fund increased the gap of unequal development despite the fact that the government's aim was to narrow it. The more developed regions accomplished a lot more through self-help programs than the less developed ones (Omari, 1985).

Another phenomenon which strengthens ethnic-ties, especially in urban areas is the resurgence of the old "tribal clubs and social unions" and the drive for self-reliance campaigns in urban areas by the people from the same ethnic group. For example, if there is a development program going on in a rural area, the member of Parliament or Party chairperson from that particular area, will travel to visit people from his area living in urban centres like Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Mwanza and so on. The aim and purpose of such visits are to familiarize the civil servants living in urban areas of the development projects in their home areas and to enlist for their support. Through such campaigns, development funds are sometimes established.

Two good examples come to my mind with regard to the above mentioned point. One occurred when Same District was divided into two constituencies and Mwanga District was created. To build a new District headquarter for Mwanga, depended very much on self-reliance of the people for both the government and Party had no money. The residents of the new District accepted the challenge. In the process of mobilizing both human and financial resources, District leaders had to travel to towns and urban centres to enlist the assistance of the civil servants living there. I remember in one meeting where all residents in Dar es Salaam from Mwanga District were called for a meeting and were told by the District Party chairperson that their assistance was needed. In that one meeting alone, more than T.shs. 100,000/= was pledged for the construction of the Party District Headquarters (which was to cost about T.shs. 38,000,000/= in all).

Another example is where people from one village in Singida District living in Dar es Salaam collected sufficient money for the purchase of a village bus in their home area.

The above two examples illustrate how civil servants can identify themselves with their ethnic groups positively. In these two examples, ethnic identification work positively in development for people has been united and pulls together available resources for development programs in their home areas.

There are, however, other aspects of this identification which can work negatively. In less developed areas, ethnic identification may become linked to a process of underdevelopment whereby people become so closed to innovation and changes clinging to their old traditions and world view.

Both aspects mentioned above are happening in Tanzania today. While the former is welcome, the latter must be rejected.

At another level, especially in the social milieu, ethnic identification through cooperation and alliance is being revived especially in urban areas. In wedding festivals and funerals, ethnicity is still evoked and utilized. A Chagga youth who is getting married in town like Dar es Salaam, will depend very much on the contributions of fellow Chaggas towards the wedding expenses. A good example is what happened in December 1984 when a young Chagga man got married in Dar es Salaam and contributions from his Chagga fellows amounted to T.shs. 100,000/= which covered all his wedding expenses and he had to spend nothing at all from his own pocket. Another example is a Haya person whose relative died in Dar es Salaam and was able to rely upon Haya contributions to cover the expenses of sending the

body home for burial. This is so because in Tanzania many people are still buried in their home areas even if they die in the urban centres where they are working.

One could also cite several examples of how the urban elites and civil servants invest at homes through house building and farms acquisitions. When this happens, rural areas find themselves with tangible aspect of development. And that is the result of their sons and daughters working in urban areas. Such endeavour springs from ethnic identification and works more positively towards rural development.

3. Vertical Social Mobility

Finally, we need to look briefly at ethnic identification in relation to vertical social mobility. As mentioned earlier, most of the top posts in Tanzania during Nyerere era were held by people from Lake Zone. At the same time I urged that there is no necessary harm in ethnic identification in civil service appointments. I need, however, to make it clear that, elsewhere in Africa, vertical social mobility in relation to ethnic identification has become a source of corruption, incompetence and nepotism. This has led to the collapse of the state machinery in some governments.

Vertical social mobility requires ability, education, skills and trustworthiness. These are intra-ethnic variables and are not tribal. Yet as it is in other governments of the world, the appointing authorities are not always bound by the above prerequisites. In the final analysis, it all depends on the integrity of the appointing authority and advisors. Tanzania has not escaped from this trap completely. The question now is whether after Nyerere in October 1985 stepped down as President will the same people remain in their respective posts? Will the new President appoint his new people according to what line? New and few appointments which have been made after President Mwinyi took over in 1985 do suggest that it is difficult to change this pattern over a night. We need time to assess his performance. It is likely, however, that the top civil servants will be changed especially in the Army and Bank. Already there is a sign towards that direction with the retirement of the Principal Secretary to the President.

CONCLUSION

I have presented few notes on the resurgence of ethnic identification and alliance through political constituencies and zones in Tanzania. This affects regional development in ways which depend on the historical development of the region, access to the national power structure of its elite, the local economic base and people's enthusiasm in development. Tanzania has been in the fore front developing a "one nation" regardless of the existing differences based on colour, class, religion or ethnicity. Its aim has been ultimately to reduce regional inequalities based on ethnic division, which in themselves, are, historical development. The current ethnic manifestations, especially in competition for development, may widen the already existing gaps.

At another level, it is my conviction that Tanzania's national identity may be strengthened within multiple sets of loyalties. In historical perspective, the chances are that sub-national units identification will outlive some of the institutional structures superimposed upon them through Party ideology, finding new expression of interests through self-reliance and developmental programs. In most of the countries of the world, people are categorized in more than one reference group. Ethnic or zonal identification is an inevitable anomaly in Tanzania political development for it is derived from the social context in which individuals and groups were born into and the level of their exposure and response to colonial situation. Further-

more, the cooperative unions now being reintroduced in the country after their abolition in 1976, will add to the process of identification in development especially in the cash crops growing rural areas. Perhaps things may change when the second and third generations of politicians get into their seats. But I doubt very much if this will happen in the near future as far as rural areas are concerned.

Both in rural and urban areas, there is a possibility that ethnicity might be identified with the accumulation of wealth. In a time where there are limited resources, the aggressive, innovative and enterprising, might cease the opportunity of liberalization of important in Tanzania and team up as commercial elites. Already among the pastoralists they are united and are becoming a threat of cultivators in Iringa and Kilosa. They are identified with cattle wealth.

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