

<特別寄稿>

THE THEORY AND THE DISCOURSES OF GLOBALIZATION

Roland Robertson

Department of Sociology University of Pittsburgh USA

本稿は1996年1月16日（火曜日）、京大会館で社会学の特別講義として開催されたピッツバーグ大学ロランド・ロバートソン教授の講演である。講義の記録を残すために教授の同意を得て、年報に掲載することにした。論文自体はロバートソン教授から後日送られてきた原稿に基づいているが、若干の修正はあるものの講演当日の発表内容と同じである。本論の内容は、主に「グローバリゼーション」の意味論について考察されており、マクロ社会学を研究する際に示唆を与えてくれるものとなるだろう。

なお、ロバートソン教授は宗教社会学や近代化論の分野で活躍しておられる社会学者であるが、『宗教の社会学』やB.S.ターナーとの共編著の『近代性の理論』などの翻訳が出版されている。これらは今回掲載の論文を理解する上で参考となるだろう。（編集委員会）

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

We have witnessed a remarkable upsurge in the use of the term "globalization" in recent years. It is in fact used in many contexts as a diffuse and vague indication of changes that have been sweeping the world as a whole. Much of this current upsurge, however, runs strongly against the grain of the themes in the debate among sociologists and anthropologists about globalization and related issues that has been developing over the past thirty years or so. Even though some sociologists have been claiming in recent years that globalization is a crucial concept, with many ramifications for the current and future practice of sociology, its analytic usefulness is becoming very precarious. It is my contention that we must directly consider the whole range of the ways in which the notion of globalization is used and incorporate these into a theory of global change.

Thus we should begin to address systematically the issue of *discourses of globalization*. In spite of a number of attempts on the part of social scientists to conceptualize globalization in a careful, analytic and multidimensional fashion, there is now so much loose and negative talk of "globalization" that serious scholars of the compression of the world as a whole, in historical perspective, face the increasingly difficult task of maintaining their intellectual integrity in the face of slipshod and often heavily ideological employment of the word. Indeed, the present situation regarding globalization is a major contemporary example of the way in which concepts and theories are first developed in serious science only to be subsequently used in "the real world" in a manner that endangers their analytic and interpretive viability and usefulness. The current situation is, however, much more complex than this.

In the case of "globalization" such endangerment is all the more disturbing because this word has in recent years acquired very negative connotations around the world. Globalization as a pejorative term is rapidly becoming globalized : *the globalization of "globalization"*. Although, in being globalized the term, globalization, acquires particular meanings in different contexts. This, in fact, conforms to my own long-held view of globalization as involving above all an ongoing connection between the universal and the particular. Globalization has become a near-universal term. At the same time it conveys relatively specific meanings in different regions, societies, disciplines, and so on. A reflexive theory of globalization has to incorporate this consideration. In addressing the issue of the discourses of globalization it is not my purpose to maintain the "purity" of academic analysis. Rather, it is my firm belief that recent work that has been done by social scientists with respect to what could simply be called world formation has definite implications for the general, everyday understanding of the contemporary world as a whole. In this sense my own work on the cluster of issues indicated by the increasingly problematic notion of globalization can be regarded as "critical." Specifically, much of my work has been directed at illuminating the complexities of what some have called world society (although I have some reservations about that particular term), in the hope that human beings generally will be able to grasp these complexities and not fall into the reductionistic and simplistic traps encouraged by the discourses that I outline briefly and selectively in this paper.

It is, of course, a widespread view that the contemporary world is complex.

Indeed, this is a cliché. The discourses that I consider are evidently directed at reducing this complexity to one factor or a very small set of factors. In sharp contrast, I argue that we should be engaged in analytic strategies of *complexification*.

It has often been said that one of the tasks of science—in the present case, mainly social science—is the reduction of complexity and that, indeed, complexity reduction is a ubiquitous feature of human life. However, particularly in the vast field of global studies, the necessity is to display as fully as possible the extent of the complexity before we begin to engage in practices of simplifications. In other words, we should begin with the task of complication before we engage in the task of simplification. The discourses that I consider here by and large involve simplistic presuppositions concerning and characterizations of globalization. To this extent they do not, strictly speaking, reduce complexity to simplicity. They start in simplistic term—and stay there.

GLOBALIZATION: THE WORD AND THE CONCEPT

Perhaps, the most remarkable thing about the current use of the term, "globalization", is that in numerous invocations in newspapers, popular books, magazines, TV and radio programs and in Internet communications, as well as in some academic circles, the term is used without any definition whatsoever. In many instances, however, globalization seems to be used to mean something like the following:

(The) loose combination of free-trade agreements, the Internet and the integration of financial markets that is erasing borders and uniting the world into a single, lucrative, but brutally competitive, marketplace. (Friedman, 1996: A15)

This quotation is from a piece in the *New York Times*, in which the author goes on to discuss "the backlash against globalization" and speaks of globalization becoming "synonymous with a 'brakeless train wrecking havoc'." Friedman also makes the point that this backlash is increasingly globewide and gives the specific examples of French labor unions, Buchanan supporters in the USA, and pensioners in France. But there are numerous other examples that could be provided, including intellectuals

and politicians in Latin American societies; their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in East and Southeast Asia; the Vatican and Catholic leaders in various places, notably Brazil; African-American students in the USA; and so on and so forth. It is this "backlash" with which I am particularly concerned. One should emphasize that, very often, casual and ill-informed participants in globalization discourse assume and/or insist that globalization means global homogenization. This is a view to which, unfortunately, even people claiming to be serious academic social scientists subscribe. The examples I could give are so numerous as to make it an impossible task to cite in a short article particular cases, without avoiding the charge that I am invidiously picking on one individual, or small group of individuals. In general, the main danger here is that there is an emergent form of globewide "political correctness" involving the simplistic declaration that local and national identities, cultures and traditions are being profoundly threatened — if not obliterated — by massive forces of homogenization. I have, on the other hand, attempted to show that, far from obliterating these, globalization actually involves the promotion of difference and variety (Robertson, 1995).

What is involved in globalization is a complex process involving the interpenetration of sameness and difference — or, in somewhat different terms, the interpenetration of universalism and particularism (Robertson, 1992). In sociology we have grown used to thinking in terms of a temporal, diachronic transition from particularism to universalism. Now we need to bring spatial, synchronic considerations firmly into our thinking and consider fully the spatiality of particularism and differences. This standpoint constitutes the core of my theorization of globalization. It entails the proposition that much of contemporary discourses of globalization reduces this process to the universalistic, homogeneity-producing trends and then uses the particularistic, variety-producing trends as points of departure for attacking the first part of the equation.

In this paper I wish to begin the task of theorizing the issue of globalization discourses with respect to discourses in (1) regional, or civilizational, contexts; (2) academic disciplines; and (3) ideological disputes; as well as (4) in the domain of gender-based discourses concerning globalization. Discussion of discourses of globalization involves exploration of the presuppositions and the rhetorical foci of "globalization talk". Notwithstanding the development of relatively comprehensive

theories of globalization in recent years or so (e.g. Robertson, 1992; Waters, 1995; Spybey, 1996; Hannerz, 1996; Buell, 1994; Friedman, 1994), the fact is that "globalization" has also come to be used in a variety of ways and for a number of different purposes (cf. Abu-Lughod, 1991). Any serious attempt to write comprehensively about globalization in the late-twentieth century must of necessity now incorporate into such a project or research program consideration of the discontinuities between and the nature of particular discourses. Here I sketch in a necessarily introductory way the variations between discourses of globalization and relate them to the increasingly challenging task of moving ahead with the project of developing a historically informed theory of globalization. Given the proliferating variety of ways in which the latter terms is used, such a project is undoubtedly complex, indeed daunting. It is my strong conviction, however, that we must persist with the project. As I have said, thematization of the issues of different discourses, particularly regional or civilizational discourses, is an exercise in the exploration of the relationship between universalism and particularism a global scale. Such discourses are, to some extent, local adaptations of the universalistic concept of globalization.

It is worth remarking that upon occasions of my first three visits to Japan in 1986, 1987 and 1988, "globalization" was usually translated as "internationalization" (*Kokusaika*). Apparently the concept of globalization (*gūbōbarizēshon*) did not become widely used in Japan until the late 1980s, its meaning having been centered in restricted circles on the idea of *economic* globalization. In contrast, my own approach since 1960s (Nettle and Robertson, 1968) has involved consideration of cultural, political and other aspects of globalization in long historical perspective. My own use has thus been comprehensive in analytic scope and historical length, as well as greatly concerned with the ways in which different civilizations have contributed to global history and the making of the modern world. In particular, I have *not*, in my own work, regarded culture as simply referring to the domain of reaction *against* economic globalization. Rather, I have conceived of culture in the broadest sense, as a crucial *aspect* of globalization. The not uncommon phrase, the globalization of culture, does not by any means captures my own concern with cultural factors. For this phrases often tends to suggest that there is occurring a homogenization of culture on a worldwide basis. But while this perception contains a kernel of accuracy, it certainly neglects the ways in which cultural clashes have occurred and are occurring

across the globe. More specifically, I should stress the fact that my view of globalization includes these clashes. In sum, clashes, conflicts, tensions, and so on, constitute a pivotal feature of globalization. *The crucial consideration is that these occur within and are a major factor in the constitution of the world as a single place* (Robertson, 1992).

In its most basic sense globalization involves the compression of the entire world, on the one hand, and a rapid increase in consciousness of the whole world, on the other. Contemporary globalization has produced a global circumstance in which civilizations, regions, nation-states, nations within or cutting across states, and indigenous peoples, are increasingly constrained to construct their own histories and identities — or, at least, reappropriate selectively their own traditions. Indeed, I have been arguing in various publications that there are now various forces at work which are leading to the global institutionalization of the expectation of difference (e.g. Robertson, 1995). In other words, in the contemporary world there is an increasing anticipation and expectation of uniqueness and, thus, variety. This expectation of uniqueness is occurring, nonetheless, in the context of a world culture that facilitates isomorphic similarities in organization and practices across the world as a whole (Meyer, et al., 1996). Even though it is becoming a pivotal features of global political correctness to speak of local resistance to the global, the very ubiquity of this tendency shows in fact that the defense or promotion of the local is a *global* phenomenon. It is, I believe, a central feature of contemporary "false consciousness" to deny the globality of locality; that is, to fail to recognize and acknowledge that ideas concerning the local, the indigenous, and so on are reproduced in a variety of international and transnational organizations and movements.

Nevertheless, around the world, we find the view frequently being expressed that globalization is like a tidal wave sweeping over the world, crushing local — including national — uniqueness, not to speak of the alleged undermining of national sovereignty. The idea that globalization straightforwardly undermines nation-state autonomy is very ironic; since the nation-state — with remarkable similarities in form across the entire world — has in fact come to have these similarities in terms of a world culture concerning nation-stateness (Meyer, 1980). To put it simply, globalization has consolidated the nation-state as a formidable actor in the global arena. This empirical claim is made in sharp contrast to the more conventional

thesis that globalization is destroying the nation-state. More accurately, we are witnessing *both* trends in the direction of a borderless world and, at the same time, the shoring-up of the nation-state.

Nationalist parties and movements have, of course, been remarkably prominent in recent years and the political rhetoric of nationalism (as well as academic interest in nationalism) has been strong. To some extent the recent apparent surge of nationalist sentiment may well seek and obtain local legitimacy as a form of opposition to "globalization". But the historical development of nationalism is so intertwined with the modern history of globalization as to make this a much more complex process than meets the eye. The nation-state has developed as an *aspect* of globalization, considered as a long-term historical process. Nationalism has also been facilitated by global (not merely globewide) developments. After all, the principle of national self-determination is a shared, although often contested, one; a principle that is sustained on a global basis. The fact that "globalization" has now, in many quarters, become a symbol of the undermining or the transcending of national integrity does not entitle us to deny or overlook this important fact.

When globalization is seen as an obliterating tidal wave, it is, as I have stressed, frequently represented in primarily economic or politicoeconomic terms — as a new form of economic and cultural imperialism, as Westernization, as Americanization, or simply colonialism in a new guise. It should, however, be noted that social movements directed against economic and other dimensions of globalization are becoming increasingly conspicuous in the USA and other Western contexts. Thus non-Western nations by no means have a monopoly on anti-global movements. Indeed, the latter may be more forcefully organized and growing more rapidly in so-called Western contexts than in other parts of the world. From the standpoint of globalization theory, anti-global sentiments or movements should be seen as an interesting feature of the contemporary global arena, as one very significant feature of the overall globalization process. That movements claim to be definitely anti-global shows in fact that there is an increase in global awareness and that global consciousness is increasing. Opposition to "globalization" thus is caught in a paradoxical situation. The growth of such opposition or resistance intensifies and expands the scope of consciousness of the whole world. Global consciousness — a crucial ingredient of globalization in a serious sociological sense — *grows* with opposition to

globalization in its narrow reductionist meaning.

Having said this, one should recognize that the rise of anti-global movements certainly makes the theorization of globalization much more challenging. The fact that some anti-global movements are transnationally organized illustrates the nature of this challenge. In any case, there is a conspicuous tendency for ostensibly anti-global movements to be organized on an international or transnational, non-governmental basis — one of the most interesting examples of this being the international organization of indigenous peoples.

Much of the theoretical work among sociologists on globalization has been undertaken by sociologists in Britain, Scandinavia and Australia, as well as a few in the USA. This has contributed greatly to the tendency for non-Western writers to talk of globalization as if it were another version of what has frequently been called Westernization. This perspective has been greatly encouraged by Giddens' declaration that globalization is a consequence of modernity and his presentation of modernity as a Western product (Giddens, 1990), in spite of certain disclaimers on his part that globalization is not Westernization (cf. Tomlinson, 1991). In sharp contrast, I have insisted that there have been a number of *different sites and forms of modernity* (Robertson, 1995; Therborn, 1995). Indeed, Japan is the pivotal society in one, primarily East Asian, form of modernity.

In my own work generally there has been a continuing insistence during the past fifteen years or so that globalization should *not* be thought of as a form of Westernization. I have been greatly concerned to address the issue of the ways in which particular non-Western civilizations and societies have contributed increasingly to the overall globalization process. Indeed the scope and degree of cultural penetration of what is commonly — but not unproblematically — known as "the West" by non-Western civilizations and societies is only now beginning to be studied adequately. There is a certain irony in the reluctance of non-Western intellectuals to acknowledge the degree to which the centuries-old process of globalization has involved major contributions to the making of the modern, increasingly compressed world.

Globalization is not simply a matter of structure. It is also, crucially, a matter of *agency*. The view of Giddens has in fact complemented a general perspective that one finds widely in the so-called Third World and other non-Western regions of the contemporary world, as well as in "politically correct" circles in the West (in spite of

Giddens having devoted a great deal of his work over recent decades to the theme of agency). This perspective centers on the proclamation that the West enjoys what is often called a hegemonic position in the world as a whole. In a certain sense, then, it is in the interests of those who maintain that they are representing subaltern or oppressed groups to cast the West as very dominant and thus to conceive of globalization as a form of Westernization or as imperialism or colonialism in a new guise. In this perspective many non-Western societies are victims without agency and "globalization" becomes simply a pejorative symbol of all things that are contaminating or disrupting these societies.

The combination of Giddens' standpoint and the subaltern perspective is very misleading empirically. Together they serve to perpetuate an image of the global field (Robertson, 1992) that is centered upon the stratification of the world into active, dominant and relatively passive elements. This image, in turn, denies to the allegedly subordinate elements a positive and constructive role in the globalization process. This means that globalization talk becomes central to the ways in which people around the world grumble about trends that they or their political and intellectual leaders do not like. "Globalization" is, in other words, rapidly becoming a scapegoat for a wide range of ecological, economic, psychological, medical, political, social, and cultural problems. It is in this particular sense that globalization is in danger of becoming simply a slogan, as opposed to a serious social scientific concept. Globalization as a slogan thus symbolizes much of the penetration of nationally organized societies by other such societies. This view rests on the unreal assumption that internally homogeneous nations are natural phenomena, when in fact the homogeneous nation has been a very prominent feature of the world for only about 250 years (McNeill, 1986).

If, on the other hand, we start with the basic and simple proposition that globalization consists of the making of the entire world into "a single place" — a place which is the site upon which a new collective, but certainly not cohesive, entity is created — then it behooves us to consider the actual, long-historical dynamics of the formative process. This means that we must allow for the full range of actual and potential contributions to the formation of what has variously been called the world system, the global system, world society, global society, the global ecumene, the global arena, or the global field. But it is not my purpose here to delve

into the issue of the most appropriate master concept for the indication of the world as a whole. Rather, I am concerned with the ways in which the problematic of globalization is actually talked about — or, more accurately, how the rhetoric of globalization is discursively structured — in relation to the compression of the world. Even if we were to ban the word "globalization" from academic discourses we would still be left with pressing questions concerning the increasing extent of transnational processes, globe-wide debates about human rights, global ecological issues, the global economy, and many other matters relating to the contemporary compression of the world. In other words, doing away with the concept (or the slogan) of globalization still leaves us with unavoidable issues of much more than academic importance.

DISCOURSES OF GLOBALIZATION

There are at least four, empirically overlapping, types of globalization discourses. First, there are clusters of regional or civilizational discourses, such as those of East and South Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, and so on. Even within these there is much variation. Second, there are disciplinary discourses — such as those of economics and business studies, political science, anthropology, sociology, and yet others. Again, in this case, there are intra-disciplinary variations. Third, there are ideological discourses of globalization. Here it is harder to give concrete examples. For present purposes I think we should talk, for the sake of simplicity, about Left and Right discourse, emphasizing that there are *both* pro- and anti- globalization discourses on the ideological right, as well as on the left. Fourth, there are shifting female and male discourses, about which I will say more in due course.

1. As far as *regional* or civilizational discourses are concerned, I would stress that I include as discourses of globalization those which do not in fact strongly highlight the notion of globalization as such. For example, there has been a lot of discussion of the theme of indigenous sociologies in sub-Saharan Africa and in South East Asia in recent years. Much of this has been undertaken ostensibly in order to promote indigenous, alternative ways of doing sociology from particular African or Asian points of view; and as a way of both injecting such worldviews *into*

the global discourses of social science and creating "local" resistance to what are seen as "hegemonic" efforts to create and sustain a Western — or, more narrowly, an American — form of universalistic discourses. I have myself argued (Robertson, 1992) that the discourses of indigenization is in fact a crucial *aspect* of globalization — although I cannot pursue this argument here. However, it is worth mentioning that there is a discourse of indigenization that is clearly global. In the early 1980s the United Nations Organization began to formalize the issue of indigenous peoples. This has been largely responsible for the recent proliferation of global and "international" concern with the problems and deprivations of stateless and indigenous peoples, resulting in the formation of transnational organizations of indigenous peoples. (It should be emphasized, however, that such organizations actually pre-date the formalization of indigeneity by the United Nations Organization.)

There are, of course, discontinuities *within* regions. A good example is provided by the strong French deviation from other prominent "national" tendencies in Western Europe. Among French intellectuals and politicians there emerged in recent years a virtual obsession with using globalization as a term with strong connotations of a great "Anglo-American" or "Anglo-Saxon" threat to the integrity of French society, culture and language, in particular, and other societies generally. In this way contemporary French intellectuals have excluded themselves almost entirely from the intellectual debate about globalization, a debate to which in fact one of France's greatest intellectuals, Emile Durkheim, made significant contributions, following the France-centered concern with this same theme in the writings of Comte and, more particularly, Saint-Simon (Robertson, 1993). The anti-globalism of French intellectuals may well be more accurately described as a French *project* of globalization, as an alternative to the actual, present form of globalization. Indeed a number of regional hostilities to globalization may best be considered as forming the basis for alternative project of globalization. The objection is, in other words, not to globalization as such. Rather, it is to the particular form of existing globalization. Because of this kind of consideration, we should make an analytic distinction between the general, *overall process* of globalization and calculated *projects* of globalization; although this distinction is not easy to apply empirically.

Another example of regional discontinuity is in Southeast Asia where both the salience and meaning of "globalization" differs from country in the area of

Golden Triangle, consisting of Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar. Chanthanom has found that it is in Thailand that globalization discourse is most highly "developed", with a strong tendency for economic, or politicoeconomic, meaning to be given to globalization.^① This is, as one would expect, a particularly evident tendency among business elites and their academic counterparts. The Office of Royal Literature in Thailand has, in fact, produced a correct, official translation of "globalization", in an attempt to stabilize its meaning. Thus the official translation of this word is *loqapiwatana*, which combines the Thai "world" with the word *a-piwatana*, meaning "to spread, to reach, to win over". This official meaning, which is not readily accepted by those committed to a unidimensional economic meaning, thus — according to Chanthanom — means "the expansion of the world, spread around the world, and change and effect all over the world". The word, *loqanuwatra* — which existed in the Thai Royal Dictionary prior to the 1994 declaration of the Office of Royal Literature — is favored by those in Thailand who see globalization in mainly economic terms. *Loqanuwatra* broadly means "to follow the world".

In contrast to the state of flux in the meaning of globalization in Thailand, Chanthanom has found that in Laos the public discourse of globalization is much less conspicuous, although it is widely used among the business and governmental elites of the capital city, Vientiane. Within these elites the major variation is between those who think of globalization as the new colonialism, on the one hand, and those who, on the other hand, regard globalization as an unavoidable economic challenge to Laotian society. Finally, in Myanmar globalization discourse is not all conspicuous and there is no official Burmese translation of the word, "globalization". Indeed the adjective, "global" is very rarely understood, yet alone used, in Myanmar. Turning to another part of the world — namely, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, that have recently regained their independence — there appears to be a considerable amount of anti-globalization sentiment, based on the (obviously wrong) assumption that globalization entails loss of sovereignty (which it does, to some degree, for *all* nations) via the rapid growth of the global market economy.

Similarly, in Latin America one finds a primarily economic conception of globalization which is apparently in large part the result of enthusiasm concerning the idea of globalization that is to be found in business circle and economists. This kind of conception is shared by Marxist or neo-Marxists, although the latter do not,

of course, share the economists' enthusiasm for capitalistic economic globalization (Ianni, 1992, 1995). At the present time there is much discussion of globalization in Brazilian journals, newspapers and academic contexts. Indeed, it is a "buzzword," that is invoked in primarily economic terms, the result being that there is considerable talk of Brazilian identity in the face of the vicissitudes of the global economy.

2. In *disciplinary* discourses of globalization one finds a tendency to reduce the globalization process to the self-referential domain of the relevant discipline. The most clear-cut example of this is obviously to be found in the increasingly salient economic discourse of globalization. In this instance globalization as a process is seen in exclusively economic terms, with specific emphasis upon the growth and crystallization of the (capitalistic) global economy (and, to some degree, the rapid growth of global-economic institutions). In the closely related discourse of business studies, notably in Japan, one does find something of a departure from that standpoint, since there is much attention to the sociocultural distinctiveness of particular markets — indeed the creation of particular markets of categories of consumers (Robertson, 1995). In any case, given the global ascendancy of economics and economists in politically influential national, international, and supranational contexts — a strong trend which cuts-across all of the regions of the world (Nettle and Robertson, 1968; Markoff and Montecinos, 1993) — it is not surprising that the discourse of economic globalization is extremely pervasive; so much so that even practitioners in other disciplines frequently assume that the economic stance is the definitive one. That is, even some sociologists — particularly in the USA — have taken it as a given that when we speak of globalization we mean *economic* globalization (cf. Hirst and Thompson, 1996). Coming from a different angle, there are the sociologists of the world-systems schools who have, during the past twenty years or so, studied the long making of the modern world-system in terms of a special brand of economic history. Here Wallerstein has been the key figure. Thus even from within sociology (although world-system theory has not been promoted exclusively by sociologists) one finds a distinctly economic conception of globalization.

② It should be pointed out, however, that world-system theorists and empirical researchers have not been enthusiastic about the concept of globalization as such (cf. Abu-Lughod, 1991).

I do not intend in this paper to provide characterizations of the whole range of

disciplinary discourses of globalization, but the conception of globalization promoted particularly by those working within the field of communication and media studies must be mentioned here. This is because the conception of the world as becoming a "global village" originated in the 1960s in the work of Marshall McLuhan, in reference to media trends. Even though it would be very misleading to suggest that all of those working in the field of communication and media studies are McLuhan devotees, the global village imagery has had a very great impact — indeed an impact that has extended far beyond this academic field. The conception of the world as a whole as being defined and shaped by global media — including, of course, the new electronic media of the fax, internet, and e-mail — remains very strong. McLuhan was, of course, a Canadian; but I suspect that in some parts of the world McLuhan is thought of as having been an agent of American cultural imperialism. In any case, it is certainly worth pointing-out that McLuhan's talk of the global village was bound-up with his Catholicism; and at certain stages in its history the Roman Catholic Church has definitely had a project of Catholic globalization high on its agenda — in spite of its current objections to "secular" globalization.

3. Interwoven with these regional and disciplinary discourses there are, as I have indicated, *ideological* discourses. As I have also suggested, these discourses have appeared on both the Left and the Right in anti-globalization and pro-globalization forms. Thus in world-systems theory one finds a predominant view that welcomes the making of the modern, capitalistic world-system as the allegedly necessary prologue to the transition to world socialism. At the same time, one also finds on the Left frequent expression of the view that globalization disables emancipatory "local" movements and/or that globalization represents the triumph of the multinational (or trans-national) corporation, as well as of world organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization — which supposedly stifle local initiative and freedom. Here ecological concerns are often also to be found. If one looks at the Right, one also finds such variation. Some on the Right (such as Christian Conservatives in the USA or strong nationalists in various parts of the world) are fond of demonizing "The New World Order", which they tend to see as the most effective way of symbolically representing what others may call globalization. Here again we find the view that "the local" (which notion may, as I have intimated, actually embrace the national) is being overridden

by the global. But, on the other hand, we also find on the ideological right the argument that globalization constitutes the release of capitalism from its historic national containers and that it is also an enabling force for the economic success of particular capitalistic societies and of capitalism in general. Here one finds a remarkable mixture of convergence with and divergence from the "international-ism" that has long been a major goal of many Marxists for many decades.

4. There are gender differences in the general discourse about the world as a whole (cf. Robertson, 1992: 105-8). While there has been a strong tendency in some feminist circles to privilege the local and in fact to regard the discourse(s) of globalization as a masculine preoccupation, this now appears to be changing in Western feminist contexts. Increasingly female academics and intellectuals are beginning to see that a feminine view of the global circumstance is desirable, indeed necessary. This has undoubtedly been facilitated in part by the increasing involvement of women in transnational organizations and the growth of a global women's movement. Increasingly, activist women have come to the realization that the position of women is a global issue. This has meant that activist and academic women from many parts of the world have become more and more conscious of the world per se and that continuation of the emphasis on locality severely limits the power and the influence of women.

The feminist discourse of globalization is much more concerned with what I call the communal aspect of globality and globalization (Robertson, 1992). More specifically, it contextualizes the male tendency to consider the global circumstance in solely economic or "world-politics" terms. In sum there appears to be a stronger tendency among interested women to think of the world as a community, as is to be seen particularly in the concern with environmental and ecological issues. It is clear, on the basis of my own experience of teaching many courses on global issues, that there are different male and female discourses. Of course, these observations are based mainly — but certainly not only — on my being involved in teaching programs in the Western orbit. Nonetheless my observations seem to parallel similar observations that have been reported to me with respect to non-Western contexts. (Here again Chanthanom's work on Southeast Asia is relevant, in that she too has found a much stronger tendency for women, particularly in Thailand, to conceive of the world more holistically and less economically than men.)

CONCLUSION

I have attempted here only the barest sketch of the array of discourses of globalization. I should reiterate that I regard the discussion of discourses of globalization as an essential feature of the overall theorization of globalization. In arguing that there is a variety of discourses of globalization I am clearly not suggesting merely that there is a cacophony of voices and leaving it at that. To adopt the latter position would be to subscribe to an "ultra-postmodern" stance on the global circumstance. To say that we now simply have a lot of "global babble" and regard the world as a Tower of Babel, without any attempt to analyze or interpret it, would indeed constitute a sociologically irresponsible celebration of the clash of "small narratives" concerning the world as a whole. In contrast, I believe that we can and should include dissection of discourses of globalization within the project of achieving an empirically and historically sensitive theory of globalization. Such theory, moreover, is a critical theory, in the sense of showing how many of our presuppositions about the modern world and its history may be deconstructed and also undermining the ways in which unidimensional discourses of globalization restrict our vision of the late-twentieth century world with unfortunate consequences for the "world society" in which we now live (cf. Robertson, 1996).

NOTES

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- ① Suvajee Chanthanom is currently writing her Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, USA.
- ② Among Wallerstein's recent writings, see Wallerstein (1991a, 1991b).

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