

**The Political Processes of Administering
Landscape Preservation**

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– A Case on the City of Kyoto

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Introduction

The hopes of numerous interested parties, including residents and related organizations, are included in the administrative processes carried out by local government. The conflict of interest and cooperation among them directly affects the political processes. This inclusion in the processes of the wishes of vested interests is the essence of selfgovernment. The Mayor, members of the City Council, and municipal officials determine a wide range of issues and implement different policies on behalf of residents and related organizations. However, some policies conflict with each other. In a democratic society, conflict is bound to occur, since vested interests are not a monolith and their interests are different.

People with different interests oppose each other. One role of the administration is to mediate interests, achieve compromises, or determine needs and give priority based on the degree of need. However, in some cases, mediation, compromise, and prioritization are all inapplicable. This is when policies which absolutely cannot compromise with each other compete.

The conflict between industrial development and landscape preservation is a typical example of this kind. Industrial development involves constructing new buildings, and creating roads and bridges to improve access. Large empty plots may be prepared to attract corporations. Landscape preservation, on the other hand, involves maintaining the present state as much as possible, although there may be some modifications. These two policies are both important, but they cannot share the same time and space.

Conflicts between these two policies are most obviously seen in the city of Kyoto. It is one of the oldest Japanese cities, more specifically, the second oldest city in Japan after Nara. Its foundations were laid about 1,200 years ago, and it still contains many historic buildings. There are also numerous areas registered as World Cultural Heritage sites. On the other hand, Kyoto City is also a large metropolis with a population of about 1.5 million, with many modern buildings. The metropolitan area, which includes Kyoto City and its surrounding regions, supports a population of more than 2 million people. Kyoto City is a “cabinet order designated city” and thus has an administrative organ as a metropolis with equivalent power to a Prefecture. Many major Japanese corporations are also located in Kyoto City. Notably,

the headquarters of world famous corporations including Rohm, Nintendo, Murata Manufacturing, and Kyocera are located in the central area, partly due to convenient transport links.

The head-on confrontation between the above two policies has been making the city of Kyoto face an extremely difficult situation in its administrative process. The administration recognizes that landscape needs to be conserved, but on the other hand, industries must be developed. These two aspects need to be achieved simultaneously. However, it is difficult to achieve both in the same area. As described below, political struggles over the landscape have occurred repeatedly in the past, but ended half-resolved every time. Preservation was not fully achieved, and development was also impeded. As a result, the landscape has been progressively damaged.

Since Kyoto is an old city, landscape preservation is considerably important. For example, laws and ordinances require the conservation of temples and shrines and their surrounding areas in the suburbs, and restrict construction of new houses and modifications. Only low-rise buildings can be constructed in these areas. In the central area (north of Kyoto Station), no buildings higher than 45 m are allowed to be built. However, planning policy is often determined reactively rather than proactively. A particular area is preserved, but a modern urban area overshadows it. Modern buildings are seen from the preserved area. In particular, in the central area, low-rise town houses lined up along the streets in the old days (this itself was a beautiful scene), but now these town houses are only randomly dotted between modern buildings. This is no longer beautiful scenery with respect to landscape. In other words, old scenery remains in one-dimensional dots and lines, but not two-dimensionally as areas. (Note 1)

Other cities of Japan also face similar dilemmas between conflicting policies, but Kyoto City administration has been more seriously embracing this contradiction because it clearly has two faces: one of the oldest cities in Japan, and a typical modern city. This dilemma has been distorting and delaying the administrative processes. For example, if landscape preservation is given priority, no new industries can be developed. The result is that revenue from fixed asset tax falls compared with other large cities. In fact, Kyoto's revenue from fixed asset taxes is extremely low compared to that in other cities (Note 2). To increase tax revenue, industrial development needs to be prioritized. As a result, the landscape will be damaged. This can be called antinomy.

Factors specific to Kyoto

So, why did conflict between landscape preservation and industrial development policies become more serious in Kyoto City than in other cities? Naturally, other cities also experience

similar conflicts to differing extents. In the case of Kyoto City, however, the following factors can be found in addition to its being a city with a long history.

Factor 1) Geographical restrictions

First, the geographical conditions of the City of Kyoto have exacerbated the problem. Kyoto is enclosed on three sides by mountains taller than 500 m (in ancient days, this configuration was considered propitious). Accordingly, the southern area is the only land that can be newly developed. In addition, Kyoto City is the only metropolitan city in Japan with a population of over 1 million that is not facing the sea. To expand the city area, the mountains would need to be leveled. If the mountain area is developed, it can be used for residential land, but not for the central area. For reasons of cost, the leveled area cannot be used for factory sites. Compared to other large cities, Kyoto City is located in an area without developable peripheral regions.

For example, Kobe City has contrasting geographical features. Kobe (now in debt but once an ideal model of urban management) reclaimed areas on the coastline with sand obtained by leveling mountainous areas, creating new urban areas. In the case of Kyoto City, to enable development, old urban areas must be continuously demolished and rebuilt. It would have been impossible for Kyoto to both preserve its old cityscape and build a new urban area. By necessity, old town houses were destroyed and replaced with high-rise buildings. If Kyoto was located in the center of a plain, and had a coastal area, the entire ancient urban area might have been preserved.

In reality, Kyoto has flat lands only to the South. The previous urban development plan divided the city into northern and southern regions and tried to foster development in the southern region. The southern area was indeed developed for industrial sites, but offices are still clustered in the northern region, which has more convenient transport links (Note 3). There is also a plan to transfer the city hall to a new high-rise building in the southern region. However, the present stringent financial conditions may hinder this plan from being realized.

Factor 2) Giving every department a hand in making decisions, i.e., the administrative culture of decentralized policy-making

Japanese local governments are often described as “department stores” or “supermarkets,” since all the departments involved in administrative services are located in the same one city hall (Note 4) containing departments that cover all the services that residents require, including civilian services, commerce, civil engineering and construction, water and sewerage, city transport, education, and other public services. All these are provided by one local government except for a few exceptional services provided through associations and broader

local government. Including these exceptions, some say that a local government behaves as one large conglomerate (Note 5).

This means that everything related to public services is examined, determined, and implemented as one organization. In other words, one local government must determine and implement conflicting policies. Accordingly, when problems occur which basically oppose each other, such as landscape preservation and industrial development, it takes time for internal adjustments to be made. If discussions take place frankly and openly, arguments may continue endlessly, ultimately causing interdepartment antagonism. The more complicated the issue, the greater the inability of the city to come up with consistent policies.

To avoid confusion, each department in the city government avoids interfering with other departments. The Mayor just ratifies policies after the fact. This is called the "department oriented principle" (or *genkyoku-shugi* in Japanese). The idea is to avoid interfering with other departments if internal coordination would take up a lot of time. Each department has a interest group which do strong lobbying activities, and therefore other departments do not interfere with decisions that are made by officials after consulting with interest groups.

The power of the Mayor of the City of Kyoto is somewhat circumscribed, as described in the next section. Policies are made separately on the initiative of each department. A political culture of traditionally giving importance to decisions made by departments has long been cultivated (Note 6). Compared to other cities, Kyoto City has a notable habit of implementing decentralized decision-making.

Factor 3) Insufficient leadership by the Mayor

In the Japanese local government system, there is only one local government in each region, unlike in the U.S. Only the Mayor and City Council members are selected by election. This means that most decision-making power rests in the democratically elected Mayor. If the governing party in the City Council is in the majority, the Mayor can in most cases see his wishes translated into policy. Under these conditions, the Mayor is almost a king.

However, in the case of the City of Kyoto, the Mayor often lacks this power (Note 7). In recent years, there has been only one Mayor who has served three terms and others served for two terms or retired halfway. Only a few Mayors can maintain their power for long. Accordingly, the authority of the Mayor's staff to integrate and coordinate plans is impeded. If the Mayor cannot maintain his post, the power of the general staffing management department is further weakened. It is said that if past Mayors had been able to demonstrate a specific direction on landscape preservation, carrying through their convictions, Kyoto might have been able to maintain its attraction as an ancient capital.

In addition, the political situation of Kyoto further weakens the power of the Mayor.

Landscape preservative and innovative forces for development are equally balanced in Kyoto. Since the governing party does not have a stable majority in the City Council, the Mayor's power has been undermined. The recent Mayors are politically based towards Conservative Parties, but there were also past Mayors supported by the Communist Party. The Mayor naturally makes decisions based on political considerations. Decision is made based on most advantageous characteristic for being elected as Mayor. In general, innovative forces stress the importance of fostering traditional industries and landscape preservation. Conservative Parties place importance on building an infrastructure for industrial development. Since the war, Kyoto has always been managed between these matching forces. The Mayor always tries to win by gaining the support of moderate forces and thus avoids making politically extreme decisions: The Mayor avoids making clear statements on any political agenda that two forces severely oppose.

Factor 4) Intricate interests

In large cities, different interests are generally in conflict and the City of Kyoto is no exception. A wide variety of vested interests are also seen in Kyoto. There are financial circles, labor associations, and welfare associations. These are interest groups or lobbying groups. The municipal administration is a product of the balance of political influences of these parties. Political dynamics of merging and balancing exist here. Kyoto has, more than other cities, been managed based on a sensitive political balance between conservative and progressive parties, as described above. The administration has to be sensitive to this balance. Moreover, Kyoto has vested interests, such as shrines/temples and tourist agencies, not seen in other large cities. In particular, the latent influence of those related to shrines/temples is very strong, and they sometimes have enough influence to change the course of policymaking. (In fact, a new tax on shrines/temples was withdrawn due to opposition by these groups. Although it was not the only reason, the Mayor at that time did not run for the next mayoral election.) (Note 8)

The balance among forces, rather than one prominent force, is the key here. Each municipal department clearly presents their case, and the Mayor has been supported by the balance of these cases. The Mayor gives a balanced opinion on both landscape preservation and industrial development. Past Mayors have been keen on fostering industry because they can gain the support of business circles. However, the Mayor still has to be sensitive to which way the wind blows. If public opposition to development becomes stronger, the Mayor will try to take this into account.

Factor 5) Indifference of ordinary citizens

The City of Kyoto is large. About 1.5 million people live in its cramped space. Most of the residents live as urban citizens, and wish to enjoy a convenient lifestyle. They wish to live more conveniently than at present, and thus policies for fulfilling these expectations, i.e., development, will be launched. Living in Kyoto is somewhat inconvenient compared to other cities with high-rise buildings: this image still underlies residents' views (Note 9). However, investment in city planning is behind the times compared to other cities, and ordinary citizens are extremely non-politicized. For many citizens, preservation of their ancient capital is low on their list of priorities, with few citizens feeling that it is important.

Opposition movements against development have been perceived as a problem limited to those living nearby or as run by professional activists trying to encourage preservation. Most citizens have not taken up the movement as a cause. One typical example is opposition to the construction of a waste treatment site. Many citizens appear to find the self-serving nature of local opposition more distasteful than destruction of the landscape. Citizens also feel that they may be drawn into a political struggle if they participate in any kind of opposition movement.

Accordingly, landscape preservation is unlikely to become part of the mainstream political agenda. The Mayor and Council members seldom include landscape preservation in their commitments. They are more interested in other interest groups who are more capable of generating votes. Since landscape preservation does not lead to the harvesting of votes, the Mayor and council members do not often show much interest in it.

In summary, the above five factors prevent landscape preservation from being handled as an important part of the political agenda. Kyoto, a city which needs to preserve its historically significant landscape, has gradually moved towards destroying it.

Interested parties in local government

Kyoto's geographical features and the fact of its being a metropolitan city are preconditions that cannot be changed. If there were more vacant lots and a lower population, there would be more options for environmental preservation. However, this will never happen in the City of Kyoto.

To think about the influence on the decision-making process of political issues, we need to assume a wide range of vested interests and examine their movements as actors involved in the political agenda.

The first actor is the Mayor. The Mayor's position and opinion has decisive importance. The second actor is the City Hall which follows, but thinks and acts separately from the elected Mayor. In particular, managers such as heads of departments may make the decision themselves when the responsibility arrives at their department. The third actor is vested

interests which directly or indirectly influence the municipal administration. These can also be called interest groups which do lobbying activities around local governments, as stated above. For Example, they are Kyoto Business Association, Kyoto Labor Association, Kyoto Medical Association and so on. City staff other than managers form also an interest group called a staff union to exert influence on the municipal administrative processes. A fourth actor is the members of the City Council. They often act in acquiescence to the lobbying groups, but they sometimes also act on behalf of political parties or in the interests of general citizens, as described below. The fifth actor is the citizens. They may also participate in lobbying activities. Some citizens are organized into political parties, for example, religious parties and the Communist Party. Grassroots conservationists act together with independent conservative council members. However, there are many more citizens who take no action. They are described as general citizens in the abstract. They sometimes exert an influence on the municipal administration. These general citizens are called unaffiliated voters at election times, and have a greater influence on the success of candidates in larger election districts. Unaffiliated voters may in some cases account for over 30% of the total. The Mayor is thus very sensitive to the behavior of unaffiliated voters at election times.

The above five actors influence the decision-making process in the city. It is similar to playing a complicated power game. However, each actor, other than the Mayor, is not a single character that can make decisions logically. They are mass groups. Since the mass plays power games, its direction is unpredictable. Interest groups, council members, and citizens compete for influence inside and outside City Hall. Since they are complicatedly intertwined, it is almost impossible to find an appropriate and logical solution when determining policies. If one politically advantageous group is formed and this group can have a dominant influence, discussions may be ultimately made to suit this group. However, this is rare. In many cases, chaotic discussions continue while each interest groups try to secure its interest in an area that does not undermine others' interests. As a whole, the system has so much inertia that it is unlikely to make a definite move in any direction. A huge elephant cannot move to any direction.

The dynamics of decision-making in the City of Kyoto

How the above factors and actors meet and how decisions are made is described next.

Although the City of Kyoto is a municipality, it has authority equivalent to a Prefecture, since it is a Designated City. For example, the City of Kyoto does not receive instructions from Kyoto Prefecture, the next layer of government, when planning city development. Accordingly, an in-house-developed city development plan can be implemented at its own discretion much more dynamically than in other small cities and towns. This means that the

Mayor, each department, city staff, council members, and interest groups can incorporate their interest in the plan independently of the views of central government and Kyoto Prefecture. Because of this discretion, the City of Kyoto shows a unique process in making decisions due to the above factors. As already described, Kyoto City traditionally gives a great deal of discretionary authority to each department. This is similar to other large cities, although its degree may differ. There is unwritten agreement that no department should intervene in a decision made by another department in large cities. Accordingly, the opinion of each department is afforded respect. In particular, with the weakening of the leadership of the Mayor of Kyoto, a decision-making process has been built which requires the Mayor not to interfere with the intentions and interest of each department.

Specific administrative services are determined by each department, not just landscape preservation and industrial development. Construction is determined by the Construction Department, welfare by Welfare, commerce and industry by Commerce and Industry, and so on. An interest complex of creeks centering on each department, interest groups, citizens involved in lobbies, and council members, i.e., the second, third, fourth, and some of the fifth actors (forming political lobbies), is built. The department discusses with the relevant vested interests when determining the details. In the case of new proposals, the person in charge creates a proposal (*ringi*), and circulates it for approval among their direct superiors and managers of related departments. If everyone approves it in each department, the proposal is accepted. The *ringi* system is a participative decision-making method unique to Japan.

Even though one policy is agreed in one department, policies that may conflict between departments may be implemented without adjustment. For example, in an extreme case, one department implements policies to preserve an old town while another department makes a plan to build a highway nearby (Note 10). Naturally, a *chôgi* (a management meeting at which the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and Department Managers make major decisions) is periodically held, and comments on decisions made by other departments may be made, but not to the extent of overturning their decisions. The Mayor also often rubber-stamps the decision. A comparison survey of decision-making in Designated Cities also shows that the Mayor has less practical power in Kyoto City Hall than in other cities (Note 11), whereas the financial department is extremely strong. The financial department may reject financially impractical plans, but the Mayor does not often have an official opportunity to reverse the decision.

However, decision-making as described above is ideal when a creek or interest complex does not interfere with any other interest. If each department has different interest groups, and has an agenda that may cause serious conflict between departments in a local government, problems will arise. In particular, landscape preservation (the department in charge of culture

and tourism) and industrial development (the department in charge of public projects) easily reach agreement within their respective departments. Moreover, the decision is considered as correct in each department. However, if the issue is discussed publicly to determine the basic missions of the City Hall, a basic conflict will be revealed.

Policy coordination is implemented in advance by the Mayor, general staff belonging to the Mayor, or within the planning coordination department. However, the Planning Department, which is a fixed item in other cities, is constantly being abolished and reestablished in Kyoto City. The tradition of strong power of departments is also a result of an internal idea that there is no need for a staff department directly belonging to the Mayor. In fact, Mayors who have demonstrated strong leadership in the past have had a very active planning coordination department (Note 12).

The Mayor's strong leadership is needed to integrate opinions to some extent if any mismatch occurs. This is because the departments and vested interest groups involved cannot view the issues objectively: their interests are complicatedly involved. They may arrange tradeoffs, but policies cannot be fundamentally integrated. Only the Mayor can give priority to such policies. In the past, some Mayors were capable, and some not. If the Mayor cannot play this role, the municipal administration processes start to wander off course.

In addition, in the case of Kyoto City, people occasionally unite under one "Kyoto citizens' identity." Ordinary citizens are like sand, with nothing that can be clearly defined. Unless a political struggle rears up or develops into a major issue that affects the entire city, general citizens have no role to play. However, when a problem comes into focus, citizens' pride of living in the ancient capital is awakened. Once they become aware of the crisis of identity of Kyoto, public opinion often unites in one direction. Also, in the past, when a political problem looms, general citizens' protests became loud only in the final stage. In this case, council members and the Mayor, who are sensitive to their electoral situation, can be moved to change their minds.

Ordinary citizens are normally hidden behind regional elites (regional coordinators such as chairmen of neighborhood associations) and interest groups. Regional elites also emphasize their individual interests, and thus are not capable of exerting a significant influence on the administrative processes. Although they oppose the construction of roads and buildings for reasons of preserving the landscape, their actions are often regarded as local egoism. Industrial development gets the support of all citizens, but local preservation movements are often not universally approved. In order to increase their influence, citizens' groups join several interest groups.

In recent years, active citizens as distinct from citizens represented by regional elites are gaining more influence on municipal administration. In the Mayoral election, the persuasive

effects of these citizens form an important factor. Ordinary citizens share a potential sense of value when it comes to protecting the ancient capital. If any problems occur, they readily unite under this sense of value.

However, since this rise of Kyoto citizens occurs only at the late stage of an incident, the situation is already very serious. Accordingly, in many cases, significant destruction of the environment has already taken place. Landscape preservation is positioned at the periphery compared to other administrative policies. Citizens have a broad interest in preservation but do not often think seriously about it. Its priority is low in policy-making since there is a lack of political parties that earnestly stress the importance of landscape preservation. Even if an interested party exists, it has little influence.

With respect to landscape preservation in Kyoto, it attracts attention as a major political issue suddenly once the issue becomes important and general citizens become aware of it, in a process similar to waking up a sleeping lion. Once the movement starts, citizens' interest rises sharply over a broad area. In this sense, landscape preservation is an unpredictable element in the political agenda. Once interest has spread, the Mayor may be pressed to make decisions that threaten his political survival.

In other words, landscape preservation in Kyoto suddenly becomes an inflammable political issue once it passes a certain trigger value. In this case, citizens' movements start dynamically, many citizens become aware of their identity as Kyoto citizens, and they strongly support landscape preservation. At this point, council members who were previously supportive of the Mayor may now express opposition. As the political issues expand, the entire administrative processes lean more and more toward landscape preservation.

However, few movements reached this point. There are regulations that create various restrictions, but most are ignored. Land is cleared or buildings are constructed without permission. Landscape is gradually being destroyed, and will end up in destroying the entire landscape of Kyoto.

Ultimately, the result depends on the first actor, the Mayor and fifth actor, citizens, and when and how they exercise their power. This will allow policies that reconcile environmental preservation and economic development, which by their nature do not get along well. Conversely, if neither the Mayor nor general citizens pay sufficient attention, municipal departments will implement development policies on one hand and preservation policies on the other, resulting in spot and linear preservation but not area preservation. This is what has actually been happening.

The City of Kyoto has experienced major problems related to landscape preservation. For example, construction of Kyoto Tower hotel, the illegal housing land development known as Mohican Mountain, construction of a golf course in a landscape conservation area, and the

rebuilding of the Kyoto Hotel as a high-rise building. Each went through a unique and complicated process, but in general, they showed the same pattern of pre-emptive development by contractors, delayed action by the administrative organs, and resulting disorder inside city hall. These issues have left serious problems within the Kyoto administrative processes, for which regret has been repeatedly expressed.

One typical example of direct confrontation between preservation and development is the reconstruction of the Station Building, described below.

The Reconstruction of Kyoto Station Building

This is a large building, the largest in the City of Kyoto, located at the boundary of the southern and northern regions of Kyoto. It has been often described as a huge wall separating the northern and southern regions. The building has multiple purposes, including a railway terminal, parking lot, theater, department store, and exhibition hall. Concerning its construction, arguments naturally occurred, by those in favor to those opposed discussing whether the building is appropriate for Kyoto. It was indeed an incident in which preservation and development confronted each other face to face. The history of this incident is described next (Note 13).

The reconstruction of Kyoto Station (originally built in 1952), which is the entrance to Kyoto City, was examined. It was already run down, and a desire to construct a new building grew in both Kyoto City Hall and Kyoto business circles. In 1989, a company for reconstruction was provisionally established. The overheating of the economy (later called the "bubble economy" period) at that time created a new idea for further discussion. The idea was to build a 130-m high-rise station building. A plan to invite a department store was also included. Business circles and conservative parties were enthusiastic about this plan.

However, an opposition movement started in the local area. Their opposition was based on the need to protect existing small companies. At this point, many other citizens regarded the movement objectively as simple selfishness on the part of local people. Soon, however, the people opposing the plan increased due to the possibility of the landscape being destroyed. As time passed, more and more citizens' groups started to oppose the plan, and the position of anti-development groups became gradually clear. Furthermore, the Kyoto Lawyers' Association also opposed the plan, and started litigation.

At this stage, the administration (in particular, departments related to the economy that favored development) clearly tried to promote a high-rise building in cooperation with business circles. The City Council also intended to ride on this trend. At first, only the Communist Party opposed a high-rise building. Soon, however, the City Council, goaded by citizens' movements, started to take a critical position against the administration. By 1991,

most groups were critical of the Kyoto Station plan. They started to oppose the opinion of the Mayor. At this stage, the political issue of landscape preservation was publicly discussed, and the views of general citizens attracted attention (some point out that the unattractive image of the Kyoto Tower Hotel still remains in the potential consciousness of many citizens (Note 14)). In the Mayoral Election, a Communist party candidate opposing construction collected only 300 fewer votes than then Mayor Tanabe. This led to critical feelings on the part of the municipal staff and City Council, who found themselves no longer fully in favor of the plan. Business circles, on the other hand, chose this time to declare their wish to see a complete removal of the height restrictions in Kyoto City. They succeeded in abolishing the 45-m restriction, and further aimed to abolish the restriction itself. The administration, and the Mayor in particular, at first supported this plan. However, as citizens' grassroots movements became more active, they showed more caution about high-rise building.

In spring 1991, a competition was held to collect designs for the building. Two designs were eventually selected, 59.8 m and 120 m in height. The screening process was held independently of the city, and the Mayor started to suggest that the chosen design be "suitable for Kyoto," clearly distancing himself from business circles. As a result, a design under 60 m in height was selected. According to Professor Hiroshi Murakami of Ritsumeikan University, "a relatively gentle work that is intermediate between the pro-development and pro-landscape preservation groups was selected." (Note 15).

At the initial stages in the decision-making processes, the wishes of business circles and corporations seemed to take precedence, and the administration, particularly those departments involved in business issues, took part in announcing the plan and taking the initiative. However, an opposing citizens' movement flared up, and the City Council joined it in response. Finally, the Mayor also started to be prudent. A competition was held among specialists, and a station building, which is not low but not too high, was constructed, taking the middle course.

The Station building was completed in 1997, and opened in September of that year. Although the building is somewhat alienated from the other buildings in Kyoto City, it was able not to undermine the image of "an ancient capital without incongruous skyscrapers," according to Professor Murakami (Note 16).

Some Suggestions and Conclusions

The administrative processes on the City of Kyoto have for some time been pointing out its limits in making policies based on tourism. Tourists are decreasing in number, and thus the administration and citizens are increasingly focusing their attention on promoting industrial development. However, there are still many who insist in giving more stress on landscape

preservation. COP3(The 3rd Session of Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate) was held in Kyoto in 1997, and the number of NPOs (non-profit organizations) that support landscape preservation grew rapidly around that time. These NPOs also have a very strong influence on the environmental administration of the city. Citizens are also paying more attention to landscape preservation. This has made antinomy more obvious when drawing up administrative policies.

What can be proposed to future Kyoto administrative processes?

Strong leadership on the part of the Mayor is needed. It is necessary to create a system that thoroughly reflects the philosophy of the Mayor concerning environmental issues in actual policies. This movement affects the actions taken by the city hall. If the Mayor cannot mediate between actions taken by each department, and bi-directional actions continue to be taken, contradicting policies will be implemented simultaneously by the entire city hall (Note 17). If the Mayor just stresses the importance of reaching an agreement, no remarks to support either side can be made. To avoid revealing conflicts many policies containing internal contradictions will be implemented. As a result, the redevelopment of the town will go ahead, but preservation of town scenery will proceed in parallel. Old town houses will remain between modern buildings, creating adisjointed effect. This is what will happen if no changes are made in the present form of municipal administration.

By nature, the conflict between landscape preservation and industrial development derives from the fact that one is a philosophical idea and the other is a more specific idea that gives an image of future affluence. Preservation is difficult unless there is significant interest on the part of citizens. The Mayor's political attitude is often the key to preservation. In addition, how ordinary citizens who regard landscape preservation as important participate in the decision-making process is significant. This means that in Japan, administrative reform is quite easy if the leadership of the head based on strong belief is directly connected with general citizens, allowing concerted moves in one direction, and superseding the decision making process of the administrative system. In fact, Mie Prefecture is a typical example of administrative reform (Note 18) of this kind.

With respect to the decision-making processes in regional administration, we must consider what kind of organizational system is required for determining the city's basic direction. For this purpose, the biggest point of contention is how to educate general citizens to consider the interest of the entire city, transcending "interest creeks" among departments, council members, and interest groups, to ultimately have an influence on election of the Mayor. One new role for grassroots movement by citizens' groups—as a counterbalance to existing special-interest complexes—also needs to be considered.

Notes

- 1) According to “*Tourist city as living space – Kyoto City Tourism Report*” (1997) by Professor Tomohiro Okada of Kyoto University, more than half of Kyoto citizens answered that the town scene in Kyoto has become less beautiful. There is also the following recent article: “Overseas visitors to Kyoto are impressed by the temples and shrines, but are distressed by the chaotic townscape not worthy of an ancient capital, where electric cables are exposed and historic buildings are demolished to make room for office blocks.” This is an article titled “Another viewpoint of tourism: Pride in one’s home country, the basic for making attractive points such as landscape conservation.” in *Nikkei Morning Newspaper* (February 22, 2003).
- 2) See “*Summary of Kyoto City Financial Administration*,” 10-11. Kyoto City Information 2002.
- 3) Kyoto City Hall is active in developing South region, but the plan is not making a good progress because Kyoto does not have its own land like Kobe City. – An interview with Mr. Yoshio Mineno, a municipal staff.
- 4) See “Prospect of a characteristic for a management process in local government,” *Kyoto Prefectural University Bulletin* 1981,33,124-139, by Masao Tao. Japan does not have a system of special district as in the U.S. As a general rule, all services are included in one local government.
- 5) A remark on city management made by the former Mayor Tatsuo Miyazaki of Kobe City. This is also applicable to other cities in some sense.
- 6) In Kyoto City, “Mayor has to largely depend on city officials in budget planning, making it difficult for Mayor to take the initiative.” in “Budget planning in local government” by Yoshio Mineno, *Leviathan* 1995, 16,145-168 in Japanese.
- 7) With respect to the weak leadership of the Mayor, this trend became more obvious after Mayor Motoki Funahashi (1971-1981) who started to give importance on departments. According to a report by Professor M. Muramatsu of Kyoto University (Chapter 9-I: “Mayor and administrative organ”) in “*Dynamics of Kyoto City administration* (Yuhikaku)” (1981), Mayor Funahashi demonstrated a strong leadership, but not subsequent Mayors. Rather, the words of departments became strong since then.
- 8) See “Actions of local government under restrictions of the central government,” *Policy Science* (Ritsumeikan University) 1997, 4(2),37-47 (in Japanese), by Yoshio Mineno, which describes about Kyoto City.
- 9) See “Historical city and landscape issues: Eyes for Kyoto identity and Sociology in historical environment” by Hirosuke Noda (Compiled by Arata Katagiri, 2000, Shinyo-

sha)

- 10) This process is very political. Mr. Mineno perceives it as a political model in the aforementioned report. This can be explained by irrational decisionmaking model such as a model of garbage-can.
- 11) "Policies in large cities and awareness of municipal staff, based on a comparative administration survey," *Kyoto City Report*, 1993, by Hiroshi Murakami (Professor of Ritsumeikan University) Tatsushi Mayama (Professor of Doshisya University), and Masao Tao
- 12) With respect to a transition of planning and coordination, "General plan and the planning coordination department" by Professor Masashi Kimimura of Doshisya University (in "Dynamics of Kyoto Policies" edited by Professor Ichiro Miyake and Professor Michio Muramatsu, 1981, Chapter 9-II)
- 13) This processes refer to "Landscape administration and policymaking process in Kyoto," *Urban Problems* 1993, 84(4), 71-97 and "Kyoto Station Building leaping in the 21st century?" (1998) in *The Manuscript Report by Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University* (in Japanese) by Tomohiro Okada. Related articles are also included in Kerr, A (2001) *Dogs and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Japan*, Hill and Wang. They are negative views.
- 14) Interviews to several people in charge at that time.
- 15) See "Landscape administration and policymaking processes on Kyoto," *Urban Problems*, 1993, 84(4), 71-97. (in Japanese)
- 16) See "Environmental Policy and the Problems of Rebuilding of New Terminal Station in Kyoto City" in *Local Autonomy and Urban Policies on Japan* (in Japanese) by Hiroshi Murakami. 2003 Horitsu-bunkasya. (in Japanese)
- 17) In 1997, the City of Kyoto established a committee for administrative and financial reform. I was one of the committee members, and experienced a course of discussion. With regard to the basic concept of the entire city, an abstract future image was discussed in the first half. With regard to a specific plan in the latter half, most of proposals from departments were listed. When proposals may conflict, both were listed. The basic plan indeed includes bi-directional actions.
- 18) Former Governor Masayasu Kitagawa of Kyoto Prefecture introduced New Public Management, and tried to reform administrative system by destroying conventional relations among interested parties. The Mayor used a method to directly appeal to prefectural citizens.