

CONCEPT OF SCIENCE IN MAX WEBER

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(I)

In the social sciences, what is represented by concept, proposition, or law with regard to their respective research objects is a remarkably elemental, and yet final question, which always challenges us for solution. According to the standpoints taken in answering the question, one concept will give birth to such a variety of considerations that, when it is taken up for a joint discussion, the natural consequence is that the participants will be pitted against each other as if they were as many people from different planets. It is certainly true of a basic concept of 'price' in political economy, for instance. To the so-called modern theorists it seems that 'price' is the most general and unified expression of the various phrases of economic life, and at the same time the common denominator of all things from which they start and to which they are reduced. The backgrounds of 'price', they think, are technique or the social relations of mankind as such of which essence could not be covered by economic life alone, and it is the circumstances presupposed by political economy as existing outside its own field. Standing upon this premise, it may be considered that political economy has only to pay attention to both mechanics of 'price' and movement from 'price' to 'price'. And it will naturally so happen that the very premise is left for consideration to the hands of other sciences such as science of technique, sociology, and so on. To marxists, on the other hand, 'price' is an actual form of the social 'value' of men engaged in the production of commodities. On one side, 'value' can not but project itself in the form of money, on that account the essence of 'value' can be clarified through money and in which are found in a general and unified way the various phases of economic life. On the other side, however, so far as 'value' assumes a special form of money, which is a social fetish, it is understood that the actual form of 'value' does not represent the essence of 'value' and accordingly the mechanics of 'price' are nothing more than an inverted form of the social relations of humanity as shown

in terms of 'value'. And when 'price' is understood as a unification of these two contradictory forms, the productive relations of capitalism, where phases of economic life are as a whole represented as movements of 'price', will be grasped dialectically, namely, affirmatively and negatively. From this standpoint, the productive relations of capitalism are not in the least the premise, whose consideration, as from the former standpoint, should be referred to other sciences, but on the contrary they are just the real field to be considered by political economy itself. That is to say, they have historical existence as one of the milestones in the development of economic life, and it is just the task of political economy to grasp them dynamically in their historical perspectives. However, by saying to grasp them as one of the milestones of development, it is not meant that the social backgrounds of 'price' are to be grasped actually and concretely. The productive relations of capitalism are not to be grasped in terms of actual and individual character, but purified by man's faculty of abstraction into a scheme which is composed of various factors in the basic trend of economic development. Setting aside this significant commentary, it can be said from the standpoint of Marxism that behind 'price' exists 'value', and 'value' representing the social relations in economic life, deeply contains within it the field of political economy itself. It is only natural therefore that the concept of 'price' is different from the two standpoints and these two standpoints are like strangers to each other so far as this concept is concerned. It is also only natural that, whatever synthesis should be undertaken between the modern economic theory and the Marxian economics, it will inevitably be very incongruous.

That is not all. Between the standpoint which seems to be content with leaving to the hands of other sciences what lies behind the movements of 'price', and the standpoint which tries to take the said premise into the field of political economy, there may well be considered much difference to a life-attitude toward the premise. The above statement will immediately remind one of ideological criticism on these two economic sciences. Such a criticism is truly significant indeed, but it alone does not settle the matter, to be sure. Some explanation will be necessary for its clarification. Generally, scientific questions, as far as they are scientific, will not only reflect directly interests of life, even if the questions have originally raised *by* them, but rather be raised *in order to* obtain through interests of life the knowledge which was not relevant to them. However, the irrelevancy of interests is not caused for irrelevance' sake, but on the contrary so in order to become really the stuff of life in a deeper sense of the

word and to obtain the higher degree of *modus vivendi* by being irrelevant, and on that account separated and *abstracted* from the direct interests of life. By becoming impractical and by receding from daily practice, scientific answers will contribute toward the repletion and enhancement of practical life, and by becoming theoretical (contemplative) they will serve a final rationalization of practice in life. Being separated and abstracted from the interests of life is no more than to negate reality once, but by so doing to serve in the reverse the progress of human reality. What is, then, the meaning of this separation and abstraction? The writer thinks, it means that it plays a role of *negative mediation*. Science is a term of the negative mediation of human reality. Therefore, the so-called ideological criticism, though significant in grasping the motif of the generation of scientific thinking, is after all a kind of *relativism*. The essence of scientific thinking lies in that passing over the relativity of the generative motif while the thinking is connected with the absolute in some sense. However, the absolute here is never to be generated beyond the relative, but rather is along the line of the relative. It is, to tell the truth, relative=absolute. And, on that account, though science negatively mediates with reality, that mediation will take place with reference to life interests or *modus vivendi*. In this sense, the *modus vivendi* which serves the generation of scientific questions will again grant an essential character to scientific argument. This character is not only given by mere social existence — individual, family, city, rural community, class, race, etc., but appears itself as *the horizontal extent* in the ontological society as well as *the depth of significance taken from reality*; that is to say, the ontological character of which value will be determined on the objective grounds where science is to be evaluated. Thus it is in a double role of the motive of scientific generation and the motif of scientific mediation with reality that an ontological life-attitude will be significant to scientific theory. — The above argument has been made in an attempt to consider the abstract character of concept ontologically or from the angle of the logic of existence.

If the relation of science to life briefly mentioned above is admitted, it will then be seen that the standpoints of the two economic sciences regarding 'value' are much more different in their life-attitudes than in their fields, and the former difference must be considered in the light of scientific theory. The modern theory which seems content with leaving the examination of the very back-ground of 'price' to the hands of other sciences maintains that its limited field should be existent within reality as a relatively independent unit as 'market'

for example; and in order that 'market' may be such and able to be such, 'market' itself should have self-sufficiency, and the significance (Sinn) of self-sufficiency is that it can exist even independent of other fields. This independent significance must be, however, such as can be apprehended by researchers in their practical life only when they are conscious that the movements of price in 'market' are neither disturbed by other phenomena nor interfering with them. The reason is that if the said significance be considered so contradictorily related to others as to be interfered with by others and at the same time disturb others, it cannot be considered as independent and self-sufficient, and therefore it must have something to do with others before it may be considered one existence. In order that 'market' may have an independent significance, not to mention of the necessity of the *abstraction from its historical concreteness*—abstraction from history is indispensable to theory—it is highly necessary that its own significance should be kept intact in the process of *abstraction to theoretical rationality*, and again in order that the significance may be kept undestroyed, it must not be losing harmony with other significances in the process of abstraction. It is just by that means that 'market' can be determined as an independent field. From the standpoint of Marxism, however, such an abstraction of theory as mentioned above could not be permitted. The reason is that the 'market' where movements of 'price' exist is a field where historical productive relations comes into being, and so to think by breaking off and detracting the productive relations from the field is nothing more than the detracting from its very relation with 'value' as well as the losing of sociological thinking. Generally 'market' cannot have 'significance' unless kept in close contact with productive relations. This maintenance is impossible before the confirmation is made that *abstraction to 'market'* should be conducted, as containing in it contradictions of the capitalistic society, and on that account 'market' alone cannot be considered independent. In short, here the mechanics and movements of 'price', when detracted from productive relations, will become 'insignificant' (Sinnlos), because in the movements of 'price' the harmony of social existence in the above-mentioned sense is not admitted to exist.

As seen from the above instance, the concept and other thinking implements in the social sciences are generally to be established through a double abstraction of empirical realities. By a double abstraction it is meant as follows: *firstly*, it means that social phenomenon, object of the social sciences, which is sensibly concrete, individual, and always subject to variation, has lost or detracted from its concreteness,

individuality, and variability in its concept. By means of this detracting or abstraction, concept is always granted generality and constancy. This abstraction, which the writer called above abstraction from historical concreteness, may well be renamed *abstraction from positiveness*. In any case, it is 'abstraction from', by which economic reality is somewhat altered in thinking. *Secondly*, the concept established by 'abstraction from' will further be subjected to abstraction in another sense. The fact is that the concept in sciences is ever intended to come to systematic unification, and science fundamentally requires rationality throughout the unification. A rational order is in the last analysis a system, and whether or not able to crystallise itself into such a system, the concept is always intended for a rational order. And this intention will inevitably accompany *abstraction to rationality*. This abstraction may be called 'abstraction to'. In 'abstraction to', empirical reality will achieve a higher degree of abstraction and receive the more alteration. Thus a double abstraction of 'abstraction from' and 'abstraction to' resides between empirical reality and scientific concept.

Whenever we encounter any concept in social sciences, therefore, it is to be remembered that it has resulted from a double abstraction such as mentioned above. And when we handle concept and other thinking implements, we will come in touch with empirical reality reversely in a *double concretion*. That is to say, one is a concretion from rational order, or so to speak 'concretion from', and here the concept, drawing from general abstractness a step nearer to positiveness, will contain an empirical content, which is still only of a special kind, if any, and yet not of a concrete and individual category. So further secondly, 'concretion to positiveness' will come to the fore and unless passing through the process of 'concretion to', the concept would not return to the empirical reality itself. The empirical reality thus found, however, is not the chaotic empirical variety of an original one but a rational reality arranged more or less under a rational order. And now by means of scientific concept we may be able to grasp empirical reality as rationalized. Therefore again, based on this, a rational formation of empirical reality itself may be expected.

Science has the two basic requirements of positiveness and rationality, which are in fact too much in conflict with each other to be easily satisfied. Scientific thinking is at all times confronted with the problem of how to meet these two conflicting requirements. And as indicating the procedures to solve this problem may be considered the

above-mentioned logical relation concerning reality and the concept and other thinking implements. A double abstraction and a double concretion may be renamed with good reason as 'an upward movement from empirical reality to thinking implements' and 'a downward movements from thinking implements to empirical reality' respectively, and through these two movements there will be met two requirements of positiveness and rationality in scientific cognition. Therefore *epistemology* in social sciences should be developed centering around these two movements. In order that such a development of *epistemology* may be made possible, there must lurk behind it the circumstances affecting real existence, that is, the relation between experience and thinking or life and cognition, and their ontological grasp must be presupposed. The reason is that real existence is the inclusive and concrete situation from which science starts and to which science returns. From various standpoints of social sciences, therefor, there first precede certain viewpoints concerning the relation between experience and thinking or life and cognition — otherwise called the relation between practice and theory — and then based upon them there will be developed an epistemology, which is no more than to make clear the above mentioned logical system of both 'upward' and 'downward' movements between empirical reality and thinking implements. And thru this system, the two scientific requirements of positiveness and rationality will be satisfied.

In the following, consideration has been given to the problem of how the above-mentioned logical relations were sloved by Max Weber. It is from this angle that the writer has probed into Weber's scientific methodology.

(II)

In treating Max Weber's scientific theory, it is necessary, as indicated by the above-mentioned introductory argument, to consider it in its vivid connection with Weber's life. As referred to above, science, as produced by the abstractive powers of man, also arises from his practical relation with empirical reality. To put it otherwise, the said relation will be once negated into a rational system of concept, and then the concept, returning to the reality, first abstractly shows its developmental line and then give a concrete form to the line through man's practice, thereby realizing the development of reality, and in that sense negatively mediating empirical reality. So viewed, it follows that scientific theory, even if pierced by conceptive thinking and in that sense offered as not directly related to various phases of

life, will certainly have behind itself in the abstract form the life of the advocate of the scientific theory; and it is thus only by the two actions of 'abstraction from' life and 'abstraction to' system that scientific theory is made possible as such. Saying so may perhaps give rise to some questions about the objectivity of scientific theory. Some one will ask as follows. If its connection with the life of its advocate must be considered, there will be taken an issue of nothing but the relation of the scientific theory either to the personality and subjectivity of a researcher which are concrete and separate or to the social conditions of a specific time and place; and after all there will be made clear only individuality, subjectivity, class nature, racial and historical characteres of the scientific theory to the loss of its objective *raison d'être*. Originally, scientific theory, apart from whatever subjective conditions of its researcher as well as whatever social conditeons of his environment, would exist as an *objective thought*; and therefore it may be considered that so far as theory is called scientific it is non-sensical unless it be treated apart from subjectivity. As a matter of fact, the writer once saw a young student of Max Weber's theory of science telling about his impression, when he read an *existentialistic* interpretation of Weber, that it took issue with 'subjectivity in the cognition of social sciences' rather than 'objectivity in the cognition of social sciences', thus losing sight of Weber's proper intention.

However, any dobut or suspicion like this, reasonable as it may seem at first sight, has failed in fact to fully understand the writer's argument. By saying that scientific theory must be grasped in its vivid connection with the life of its researcher, it is not only meant that various propositions shall be reduced to all private and social conditions related to the formation of the scientific theory so as to find the reasons for producing the propositions. It is one of private or social interpretations of scientific theory — so is an ideological interpretation —, accordingly it must inevitably result in such a criticism. Far from it, the understanding of scientific theory in connection with the subjective and objective conditions of its researcher will actually serve to clarify in what way the objectivity of scientific theory is made possible and to what extent, just for reason of the objectivity, cognition in social sciences will come to act as negative mediation of empirical reality. And it is in the following sense. — A researcher coming in touch with an empirical reality may surely encounter in his observation or personal experience some contents which are historically variable, socially limited, and full of personal equations. And he will proceed with his mediation

along the line of the contents. Whatever a broad knowledge of the objective world he may get — it must be an endeavour indispensable to a researcher — so as to get rid of the contingency and finiteness of the said contents, the subjectivity or finiteness of the knowledge, as long as one who unifies the contents of such a broad knowledge remains the same person, it cannot possibly be negated. Rather, on the contrary, by the broad knowledge the separate subjectivity or individuality in personal experience will come to be the more strengthened. The contents of personal experience will be coloured by personal characteristics. Thus, to the more accumulation of the contents of objective experience is denied the way of getting rid of subjectivity. The way of obtaining objectivity must be rather expected of the abstracting process of the contents. This abstracting process is, as mentioned above, of two kinds; and in the rationalizing process experience will be generalized and universalized by negating itself along the line of its own concrete and separate contents. The proposal of 'the individual is the general', as Hegel said, is made possible as far as this abstracting process-rationalizing process is the negation of the contents of personal experience. Thus concept and other thinking implements come to light and by their obtaining of universality the objectivity of the scientific theory will be established. It may further be said that in accordance with the greatness of universality possessed by concept and others, the greatness of the objectivity, namely, the methodological value, of the scientific theory is determined. That the writer wants to understand scientific theory in its vivid connection with life is with a view to not only reducing scientific theory to its generating reasons but also probing as to how a rationalizing abstraction has been made from the individual generating reasons and to what extent objectivity has been obtained. The writer might be said therefore undertaking the *reproduction-from-life* of scientific theory. In other words, the writer intends not only to see the reduction to subjectivity, but rather to ascertain how much scientific theory has done in the *line of objectification* rearranging itself reversely from the last point reached in the line of subjectification. Thus, the examination of scientific theory in the light of its vivid connection with life contains within it the two operations of, firstly, the reduction of concept and other thinking implements to their positive contents and, secondly, the rationalizing return from positivity to the concept and other thinking implements. And by dint of this return it will be made clear in what way conceptive order in methodology has contained positivity in it

and to what extent it has taken in reality. — Thus it is just by the failure of understanding this later operation and its meaning that the doubt mentioned above has been brought to the light.

Now, from the writer's standpoint of scientific theory, an important thing stands out. That is that whatever rationalization may be conducted and whatever universality and objectivity may be obtained by the abstraction in concept and others, the rationality and objectivity are in the last analysis nothing less than formal. The very content regarded rational and objective, namely, its essence will inevitably reside in the very personal and social conditions which are discovered as the result of reduction toward subjectification. Thus after all, the final substantial grounds for the objectivity of scientific theory are to be found within the subjective body of a researcher and the objective conditions which surround it. And this is made possible either on the strength that the universal resides in the personal or on the basis of the *philosophical* or *metaphysical truth* of *reality* that the universal appears itself through the individual person. In short, objectivity of scientific theory is in fact *along the line of* subjectivity. To put it more clearly, objectivity is along the line of the way a researcher's subjective body acts as a social being. The writer thinks that objectivity of science should strictly be called *subjective=objectivity* in this sense.

Before closing the introduction, a little further comment will be added on this subjective=objectivity. What underlies the theory of social sciences is found in nothing other than the contents of social reality daily experienced by the subjective body of a researcher reflecting over social reality. And the contents are infinitely diverse and disorderly within the sphere of the empirical knowledge of the researcher, and may well reflect objective conditions of the society. However, the contents expressed in a concept are always somewhat orderly and given some unification. In the subjective body of a researcher, at any rate, the infinitely diverse contents are arrayed in a definite order as empirical knowledge. If so, it means not only the reflection of objective conditions in the subject but also their being controlled under the thinking ability of the subjective body and metamorphosed subjective body. Therefore, empirical knowledge is not merely subjective, but truly unified in reference to subjective body. Cognition of social sciences will start with this subjectified empirical knowledge. And by the double abstraction mentioned above, the contents of knowledge will be rationalized as well as objectified. Therefore, objectivity of scientific knowledge is not formed quite independent of subjectivity, but on the contrary for the formation of objectivity, subjectivity will take its place the

more deeply. That is the reason why objectivity must be, in fact, subjective=objectivity. This is to be made the clearer by considering the practical character of social sciences. There is no need to dwell on the necessity for social sciences to make arguments of policy — the crux of the matter is rather the methodological sense of the argument, and it is also true of Weber's theory —, but how are they made possible? If the arguments are to have subjective=objectivity in the above sense, they ought to be essentially not irrelevant to the subjective body, but have with it the possibility of subjectification. Propositions have the potentiality of being subjectified, thus becoming a guiding power for actions of the subjective body, and being shifted to subjective practice. They are not, as it were, a tower built on the sand by personal desire, fancy, or ambition, but possess an objective value, because they contain subjective=objectivity. Thus, the subjective argument, by being subjectified and realised, will grant man an *objective subjectivity*. Accordingly, that the argument is realized in various social conditions does not mean the realization of the subject's desire, fancy, or ambition, but the participation of the argument in the developmental formation of social reality.

The above may be considered as too long for an introduction, but the writer wishes to get the readers' understanding of his standpoint. And from this standpoint, consideration will be given to Max Weber's scientific theory.

(III)

It is already a well-known fact that Max Weber was by nature so fond of political and practical activities that while as a scientist attaining brilliant achievements, particularly since the time when the prospect of the World War I was becoming clear, he was very active as a political commentator. As for the problem of the relation of politics to science in Weber, which has been already discussed in detail (e.g. Christoph Steding; *Politik und Wissenschaft bei Max Weber*, 1932), his existence as a politician, giving a decisive direction to all his scholastic activities concerning matters not only in political science but of scientific theory and social sciences, is plainly reflected in their very respective theories. The writer also agrees with Steding on his theme.

Here the writer does not wish to elaborate on Weber's political activities, his works as a political commentator, and his position in political science. The job may be left to the hands of some more suitable person. Only the matter will be briefly explained so as to

be instrumental in the better understanding of the following statements. Weber had inherited two sets of character traits——from his father who was a bourgeois politician anxious for power and pleasure in the world, and from his mother, who, filled with the religious sentiments of the Protestants and preoccupied with charity and philanthropy, seemed to have so-called vocational morals of Protestantism, ——among his forefathers on the mother's side was an Huguenot engaged in a wholesale business. These hereditary tendencies were not united so easily, rather the conflict between them was the greatest problem to be solved in his younger days. At last, however, his familiarity with the home life of the relatives on his mother's side, while he was in the army, came to make the influence of the maternal character stronger. And it can be said that the worldly man's needs were internalized and deepened into an ethical view of life, and at the same time reversely again religious internality was externalized to be sociality, deciding thus the realisation of the ethos of Protestantism as his later life attitude.

This includes the following fact. It is that life attitude was penetrated with the rationalistic way of thinking which had also traditionally characterised the Christian theology in Europe. The highly vulgarized ethos of Protestantism will come to be, therefore, the demand for the emancipation of the world from magic (*Entzauberung der Welt*). This is the basic objective of Weber's life. And this objective is composed of two sides. One side is a firm determination to practically rationalize the social environment, by dispelling all kinds of magic and mystery. Max Weber fought for democratic rationalization of society, incessantly offering criticism on the Second Empire of Germany, under which he was brought up and whose prosperity he celebrated, as well as on the feudalistic and bureaucratic social system of his fatherland. And again it was due to the said determination that he leveled a methodological criticism at the historical school of social sciences. However, this criticism of objective body or object would not be made perfect without the endorsement of criticism on the subjective side, namely, self-criticism. (All criticism cannot be worthy of the name unless they are the simultaneous criticism on both sides of subject and object.) Self-criticism will in the field of practical life assume the form of ethical criticism. Here, to establish self i.e. ethical self was a practical problem that Weber imposed upon himself. He, who indignantly took legal action against a news-reporter who fabricated a groundless report to be circulated regarding the

woman's movement with which his wife was connected; he who answered with a cool refusal towards German youths regarding him as a racial leader; he who raised the requests for modern politicians by lecturing on 'Politics as a Vocation'—— these facts were certainly no more than the outcome of a practical self-criticism based on Kantian view of morals. Again, criticism of self will theoretically assume the form of self-reflexions on cognizing-subject. The request for these reflexions was evident equally in him who had to and could lecture on 'Science as a Vocation' as well as in his scientific theory which aimed at dispelling both faith and world outlook from the subject of scientific cognition. Thus, over the requests of these two sides, his objective of life, the emancipation of the world from magic, was able to be set up. And that this objective had to mean the emancipation of self from magic as well will not be difficult to grasp from what the writer has said above.

How then were these two requests satisfied? In answer to these, what self was practically and theoretically established for his self? To what degree did the historical reality around him make a *developmental formation* by dint of his character? To what extent did his cloudless scientific cognition *grasp the truth of historical reality*? These may be of course subjects for discussion. Among these, however, the writer will limit the matter to scientific theory.

To begin with, what did Weber think about the relation between life or practice and cognition or theory? The writer has mentioned above that already in his younger days Weber's view of life was decided as ethical—— it was in truth subjective idealism (subjectiver Idealismus) from the view-point of the types of world views. This line he developed unflinchingly all his life. So his views on life and cognition must have already been announced earlier. For such views of his we should refer to his two letters in his younger days.

One of them was the letter dated July 5, 1887 and addressed to his cousin Emmy Baumgarten, in which he admonished her not to pass judgment on moral value by concept of understanding. Moral consciousness, that is, "one person's consciousness of responsibility for his own action will not be based on consciousness of understanding, and accordingly will be neither composed nor repulsed by understanding". "Standing just here at the limit of the conceptive ability of man, we enter into quite a different world where quite a different side of our mind will try to make the evaluation of things. And it is well known by all that the judgment of that side, in spite of being based on no concept of understanding, is as accurate and clear as the logical term

of inference brought forth by understanding", (Max Weber, *Jugendbriefe*, p. 258, 261. The excerpts from the letter appear also in 'Max Weber, *Ein Lebensbild*', p. 166, 167.) These words of his certainly account for the standpoint of the young Weber who accepted the Kantian distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason, and his argument that a scientific attitude and a practical attitude of moral or political category lie in two different worlds may directly be connected with the request for 'nonvaluation' (*Wertfreiheit*) in scientific theory. In the next place, in the letter dated August 5 of the same year to his younger brother Alfred, he answered the brother's complaint about the difficulty of theoretical comprehension, warning him of his 'excessive evaluation of conceptive cognition' and saying at the same time that theory was always tied with 'premise', and though by it a parson may be often made inclined to *behave negatively* toward theory, it will not on that account affect his evaluation of theory. (*Jugendbriefe*, p. 263-265) These words are indicative of Weber's having noticed the one-sidedness of theoretical cognition. The optimism that all reality could be grasped by theory was made possible either from the standpoint of natural law in the 18th century — where was found a mixing up of empirical science and metaphysics — or from the standpoint of Hegel's pan-logistic metaphysics — there the point was the reconciliation of theory with reality. However, it was *a sort of pessimism* rather than such optimism that Weber held toward theory. It was an idea that by theory of science not the whole of reality could be grasped, while on the contrary scientific cognition was at all times tied with a certain 'premise' and on that account no more than finite either in the scope of objects or in being concerned with the human objects. The breaking off from a world view or metaphysics, and the peculiarity of the character of theory — were the requirements and requests like these not already budding forth even in the wording of these letters?

It is obvious that these two requests that young Weber held toward the thinking and theory based on concept of understanding could not be proposed unless the 'subject' (or self) of the scientist Weber be established behind the requests. The establishment of the subject could be made by establishing the subjective body as a conductor of responsible morals on one hand and as a place of conflict among different systems of world views and metaphysics, or as an unflinching fighter in political conflict on the other hand; and in accordance with the degree to which the subject is established, 'clearness' will be obtained in scientific cognition. In this case, as the reader

will see, objectivity of cognition will be along the line of subjectivity.

How did he, then, make his *début* with his scientific theory in the academic world? The examination of the nature of his problem regarding scientific theory had better be started with this question. There is almost no doubt that the conclusion of a wonderfully huge and extensive survey and historical study made in a short time was 'National State and National Economic Policy' (1895), his inauguration lecture at the Freiburg University. There we can see Weber's concern at the time and the line of its solution. (For detailed analysis of this thesis refer to the writer's work, 'Economics and Historical Sense') There he made an issue of the circumstances that the living conditions of German immigrants within the country to the east of River Elbe had caused a deplorable situation for the development of the Second Empire. And after giving a conclusion of economic policy as to how to cope with that situation, he proceeded to discuss the question as to what standard of value is in economic policy and who in the German race should be a driving force of policy according to that standard. Here he answered point-blank to the questions, such as of the relation of theory to policy in political economy, the connection of politics with economics etc. The writer will not here refer to the respective matters. Only he wishes to draw the readers' attention to Weber's standpoint in regard to the theory of policy which made a counterpart of the above-mentioned negative attitude toward theory, by saying that in the said conclusion Weber raised nothing but a negative proposition regarding the agent of economic policy and stated an outwardly circuitous argument such as of the need of the political education of the German people. The noticeable point in connection with the foregoing statements is that the political enthusiasm of Max Weber as a citizen of the national state of Germany had come concretely into the limelight. There it was stressed that interest in economic value should be subordinated to interest in political value. Weber's was the standpoint of 'raison d'État', that of Macchiavellism in a broader sense, but not of natural law. From the *dark world* of the interest of state power or *Machtinteresse* which was unrationalistic and distinct from the brightness of natural law, he evaluated economic life and drew a practical conclusion. As long as he stood on the standpoint of a scientist, however, he could not remain in the dark world. To set free the dark world from the magic of power desire, to rationalize power desire would naturally have become the next problem to solve. How was this problem to be solved?

According to F. Meinecke, we may be able to tell about the conflict

between ethos (ethics) and krathos (power) within the *raison d'État*. (F. Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsräson in neueren Geschichte*, Einleitung). *Raison d'État* is a world of mutual limitation between the darkness of krathos and the light of ethos, and even if modern states be replaced by a new form of human community, the *raison d'État* will certainly appear on the stage in a new dress. When Weber proclaimed that a final value standard of economic policy should be the *raison d'État*, he must have keenly felt there the existence of both darkness and light. And the rationalization of darkness, as evident from what has been discussed before, had to be carried on by the ethos coloured by a rationalistic factor in Christianity. Modern states, at their start, were each established with their respective state reasons, but they developed from the stage of absolute monarchy to capitalistic and democratic stage. This national development was due to the ethos of Christianity, more properly, of Protestantism, tying with the bourgeoisie, which liberated the *raison d'État* from the dark and thus made the European world proceed toward a rational world. The task had to be kept up so as to realize the further vulgarization of that ethos in the succeeding times, and at the same time the relation of the ethos of Protestantism to modern capitalism had to be studied looking back over the preceding times. And thus, as easily understood from the brief statement above, Weber's sociological study on control (*Herrschaft*) and his study on the 'spirit' of modern capitalism were necessarily the products derived from his practical objective.

(IV)

Weber's scientific theory eventually bore fruit in the purification of the pessimistic line of epistemology expressed in the above-mentioned lecture. He believed then that so far as he is a scientist, he should not set up epistemology by looking down from the high place of philosophical or metaphysical standpoint. The request of his conscience as a scientist dictated him to pursue a system of cognition from scientific knowledge itself. Therefore, Hegel's pan-logistic metaphysics and the historical metaphysics of the romantic school should not be effective in the solution of his problem. He was agreeable not with the philosophy 'from above', but with the philosophy 'from below'. And an influential philosophy of the latter kind at that time was the Baden School of Neo-Kantianism which, opposing the philosophy which had been aiming at an expansion of the cognition of natural science, attempted to develop the epistemology of history from Kantian standpoint of cognition as against the epistemology of natural science. Weber

borrowed *willingly* from the theories of Rickert, among others, so as thus to purify and establish his own methodological standpoint.

How is the concept of ideal-type to be composed? The following is a brief logical tracing of the composition of the concept.

Various phenomena we encounter in our social life are of infinite variety and individuality, and we can not find within them a principle of consolidating and unifying them. Out of material itself a unifying principle will not be born. Rather the principle is on the side of the subjective body which comes in contact with those phenomena. And then, the subjective body as well is an individual who is at all times inescapably subjected to the limitation of time and space. Even if one human group happens to act as one subjective body and share a similar cognition concerning social life, the generation of such a similar cognition must presuppose that an individual cognition precedes it and pass through some social operation in order to be similarized. Originally, when an individual subjective body comes in contact with individual phenomena, the subjective body, through its knowing conduct, will take in, adapt itself to, or effect some alteration on, the phenomena, — that is the beginning of cognition in social sciences. Starting from that beginning, to cognize the individuality of the phenomena, to discover a universal order among them, and to find out the behavior norm of the subjective body responsive to them, in short, to carry out the thinking arrangement of empirical realities along the line of the practical action of men is nothing less than scientific cognition. And the reason why it is called scientific is that the manner of arrangement can not only satisfy the intellectual thirst of the persons engaged in the cognition, but at the same time meet that of others with similar convictions. That state can be attained not directly from the very phenomena, but through the establishment of cognizing subject as universal as well as separate or through the *self-consciousness of the subject as individual and at the same time universal*. According to Weber, that was made possible when the subjective body was established as a civilized man — a man daily bathed in the culture of modern Europe — and at the same time when Weber himself was conscious as such. The civilized man acts with regard to various phases of European culture, connecting their respective value ideas of culture. Entertaining respective interests of value in those phases, he endeavors for the higher social realization of those values. And simultaneously, he tries not to lose at any moment an intellectual interest in grasping those phases along the line of their ideas of value. This intellectual interest, though being along the line of the practical interest in the

realization of value, is actually quite different and independent interest. By becoming a separate, independent interest and having a cultural significance, it can serve the promotion of civilization, and at the same time make itself a great culture, or intellectual culture. And so far as scientific cognition is concerned, intellectual interest within it must be quite different from practical interest. Into it there must not be permitted to intervene all kinds of interests of evaluation, whether moral interest or political interest. Rather, the very problem of how these interests as well are able to evaluate must be considered under an intellectual interest alone. Thus a civilized man will come to be determined as a possessor of intellectual interest, 'a thinking researcher'.

However, under this determination alone, a *general person to cognize* may be established, but there is not yet established a general person to cognize scientifically or to engage in cognition of empirical science. For that purpose, there will further need to determine him as one who engages in the systematic arrangement of empirical knowledge. The systematic arrangement of empirical knowledge is made possible only by ever keeping one's eyes from empirical contents and observing the cultural significance of the contents themselves, and only by deisting from reading their significance in what is considered to be a super-empirical source which exists behind that cultural significance. The reason is that the latter will interfere with attaining the objective of empirical science. Though, to a concretely behaving individual, empirical knowledge may, only when always supported by the super-empirical, become material for practical purposes, the cognizing subjectivity of empirical science would not be qualified for such before it has some support behind it. Thus it is only when irrelevant to metaphysics, world-view, or life-view that the cognizing subjectivity of empirical science may be established.

This establishment of subject would not be made possible without the establishment of it as such within Max Weber himself, that is, without Weber's self-consciousness of it. And this self-consciousness must not have been made except with reference to the historical, social conditions in which Weber's personality was placed. As a matter of fact, Weber became conscious of it as a man living in the sphere of European culture in the 19th century. Though in Germany it sometimes happened to be clouded, in both Western Europe and America the empirical scientific subject of an individual exists as a fact of reality, because there the rational formation of society has been carried on, and culture has been created on the basis of the free activities of individuals. Here the above abstract subject is based on reality.

That is not all. This subject drawn out of cultural persons of modern Europe should be not only be available in Europe, but further have the character of internationality. Though rationalization, namely, the emancipation of the world from magic has been conducted only in Europe, the world should be rationalized, and even if magical restraints predominantly bind cultural spheres other than Europe, it is not because these spheres are in essence categorically repulsive to rationalization, but only because they remain in the yet unrationalized stage. Therefore, so far as people there are awakened to the line of rationalization — man originally should be so —, even if magic still predominates there, the above subject of empirical science should be made possible abstractly (scientifically). Therefore, it may be said with reason that the subject drawn out of cultural persons in modern Europe is universal all over the world. It is not to be overlooked that such a firm belief in the internationality of European culture has become the endorsement of Weber's cognizing subject.

What significance has this self-determination of cognizing subject? The process of abstraction that a practical subjective body will reach the merely cognizing body by throwing away moral and political interest, breaking off with world-view, and getting one side of empirical reality related to the idea of value — such a process may be considered *a thorough retreat from the concrete, practical subjective body*. It may be said to be almost similar to the case of Kant where subject in theoretical cognition was established by retreating from an empirical perceptive person to general consciousness (*Bewusstsein ueberhaupt*). And it may not be amiss to say that as Kant laid epistemological foundations for classical physics, so Weber did to capitalistic economics. In the social sciences, as distinct from in the natural sciences, object and subject being very complicated in contents, the retreat to the above-mentioned 'thinking researcher' is much more complicated than the general consciousness drawn out in Kant. Though it may seem established by detracting all the historical and social conditions from the cognizing subject, in fact it is not the case; in some sense the conditions remain purified in the thinking researcher. In the first place, this 'thinking researcher' is characteristically an individual. With Weber even the social phenomena of the time, when the awakening of individuality was not yet realized, and lay buried in some social group, will be grasped, first as cognized by an individual, and then as losing gradually the individuality into the generality of group consciousness. Of course it is not what we call the story of Robinson, but making a model of Robinson, the above thinking has grasped the

past ages up to him as the undeveloped stages thereto. In short, Weber's cognizing subject was established with modern individual as a model. Saying so, the writer does not mean that by it man before modern ages can not be grasped. In consideration of man, it is very profitable of course first to analyze the current developmental phases and then to retrospect on the past. However, not to mention that the historical character of a modern individual cannot possibly be understood by the mere consideration that he is the final point of development from the past, it is perhaps not to be grasped fully even by the historical idea that an individual may, in future, change his significance in social life. Far from it, though the significance of an individual is indistinctly changeable, the *historical nature* of an individual in the true sense seems to be cognized correctly, when it has come to be already foreshadowed in a basic point. In the case of Weber, an individual has already been socially established, only belonging to his existing being or *Gewordensein*, and the image of its own future change has not in any sense foretold. Accordingly this subject cannot be established except as one who engages in the *critical self-interpretation* of the existing modern individual. However, the true subject in the social sciences must be established as one who forms himself developmentally only by determining himself critically, and at the same time be a universal person who has been given energy for advancement reversely by the retreat of a real person to an abstract 'researcher'. Thus, Weber's subject must be respected for its thorough self-restraint, but simultaneously seems to be defective in an important point.

In the second place, within Weber's scientific subject a definite image of the world is premised. As already seen, the world constitutes an arena of eternal conflicts for power among racial states, and at the same time presents a picture of the modern European culture acting as the spearhead and other cultural spheres following it as subordinates. This image of the world has been held equally by thinkers in the modern Europe, and is an image of the existing world. Weber considered this as a world which, liberated from magic, proceeds toward rationalization. This world has been in fact emancipated from magic by individualistic rationalization, and by its development the racial conflicts as well will be expected to distinguish. To Weber there is considered no other world than that which should be the last along this line. His scientific subject has in the last analysis been established with the intention of making a critical interpretation of the modern world, and will not participate in the formation of a new image of the world

quite different from the modern one. Is it not truly necessary, however, that behind cognizing-subject of the social sciences an intention for such an image of new world is deeply contained? As seen above, in the subject established by Weber lies the intention of self-interpretation of the given existing man and world, and in this regard also, it seems to contain an important problem to be criticized.

The way the cognizing subject acts determines the character of the cognition itself. Objectivity of cognition is established along the line of the establishment of the subject. That is what they call the objectivity of the cognition by means of ideal type. In what sense then was empirical reality rationalized by it? There is no need here to explain as to how what is called ideal-type is formed, what part it will play, and of what character the cognition by means of ideal-type is possessed. (cf. the writer's work 'Economics and Historical Science') From the angle indicated above, this question alone will be briefly handled as follows.

The ideal-type can be compared to spectacles. It is the spectacles for arranging in thinking the chaotic contents of empirical knowledge. There 'abstraction from' positivity means simultaneously 'abstraction to' rationality. For one thing, the former is that, as regards the matters connected with a certain idea of value, the subject who is inquiring after a cultural significance of the said idea selects empirical knowledge and sets them into one group. The group has some rational character. For another thing, the latter is obtained by forming out of that group of phenomena the image of idea, which has no contradiction in its contents. Formerly in the case of J. S. Mill, social sciences were considered to need the two processes of ratiocination and verification (J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic*, Book VI), while in the case of Weber these two operations are unified. The reason is that the 'abstraction from' empirical contents, being carried on concerning rational representation, will have the significance of 'abstraction to' rational ideal-type while holding on to positivity. By such unification, the historical character of empirical knowledge will be expressed in the very ideal-type, causing the keener consciousness of the *historical character of cognition*, and at the same time the positive knowledge of history will become scientific, the *cognition of historical character*, accordingly, the *epistemology of history* being thus obtained there. In the case of Weber, as different from in the case of Mill, the distinction between 'direct deductive method' and 'reverse deductive method or historical method' will disappear itself. This may well be said to be Weber's great advantage over Mill's methodology.

However, this double abstraction in the formation of ideal-type concept is a little different from what the writer mentioned above. By 'abstraction to' rationalization, empirical knowledge will be transformed into rational knowledge or, according to Weber, *nomothetisches Wissen*, but the writer thinks that it does not merely reflect empirical reality rationally or intelligibly, but in the very cognition will come to reside a creative force which will developmentally form empirical reality along the line of the greater rationalization. Speaking figuratively as above, scientific cognition might be considered as spectacles which give creative indications to the wearer. In the case of Weber, however, that ability is not certainly granted to scientific cognition. It is because the theory of non-valuation necessarily accompanies the theory of ideal-type.

It needs no elaboration that the theory of non-valuation is the natural conclusion to the cognition arising in answer to the above-mentioned establishment of the scientific subject. It is a strict warning given to the subject against its deviation into the arbitrary action and its commission of the self-deceit of limit-trespassing. In cultural spheres where, in the process of the emancipation of the world from magic, are not so rationalized as in Europe and staying on either of those stages, through which Europe has passed up to the present, the actual results of European rationalization will become the reference material for passing a practical, evaluating judgment for the benefit of both such developmental formation of society and their attempted overtaking of Europe. This was already made clear in J. S. Mill's theory of policy as well, in which he said that backward nations would economically advance by imitating the economic systems of Britain and the United States of America, and Weber only replaced it with ethos, granting the latter an ideal-type significance. It is not to be forgotten that here as well the image of the world equally held by the modern Europeans has been presented distinctively. However, non-valuation will be truly requested in the future society of Europe. There will not be objectively set up the standard of evaluation such as will become guiding wires for empirical science. It may be held by each subjective body of action, but has been rejected in the premise of science. And when it is made an issue in empirical science, its practical evaluation will be eliminated and the significance of its empirical reality alone be asked. The political arguments of empirical science will therefore be its contents only in the ideal-type sense. One who reads Weber's value-discussion or *Wertdiskussion* will be deeply impressed by the fact that he was thorough-going in his

ideal-type interpretation of evaluation. Thus the evaluation of various political arguments is to be determined by practical persons, but not the concern of a thinking scientist. As to the future society of Europe, therefore, there is only a coexistence of various kinds of policies, and for the decision among them there will be no alternative than resorting to practical disposal. Among races, as there is only an eternal conflict centering around an interest in the value of power, so nothing is found other than a conflict of real ability. It is an eternal conflict of Gods, as Weber said. As to the future of the capitalistic society, J. S. Mill, relying on a metaphysical idea of 'progress', attached his hope to the suspension of class conflicts in the 'stationary state'. Weber could not find guiding wires as Mill, and he could not approve anything like Mill's standpoint. Rather, his request was that the conflict should be accepted as fate and it should be watched and loved by the intellectual integrity of a modern individual and his conscience in action. In this regard too, he was certainly more thorough-going than Mill.

Thus considered, cognition of the social sciences in Weber is an accumulation of fragments in various senses. Regarding objects, social sciences exist unrelatdly varying with value ideas; regarding historical images, materialistic and idealistic system according to view-points existing simultaneously; regarding the different interests of subjective body, theory, history, and policy constituting independent fields respectively. Those fragments are related to one another formally through the ideal-type=non-valuation idea system, but not related substantially. In short, the representation of reality as a related system will be categorically denied to the field of empirical science. A negative idea of methodology early indicated in his ceremonial appearance on the stage of the academic world, thus going so far as to be pessimistic, eventually bore fruit which is complacently contented with keeping to the sphere of an empirical scientist. This achievement can be attained only by a personality like Weber who embodies the ethos of Protestantism, and its credit should be highly evaluated only in its connection with his subjective body. However, once the methodology, apart from Weber's personality, be adopted or feigned to be adopted and handled non-subjectively in theory itself, it would lose its proper value and become an idle rest garden for the social sciences of bourgeoisistic category. The 'methodological individualism', as his methodology is sometimes renamed, is one example of this tendency. It is most necessary in the present age to prevent such a misunderstanding. And, if Weber's scientific theory is in danger of being subjected to such a misunderstanding, then his theory itself is partly to blame for it.

Lastly, mention will be made of one way of amending critically Weber's theory. For it, there is no other means but, awakening to the subjective=objectivity of scientific cognition as mentioned in the introductory passages, to develop thoroughly his methodology along that line. In the case of Weber as well, as seen above, objectivity was necessarily united with the establishment of cognizing subject, and the subject was established by the outright retreat of an acting subjective body from its acting character. In that sense, his objectivity as well should have been considered in fact a sort of subjective=objectivity. Only the subjectivity was requested to disappear due to its complete lack of positive=affirmative meaning. The disappearance of subjectivity, in the case of Weber, was made possible only by the strong tension of ethical restraints. This should not be requested or may not be expected of all students of social sciences. That is responsible for the danger of being falsified and distorted to which his theory is always subjected. There is a good reason for the fact that Weber tried to deny and extinguish the subjective body. It is because subjective body was an individual in the bourgeois society. Generally, the bourgeois society wants to split itself into individuals and bring to itself rational connection as the connection of their rational actions. So Weber considered that though scientific cognition is conducted by individual, to push the individual's subjectivity on the surface would not bring out an objectively rational connection, but rather the objectivity of connection could be realized only by the denial of that subjectivity. But it will be accompanied by such defect as stated above. Thus considered, it follows that the theory of science will have no other means than to be determined not only by self-denial of subjectivity, but denied again and determined affirmatively as one whose practice will lead the society to a higher stage. That the subjective body, which has been generalized formally as 'a thinking man' by one denial, is denied again means that it returns to 'a willing man' again; and that man will not be a self-centered member in the bourgeois society who starts from self and returns to self, but be a creative self which stands ready to start from itself and participate in the formation of the historical reality itself. That will not be individual in character, but also a self which goes on bearing whatever form of man's historical existence on his back as well as looking forward to the trends of historical reality on his way. Truly, an individual is nothing but a historical, relative existence. But, he will have the insight by which it may be transformed into a motive able to overcome the relativity by a full realisation. In a case of Weber,

the relativity of subjective body was to be overcome by negatively retreating from various subjective and objective conditions surrounding it. Here, these things once denied were to be affirmed positively by being denied again so as to be transformed into a universal subjective body. If the subjectivity in this sense is obtained, it does not mean that the cognition, which appears along the line of subjective body, could not have the objectivity except in the sense of non-subjectivity, but that rather by the subjectification of the cognition bearing a positive value of subjective=objectivity, the subjective body will become the socially and historically objective body and thus participate in the developmental formation of social reality. Thus considered, the critical ammendment to Weber's scientific theory will be carried out only by the true *establishment of subjectivity* in cognition. And the logic for the purpose must be a *dialectical logic* which is epistemology and at the same time ontology.