

Establishing an Islamic State: Ideals and Realities in the State of Kelantan, Malaysia

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Abstract

This paper observes an experience in establishing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan, Malaysia, undertaken by the Malaysian Pan-Islamic Party (PAS) -led government. From the outset of its establishment, PAS holds to the ideals that political and governing power, hence an Islamic State, is indeed an important means in executing a complete law of Allah. Without political power, PAS believes, not only an establishment of an Islamic State is impossible, but the execution of the laws of Allah that binds the complete Islamic way of life would also be unachievable. In the State of Kelantan, the ideal of having the governing and political power has already been accomplished. But this is inadequate. The PAS-led government is facing with two unfavourable realities. Firstly, the realities that are related to external factors, from outside the Party, and secondly to internal factors, from within the Party and the PAS-led government themselves. In the former, one witness the role of the Federal Barisan Nasional government, especially through its Federal Development Department established in the State, in interrupting the endeavours undertaken by the PAS-led government. In the latter, PAS is suffering from at least five realities, viz. leadership identity crisis, lack of practical experience and expertise, the existence of unmotivated civil servants, absence of either a blueprint or a proper operational guideline, and refusal to welcome help from other sympathised Islamic movements. Consequently, the idealism of the PAS-led government in establishing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan has yet to be fully realised. Beside these shortcomings, however, the Kelantanese have certainly proved to at least attempt to determine their own lifestyles according to their self-determining character, culminating in the existence of the beauty of Islam already partly felt in the State, with relatively more peacefulness, tranquility and friendly atmosphere.

Introduction

Establishing an Islamic State, for almost all forms of Islamic struggle, is an eventual aim. Be it an Islamic *dakwah* movement, a sufi group and moreover an Islamic political party, the establishment of an Islamic State, clearly or subtly, would be its greatest accomplishment. The difference may only lie in the definition of the Islamic State and the methods towards its achievement.

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To Islamic *dakwah* movements or a sufi group like Darul Arqam in Malaysia, for instance, “an Islamic State” may mean an Islamic socio-economic and political administration evolving from within themselves to their own family, society, state and eventually to a global level. In this sense, an Islamic State does not necessarily come with a geographical entity. It evolves from below through the strengthening of their inner spiritual selves and rises upward to family, society, state and global levels. At each level, Islamic States with definitions of their own are established.

On the other hand, an Islamic political party such as the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, well-known as PAS, obviously sees an Islamic State as a geographical entity, with power and Islamic socio-economic and political administrations prevailing in it. It must be achieved through electoral legal system as in the case of PAS or through the revolutionary process such as in Iran. Both, however, share similar beliefs that the establishment of an Islamic State necessitates a change of political power hence leadership, from what they regard as unIslamic secular power and leadership to their Islamic power and leadership. Secondly, they also, in accomplishing their mission, mobilise their people from below but start to attempt the establishment of an Islamic State firstly only when the power is already in their hands and secondly, from above.

This paper observes an experiment of establishing an Islamic State through the perception of the latter, in particular by the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party or PAS in the State of Kelantan, Malaysia. The State of Kelantan is ruled by an opposition coalition called Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU), and PAS is the dominant party. Its main partner, the now defunct Parti Melayu Semangat 46¹⁾ and other partners such as Berjasa and Hamim, are relatively marginal. The government of the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah in the State of Kelantan is therefore seen as a PAS-led government, hence its formulation of policies and day to day administration. The experiment of establishing an Islamic State in Kelantan discussed in this paper is indeed very much equal to the endeavours of the Islamic Party PAS.

The discussion in this paper is divided into four sections. The first begins with a brief introduction to PAS and the State of Kelantan. The second investigates the PAS idealism in relation to the establishment of an Islamic State. The third looks at the realities prevailing in the State of Kelantan, and finally, the fourth is the conclusion.

1) Parti Melayu Semangat 46, previously known as Semangat 46, is an opposition party established by a splinter group of the ruling United Malay National Organisation (UMNO). Its leader was Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, a prince of the State of Kelantan and former Malaysian Finance Minister. The party later broke off from the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah and subsequently defunct. Tengku Razaleigh and some of his followers returned to UMNO while others joined PAS.

PAS and the State of Kelantan in Brief

The Islamic Party PAS and the State of Kelantan are intimately related for various reasons. Firstly, PAS is the only and the oldest Malaysian opposition Islamic Party (established in 1951) while the State of Kelantan is the only state of the 13 states in Malaysia which is ruled by PAS, and in fact the only one by the opposition.²⁾

Secondly, Malay Muslims dominate both the Party and the State. Almost all PAS members are Malay Muslims while about 93 percent of the State of Kelantan population are also of the same race sharing the same religious belief.

Thirdly, the State of Kelantan is almost synonymous with PAS for the State has been under PAS rule for a long period and more than once. Unlike the neighbouring State of Terengganu which also used to be ruled by PAS but only once and for a much shorter period (1959–1962), the State of Kelantan has been under PAS twice, each with a quite substantial period. The first rule, beginning as early as two years after independence, in 1959, was for a period of 18 years (1959–1978), and the second, which is still prevailing at the moment, has already been into its ninth year now (1990–present).

The interval between the two rules, viz. when the Barisan Nasional ruled the State, was only about 12 years (11 March 1978 to 21 October 1990).³⁾ After that, for the second time, in the 1990 General Election, PAS returned with an overwhelming victory, winning all the 39 State and 13 Parliamentary seats. The victory was achieved through the PAS-led opposition coalition Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU). In the following General Election in 1995, the victory was repeated again, though this time with a lesser majority, continuing its rule in the State of Kelantan until now. All in all, to date, the State of Kelantan has been under the PAS control for a total of about 27 years.

During both administrations, however, serious endeavours in establishing an Islamic State could only be seen during its second rather than its first rule. The first rule basically was said to have been suffered from an Islamically less serious leadership, with not only administrative inefficiency and incompetency, but also trapped in resource mismanagement, financial crisis and corruption [Alias Mohamed 1984]. These to a great extent contributed to its defeat in the 1978 General Election. The PAS leadership then

2) For a brief history of PAS, see Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latif [1991]. For a detailed analysis, see Funston [1980].

3) The take over of the State of Kelantan by the Barisan Nasional itself began with chaotic incidents. A year prior to the 1978 General Election, the State of Kelantan was declared to be under emergency rule following riots against the PAS government planned, as alleged by PAS (see *Manifesto PAS Kelantan* [1982: 1]), by the ruling Barisan Nasional. It was during that chaotic period, when the Kelantanese sentiments were anti-PAS government for its alleged corruption and other vices, that the General Election in 1978 was held.

failed to differentiate itself from the conventional politics and politicians, particularly from UMNO (United Malay National Organisation, the dominant party of the ruling National Coalition, Perikatan) as well as being overwhelmed by political power and wealth. Towards the end of its first rule, in 1972, PAS established a joint PAS-Perikatan government in the State of Kelantan and subsequently at Federal level. In 1974, PAS was accepted as a component of the National Coalition, which then changed its name from Perikatan to Barisan Nasional but was expelled about four years later on 13 December 1977.⁴⁾ PAS around that time, for about 20 years (1963–1983), has been led by what is considered as “unIslamic” Malay-Islamic nationalist leadership. The main protagonist was said to be Datuk Asri Mohamad [Mohd Sayuti Omar 1991: 49–51].

But the second administration, having experienced the previous important lessons, is a result of revitalised efforts, led by what PAS called its *ulamak* leadership. The *ulamak* leadership refers to a leadership which identifies itself as *pewaris al-anbiya'* (literally, inheritors of Prophets). He possesses respected characters of the previous Prophets and pious Muslims such as high commitment to the Islamic cause, sincerity (*ikhlas*) and piety (*taqwa*) in leading the members, practising Islamic lifestyles and mode of thinking and having an image of self-sacrifice [Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latif 1991: 35].

The emergence of such a leadership is attributed to the urge for a more Islamic leadership and Islamic methods of struggle initiated particularly by the PAS Youth of Bukit Mertajam in Penang during its Mukhtamar (General Meeting). This was done after having realised the prevalence of the unIslamic nature of the Malay-Islamic nationalist leadership in the Party. The *ulamak* leadership era came into actualisation on 1 May 1983 by the leadership of Haji Yusuf Rawa and the establishment of Majlis Syura Ulamak (Ulamak Consultative Council), after Datuk Asri and his 13 supporters became outcasts. Haji Yusuf Rawa then was closely aided by Islamic scholars such as the present PAS President Dato' Fadzil Noor, the present Deputy President Haji Abdul Hadi Awang and the present PAS Murshidul-Am-cum-Chief Minister of the State of Kelantan Dato' Haji Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat.

The new *ulamak* leadership has brought at least six changes to PAS members' attitude, political vision and approach [Mohd Sayuti Omar 1991: 53–58]. Firstly, there was a drive for self-assessment and correction among the individual members and within the Party itself. Secondly, priority and special concentration was given to both increasing

4) According to a PAS intellectual, the reason for joining the National Coalition was because of PAS' awareness that Malay political leadership as a whole was challenged following the 13 May 1969 racial clash in the country, hence a need for a Malay unity. The divorce was due to an internal crisis of the joint PAS-Barisan Nasional government in the State of Kelantan that was purposely created by Barisan Nasional which eventually entailed the demise of PAS government in the State in 1978 State Election [Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latif 1991: 23–24].

the understanding of Islamic knowledge and the implementation of the laws of Allah in their everyday lives. Thirdly, PAS members' mode of thinking was gradually changed from being obsessed with secularism (*ilmaniy*) and materialism to the concentration on the rights of human beings as the Vicegerent and creation of Allah. Fourthly, Islamic scholars (*ulamak*) have no more been merely a symbol in the Party but instead the main mover in the Party's struggle. Fifthly, PAS' image as merely a "welfare political organisation" has been changed to a commercial one with its own cooperative and businesses in order to raise the living standards of its members and strengthen the Party's monetary fund. And sixthly, the new PAS leadership has been more rational and opens its scope of struggle to a wider audience. They cooperated with the Chinese Consultative Council (CCC), establishing an understanding with non-Islamic opposition parties such as Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM, People's Socialist Party Malaysia), Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) and Parti Nasionalis Malaysia (NASMA, Nationalist Party Malaysia) under the banner of Harakah Keadilan Rakyat (HAK, the People's Justice Movement), and attracting secular-educated Malay Muslim elites rather than the normally traditional Islamic-educated rural Malays alone.

It was with such changes under the new leadership that the State of Kelantan has fallen back completely into PAS' hand for the second time in 1990. And it is the endeavour in establishing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan during this second rule, under the *ulamak* leadership, that is the focus of this paper.

PAS Idealism and the Islamic State

From the outset of its establishment, PAS strongly holds to the belief that realisation of a comprehensive Islamic way of life could not be attained unless one has the political power, hence the establishment of an Islamic State. The PAS Constitution, particularly in Section 5, states such a belief. The very first of its two objectives mentioned in the Section says that the objective of the PAS struggle is to strive for "a society and government in which Islamic values and precepts are implemented towards the attainment of the pleasure of Allah" [Pejabat Agung PAS Pusat 1990: 2].⁵⁾

Such an objective was elaborated in a more direct and clear form in a separate writing by the PAS Information Department as below:

What needs to be understood is that the aim of the PAS struggle through political party is to establish an Islamic State in Malaysia The PAS struggle for power to govern is not merely for power itself, but as a means to establish an Islamic State, which is able to realise complete laws of Allah. The purification of Islam and the sacredness of the *shari'ah* of Allah could not be

5) The second objective is to maintain the sacredness of Islam, independence and national sovereignty.

maintained unless under the umbrella of an Islamic government adhering to al-Qur'an, al-Sunnah and other *shari'ah* sources as well as with the leadership attitude which really conforms to the *shari'ah* of Allah. [Jabatan Penerangan PAS Pusat n. d.: 2]

This stance is firmly held all through the PAS struggle, until now and in all situations. Recently, even in the midst of the repeated usual rejections of the PAS-sponsored Islamic State both by the ruling party UMNO and the Chinese-dominated opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), the stance for the Islamic state is reiterated and reemphasised. PAS President Dato' Fadzil Noor restated firmly that an Islamic State indeed remains an objective of the PAS struggle [*New Straits Times*, 11 April 1999].⁶⁾ His Deputy Haji Abdul Hadi Awang stressed that PAS has never moved backward in endeavouring an establishment of an Islamic State. In fact, said the PAS Deputy President, the effort in upholding the Islamic *shari'ah* has been a PAS persistent ambition. PAS would not pull off this ambition irrespective whether it has to be alone, or together with other opposition parties such as the DAP, Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) and the newly-formed Parti KeADILan Nasional (PKN) in an opposition cooperation pact planned to win over the Barisan Nasional government in the coming general election [*Harakah*, 23 April 1999].⁷⁾

Elsewhere in the similar writing of the PAS Information Department, the party

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- 6) This statement, together with the whole interview by Joceline Tan of the *New Straits Times* (in which the statement was made), was translated into Malay and published in *Harakah* [16 April 1999].
 - 7) The latest polemics on the PAS-endeavoured Islamic State emerged following the reiteration of the DAP's rejection of the PAS ambition in establishing an Islamic state. In spite of the differences, PAS and DAP signed a cooperation pact (Prinsip Kerjasama) on 28 April 1999, together with the opposition Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), and Parti KeADILan Nasional (PKN) [*Utusan Malaysia*, 29 April 1999]. The main aim of the pact is to win over the ruling Barisan Nasional in the coming general election, to be held latest by June 2000. DAP's Secretary General Lim Kit Siang and its Federal Territory Chairman Dr. Tan Seng Giaw at a DAP meeting on 9 May 1999 explained that DAP's cooperation pact with PAS is meant to uphold justice, democracy and freedom of speech, not on the establishment of an Islamic State [*Utusan Malaysia*, 10 May 1999]. Prior to this explanation, the issue of the Islamic State has resulted a rift within the DAP leadership. Assemblyman for Bandar Klang, Chua Kow Eng, 7 branch chairmen and 20 members quit DAP. Apart from giving injustice and lack of transparency in the party's leadership as reasons for their resignation, they also quoted lose of confidence in the DAP under Lim Kiat Siang's leadership, especially on the issue of the sudden marriage of convenience between PAS and the DAP, though in 1995, Chua said, Kit Siang had recorded his uncompromising objections against PAS' objective of setting up an Islamic State and the implementation of *hudud* law [*New Straits Times*, 1 March 1999]. The ruling party UMNO through its controlled-media, manipulated fully the issue of the Islamic State for its political gains. At the writing of this paper, the issue has gone to the extent of questioning who among the leaders of the opposition parties, in the midst of their differences, would be the next Prime Minister if they win the election.

strengthens its earlier arguments with the statements below:

Implementing the laws of Allah in the form of *ibadah* (worship) such as fasting, praying, paying *zakat*, performing pilgrimage and so on is relatively easy but to implement other laws of Allah such as laws, economic, political and social systems and so on is not easy, unless by establishing an Islamic "government."

Based on this fact, it is a reality that power is the main condition in implementing the laws of Allah. For this reason, the struggle for governing power is a must for every Muslims. And it is this governing power that is called the political power. It is such a political power that has been the struggle of PAS for so long.

The political power is a means of implementing the laws of Allah. The laws of Islam could not be implemented automatically unless through a governing institution. Only the government that strives for the laws of Islam could guarantee an implementation of the laws of Allah. Based on this fact, PAS has chosen the struggle through political party that is based on Islam as policy towards an Islamic rule. Therefore, what is striven for by PAS must be supported by the society, especially by the Muslims in this country. [Jabatan Penerangan PAS Pusat n.d.: 6-7]

The above quotations clearly show that the main prerequisite of an Islamic State for PAS is political power. Indeed, according to one PAS leader-*ulamak*, attaining an Islamic governing power is a collective (social) obligation (*fard kifayah*), similar to the case of *jihad* (struggling for the Islamic cause) [Harun bin Taib 1981: 23]. More serious is the stance by a PAS intellectual, who views the establishment of an Islamic State as an individual obligation (*fard ain*) [Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latif 1991: 19].

While the political power is a means to the establishment of an Islamic State, the Islamic State itself is viewed as a means to the implementation of a complete Islamic way of life. Without political power, not only an establishment of an Islamic State is impossible, but the execution of the laws of Allah that binds the complete Islamic way of life would also be unachievable. In other words, the complete Islamic way of life, through the execution of the laws of Allah, is believed to be completely realised, at state level and from above, by the initiation of the Islamic government established through the taking over of political power. Although political power undoubtedly must initially involve a mobilisation of masses from below, an Islamic State must be established from above, only when the political power is in the Islamic government's hand.

Secondly, as PAS equals the implementation of a complete Islamic way of life with a comprehensive execution of the laws of Allah, the establishment of an Islamic State, therefore, does not only mean a change of political power and leadership, but also subsequently the replacement of the state's Constitution. To PAS this is inevitable because it is not the state that gives birth to Islam but instead Islam that gives birth to a state. In other words, as according to one of the PAS' leaders, an Islamic State is born

by laws outlined by al-Qur'an and as-Sunnah (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), and not otherwise [Harun bin Taib 1981: 9]. It explains why PAS has been so insistent in persuading the Barisan Nasional Federal government to amend the Federal Constitution according to Islamic tenets so that out of it, Malaysia would emerge as an Islamic State. It is moreover self-explanatory that in the State of Kelantan, the PAS-led government is very serious in attempting to change the Constitution of the state from conventional to *hudud* laws. It could be easily implied that the State of Kelantan believes itself to be unable to be a complete Islamic State unless the Constitution is changed.

However, the above idealism has yet to be accompanied neither by a clear and proper guideline, nor by a specific blueprint that explains a specific model of the PAS Islamic State. One is left with the idealism without an operational working plan. If any, there are only general theoretical deliberations made by two PAS leaders on their own individual capacity. One of them is Harun bin Taib, now the Chief of the PAS Dewan Ulamak, who through his book, *Kuasa Pemerintahan Islam* [1981], deliberates on the power of an Islamic governance. The other is the PAS Deputy President Haji Abdul Hadi Awang who writes a book entitled *Sistem Pemerintahan Negara Islam* [1995] that explains the governance system of an Islamic State.

Harun bin Taib [1981] writes that the government of an Islamic State, born by Islamic laws, is called Khilafah or Imaratul Mukminin or Imamah al Akzma. All the three terms refer to a government based on Islamic *shari'at* (regulations) and *aqidah* (faith). Its holder of the governing power could also be called by any one of the three terms and the Islamic government's characteristics, according to him, are as follows. Firstly, the head of the Islamic State must be responsible and elected by the people after being nominated by members of a candidate screening committee. Secondly, the prerogative of the head of the Islamic State encompasses both political and religious matters. Thirdly, the head of the Islamic State is regarded as replacing the Prophet hence is obliged to execute Islamic laws in every corner and on every individual in the state. Fourthly, the power of the head of the Islamic State encompasses all Muslim regions. Fifthly, as long as the head of the Islamic State fulfils his responsibility according to al-Qur'an and as-Sunnah, the people are obliged to obey and provide him help. And sixthly, whenever the head of the Islamic State does not fulfil his responsibility justly, or his qualification as the head of the Islamic State has changed, he could withdraw himself from being the head. If not, all the people must put an effort to bring him down [*ibid.*: 3-4].

Eighteen years after this explanation, in 1999, Harun bin Taib provides another eight principles of the model of an Islamic government [*Harakah*, 7 May 1999]. They are, firstly, religion as the guide; secondly, the sovereignty of government; thirdly, universal justice; fourthly, public security; fifthly, welfare government; sixthly, sustainable economic development; seventhly, long-sighted leadership; and eighthly, planning with the vision of *akhirah*. To accomplish these principles, he stresses, the worldview (*tasawwur*) of the structure of the Islamic governance must be based on al-Qur'an, as-Sunnah

an-Nabawi (traditions of the Prophet), al-Ijma' (consensus of Islamic scholars) and al-Qias (analogical methods).

Like Harun bin Taib, Abdul Hadi Awang [1995] too deals with a general elaboration of the basic governance system of an Islamic State. He touches on the meaning, characteristics, objectives, practical principles, leadership, and judiciary and tax systems of an Islamic State. According to him, an Islamic State could mean simply a place ruled by Muslims, indicated by peacefulness enjoyed by the Muslims living in it [*ibid.*: 24]. He outlines three characteristics of an Islamic State, viz. upholding Islam, putting *shari'ah* at a special position, and having population that upholds Islamic doctrines [*ibid.*: 24–48]. The objective of an Islamic State, he argues, is to accomplish the goal of man as Vicegerent of Allah (Khalifatullah). This must be done by taking care of the Islamic religion and managing businesses in this world by Islam as well as to accomplish the objectives of trust (*amanah*) and worship (*ibadah*) [*ibid.*: 58–77]. The practical principles of an Islamic State lie in upholding the laws of Allah, truth, justice and freedom [*ibid.*: 78–124] while the State's leader must be a male-Muslim, knowledgeable and understands contemporary problems, just, possesses spiritual (*maknawi*) and physical ability (*jasmani*), as well as influential [*ibid.*: 125–132].

The above explanations are undoubtedly important, but they are more of general theoretical deliberations and opinions of individual leaders rather than of the PAS as an organisation. Beyond that, one is more curious of the specific way PAS, as a political organisation, would translate these theoretical deliberations within the socio-economic and political realities in Malaysia. Questions such as PAS concept of an Islamic State, its implications for economic development, its impact on a mutli-ethnic, mutli-religious society, and its ties with other secular states have yet to be deliberated.⁸⁾ In addition, PAS concrete stand on the economy, education, culture and mother tongue in the context of Islam as well as what sort of development to expect are not dealt with as yet.⁹⁾ Obviously, the necessity to deal with the Islamic State must go beyond the mere deliberation on its concept. The PAS President, though admits the necessity to explain, views that the concept of an Islamic State has more to do with the principles of Islam than with any specific country or state, hence, perhaps, the general theoretical deliberations [*New Straits Times*, 11 April 1999¹⁰⁾]. It is thus without such a concrete guideline that Kelantan government is attempting the establishment of an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan.

8) Such questions have been raised in the *New Straits Times* [18 April 1999].

9) These questions were raised by ex-DAP Member of Parliament Dr Kua Kia Soong, who is also a leading figure in the human right group SUARAM (an NGO also involved in Malaysian *reformasi* movement GERAK led by PAS and joined by DAP). See Tan [1999].

10) Also translated into Malay and published in *Harakah* [16 April 1999].

Islamic State and Realities in the State of Kelantan

PAS-led Government Endeavours

In the State of Kelantan, the first hurdle towards the establishment of an Islamic State has been overcome. The political power is already in the hands of PAS for already quite a substantial period. What is still absent is a proper operational guideline from the Party. But the PAS-led government itself seems not to have been very interested in formulating a specific operational blueprint. It seems to rather just opt to the general framework of the Party's world-view, viz. to execute the laws of Allah in aspects and ways possible so that out of it, an Islamic State would eventually emerge. In such a case, the execution of Allah's laws in particular and endeavours in establishing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan in general sometimes look quite fragmented and loose. However, it must not be seen as an isolation from a motto the PAS-led government holds [Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latif 1991: 36, fn 33]. The motto is based on a verse of al-Qur'an which says:

If the people of the towns had but believed and feared Allah, We should indeed have opened out to them (all kinds of) blessings from Heaven and Earth. But they rejected (the truth), and We brought them to book for their misdeeds. (Al-A'araf 7: 96)

The PAS-led government in the State of Kelantan believes that the execution of the laws of Allah itself is a means to a creation of a believing and fearing society, entailing blessings from Allah and eventually the emergence of an Islamic State. Without the execution of the laws of Allah, there would not be a society that believes in and fears Allah, hence an absence of blessings from Him. Without His blessings, the establishment of an Islamic State is definitely impossible. As such, the execution of the laws of Allah is indeed, to PAS, the second hurdle to be overcome in the process of establishing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan. This is what the PAS-led government have been endeavouring for the past years of its second taking over of the State of Kelantan. All in all, these endeavours could be divided into two forms.

Firstly by changing those aspects which involve neither radical structural nor constitutional changes. This includes at least seven endeavours, as follows:

- (i) Promoting the concept of *tazkiyah*, that is self-purification based on Islamic teachings. It is combined with physical development efforts to become what a PAS intellectual called "purification with growth" [Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latif 1991: 40]. Included in this endeavour also is the concentration on human development, that is labour, rather than capital, by having programmes to uplift human's piety (*taqwa*) on the basis of an *ubudiyyah* model (*pengabdian*,

- submission to Allah). To PAS, people with high *taqwa* will also be proactive and productive [Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latiff 1995: 5].
- (ii) Uplifting *zuhud*, i. e. the adoption of minimum consumption within individuals, consuming only goods and services that are really needed, rather than that are desired by one's wants. In creating such a consumerist behaviour, among other things, Kelantanese are prohibited from presenting presents to government officials and politicians during their official visits. The State must use the existing government cars and not new ones as long as they are still usable. Allowances and other facilities of State leaders including the Chief Minister himself and his colleagues that are regarded as extravagance are cut down hence avoiding corruption and abuse of power.
 - (iii) Promoting a concept of development which "basically gives priority to a balanced human development in physical and mental aspects with the aim of creating a comprehensive unity in the society."¹¹⁾ This balanced human development involves two main characteristics, that is the normal physical development and a development towards "preparing a new boundary for *ummah's* thought based on Islam as Ad-din (a way of life)."¹²⁾ This vision is in line with PAS' election manifesto Membangun Bersama Islam (Developing With Islam). Its realisation must be generated by three main principles: *Itqaan* (skill), *ubudiyyah* (submission) and *mas'uliyah* (accountability).¹³⁾
 - (iv) Advocating a participatory development and collective consciousness through the concept of *at-taawun* (*gotong-royong*), viz. working together in a collective manner to achieve common goals. Through *at-taawun*, not only people's participation and a collective sense of belonging are created, and development from below is possible, it is also minimising the cost of development. For example, a bridge costing RM60,000.00 if constructed by a contractor chosen through the normal tender system, was constructed through the *at-taawun* concept for only RM40,000.00 [*Buletin*, July 1991: 5]. These participatory development and collective consciousness are extended to the establishment of Desa Taqwa (literally, Pious Village), aimed at creating a model society based on Islamic teachings—a society free of vices (*maksiat*), diligent and hard working, progressive family, society and state, as well as increasing cooperation and mutual help through an active and progressive culture [*Buletin*, November 1992: 2].
 - (v) Fulfilling the basic needs (*dharuriah*) of the people by providing ownership of virgin lands, hence increasing the state's revenue through additional land tax,

11) A definition given by the then the State of Kelantan State's Secretary Dato' Abdul Razak Salleh [1993: 3], quoted in Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latiff [1995: 7].

12) See note 11).

13) For further details, see Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latiff [1995: 7].

rather than raising taxes on the existing landlords. This is feasible as land matters, according to Federal Constitution, are under the auspices of the state government.

- (vi) Providing to population with necessities that are compatible with human's instinct (*fitrah*) such as increasing maternity leaves for female government staff.
- (vii) Respecting the concept of and the need for "neutrality of the civil service" by returning the post of Chairman of each District Council to District Officers. During the Barisan Nasional rule, the post was given to politicians.

All the above endeavours do not really involve a radical structural and constitutional change. But to PAS, they are nevertheless radical in themselves because they involve changes in world-view (*tasawur*) and lifestyles [Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latiff 1995: 8].¹⁴⁾ A simple but important example of the change in world-view and lifestyles is the recitation of Qur'anic chapters al-Fatihah at the beginning and Al-Asr and the prayer verses Tasbih Kifarah at the end of any formal meeting. So is the reduction of the 45 percent of the allowances received by the Chief Minister and other political leaders in an effort to avoid affluence and encourage moderation. In terms of development, there are Tabung Serambi Mekah (literally, Mecca's Verandah Fund) to encourage collective contribution to development, RM250,000.00 allocation for Investment Promotion Scheme (Skim Galakan Pelaburan), the shifting of fixed deposits of the government's fund from interest-bearing ones to interest-free Bank Islam, the provision of Islamic loans to staff of the State government, the introduction of Islamic Pawnshop (Ar-Rahn) and the replacement of timber tender through negotiation with open tender. In addition, activities which are not only contrary to Islamic teachings but also have implications upon economic development by generating underemployment and so on are prohibited. Examples are gambling, rock concert, video games and snooker. Such changes are regarded as the PAS-led government's consideration on the "human capital" as an important factor in development process, taking the moral factor as one of the factors of production and other non-economic factors as integral to the economic development framework.

The second form of the PAS-led government's endeavour, which is tougher and complicated, is through the change of the Constitution. As PAS-led Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah governs the State of Kelantan, endeavours that involve changing of the State Constitution are not too difficult. But being in a federal country like Malaysia, the State of Kelantan, like the other 12 states in the country,¹⁵⁾ in some areas is also bound by

14) Since its return to the State of Kelantan on 21 October 1990, the PAS-led government had undertaken more than a hundred changes of that sort. For a detailed list, see UPENK [1992], Lotfi Ismail [1992] and Muhammad Syukri Salleh [1995: 7-12].

15) These states are Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor, Pahang, the State of Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis, Pulau Pinang, Perak, Sabah and Sarawak.

certain Federal Constitution. Matters that fall into the domain of this Constitution could not be changed unless the sections related to them in the Constitution are themselves changed. They necessitate a deliberation and discussion in and approval by the Malaysian Parliament. Since the Parliament is dominated by the ruling Barisan Nasional, it is self-explanatory that an approval is not easy if the proposal for changes come from an opposition party like PAS, hence the inability to realise the PAS-led government's vision.

The best example in such a case is the PAS-led government's effort to execute *hudud* laws in the State of Kelantan. In spite of its high political will and commitment as well as approval by the State Assembly in 1993, *hudud* laws could not be implemented in the state because it was not allowed even to be tabled in the Parliament.¹⁶⁾ The execution of the *hudud* laws means an execution of the laws of Allah, in this case through the changing of the Constitution. As execution of the laws of Allah to PAS is prerequisite towards the establishment of an Islamic State, so is the execution of the *hudud* laws. But political realities, however, overshadow its realisation and the PAS-led government, apart from endeavouring matters unrelated to the change of Constitution, could not escape from submitting to these realities. In fact, there are lots more realities that the PAS-led government is facing in its effort to establish an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan. Some of them are discussed in the following section.

Realities in the State of Kelantan

The realities in the State of Kelantan associated with the establishment of the Islamic State could be divided into two categories. Firstly, those related to external factors, from outside the Party, and secondly to internal factors, from within the Party and the PAS-led government themselves.

The external factors very much relate to challenges posed by the federal ruling Barisan Nasional. These challenges have emerged through at least two obvious forms. Firstly, the ruling Party directly or indirectly interrupts the PAS-led government to establish an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan through the control of the Federal Constitution as in the case of the *hudud* laws. Secondly, it creates a federal coordinating office in the State of Kelantan called Jabatan Pembangunan Persekutuan (JPP, Federal Development Department), to function no less than the PAS-led government's State Secretary Office. While the latter coordinates state government agencies/offices and is accountable to the state government, the former coordinates federal government agencies/offices and is accountable to the federal government. As both offices are controlled by two contradicting political ideologies, inevitably there arises conflicting interest, objectives and methodologies, hence negative implications for the establishment of an

16) For the outline of the *hudud* laws proposed by the PAS-led government in the State of Kelantan and discussions on and reactions to it, see *Pelaksanaan Hukum Hudud Di Kelantan* [1994].

Islamic State in the State of Kelantan.¹⁷⁾ Among the implications are as follows.

Firstly, as the number of agencies under the Federal Development Department in the State of Kelantan is much larger than those under the State's Secretary Office (the former having 99 agencies while the latter only 49), Islamisation of the State is quite difficult. Even if all the 49 state's agencies/offices adhere strictly to Islamic teachings as are advocated by the PAS-led Kelantan government, the other 99 that are controlled by the Federal government would not necessarily be obliged to do the similar.

Secondly, the federal agencies are non-committer agencies as far as the Kelantan State is concerned. Although many of them are appointed by the State government to be in the coordinating committee of various State's projects and programmes, no ultimate decision and commitment could be made without reference to the Federal Development Department and subsequently to their superiors in Kuala Lumpur.

Thirdly, the enormous financial support from Kuala Lumpur that flowed in via the Federal Development Department has not only worsened federal-state conflict and disunited the Kelantanese, but it has also strengthened the persistence of the neo-classical development philosophy in the State as held by the federal Barisan Nasional. In one sense the financial flow via the Federal Development Department is beneficial for the development of the State of Kelantan as a whole as the direct financial assistance from the Federal to the Kelantan State government is very limited. But these benefits, however, are more of a dichotomous form. The Federal Development Department's target groups are more concentrated on UMNO supporters whereas the state's targets are PAS supporters.

Fourthly, the Federal Development Department could be considered as one of the avenues for Federal government to apply its political pressure on the PAS-led government in the State of Kelantan. The pressures are reiterative. During its first rule (1959–1978), the PAS-led government was pressured through the issues of FELDA, Kelantan bridge and adult classes.¹⁸⁾ Now such a pressure meant to undermine the State government is done through the issues such as *hudud* laws and other endeavours mentioned earlier.

Apart from the above external factors, admittedly the realities related to internal

17) A PAS writer regards the establishment of the Federal Development Office in Kelantan as a creation of a "government within the government." See Tarmizi Mohd Jam [1993: 83–90].

18) FELDA issue started when PAS government in Kelantan rejected FELDA's application to open its scheme in the state. As a reaction, FELDA changed its policy by having absolute decision on FELDA's settlers although according to Federal Constitution, land is a state's matter. On the State of Kelantan Bridge issue, the Federal government did not provide financial support for its construction costing RM 5 million, with reason that the state government did not submit its plan to Public Work Department (Jabatan Kerja Raya). The bridge therefore had to be born by the state government which, nevertheless, eventually completed. In Adults' Class (Kelas Dewasa) issue, its Directorship was given to an UMNO candidate who lost in 1959 Election and all the teachers were UMNO members.

factors also entail pertinent impact on the establishment of the Islamic State in the State of Kelantan. Firstly the realities that are prevailing within the PAS itself. Among others, there seems to exist an identity crisis within its leadership. Attention given to the State of Kelantan Chief Minister Haji Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat who is also the PAS Consultative Council Chief (Murshidul Am) and the Deputy President Haji Abdul Hadi Awang is relatively much more as compared to its President Haji Fadzil Noor, even in PAS' own media. Apart from extensive media coverage, both the State of Kelantan Chief Minister and the Deputy President have their own columns in the PAS bi-weekly newspaper *Harakah*. The President, on the other hand, not only does not have any column, but appearance of his news also has neither been as frequent as the other two leaders. In one sense, the overwhelming exposure of the State of Kelantan Chief Minister is good for the Islamic endeavours in the State of Kelantan. But on the other, the overshadowing of the President by his two subordinates has not only affected his charisma but also more important, reflects a lack of coordination and weak psychological warfare within the Party itself. Subsequently, one could even go to the extent of thinking about the probable existence of various camps in the Party, reducing people's confidence in the Party in general and in the PAS-led State of Kelantan government in particular. Though the coverage of the PAS President in the Party's media seems to be increasing quite recently, especially after the sacking of the former (and now jailed) Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on 2 September 1998,¹⁹⁾ but it has not overcome completely the identity crisis as yet.

This is worsened by limited assistance from the central PAS in establishing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan. At PAS central level there is a *shura* (committee) pertaining to the State of Kelantan, but its task is restricted to merely offering only ideas and proposals. The ultimate decision has to be made at the Kelantan state level in consultation with other members of the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah coalition, especially formerly the Semangat 46, and has to be based on the suitability with local socio-economic and political atmosphere.

Let alone such an unfortunate procedure, neither the central PAS nor PAS members nationwide have seriously offered a systematic and strong financial support to the PAS-led State government of Kelantan. With only RM0.50 contribution from each of about

19) Anwar Ibrahim was sacked unceremoniously from the Malaysian Cabinet and subsequently from UMNO on charges of corruption and sexual misconduct. He was sentenced to six years jail on the former case and, at the writing of this article, is still facing trial on the latter. Opposition parties, including PAS, fight in favour of the former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, for what they view as unfair treatment on him. Fadzil Nor himself, representing PAS, leads a movement called GERAK, consisting of members from other opposition parties, Islamic movements and NGO's to strive for justice, socio-economic and political reformation as well as the abolition of Internal Security Act (ISA) that allows arrest without trial. It is partly with these activities that Fadzil Nor is covered more frequently in the PAS media.

600,000 PAS members nationwide per month, to total RM300,000.00, the State of Kelantan could have been a financially strong, independent state hence a smooth construction of a role model Islamic State. But not only is this not happening, but to PAS leaders, this is also impossible. It was argued that let alone such a contribution, even membership fees have neither been paid fully nor consistently by the members because of their poverty or apathy, or perhaps, in my opinion, lack of effective *tarbiyyah* (education and training) and systematic method of collection. The PAS members, therefore, remain as people who are just proud of the PAS' victory in the State of Kelantan but contribute inadequately to the establishment of an Islamic State. Their sacrifice leaves much to be desired.

Secondly, the realities that are prevailing in the PAS-led government in the State of Kelantan itself. At least three realities are observed: firstly, lack of practical experience and expertise; secondly, the existence of unmotivated civil servants; and thirdly, refusal to welcome help from other sympathised Islamic movements.

In the first case, practical experience gained by PAS in the State of Kelantan in establishing an Islamic State only began during the second administration. Prior to that, in spite of the 18 year rule during 1959–1978, PAS accumulated limited experience, as its Malay-Islamic nationalist leadership did not seriously aim at establishing an Islamic State. Moreover at the PAS organisational level itself there has not been any attempt to implement Islam in a comprehensive manner, however small it may be.

These are compounded by a lack of Islamic expertise in various professional fields in the State of Kelantan. In Islamic development, for instance, not even a single Kelantan State Civil Servant graduated in the field. From about a quarter of the Kelantan State Civil Servant researched in 1994, only two majored in general Islamic studies while others were graduates in secular fields such as building management, business administration, planning, finance, economy, civil engineering, agricultural science, rural development, sociology and anthropology, social sciences, psychology, genetic and history [Muhammad Syukri Salleh 1995: 18–20]. So are those seven who hold further degrees. Their fields only include urban and regional development, public administration, business management and political science.

Undoubtedly, the above professional fields are pertinent to the development of the state as a whole. But without an Islamic understanding among the professional cadres, the PAS-led government's vision of Islam could not be realised. This is worsened by the lack of basic Islamic knowledge among the Civil Servants themselves. From those surveyed, 85.1% only had basic Qur'an reading knowledge learnt in their own villages, while only one used to learn at *pondok* (traditional Islamic learning centre) and three others at Islamic religious primary and secondary schools. It is understood that most of the Civil Servants graduated during a time when Islamic Studies were given less priority, and Islamic development courses were non-existent. But even when Islamic Studies was revived and Islamic economics and development related courses were introduced in and outside Malaysia during the PAS rule in the 1990s, none of them have been sent to pursue

their studies in the fields. Indeed, according to our survey, 80.4% of them expressed their interest in pursuing their studies. But again, their interested fields are still lingering around secular fields such as law, development, English, management, psychology, public administration, business administration, organisational leadership and economic studies. Only four chose Islamic administration and one each chose Islamic development, Islamic studies and Arabic language. Even short courses they have attended more or less reflect a similar pattern. Of the Civil Servants surveyed, 32 attended secular courses from one to seven times each during the PAS-led government since 1990 as opposed to only 10 who attended Islamic related courses from one to only three times each.

These Civil Servants previously for so many years during the Barisan Nasional government were obliged to submit to the neo-classical philosophy of the national development policy. Now in the Kelantan PAS-led government, they are expected to formulate an Islamic development programme to be forwarded to, and, if thought to be Islamically viable, approved by, the state Executive Councillors, majority of whom are politicians. The change to PAS-led government naturally necessitates a reorientation of their mind and system of working. There are few that put a great personal effort on this. But many others, without an interest in related Islamic fields and encouragement to pursue their studies, such a task is not easy.²⁰⁾ In addition, neither a blueprint nor a guideline of Islamic development is available to help them cope with the changes. Hence enthusiasts among them have to formulate their own "Islamic" development programmes within a very loose definition, each according to their own restricted abilities. Even so, there are hardly any Islamic development experts from outside the State of Kelantan and PAS who have ever been seriously invited to help in the formulation, planning and implementation of a holistic and comprehensive Islamic development blueprint.

It is quite uncertain how much impact the above problems have on the motivation and creativity of the State of Kelantan Civil Service. But based on findings made through participant observation, it is a reality that many of them are relatively unmotivated. The exact reasons at the moment are uncertain unless a serious research is carried out. But reasons that could be observed and felt quite immediately, especially towards the end of

20) This is worse among those who have an opposing political ideology. In fact the opposing political ideology has been argued as one of the reasons for the State of Kelantan's underdevelopment and low productivity. For example, the State of Kelantan UMNO leader and the Malaysian Rural Development Minister Datuk Annuar Musa alleged that the lack of development in the state, less productivity among its pro-UMNO Civil Servants and eventually the loss of interest in their jobs were the results of the PAS-led government's biased attitude and discrimination against them. He cited the case of at least five senior officers of the Kelantan State Economic Development Corporation who tendered their resignations recently and 18 who met him personally to express their grouses against Datuk Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the State of Kelantan Chief Minister [*New Straits Times*, 4 April 1995]. Similar attitudes and discrimination against pro-PAS Civil Servants in the Malaysian states ruled by Barisan Nasional is also difficult to deny.

1995, relate very much to their concentration of work and their linkages with their superiors. In the first reason, too much time and energy seem to have been spent on protocols either pertaining to palace matters, VIP visits to overseas or receiving VIP visitors from outside Kelantan. In the second, there is a limited check and balance process from their superiors. During the Barisan Nasional rule, there was the Public Service Department (JPA, Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam) in Kuala Lumpur which consistently checked and provided guidelines and directives, and if necessary even insisted on the given tasks to be completed within deadlines. But now, as an opposition rules the State of Kelantan, such an attention automatically ceases to be under the auspices of the Public Administration Department. The State of Kelantan Civil Servants are now accountable only to the PAS-led state government and they are therefore free of the federal-state administrative linkage.

This is worsened by the third reality, that is the PAS-led government's reluctance to accept help from other sympathetic Islamic movements, in spite of the lack of practical experience, professional expertise and efficient personnels in the State of Kelantan. At least two offers by Malaysian-based Islamic movements have been rejected either directly or indirectly. The first was from Jemaah Islah Malaysia (JIM) and the second was from Darul Arqam.

In the case of the former, the rejection of the offer for help in constructing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan was more outright, even though JIM is acknowledged to have many Islamically-inclined professionals in various fields. This may be due to PAS' suspicion on JIM's true intention. In 1986, a few JIM's (then known as IRC, Islamic Representative Council) members who joined PAS and were sympathetic especially to PAS Deputy President Haji Abdul Hadi Awang, were accused of trying to influence the PAS leadership and said to have an intention to eventually dominate the Party.²¹⁾

In the case of Darul Arqam, the rejection was more indirect but drastic and radical. Prior to the PAS' rejection in September 1991, Darul Arqam has been organising Islamic concerts and exhibition in almost all districts in the State of Kelantan. Its aims were to help the PAS-led government to expedite an understanding of Islam among its population, provide a practical Islamic entertainment and consumer products, and enliven the Islamic atmosphere in the state.²²⁾ But when Darul Arqam's activities in the State of Kelantan came to its climax with an organisation of a grand expo, Islamic Cultural

21) Interview with one of JIM's leaders in Perak in March 1996.

22) Darul Arqam has been known as a dynamic "technological sufi" as it was self-reliant and has been able to blend human's spiritual development with new technologies. Using modern technology, it produced hundreds of consumer products (foods, toiletries, etc), published a total of nearly 20 weekly/monthly publications and more than 70 titles of book, established about 40 Islamic villages all over Malaysia and pioneered Islamic entertainment. It was with all these practical experience and abilities that Darul Arqam was offering help to the PAS-led government in the State of Kelantan.

Concert and Annual World Gathering scheduled to be held in the capital of the State of Kelantan, Kota Bharu, from 11 to 13 September 1991, the PAS-led government suddenly cancelled its earlier permission and banned them. The banning was done at the last minute, viz. a day before the scheduled programmes, when all physical preparations at the premise were nearly completed.²³⁾

According to the then Kelantan State Islamic Development, Education and Dakwah Committee Chairman Haji Yahya Othman who was also a PAS Exco member in the State of Kelantan state government, the banning was in accordance with directives from the Malaysian Barisan Nasional's Prime Minister's Department, Islamic Centre and the State Islamic Religious and Malay Culture Council (MAIK) [*Utusan Malaysia*, *New Straits Times* and *Berita Harian*, 12 September 1991]. To many observers the reason was very ironical. The PAS-led government now appeared to have submitted to its traditional political opposition, and more ironical was the decision to ban not only an Islamic movement's activities on the latter's directive, but also the movement which attempted to help expedite the establishment of the Islamic State in the State of Kelantan.

But looking from different perspective, the banning was anticipated. Firstly, Darul Arqam has long been viewed by PAS as pro-UMNO dominant government. If Darul Arqam continues to be active, as argued by the PAS Information Chief Subky Latiff [1991: 6], it would help UMNO and the Federal government to place PAS in confusion. PAS did not realise that it was the PAS-Darul Arqam unity that was feared by the UMNO-led Federal government. Secondly, the Darul Arqam founder-leader Sheikh Ashaari Muhammad At-Tamimi, an ex-PAS leader, is viewed by PAS as critical of PAS' method of struggle and internal weaknesses prevailing in the Party [Tarmizi Mohd Jam 1993: 191–205]. Thirdly, Darul Arqam's grand programme in September 1991 in the State of Kelantan was seen by the PAS-led government as a challenge, not a complement, with the aim to compete with, if not to undermine, the Islamic government.²⁴⁾ Fourthly, the PAS President Haji Fadzil Noor himself unequivocally stated that PAS has, for a length of time, not agreed with the spiritual practice of Darul Arqam [*Utusan Malaysia*, 7 October 1991]. When Darul Arqam was banned by the Federal government in 1994, not only was the action supported by the PAS President [*Utusan Malaysia* and *The Star*, 9 August 1994], but also by the the State of Kelantan Chief Minister Haji Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat who agreed and apparently gazzetted the Darul Arqam banning in his state [*Harakah*, 12 August 1994; *Utusan Malaysia* and *Berita Harian*, 16 August 1994; *Utusan Malaysia*, 31 August 1994]. The State of Kelantan Deputy Chief Minister Datuk Halim Mohamed,

23) For a more detailed analysis of this incident, see Muhammad Syukri Salleh [1992: 282–283].

24) This was unequivocally expressed during a meeting between representatives of the PAS-led government and leaders of Darul Arqam held immediately after the banning of the Darul Arqam activities in the State of Kelantan.

acting as the Chairman of the State Local, Housing and Environment Committee, directed all local authorities in the State of Kelantan to pull down all Darul Arqam's logos, advertisements and sign boards. In a nutshell, according to a PAS writer, Darul Arqam is regarded by PAS as *musuh dalam selimut* (literally, enemy in our own blanket) [Tarmizi Mohd Jam 1993: 191].

In a situation when the PAS-led government badly needs support in various aspects, especially from those who not only offer help but is also Islamically-inclined and possess expertise and experience, this third reality is obviously an unfortunate one. If otherwise these expertise and experience were to be welcomed and operated in the State of Kelantan, the present state of the realisation of an Islamic State might be different. The recent sacking of Anwar Ibrahim and the subsequent establishment of reformation movements like GERAK has to some extent opened PAS for cooperation with other Islamic movements such as JIM and ABIM (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement). One would hope that such a cooperation could be extended to the establishment of the Islamic State in the State of Kelantan.

Conclusion

Some of the idealism of the PAS-led government in establishing an Islamic State in the State of Kelantan undoubtedly has been realised. However, looking from PAS' own definition of Islamic State, a comprehensive realisation of an Islamic State has yet to happen. Those realised idealism are more of those which do not necessitate radical structural and constitutional changes, whereas an Islamic State, according to PAS, must involve a full implementation of laws of Allah, hence a total change of the state's Constitution. As the full changing of the Constitution at the moment is still impossible, and the realities prevailing in the state are not insignificant challenges, a real Islamic State therefore, in spite of the PAS-led government's maximum use of its limited autonomy, also leaves much to be desired.

However, despite the shortcomings, it has to be admitted that the Kelantanese have so far already to some extent been able to determine their own lifestyles according to their "self-determining character" [Roff 1974]. More importantly, the beauty of Islam could more or less already be felt in the state. Peacefulness, tranquility and friendly atmosphere dreamt by almost all human beings are partly already available there. One could imagine the state of these qualities if the State of Kelantan really becomes a comprehensive Islamic State. For this, it is not only the responsibility of the PAS-led government alone that matters, but also the contribution of all the Kelantanese. As said by the Kelantan Chief Minister Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the state government is the executor while the people are the assistants in executing the endeavours for an Islamic State [*Utusan Malaysia*, 2 May 1991].

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