

Antinomies and the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Kurando OSADA

As concerns proofs of “Transcendental Antinomies” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it has been quite a natural attitude to entertain doubts against their validity. This paper picks up some proofs from both Theses and Antitheses of the Antinomies and tries to clarify them in terms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as Reason’s “logical postulate.” For this purpose, this paper shows, in the first place, a relation between the major premise of “Dialectic Reasoning” and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. What is emphasized in this argument is, it is not this Principle that Kant rejects as a “transcendental Illusion.” The root of the Illusion is not that Principle as a “logical postulate,” but the failure in recognizing essentiality of Sensibility for human knowledge. Secondly, upon these arguments, this paper construes each argument of the First, and the Third Antinomies. To understand the ground of inevitability in falling into these Antinomies and of the alleged validity of each proof, it will be necessary to remember that what Kant wanted to deny is not the “postulate” of Reason itself. Reconstructing several proofs of Antinomies from this point of view, this paper makes clear that the Reason’s postulate is related to the demand for the unity of nature (Natureinheit), and this demand plays an important role as a keystone in making proofs of the Antinomies ‘valid.’ As a result of this, finally, we will see that when laying the foundation for the causal law of nature, Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic are imposed a double task of meeting that demand for “Natureinheit” on the one hand, and of ‘schematizing’ the Principle of Sufficient Reason on the other hand.