

Thinking of a Human Being as ‘Homo Fidens’ by Examining a Baby in the Philosophy of Education

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This paper investigates the fundamental characteristic of human beings as regarded as ‘homo fidens (a person who is trusting)’ by examining how a baby has been thought of, mainly in the field of philosophy of education. Both etymologically and philosophically, babies have been underestimated or marginalised. However, when we examine the origin of trust that forms a human being, the interactive relationship between a baby and its parents plays a crucial role in emerging trust. In this place, trust is not transmitted from the parents to a baby or vice versa but emerges in a close positive relationship between them. The existence of a baby is substantially connected to trust, suggesting that trust plays a decisive role in our existence that underpins even mature and better human beings because it prompts us to construct better, mutually respected communities of human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to consider a human being as ‘homo fidens’.

1. Introduction

Since Kant formulated the integrated and fundamental question of philosophy as ‘What is a human being?’ followed by the three questions, ‘What can I know?’, ‘What should I do?’, and ‘What may I hope?’ (Kant 1968, p. 25; 1998, p. 677), the concept of ‘human being’ has been examined in philosophy and educational science with a variety of tones. One of the main tendencies of these inquiries is that human beings are understood in contrast to animals. Kant even argues that a human being is the opposite of a mere instinctive animal, taking reason as the basis of her existence. Moreover, Ueda, one of the representative Eastern philosophical anthropologists, also suggests that a human being is ‘one who stands upright and says “I”’ (Ueda 2006, p. 6), which nevertheless presupposes a human being as an extraordinary existence in comparison with animals¹⁾. Intellectual reason has been proclaimed one of the main human attributes, although Romantic emotions, human life, or existence have been evaluated as the key moment of understanding human beings. However, as Artificial Intelligence (AI) spreads in our society, the identity of a human being as an intelligent rational existence will be threatened by it (Cf. Coeckelbergh 2020, 2022). There is no doubt that AI can calculate much more accurately and rapidly than human beings, and furthermore, it will gradually come to ‘create’ fully suitable sentences and ‘make’ the best judgements based on enormous bodies of data. Confronted with this situation, we must ask what human beings are. In this place, I do not intend to presuppose that human beings hold an exclusive unique nature differentiated from both animals and AI, but accept, though without direct clear comparisons with them, that human beings nevertheless possess a crucial trait that consists of it as itself²⁾. Through this consideration, I attempt to consider another concept of human being.

It is quite difficult to imagine that a human being lives without trust towards others. Conscious or not, we trust others, at least to some extent, when we use instruments or eat foods made or

produced by them in our ordinary lives. Otherwise, we cannot use instruments or eat foods because of worries about defective instruments or foods with radioactive contamination, for example. Unless we live alone and entirely by our own efforts, trust is indispensable. How can we live in a society without trust? Can we use money while distrusting national banks, and others? Can we ask others whom we do not trust for help? As a matter of course, we sometimes distrust others or doubt whether they are trustworthy, but even in this case, we trust various basic matters in our ordinary lives if we want to live, work, or accomplish something.

There is abundant research on trust in various fields, such as psychology, sociology, politics, economics, philosophy, and education. Each draws upon the concept of the nature and roles of trust in their own fields, but what I consider in this paper is the formulation of ‘human being’ as a human being who is trusting, namely, ‘homo fidens’³⁾. In order to propose human beings as ‘homo fidens’, I scrutinise the origin of the trust for human beings, that is, trust in a baby–parent relationship, as I seek to show here that trust is not only a cultural outcome but is embedded in a ground of our most fundamental relationship. In this paper, I will first investigate the existence of a baby in a theoretical and philosophical manner, and second then describe the origin of trust in a baby–parent relationship, mainly following Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s consideration of trust, and suggest that this trust profoundly underpins mature human beings. Through this consideration, I propose that a human being is fundamentally constituted by trust and, therefore, could be regarded as ‘homo fidens’.

2. Existence of a baby

A baby or infant has not been sufficiently examined in the fields of philosophy and the philosophy of education. It is commonly known that babies have been enthusiastically investigated in terms of recognition, emotion, and scientific brain development in several psychological and developmental scientific fields. It is not easy to distinguish between philosophy and psychology in a strict sense, as some scholars, such as Tomasello, have built a bridge between them in the field of studying babies, although his work revolves around evolutionary developmental psychology (Tomasello 2009, 2016). In philosophical fields, the facts and meanings of the birth of human beings have recently drawn intense attention. Arendt contemplates human birth as the radical decisive moment of human life and activity, whereas Benatar proposes an antinatalism in which we were better never to have been, and we, the human race, should be eradicated in order to negate harm (Arendt 2018, Benatar 2006). However, babies are still ignored or underestimated when we think about human beings philosophically. This is not very different, even in the fields of educational science, pedagogy, and the philosophy of education. In contrast to considerations of the existence of a child, a baby has been regarded mainly as one who needs to be developed adequately during upbringing, reduced to a mere child, or ignored in discussion. A baby is, by its very nature, a child, but at the same time, it is hard to be identified completely with a 12-year-old girl or boy. What, then, is a baby?

2-1. Thinking a baby etymologically

Etymologically, a baby was called *μωρό* in Ancient Greek, from the word *μωρός* (sluggish, stupid), which is differentiated from *παῖς* (child). The word *μωρό* conveyed the negative meaning that a baby is stupid since she can do almost nothing in comparison with a rational, mature human being. However, the word *παῖς* lacked such a negative sense, being thought of as an existence who must be

led, by education ($\pi\alpha\iota\varsigma + \acute{\alpha}\gamma\omega \rightarrow \pi\alpha\iota\delta\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ($\rightarrow$ pedagogy)). In this strictly etymological sense, a baby as $\mu\omega\rho\acute{o}$ was, from the beginning, excluded from the educational process. Although all human beings come to this world as babies, their existence was substantially underestimated in Ancient Greek. In Latin, there were two words for baby: *infans* (*infantulus*, *infantula*) and *lactens*. The former consists of *in* (not) + *fari* (speak, talk), suggesting that a baby as *infans* is one who cannot speak words. Normally, *infans* was understood as a very small child. In contrast, the latter word conveyed a different meaning. *Lactens* originates from the word *lac* (milk); therefore, it means one who suckles. *Infans* is associated with the English word 'baby', from *bebe* in Old English, an onomatopoeic word for babbling. A baby is, in this sense, one who cannot speak words but just utters noises. In contrast, *lactens* relates to suckling. German follows this tradition (ein Baby, ein Säugling), as does French (un bébé, un nourrisson). In short, a baby cannot speak words and simply suckles. It is interesting that Latin and later languages, such as German and French, refer to a baby, particularly as one who suckles. Human beings do not suckle after a specific period, infancy; therefore, it is, in one sense, understandable to characterise a baby as suckling. However, how can we recognise the entire existence of a baby with one specified function, namely, suckling? Can a baby be reduced to suckling although she breathes, sleeps, smiles, and lives? The word suckling also connotes a negative sense of a baby. If languages had comprehended a baby as a complex and whole existence of human beings, they would have called her with different words.

How about babies in Japan? There are almost the same expressions for suckling in Japanese (*Nyuiji*, *Chinomigo*). Two other expressions of a baby in Japanese are *Akachan* (*Akanbo*) and *Midorigo* (*Eiji*). The former describes a baby as one who looks red ('akai') just after birth. The latter refers to a baby who sticks to someone else (usually parents) with the word *Midori* or *Ei*. Both words depict the baby's appearance. What is remarkable is that no word is identified with a baby or infant, that is, one who is unable to speak words. Currently, the Japanese language does not emphasise the distinction between those who can and cannot speak. Consequently, it describes a baby using other expressions regarding its external appearance. Nevertheless, Japanese also regard a baby with specified external expressions, while the words for 'human being' (*Hito*, *Ningen*) have much more abundant and profound relational meanings. In Western and Japanese cultures, babies have been relatively underestimated in our thought.

2-2. How has a baby been considered in pedagogy? An overview of discussions of a baby
Babies were not the first or main topic of pedagogy, although all human beings started to live in the world as babies. One of the first classical pedagogical works, Plato's *Republic*, describes how one can educate a philosophical ruler. In the book, Plato insists that excellent children should be developed and cared for by nurses instead of mothers in an isolated facility so that the Republic can possess and educate such children (Plato 2000, pp. 158–160). Plato does not use the word 'baby' in this consideration but regards the child here as one who needs to be suckled by a nursemaid. When 'a baby' is just identified with a suckling child, then it does not matter who suckles the child; rather, what matters is the people who can do it. We cannot find a baby-parent relationship, but only a suckling child. Moreover, the seventh part of *Republic* describes the educational process with the famous metaphor of a cave, where one as a prisoner sits with a bounded neck, bounded hands and feet since she was a child (Plato 2000, p. 220). The child mentioned here seems to include a baby. But this part focuses on the 'mature' man instead of a baby. A child in the sense of 'a baby' in *Republic* is just substantial-

ly thought of as one in connection with nursemaids.

Rousseau clarifies the particular characteristics of a child in *Émile*, but he discusses babies very little, following Plato's understanding of the child as a baby. Rousseau mentions suckling in connection with nursemaids as follows: 'If one [suckling]⁴⁾ takes a vicious woman, I do not say that one's nursling will contract her vices, but I do say he will suffer as a result of them' (Rousseau 1991, p. 57). He elaborated on the content and outcome of the relationship between a baby (suckling) and a nursemaid in a developmental sense. A nursemaid influences a suckling, even emotionally and personally. Moreover, 'they [nursemaids] understand everything their nurslings [sucklings] say' (Rousseau 1991, p. 65). A nursemaid can educate her, and for her part, a suckling is not just suckling but learning from her nursemaid. Fröbel deepened the consideration of a suckling and indicates that a suckling is a suckling in the complete literal sense. Namely, 'suckling [Einsaugen] is almost the only activity an early child can do...crying or expressions of smiling stay in her inner part and are action related with "suckling" directly and inseparably. Human conduct in this stage is nothing but taking various outer things into oneself' (Fröbel 1951, p. 22: my translation). A baby, as a suckling, takes in and absorbs many things, ranging from milk to manifold things and matters. Furthermore, Kant takes over the insight of a baby as a suckling from Rousseau⁵⁾, situates the baby as the beginning of a human being explicitly at the opening of his *Lectures on Pedagogy*, and suggests an education for such a baby as follows:

The human being is the only creature that must be educated. By education we mean specifically care (maintenance, support), discipline (training) and instruction, together with formation [Bildung]. Accordingly, the human being is first infant [Säugling], then pupil [Zögling], and then apprentice [Lehrling]. (Kant 2007, p. 437)

This discourse is significant because Kant attempts to associate human beings with the first existence of an infant. As we have already seen, a baby is etymologically marginalised, even as a child; however, in Kant's *Lectures on Pedagogy*, a baby as an infant is situated as the first human being instead of a mere animal or an in-human being. For Kant, a baby is not an intermediate ambiguous existence between animals and human beings, but undoubtedly a human being. Accordingly, Kant considers the baby even in his *Anthropology*.

Furthermore, when the child tries to speak the mangling of words is so charming for the mother and nurse.... On the one hand, this creature's charm in the time period of his development toward humanity must be credited to the innocence and openness of all of his still faulty utterances, during which not dissimulation and no malice are present. But on the other hand, the child's charm must also be credited to the natural tendency of the nurses to comfort a creature that ingratiatingly entrusts himself entirely to the will of another. This permits him a playtime, the happiest time of all, during which the teacher once more enjoys the charm of childhood, and practically makes himself a child. (Kant 2007, pp. 239–240)

Kant mentions a child instead of a suckling or baby, which nevertheless describes a baby, as he thinks a baby as a human being and that a baby can be paraphrased as a child. What is crucial in this citation is that a nursemaid or teacher enjoys her time when confronted with a baby, and the baby is shown as

a kind of moral existence. The former indicates that the baby lives in multiple relationships with parents and others, whereas the latter treats the baby as already having a potential moral existence. Concerning a moral baby, Kant suggests that 'freedom not merely to be independent of others, but even to be master over other beings who by nature are equal to him – which one even notices already in the smallest child' (Kant 2007, pp. 422–423). Raising up a baby indulgently and allowing her just to follow her own desires is undesirable for Kant; 'if all of their whims are fulfilled in early youth, their heart and their morals are thereby spoiled' (Kant 2007, p. 452). As an early child, a baby is already a human being; consequently, she is also asked to be developed in a better ethical way.

Ariès briefly refers to a baby in a certain way in comparison to a child in his book *L'enfant et la vie familiale sous l'Ancien Régime (Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life)*. He mentions a baby when he introduces a picture of a child, especially in Christian pictures in the Middle Ages, such as the picture of Maria and a small Jesus with newborn clothes going up to heaven in Santa Maria church of Rome (Ariès 1973, pp. xiv–xv). A baby was visualised through a small Jesus. However, a word for a baby as distinguished from an elder young child lacked even in the 17th century, so 'a baby' was applied to the elder child (Ariès 1973, p. 17). The word 'baby' meant a child there, which suggested that a baby was not distinguished from a child at that time. Ariès indicates that 'baby' (un bébé in French) gradually prevailed after the 18th century. This fusion of two words, a baby and a child, therefore, has two types: a baby is called a child (Kant) or vice versa (Ariès), which implies that, on the one hand, a baby is valued as a human child, but on the other hand, a baby is simply reduced to a child and loses its own particular meaning. The baby was in urgent tension.

Finally, I attempt to consider the baby in the discussions of contemporary philosophy and the philosophy of education. Lyotard designates 'infantia' as one that does not speak by itself and babyhood as a time that does not pass in our lives (Lyotard 1991). This concept of infantia urges us to reflect on existence before and beyond language in the postmodern period (Cf. Morita 2001, pp. 220–226.). Nishihira insightfully indicates that infantia, as per Agamben, is not a state before language but the origin of language; therefore, in a strict sense, infantia and language circulate with each other (Nishihira 2015, p. 16). It is remarkable to look at infantia in connection with a baby. However, a serious problem in this discussion is that the concept of a baby is still that of one who cannot speak any language. As a matter of course, this discussion of infantia does not attempt to clarify the baby itself, but this one, without any other examinations of a baby, makes us blind to thinking about the existence of a baby. A baby is not just identified with infans, but touches, feels, and smiles as a human being. Doesn't a baby nevertheless do anything even though she cannot use or speak a language at all? What a baby particularly does, I think, is that she relates to others, which is where trust emerges, even though she cannot speak by herself. In the next chapter, I will argue for trust based on Bollnow, Erikson, and Langeveld and suggest that trust is profoundly involved in the fundamental relationship between a baby and its parents.

3. Radical trust for human beings

3-1. Emerging Trust

Bollnow investigates trust as a fundamental pedagogical atmosphere by examining the child's trust towards her mother and the mother's (and father's) trust towards her (and his) child. These two sides cannot be completely separated, as these trusts seem to be intermingled in a comprehensive

atmosphere (Bollnow 2001, pp. 15–16). He describes these trusts as separated, however, in order to clarify the nature of trust in education more expediently and sufficiently. In this consideration, he juxtaposes both trusts and does not show which trust is the origin, which implies that trust should not and cannot be regarded as one formed from an objective fixed origin. Rather, trust is, from the beginning, a relational composition. Bollnow indicates the ‘origin’ of a child’s trust towards her mother as follows:

The protecting surroundings of houses and families with a feeling of close people and security of a guarantor, which radiates from the surroundings, stand at the beginning of this series of atmospheric precondition. This feeling of trust is the first indispensable premise for all healthy human development and therefore also for every education. (Bollnow 2001, p. 18: my translation)

Am Anfang dieser Reihe atmosphärischer Vorbedingungen steht der schützende Umkreis des Hauses und der Familie mit dem von ihm ausstrahlenden Gefühl des Vertrauens und Sicherheit Gewährenden. Dieses Gefühl des Vertrauens ist die erste unerläßliche Voraussetzung für alle gesunde menschliche Entwicklung und damit auch für jede Erziehung. (Bollnow 2001, p. 18)

The surroundings of houses and families, where close people or guardians protect a child, are the basis of the trusting relationship between a child and parents. In addition, they radiate feelings of intimacy and security towards the child, in which a feeling of trust emerges. Trust is not transmitted from parents or guardians to a child but gradually appears in a certain place in the surroundings. Parents protect and secure a child with a close and intimate feeling, which is further identified as a feeling of trust. This feeling of trust is radiated towards the child as the basic nature of the atmosphere. However, parents or guardians do not directly trust a child in the sense of a baby, as it is not certain what it means for parents to trust a child in the sense of a baby in this context. We usually trust others when we think they can accomplish their tasks and meet our expectations (Hawley 2012). What kind of requests can the child fulfil? If the child, in the sense of a baby, is so little that she cannot do almost anything by herself, how can we trust her in the usual sense? Parents or guardians protect children closely, which is accompanied by a certain feeling of trust. Remarkably, this parent’s feeling of trust is considered in the section of this book titled ‘Trust towards a mother’. Accordingly, we can contemplate this feeling of trust, considering the attitude and reaction of an early child, that is, a child in the sense of a baby, in this child-parent relationship. Following Pestalozzi’s description of the early basic relationship between a child and its parents, Bollnow suggests the following:

Pestalozzi developed the aforementioned work in an excellent manner, how a child must acquire trust already early through contact with her mother. A child feels safe only in her surroundings. He describes this occurrence as follows: as soon as unknown object startles the child, and as soon as the child begins to cry about it, the mother embraces the child and smiles at her. So he continues, but the child ‘replies to the smiles of her mother with cheerful, not-clouded eyes- the germ of trust is unfolded in her’. (Bollnow 2001, p. 19: my translation)

Pestalozzi hat in dem genannten Werk in unübertrefflicher Weise entwickelt, wie das Kind das Vertrauen schon früh im Umgang mit seiner Mutter erwerben muß. Nur in ihrem Umkreis fühlt es sich sicher. Sobald irgend ein unbekannter Gegenstand das Kind erschreckt, so beschreibt er diesen Vorgang, und sobald es darüber zu weinen beginnt, nimmt die Mutter das Kind auf ihren Arm und lächelt ihm zu. Das Kind aber, so führt er fort, "erwidert das Lächeln der Mutter mit heiterm, unumwölkten Auge- der Keim des Vertrauens ist in ihm entfaltet". (Bollnow 2001, p. 19)

Bollnow does not specify that the mother trusts her child, and the child then subsequently trusts her. This trust is not transmitted through a causal chain of relationships. Rather, trust emerges in the circumstances of a mother's close contact with the child. If we may locate this occurrence within the previously mentioned process of feeling of trust, the matrix of this 'origin' of trust is formulated as the positive attitude of the mother (parents) towards a child, from which trust gradually emerges in both the mother and a child, respectively. It is almost impossible to identify which trust is prior. This is simply a chicken-and-egg problem. At the least, we can deem that the mother does not trust her child at the beginning when the child trusts her; moreover, the child does not trust her mother because the mother trusts her. Trust is not a reaction to the other's trust but emerges in the matrix of the mother's positive attitude, such as embracing, protecting, and smiling at a child. As Pestalozzi profoundly indicates, the child holds a 'germ' of trust instead of trust itself in a close relationship with her mother, which implies that trust in a child will change and develop as she grows up in various relationships with her mother, father, and others. The significant recognition of this emerging trust in this paper is that an early child such as a baby acquires trust towards her mother (and father) very early if it is ensured that the child will live in a positive close relationship with the mother. This trust cannot be identified with the innate nature of a child, but she can only live with the help of her mother (more generally, parents or guardians), where trust emerges in her. Considering these basic facts of how a human being lives, trust plays a fundamental role in the existence of the child in the sense of a baby and, thus, of human beings.

3-2. 'Human being' as 'homo fidens'

It is well known that Erikson finds a basic trust (Urvertrauen) in a baby-parent relationship. According to him, a basic trust is 'an attitude toward oneself and the world derived from the experiences of the first year of life' (Erikson 1980, p. 57). Through a psychoanalytical investigation, he indicates that a baby trusts her mother, surroundings, and society. However, he hesitates to call such trust confidence, as the word trust contains more ingenuous and interactive nuances than confidence; moreover, it does not seem overblown. Therefore, 'an infant can be said to be trusting where it would go too far to say that he has confidence' (Erikson 1963, p. 248). What is noteworthy in the discussion of basic trust is that it underpins human personality throughout one's lifetime. Accordingly, a 'life-long underlying weakness of such trust is apparent in adult personalities in whom withdrawal into schizoid and depressive states is habitual' (Erikson *ibid.*). Without such basic trust, it is very hard for human beings to live in an actual society, which demonstrates that trust is not just for babies but forms one's self as a human being. Basic trust should not be underestimated, not only for babies but also for human beings as such. Trust is the fundamental moment, medium, and even end itself for human beings.

We do not trust someone or something in order to construct a better society or to communicate with each other smoothly; rather, we trust them or are trusted by them since we want to live as better human beings. If I betray someone and after that, I will become distrusted by others—that is, I will be excluded within a fundamental human interaction—then I will lose the radical base of my life in this actual world. Trust is not just a means to an end of social communication but is one of the components of our existence as human beings. Consequently, ‘the quality of human beings depends on trustworthiness, namely, whether one can be trusted or not’ (Langeveld 1980, p. 114: my translation). We are existentially helpless, which impels us to trust each other in a straightforward manner. In this sense, ‘trustworthiness is the most fundamental end for human life’ (Langeveld 1980, p. 115: my translation). Although we as human beings must trust others, we do not always trust them. Rather, we might betray someone and distrust something in our ordinary life. This reality shows that trust is not a self-evident matter but must be accomplished continuously. The basic trust seen in a baby–parent relationship decides what human beings are, and trust in general unceasingly makes us better human beings in this actual world, as trust prompts us to construct better, mutually respecting communities of human beings. This is because a human being might be seen as *homo fidens*.

4. Conclusion

There are many types of human characterisations, such as *homo ludens* (playing man: Huizinga 1955), *homo faber* (working man: Bergson 1944), and *animal educandum* (an animal that must be educated: Langeveld 1978). These characterisations do not reflect various natures of human beings but suggest that they are essential to human beings from the beginning; that is, they are not acquired in specific cultural environments. The crucial point here is that there are two critical conditions in these characterisations: whether they are ‘essential’ characteristics seen even when a person is a ‘baby’. In this sense, these three characterisations are suitable. I do not intend to add *homo fidens* as yet another such characterisation but to show it as much more essential for human beings so that *homo fidens* needs to be regarded as the special matrix of these characterisations. Without trust and trust relationships with others, how can a baby play, work, and be educated as a human being? A baby is neither a thing nor an animal forced to live by instinct. The characterisations of *homo ludens* and *homo faber* do not pertain to relationships with others but only focus on the isolated human being as an object, which I think is not fundamentally essential. A man who needs to be educated should have certain pre-existent relationships with parents, guardians, teachers, and others. Consequently, *homo fidens* can be considered as constituting a more fundamental basis of human beings.

Trust is not the complete innate nature of a child, that is, of a human being, but emerges in the fundamental relational ground of human beings, which forms a baby, a child, as a human being. Without this emerging trust, how can we construct and constitute the community of a world? In this situation, a baby, in the sense of a child, does not depend on others in a physical, mental, or psychological sense. Such a baby, in the sense of a child, could not live a healthy life (Bollnow 2001). Moreover, people who do not trust others at all cannot but ignore such human relationships, which leads to wars, terrors, and innumerable conflicts in this world. Unfortunately, living as a human being is not compatible with living in a world of war. Of course, we have survived various times of war, but this does not mean that we, as human beings, have lived in such a world. It is quite difficult to identify those who do not hesitate to kill and eradicate others, and even the human race, as human beings,

as this is logically as well as actually self-contradictory. Is it meaningful to express a self-contradictory concept when contemplating our existence? If we accept and hope that we are not self-contradictory, we must live in relationships with others based on emerging, actual trust.

In this paper, I could not scrutinise a baby existentially but indicated that a baby should be examined from such a standpoint. At the very least, I have attempted to discuss here that a baby needs to be understood as one who lives without speaking words, which encourages people to pay attention to the baby's fundamental early relationships with parents and others. However, a baby lives much more comprehensively in this and that world. Moreover, I think that she cannot be grasped with only our established words and recognitions. We, therefore, must engage in studying babies from these perspectives in the philosophy of education.

What is further lacking in this study's discussion of homo fidens is a much more intensive examination of trust. I have followed Bollnow's idea of trust in an educational context, but it is important to consider the meaning of trust in a variety of broad fields. Moreover, we must consider the significance of meanings of emerging trust for us. This origin of trust reflects a kind of sacredness of trust, as Bollnow and Buber (1960) imply. There are tendencies in studies of trust to avoid describing trust in relation to a sacred belief or faith. I understand that such theological ways of thinking prevent us from examining the idea of trust more fundamentally, but these tendencies concern me because trust cannot be reduced to a rational, mechanical function of our competency. At the same time, trust is much greater than this function. Therefore, trust can become the radical matrix of our existence.

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Notes

- 1) Ueda argues that one lives as a human being in an extraordinary, complex, and dynamic correlation of whole life (Seimei), living life (Sei), and life (Inochi). The first and third lives associate us with other living beings such as other animals and plants, but nevertheless all lives combine to form one outstanding human being (Ueda 2006, pp. 28–49).
- 2) The category of human being cannot be fully fixed before scrutinizing its critical traits in a strict sense. However, these critical traits also cannot be recognized without the category of human being. Therefore, I accept the concept of human being in an expedient manner so that the concept can be substantially formulated in a different way.
- 3) In Latin, 'fido' means 'trust' or 'believe', and 'fidens' means 'trusting' or 'believing'.
- 4) [] indicates an addition by the author.
- 5) 'Physical education is actually only maintenance, either by means of parents or wet-nurses or attendants. The food which nature definitely has intended for children is the mother's milk' (Kant 2007, p. 449).

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