

# International Symposium on “Conditions of Happiness”

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1993年3月29日—31日の3日間、中川を組織委員長とする国際シンポジウム「幸福の条件—歴史的展望」が、国際高等研究所によって、京都市下京区の京都センチュリー・ホテルで開催された。

私たちは、1年前、すなわち1992年4月5日—6日の2日間、本国際シンポジウムの予備的段階として、ワークショップ「幸福の条件」を京都市左京区東一条の芝蘭会館において開催しており、今回はそれを受けた本格的国際集会であった。\*

本国際シンポジウムにおいて私たちが目指したのは、以下の7つの伝統的文化圏に生きていたひとびとの幸福の理念、幸福の個人的・社会的条件を、歴史的な流れのなかで検討してみることであった。——インド文化圏、中国文化圏、日本文化圏、ギリシア・ローマ文化圏、キリスト教文化圏、イスラム文化圏、世俗化したヨーロッパ文化圏。報告者は、各文化圏ごとに、日本人2人、外国人2人。

ひとつの伝統的文化圏の幸福観を絶対視するのではなくて、諸文化圏ごとに異なる幸福観を比較しうる見地を獲得すること、いわば比較幸福学と称すべき新しい学問建設の発端をつかむこと。これが、私たちの狙いであった。そのために私たち報告者は、比較のための共通の枠組として、以下の4つの視点を設定しておいた。——①幸福（およびその反対語不幸）を示すために、どのようなことばが用いられているか。②幸福の理念は、時代によって違いが見られるか、いなか。③この理念はまた、階層によって違いが見られるか、いなか。④超越者とのかかわりのなかで幸福が意識されているか、いなか。ただしもちろん、以上の4つの視点は、個々の発表を拘束するものではなく、報告の内容は自由であった。

それぞれ内容の充実した研究発表、および一般参加者をも含めた積極的な質疑応答、最終日のこれまた活発な総括討論をととして、伝統的諸文化圏それぞれに特有の幸福の理念、幸福を獲得するための条件、および両者の結びつきが、いずれも明確な形をとって浮かび上がってきたように思われる。今回のシンポジウムでは、報告者の国際性を顧慮して、英語を公用語として使用した。

この研究成果は、あらためて論文集の体裁にまとめ直した上で、オックスフォード大学出版局から出版すべく、現在話しあいの段階である（編者：中川久定、ベアトリス・ディディエ、ヘイドン・メイスン）。

本シンポジウムのために私が用意した原稿類を、以下の順序でここに発表する。——“Memorandum”, “Opening Remarks”, “Abstract”, “The Transformation of the Concept of Happiness in Eighteenth Century France: From Religious to Secular Understanding”, “Concluding Remarks”。

私の報告は、現在の私の関心の中心にある18世紀フランス文学・思想史にかかわりのある問題を、一つの側面から検討してみたものである。

\* 昨年のワークショップの成果は、次の形ですでに公刊されている。——雑誌「無限大」No93, 1993年3月（特集「幸福の条件」）、日本アイ・ビー・エム株式会社。

## Memorandum

Before we begin, I would like to clarify a possible source of confusion regarding the title of our symposium. We have used two titles, one Japanese and one English. I fear that the English title of our symposium, “The State of Happiness”, may be interpreted more narrowly than the Japanese title, which I intended to be rendered in translation as “Conditions of Happiness.” When we decided to organize this symposium, we hoped to use the most general title possible in order to ensure a broad range of discussion. We thought that the term “conditions” would allow consideration of the material, social, technical conditions, etc. of this topic. Although the Institute’s translator has rendered the title “The State of Happiness”, I ask that you understand our aim in the broadest sense and feel free to speak on any aspect of the topic which you feel to be relevant.

With regard to the publication of the proceedings of this symposium, I have spoken with the representative of Oxford University Press in Tokyo. The Press indicated they wanted to first see a concrete proposal before committing themselves to a publication. They also indicated that they would prefer to publish our papers not in the form of simple proceedings but rather in standard academic article form. Before seeing the abstracts from all of the participants, however, I did not have a clear view of how much work this would entail. I would like to ask, therefore, if you are in favor of publishing our papers in article form after

the symposium.

With regard to editor, the Press has indicated that they would like to have three people representing the Japanese, European and English speaking academic communities. We have chosen Professor Béatrice Didier, Professor Haydn T. Mason, and myself. We have selected as a tentative title for the volume: *Comparative Studies of Happiness in Various Cultural Traditions of the World*. I will make available to you instructions concerning the desired format for articles as soon as possible.

### Opening Remarks

I would like to extend my greetings to everyone here and to thank you for your participation in our symposium. Before we begin, I would like to speak for a few minutes about the reasons why we at the International Institute for Advanced Studies have decided to organize an international symposium on Happiness. I would also like to share with you our goals for the days ahead.

Here in Japan we cannot but be very aware of the potential for conflicts which arise with the encounter of different cultural traditions with different values. Japan has had three major encounters with Western cultures: first, when Portuguese missionaries arrived in the sixteenth century, second, when Dutch merchants came for commercial purposes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and third, the post-Meiji era of continued contact with a broad variety of cultures. Each of these encounters brought with it conflicts of values, perhaps the most fundamental being differences in the understanding of the idea of happiness and the best way for individuals to organize their lives in order to attain happiness.

My own research in eighteenth century French Literature and Intellectual History has made me sensitive to this issue in two distinct, yet related ways. First, as a Japanese researcher I cannot help but be aware of differences between the views of happiness held in my own culture and in the culture which I study. Secondly, my research has led me more and more to focus on a fundamental shift from Christian to secular views of happiness which occurred within eighteenth century French culture.

I will take up in detail this second issue of the transformation of the idea of happiness in eighteenth century France in my paper later in the conference. For now, however, I would

like to focus on the larger issue of how differing value systems and differing concepts of happiness have helped produce conflicts between peoples, races, countries, and even entire continents.

I believe we cannot hope to resolve these conflicts without understanding the differences which exist in the cultural traditions of the parties involved. We cannot compare traditions, however, without first studying each tradition separately. In particular, we will need to examine the sources for each culture's concept of happiness from an historical perspective.

Even this preliminary step, however, is made extremely complicated by differing concepts of, one might even say different types of happiness, which appear within any one culture. These differences, in turn, are mirrored in the ways in which scholars from different disciplines approach the study of human culture and society: scholars of aesthetics speak of aesthetic pleasure, economists speak of utility, political scientists seek optimum ways for structuring society, psycho-analysts seek ways to eliminate neuroses and promote mental health, and so on. All of these fields have developed their own way of dealing with the problem of happiness, but up until now we have failed even to develop a common vocabulary for the discussion of an issue which is so central to the life of every human being.

It is my belief that the best way to approach this set of problems is not to simply wait for each discipline to reach some definitive conclusion on its own concerning the question of happiness. Nor should we wait for our individual studies in our chosen cultural traditions to be exhausted before moving to the second, cross-cultural task. To wait for such results would most likely require us to wait forever, or at any rate, longer than is feasible. Instead, I propose that we jump right into the comparative phase of the project in the hope that we can all learn from one another even as we learn about each other's methods and chosen traditions. It is for this reason that we have invited such a large number of highly esteemed colleagues to come together and make the first attempt at unravelling the complexities surrounding the issue of differing concepts of human happiness.

Before concluding, I would like to add a word of explanation about the International Institute for Advanced Studies which is sponsoring the symposium. Although the Institute has in the past sponsored several symposia, this will be the first effort undertaken by the Institute to directly study the problem of human happiness. This is in keeping with the Institute's charter to promote human happiness and safety through scientific study. We hope to continue this task in our new headquarters here in Kyoto, which will be completed in July or August this year. We ask for your continued support in the future as we try to undertake

scientific research not simply in abstraction but rather as part of an effort to make the world safer and more humane.

I would like to conclude on a personal note — as I mentioned earlier, my field of study is French Literature. Having been influenced by both Japanese and French tradition, therefore, my English is very poor. In fact, this is the first time I have spoken publicly in English, and I ask your indulgence if I do not speak well. If during our discussions I am unable to express myself clearly, I will follow another time-honored Japanese tradition and ask my wife for assistance.

I would like to again extend my warmest welcome to everyone here, to thank you all for coming and to express my great hopes for what we can achieve together in the next few days. Thank you.

### Abstract

#### The Transformation of the Concept of Happiness in Eighteenth Century France: From Religious to Secular Understanding

In late seventeenth and early eighteenth century France, the predominant conception of happiness reflected the Christian belief that man cannot be happy without the activity of God and the experience of God's Grace. In the early eighteenth century, however, the concept of the scope of Divine activity was gradually diminished. God remained necessary for human happiness, but in a more abstract way. In this second concept, God appears as a gentle Father whose presence is comforting to his children even though he does not take an active role in their lives. This modified Christview in turn led to a more fundamental transformation of the idea of happiness. In place of these Christian-based views, a new concept emerged in which Man was deemed capable of achieving happiness without dependence upon God or Christian dogma. The aim of this paper is to make clear the main trend in eighteenth-century French thought in which one can recognize this great transformation of mental climate.

I will begin with an examination of an article in Vol. II (1752) of the *Encyclopédia* by the Abbé Pestré entitled "Happiness" (Bonheur). Although the content of this article reflects the influence of Fontenelle's *On Happiness* (1724), I will use Father Pestré's article because of the great popularity of the *Encyclopédia* among the nobles, grand bourgeois, and intellectuals of

the time.

Father Pestré's article is of primary importance for two reasons. First, it sets the problem of happiness on the psychological level in terms of the pervasive *sensationiste* climate of the time. Secondly, Pestré insists that happiness is not defined by outside conditions but is rather an internal state of mind. These two points have been more or less accepted by successive generations of those who think about the question of human felicity.

With regard to his first point, Pestré believed that one can claim to be happy when he lives in a calm, peaceful state. At the same time, however, Pestré believed that this calm, constant state must sometimes be enlivened by moments of great pleasure. Jean-Jacques Rousseau took up this point in his *Confessions* and *Dreams of a Solitary Stroller*. In the fifth stroll of *Dreams of a Solitary Stroller*, Rousseau contrasted Pestré's two categories of calm and pleasure and favored the calm state.

Pestré's second point, that happiness is an internal experience, was emphasized by the Marquis de Caraccioli in his work *Enjoyment of One's Self*, published in 1759. In this work, Caraccioli presents a concept of happiness similar to that of Rousseau. For Caraccioli, to be happy means to enjoy one's self in a peaceful state, as if reading one's self or one's soul in the same manner as one reads a book.

The most remarkable aspect of Caraccioli's work, however, is that he goes on to suggest a technique for producing a happy state in one's soul. According to Caraccioli, one can be happy by remembering the moments of felicity in one's past. This technique of using a return to the past to create for one's self the state of happiness was consciously used by autobiographers such as Rousseau or Stendhal. In such works as *The Confessions* and *Memoirs of an Egotist* both men explicitly declare that they hope by reliving the past to find calm and happiness in the present.

Although Stendhal stands out as an exception, it is significant that Fontonelle, Pestré, and Caraccioli were all Christian, and that even Rousseau pretended to be Catholic. Yet none of these men defined the state of human happiness in terms of Grace or Christian dogma. Instead, Caraccioli, Rousseau, and Stendhal emphasized a technique by which they themselves could bring about the state of happiness. In so doing, the Christian view of happiness was completely transformed into a secular, humanistic concept in which individuals can find happiness independently of God and transcendental existence.

## The Transformation of the Concept of Happiness in Eighteenth Century France: From Religious to Secular Understanding

One of the most striking phenomena in eighteenth century France was the increasingly large role of journalism as a shaper and arbiter of public life and discourse. Literary reviews sprang up containing critiques of dramatic works and public debates. The new publications gave the intellectual public a forum for presenting amateur literary and philosophical essays. These journals reveal a recurring set of oppositions and conflicts which dominated the intellectual life of the time. These conflicts centered around the differences between the followers of the so-called "New Philosophy" and the adherents to more traditional ways of thinking. While the traditionalists remained more or less faithful to the structures and institutions of the government and the Catholic Church, the new school asserted that men could find happiness and fulfillment independently of Christian precepts. The aim of this paper is to examine in greater detail the shift away from traditional, Christian-based views of happiness towards the secular understanding which characterized late eighteenth century French thought.

These issues were presented and discussed by Robert Mauzi, specialist of eighteenth century studies in his magisterial work *The Idea of Happiness*. I will refer to some of the works cited by Mauzi in order to analyze the main philosophical trend within the intellectual community as it sought to reorganize or reconfigure its scale of values centering on the idea of happiness. Towards this end I will start from Fontenelle and proceed to Stendhal, passing through the Encyclopedists and other writers along the way.

Fontenelle's contribution to this debate appeared in a little piece entitled "On Happiness", which was published with other works of his in 1724. In his essay, Fontenelle discusses the true state of happiness for man and techniques for bringing this state to one's soul. He begins by distinguishing two contrasting states in the soul: one state consists of exciting moments of pleasure, the other is characterized by extended periods of calm and tranquility.

In contrast to the opinion of most men of society, Fontenelle did not attach much importance to moments of pleasure. Although it was commonly asserted that riches or noble status were necessary for happiness, Fontenelle was careful not to confuse external conditions with inner sentiment. For Fontenelle, true happiness consists of a peaceful and tranquil soul. Thus Fontenelle maintained that one can be happy amidst wealth and nobility, but it

is in spite of these conditions, not because of them. Although himself a man of society, Fontenelle felt that the happiness for which he was seeking could be found not in the external world but only within one's heart.

Fontenelle's opinion greatly influenced that of the Abbé Pestré, who published an article entitled "Happiness" (Bonheur) in the 2nd volume of the *Encyclopédia* in 1753. Pestré, like Fontenelle, contrasts two states of the soul: one characterized by moments of pleasure, one characterized by stability. Pestré, like Fontenelle, believes that we cannot be at ease without a peaceful, stable state of mind. Pestré goes on to say, however, that if this peaceful state continues for too long, the result is simply boredom. For Pestré, therefore, life must be interspersed with pleasant moments to enliven the soul's peaceful yet colorless state. Thus the first distinguishing characteristic of Pestré's definition of happiness is that it is based upon a psychological or, more precisely, *sensationiste* analysis of states of the soul.

A second defining characteristic of Pestré's view is his insistence, along with Fontenelle, upon the internal nature of happiness. Pestré provides two amusing anecdotes to support his view. The first, which is taken from Elie's *Various Stories*, depicts a fool who lived near the port of Athens. The story relates that the fool, due to his mistaken belief that all the ships he could see in the port were his own, was always very happy. The actual owners of the ships, in contrast, were never as happy as the deluded fool. Thus Pestré concludes that happiness must come from an internal capacity for enjoyment, not from external conditions such as ownership of property.

Pestré also uses the figure of the hero of Molière's comedy *The Miser* to advance his argument. Molière's miser is always happy about having large amounts of money in his coffers. As Pestré recounts the tale, the miser is continuously savoring the pleasant moment of buying sumptuous goods with his money. In Pestré's view, the miser has made an internal association between the preservation of his coffers and the pleasant act of purchasing goods. In both the case of the fool and the miser, Pestré thus focusses upon the subjective and psychological moment of happiness. Pestré goes even further, however, in his account of the miser. He notes that the miser here and now is already deriving pleasure from the hope of future purchases. Pestré remarks that, in a similar sense, if a Christian is happy now, it is because he is enjoying in advance the germ of eternal happiness which will be given later by the Grace of God.

Pestré's article, although not very long, is important because it anticipates several later approaches for dealing with the question of happiness. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example,

reflected similarly upon the internal nature of his own happiness in his autobiographical works, *The Confessions* and *Dreams of a Solitary Stroller*. In *The Confessions* Rousseau put his stress upon the continuity of his stream of emotions. The importance of continuity was so great for Rousseau, in fact, that the great pleasures in life, which tend to fade quickly, gave him little contentment. In *Dreams of a Solitary Stroller*, Rousseau contrasts delicious, exciting joyful moments with a continuous, unified state of mind. Rather than seeking happiness in a succession of quickly fading moments of joy, Rousseau declares that he prefers a prolonged tranquility of the soul.

In 1759, Louis-Antoine de Caraccioli, younger brother of the French diplomat Marquis de Caraccioli, published a book entitled *The Enjoyment of One's Self*. In this work, Caraccioli presents a technique for bringing about happiness within a very moderate and popular Christian framework. Caraccioli urges his readers to be happy simply through the enjoyment of themselves. By this he means keeping one's soul peaceful and carefully observing the impressions the soul receives. As Caraccioli puts it, to be happy one must read one's soul and one's own figure as if reading a book. Caraccioli's technique of self-examination or self-reflection is very similar to what Rousseau proposed in *Dreams of a Solitary Stroller*, but Caraccioli is careful to place this technique within a Christian context. Thus Caraccioli adds that to enjoy one's self one must feel one's self as one really is. This means that one must see one's self in the Being who made us all. This in turn means that we must reflect upon our existence within God and because of God, just as we breathe within God and because God gives us breath.

Interestingly, for Caraccioli, the opposite of happiness is not boredom but confusion. That is to say, the opposite of the enjoyment of one's self is to live outside of one's self, to lose one's self in the disorderly outside world. Caraccioli believes that it is because we try to live outside of ourselves that we tear apart our good nature and lose our happiness. Happiness can only be found, he maintains, in the tranquility which is produced by self-reflection. Significantly, Caraccioli's characterization of happiness in terms of the peacefulness of the soul conforms to the definition of happiness found in Pestré's article in the *Encyclopédie*.

The distinguishing feature of Caraccioli's work lies perhaps in his exposition of a technique for putting one's soul into the tranquil, happy state. The art of being happy, according to Caraccioli, is a function of "souvenir", or memory. He writes: "there is nothing more pleasant than to recall the past and to represent past facts with their dates and with the

situations in which they occurred. In so doing one lives by taking into one's self a history which one can read whenever one wishes". "Souvenir", or memory thus obtains the status of a technique for making us happy.

Caraccioli goes on to distinguish between two sorts of memory: those which are "real" with human value and those which are merely mechanical actions. He writes: "To real philosophers, memory is an act of the soul reflecting upon itself. To those who live in the world of society, however, memory is but a mechanical action involving a return to the past". For Caraccioli, real philosophers — that is to say, those who can recall the past in the true sense of the word — can at any time live in their past by summoning memories or by engaging in self-reflection.

As I mentioned earlier, Caraccioli believes that this self-reflection is made possible by God. This view of Caraccioli's closely resembles that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in two respects. The first is the conviction that each individual has an internal continuity which can be recalled by self-reflection and that through such reflection upon one's interior self, happiness can be achieved. Rousseau expresses a very similar opinion in the seventh volume of his *Confessions*. He writes: "I have only one guide which traces the continuity of my existence and indicates the succession of the various events which were causes or results of these sentiments". Rousseau further declares that although he is capable of making errors with regard to dates or matters of that sort, he is never mistaken with regard to his own impressions. Rousseau's objective is thus an attempt to write the history of his own soul, to make known to his readers his inner self. To write this history of his inner sentiments, Rousseau maintains that it is sufficient to return to and reflect upon his inner self. Although Rousseau is more eloquent than Caraccioli, they hold virtually identical positions.

The second point of similarity between Caraccioli and Rousseau lies in the role they leave for God as the guarantor of the authenticity of self-reflection. Rousseau states proudly at the beginning of the *Confessions* that the trumpet of the Last Judgement can sound any time, for he is ready to be present before his Supreme Judge. Armed with the *Confessions* he will declare, "In this book I wrote frankly of all that I have done in my life, whether good or evil, concealing nothing". Here, as with Caraccioli, Rousseau appeals to God to be the witness of all his acts.

Yet one cannot help feeling that while focussing upon their inner happiness, these men have made God an increasingly peripheral figure. Although God is still asked to be a witness or guarantor, his role is a silent, passive one. At no time does either Caraccioli or Rousseau

suggest that God would ever interfere with their reminiscences or autobiographical writing. Far from appearing as a Creator and Judge, God has been abstracted to the point of being little more than the Supreme Witness.

In view of this, it is not surprising that Stendhal found it so easy to continue in the autobiographical tradition of Caraccioli and Rousseau while doing away with God altogether. In his *Memoirs of an Egotist* Stendhal continues to be concerned with the authenticity of his reflections, but instead of turning to God he engaged in further reflection upon his moral conscience. Thus, Stendhal came to seek not only happiness but also the truth within himself and by himself.

In his second autobiographical work *The Life of Henri Brulard*, Stendhal developed these themes further. He asserts that he has no intention to seek after the truth of things in themselves. Rather, his intention is to describe the impressions the world has made upon him. Similarly, the notion of God as witness is discarded in favor of the notion of ideal readers who would appear in the not-too-distant future to evaluate his work.

In spite of this removal of God from his writing, what is most striking about Stendhal's autobiographical works is their continuity with those of Caraccioli and Rousseau. As with his predecessors, Stendhal insisted upon the continuity of his impressions and inner emotions. Stendhal was also deeply committed to the notion that happiness could therefore be attained by one's self through the recollection of former times and sentiments. This technique for seeking happiness is reflected not only in his autobiographical writings, but throughout the body of Stendhal's works.

In conclusion, I would like to point out three characteristics of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century French discourse on happiness. First, most thinkers, whether Christian or non-Christian, asserted that happiness lies not in the accumulation of moments of pleasure, but rather in a continuous calm state of mind. Second, that happiness consists therefore of internal satisfaction and not such external conditions as the possession of wealth and property. Third, that both past and future happiness are accessible and are enjoyed in the present. This theme is found everywhere from Rousseau's *Confessions* to Molière's *Miser*, to Stendhal's happy anticipation of future ideal readers. With the appearance of Stendhal, who was both the spiritual son of the *philosophes* and Encyclopedists and the first to reject the role of God as guarantor of human happiness, the transformation from religious to secular concepts of happiness was complete.

## Concluding Remarks

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all participants of this symposium for presenting such a great variety of interesting papers on the problem of happiness, as well as to the audience for their active cooperation.

After two days of paper presentations and discussions, we now have come to the final day when the general discussion will take place. We had originally planned to have four persons in each section, but unfortunately two persons — one in the Greco-Roman section and the other in the European section — were unable to attend, so those two sections had only three persons.

After listening to all of the papers, I think you may have been surprised that there were so many differences among the seven cultural blocs in their respective views on happiness and the conditions which bring about happiness. Each participant has, of course, his or her own unique standpoint and methodological approach. Nonetheless, I believe common characteristics within each cultural bloc have come to the surface, as light has been shed on the problem multidimensionally.

Furthermore, one thing has become clear; namely, with India as the central axis, there exists a sharp contrast between the cultural blocs east of India (excluding the Christian and Islamic cultural blocs) and those west of India. In the eastern blocs the peoples are of course aware of the distinction between the present world and the world which is transcendent to them, but they place more value on the accord and reconciliation of the two.

On the other hand, in the world west of India (except for the Greco-Roman cultural bloc), there exists a sharp disruption and a tension between the Transcendental Existence, the Creator of the world, and the human beings who are created by him. Various problems have developed as a result of this tension.

With regard to the papers presented in the Greco-Roman section, some of them pointed out, quite interestingly, not only the ideological but also the linguistic aspects of the problem. We also learned that people put importance on the relationship between happiness and the fate and physical conditions of human beings.

We should not, however, reach any rash conclusion at this point. To do so would be to ignore the fruitful results of the past two days. We are confident that humanity is one, and

yet we realize that this commonality has diversified in various cultures. And it is those diverse aspects of the problem that we have to examine now after two days of discussions. Let us pay attention to this diversity, always with the hope in our mind that we can reach a common understanding, as we are all part of humanity.

Before beginning the general discussion, I would like to say a few words about the publication of the proceedings of this symposium. As I have already mentioned in my memorandum, I have talked with the representative of the Tokyo Office of Oxford University Press several times. He has made it clear that they are unable to publish the papers in the simple form of proceedings; they could publish them only on condition that (1) each paper takes the form of an independent article, and (2) all papers constitute a well-organized entirety.

The publication committee consists of Professor Haydn T. Mason of University of Bristol, Professor Béatrice Didier of University of Paris VIII, and myself. Professor Mason is a great specialist of Voltaire and is at present President of the International Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies which has a membership of nearly 7,000. The International Congress of the society, which was held the year before last at Bristol, was a great success due to his efforts. Professor Didier is one of the most outstanding researchers of French Literature. Her almost yearly publications have undoubtedly opened the eyes of every reader.

I will read all papers, in close collaboration with Professors Mason and Didier, and will discuss with them how to organize them. When we reach a point of concensus, we will submit a proposal to Oxford University Press. I would, therefore, like to have your prior agreement that you will revise your papers if it becomes necessary. I apologize for giving you extra work to do.

Now we would like to move on to the general discussion. The seven persons representing each group are kindly requested to give a brief summary of the papers presented in their respective sections. We will then invite questions from the floor. Those who wish to ask questions are kindly asked to tell us to whom their questions are directed. Thank you.

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The discussions are getting more and more interesting, but alas, the time is almost up, and we have to bring the discussion to an end. I hope that through listening to the papers and through the discussions this comparative study of happiness has taken on a clear shape to all

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of you. I wish again to thank all of the participants for their wonderful contributions to this symposium, and I will close this session with a wish that study in this field will be deepened in the future.