直接指示説の一つの帰結―信念文におけるクリプキのパズルについて―

Abstract

In this paper the author presents a consequence of direct reference theory through a careful examination of Kripke's Puzzle about belief. Kripke presented, in 'A Puzzle about Belief', a puzzle about belief which has no relation with a substitution of proper names. In doing that, he rejected a superiority of Fregean semantics, and suggested us a reconsideration of belief attribution. But the author dares to accept usual attribution of belief for a practical reason, and on this assumption tries to resolve the puzzle. A consequence is the following. If we accept usual attribution of belief, accept direct reference theory of proper names, and want to resolve the puzzle, then we must also accept a multiplicity of worlds, that is, a multiplicity of models of our language. Additionally, the author points out that Kripke's way of thinking that concludes innocence of a substitution of proper names is incorrect.