実在論論争の舞台を考える : van Fraassenの主意主義的認識論の検討を中心に

Abstract

What is the central aim of science, or what belief is involved in the acceptance of a scientific theory? Is it rational to believe in the existence of unobservable entities that science has incorporated into our world image? These are different questions, at least on first glance, although must be related to each other in some way. The former is concerned with the view of science, how we understand the scientific activity, while the latter is with the rationality of our belief. Bas C. van Fraassen has developed empiricist answers to these questions since his The Scientific Image (1980), which is now one of the classical literature in the field. His answer to the first question is presented as "constructive empiricism, " and the answer to the second is provided in his "voluntaristic epistemology." These positions together imply that science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate, while belief in the truth of the whole theory is not ipso facto irrational but supererogatory as far as science is concerned. How should we understand this remark? Are "the view of science" and "rationality of belief" different questions, the answers to which could be used separately when we address the problem of unobservable entities? This paper investigates the relation between the first and the second questions, especially in van Fraassen's voluntaristic epistemology, and examines its implication to the debate over scientific realism.