カントにおける道徳性の最高原理--定言命法から意志の自律へ

Abstract

『人倫の形而上学の基礎づけ』には定言命法および定言命法と見なされるものが様々な形で提示されている. それゆえ, 定言命法全てを正確に数え上げ分類することは非常に困難である. こうした中, 定言命法を五つの法式に大別するペイトンの解釈は, 現在に至るまで多くの研究者によって踏襲されている. この解釈は同時に定言命法の「基本法式」を「道徳性の普遍的な最高原理」とするものであるが, このことは意志の自律を「唯一の」「道徳性の最高原理」とするカントの立場と相容れないように思われる. 本稿では, ペイトンの解釈をテキストに定位して確認し(第一節), その解釈とは異なった角度から意志の自律の特性を明らかにし(第二節), その正当性を確保する(第三節). これによって, 意志の自律の解明を行なうその後の同書の議論への道筋をつけることができる.

The Categorical Imperatives and the alleged Categorical Imperatives in Kant's Grundlegung zur Metasphysik der Sitten take a variety of forms. It is almost impossible for us to classify all of them. Hence, the interpretation of Paton, who broadly divides the Categorical Imperatives into five categories, numbers each of them to definite the relation among them, and then classifies them into three types based on their contents, has been followed by many scholars. Paton insisted that the so-called Formula of Universal Law of the Categorical Imperative is "the general and supreme principle of morality." Of course, his view is based on the text. However, this view also appears to be inconsistent with Kant's assertion, according to which autonomy of the will is "the soul"- the "supreme principle of morality." How do we solve this dilemma? In this article, I (1) trace Paton's interpretation by focusing on the text, (2) clarify the special quality of autonomy of the will from a perspective different from that of Paton, and (3) verify the validity of my thoughts. Through this examination, I can obtain a unique autonomy of the will that does not damage the value of the Formula of Universal Law. Further, we can pave the way for later arguments by addressing the problems regarding the prospects of autonomy of the will.