<書評>反機能主義者であるとはどのようなことか

Abstract

Ned Block has dedicated himself to many topics of philosophy of mind in the past thirty years. We survey his contribution to the philosophical investigations of mind, consciousness and qualia by taking up principal papers contained in his Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (2007, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). The article is divided into five sections. In section 1, we explain what functionalism is and take up Block’s refutation of this position. In section 2 and 3, we introduce Block’s analysis of consciousness based on his anti-functionalism and consider how he applies this analysis to several new findings in contemporary scientific consciousness research. In section 3, we consider a series of his arguments against representationalism. In section 4, we formulate the harder problem of consciousness which Block regards as an obstacle to his position.