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Title: Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth with Consumption Externalities
Authors: Hori, Katsuhiko
Shibata, Akihisa  kyouindb  KAKEN_id  orcid (unconfirmed)
Author's alias: 堀, 勝彦
柴田, 章久
Keywords: Differential games
Consumption externalities
Endogenous growth
Open-loop Nash equilibrium
Feedback Nash equilibrium
Issue Date: Apr-2010
Publisher: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Journal title: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume: 145
Issue: 1
Start page: 93
End page: 107
Abstract: This paper introduces consumption externalities into an endogenous growth model of common capital accumulation and characterizes balanced growth equilibria. Contrary to the standard argument in previous studies, we show that the growth rate in a feedback Nash equilibrium can be higher than that in an open-loop Nash equilibrium if agents strongly admire the consumption of others. This result is irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit “keeping up with the Joneses” or “running away from the Joneses”.
Rights: The final publication is available at
DOI(Published Version): 10.1007/s10957-009-9631-3
Appears in Collections:Journal Articles

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