インドネシア共産黨武力蜂起の失敗とメッカ巡禮者との關係 (一九ニ六-ニ七)

Abstract

In the year 1345 of the Muslim calendar (July 12, 1926-July 1, 1927) the number of the pilgrims from the Netherlands Indies reached the unprecedented fifty-two thousand which amounted to 42.6 percent of the total pilgrims of the year. Some reasons are attributed to this phenomenal increase : the native planters in West Sumatra were enjoying the highest prosperity in tropical produce, especially rubber ; King Ibn Saud finally brought about unity and stability to Arabia after years of struggle among the tribes of the region ; the day ending the fasting period in that year was believed to be unusually lucky according to the Muslim calendar. The Indonesian Communist Party, abbreviated as PKI, started around the same time premature and sporadic uprisings in Java and West Sumatra, only to be suppressed individually and easily by the Dutch colonial government. This indicated that the period of relatively enlightened colonial policy for a quarter of a century gave way to that of an authoritarian stance, which was to last until the outbreak of World War II. Most of the captured Communist rebels were either executed, imprisoned or exiled to remote islands. Rumor had it, however, that some of them successfully traveled to Mecca where they tried to carry out an anti-colonial propaganda to the Indonesian and Malay pilgrims. The Dutch Consulate in Jidda kept a watchful eye over the Indonesian community in Mecca by stationing there a vice-consul who was Muslim Indonesian. In the course of a few months the Dutch personnel of the delegation gathered the information that several members of the former Indonesian Communist Party were carrying out a propaganda activity not only for their compatriots but also for local Arabian laborers, though with even less success. The delegation also suspected that there must be at least moral support for this activity on the part of the Russian Consulate in Jidda. The Netherlands home government decided to request its Arabian counterpart the arrest and delivery of these former PKI members. This put the Arabian government before a difficult choice. 0n the one hand, it did feel obliged to accept the demand of the Netherlands government which, after all, was the greatest supplier of the pilgrims and, accordingly, the best benefactor to the finances of the country. 0n the other hand, however, had it fulfilledthe Dutch request, it would have been criticized for having captured the Muslims, even if nominal, while performing one of their five cardinal duties. Those who opposed most firmly to the idea were some cabinet members who had taken refuge from Syria then under the French colonial rule. After heated debates King Saud finally ordered the arrest and delivery of the Communists to the Netherlands delegation. They were neither the prominent PKI members nor had they been directly involved in the uprisings. With their repatriation to the Netherlands Indies the probability of a similar infiltration in the future by the PKI remnants seems to have tapered off. The Muslim as well as other protests against the measures taken by the Saudi Arabian government came from all over the world, damaging somewhat the prestige of the king as the ruler of the holy city. The Netherlands government also realized how cumbersome such a request was for both sides. The Muslim radicals who had cherished some hope of making Mecca the center for struggle with their infidel governments must have discovered that the new regime stood definitely against any politicalmovements. Therefore, the center of these activitiesshifted from Mecca to Cairo.