「鹽の義務」と「聖戰」との閒で

Abstract

How the Qing dominion of the Eastern Turkistan acquired the necessary legitimacy? The emperor Qianlong 乾隆 was deeply convinced of the universality of his "Celestial Fortune" to expand his dominion over the New Territory while its Muslim inhabitants had, needless to say, nothing to do with the Confucian idea of polity. According to the Muslim view on the world, it is divided in two : the House of Islam and the House of War. The Muslims of Eastern Turkistan got to know till the end of the 19th century, at latest, the juristic opinion, that a believer who finds himself in the House of War has to immigrate to the other part of the world, conformably to the Prophet's way. But in reality, they lived under subjugation to the infidels for centuries. It is true that among the local Muslims there existed always the anti-Qing faction which, from time to time, invoked the jihad, but the majority, from hereditary wang down, vindicated the Qing dominion. It is well known that the Qing authorities took a sort of laisser-faire policy towards the local Muslim society of Xin Jiang 新疆 so that its ruling class, so called begs, could conduct themselves like true independent rulers vis-a-vis their coreligionists subordinated to them. Until 1864, the question whether the Eastern Turkistan had changed into the House of War was scarecely raised and the native begs regarded their subjugation to the Qing as a matter of course, being based on their proper moral sense of which the sources were anything but the Islamic jurisprudence. First, they were convinced of the justice, or to say more precisely, fairness, of the emperors of China comparable with Anusirvan. "Indeed they are infidel, but righteous. So you have to obey them." Secondary, they were bound in sense of duty, duty of salt (and bread) tuz (etmek) haqqi, which claimed to submit to anyone who had given favors. The term itself appeared for the first time in Qutadgu Bilig, but its conception could be traced back to the Orkhon inscription. The term and the notion existed and maybe exist today too in all the Turkic-Muslim societies, from Central Asia to Anatolia. The native ruling class of Eastern Turkistan only had to apply it to the relation with their infidel rulers. For the Muslims, jihad means the human efforts to realize the god's will that the whole world should accept the Islamic faith or submit to the Islamic political power. But Mulla Musa Sayrami, a native historian, refused to consider the uprising of 1864 as jihad, because he accepted even the infidel dominion over Muslims as divine providence and insisted on discharging the "duty of salt". He and his contemporaries were ambivalently situated between the sacred obligation and the "secular" moral sense.