ウィトゲンシュタインの「規則に従う」論の若干の考察

Abstract

Since Saul A. Kripke published a vigorous book, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language in 1982, the problem as to following a rule in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations has been discussed frequently. Wittgenstein says in §202 of this book that following a rule is a practice and he draws a clear line between to follow a rule and to think one is following a rule. Then a question arises. What distinguishes following a rule from thinking one is following a rule? Answers are divided into two groups. One group asserts that the criterion is a general agreement of the community on what acts accord with what rules. Kripke and Norman Malcolm represent this group. Another group insists that it only needs a regularity of action by a single person to make his action following a rule. The representatives of the latter group are G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker. Judging from the Wittgenstein's words ('uses' or' institutions') in §199, the former group seems to interpret him correctly. But then, should we act in accordance with the agreement of the community? As Norman Malcolm himself recognizes, this interpretation goes against the 'intuitions' of philosophers. So we try to find a third way to solve this problem. The key word is a 'form of life.' Children are trained by teachers or parents as to how to react to a sign-post. I think this reaction is also a form of life. And as Wittgenstein says in §241, human beings have a agreement in form of life. This is not a mere fact but also a social demand. A father trains a child so that their forms of life accord with each other. But once the child is trained to react to a sign-post in a particular way, the form of life becomes his form of life. He needs no more the agreement of the community. So it is not correct to say that we act in accordance with the agreement of the community. We act to some extent socially and at the same time to some extent individually.