「感性の弁護」（Apologie für die Sinnlichkeit） とは何か : カントの「直観」概念の見過ごされたアスペクト

Abstract

Due to Kant's distinction of faculties of knowledge which ascribes concepts to understanding and intuitions to sensibility, a notion of 'sensible intuition' has given the appearance of a self-evident term which is exempt from a further explanation. From the historical viewpoint, however, 'intuition' is not necessarily conceived as a mode of knowledge which should naturally be coupled with sensibility, or a faculty of 'sense'. For what reason, then, does Kant assume that intuition belongs to sensibility? Why should sensibility not be considered simply as a faculty of 'sense'? Urged by this concern, this paper illuminates an aspect of Kant's notion of 'intuition' which has hitherto been neglected, that is, its nature as 'totum' (totality). From this aspect, we scrutinize the relation of intuition to sensibility, and dig up the logic behind Kant's 'apology for sensibility' which is supposed to be accomplished based on the connection of sensibility with intuition a priori. This paper achieves these objectives by the following steps. Firstly, it points out the fact that the issue of the nature of Kantian intuition has been treated only in view of 'immediacy' and 'individuality (singularity)', and that by this approach we cannot explain the reason why sensibility should be equipped with intuition. Secondly, notions of space and time as 'eine unendliche gegebene Größe' are examined to elucidate the aspect of intuition as 'totum'. On the basis of this consideration, thirdly, this paper shows that sensibility alone, not understanding, can accomodate the 'totum' of intuition, and fourthly, it demonstrates how this 'totum' contributes to the individuation of objects. Finally, contrasting the 'totum' of space and time with totality of 'God' and 'the world', we view the structure of Kant's 'apology for sensibility' as the reverse side of the same task of 'critique of reason'.