ダウンロード数: 503
このアイテムのファイル:
ファイル | 記述 | サイズ | フォーマット | |
---|---|---|---|---|
j.jcorpfin.2013.11.013.pdf | 406.2 kB | Adobe PDF | 見る/開く |
タイトル: | Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts |
著者: | Hori, Keiichi Osano, Hiroshi https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6037-8361 (unconfirmed) |
著者名の別形: | 小佐野, 広 |
キーワード: | Agency conflicts Investment timing Real options Restricted stock Stock options |
発行日: | Dec-2014 |
出版者: | Elsevier B.V. |
誌名: | Journal of Corporate Finance |
巻: | 29 |
開始ページ: | 607 |
終了ページ: | 627 |
抄録: | This paper considers what kind of managerial compensation contract is optimal for mitigating the moral hazard decision regarding investment timing. We examine the situation where the personal objectives of managers do not align with those of shareholders and where there is the possibility of project liquidation but where managerial compensation is endogenously determined. Using a real options approach, we show that restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options under various circumstances. However, we also suggest that stock options are more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversified firms involving more complicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate governance. In addition, we find that project start-up is more likely to be deterred by the greater likelihood of project liquidation and larger managerial effort cost, whereas the amount of stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the probability of liquidation but is increasing in managerial effort cost. |
著作権等: | © 2013 Elsevier B.V. この論文は出版社版でありません。引用の際には出版社版をご確認ご利用ください。 This is not the published version. Please cite only the published version. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/192938 |
DOI(出版社版): | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.013 |
出現コレクション: | 学術雑誌掲載論文等 |
このリポジトリに保管されているアイテムはすべて著作権により保護されています。