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dc.contributor.author柿崎, 一郎ja
dc.contributor.alternativeKAKIZAKI, Ichiroen
dc.contributor.transcriptionカキザキ, イチロウja-Kana
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-12T06:56:03Z-
dc.date.available2015-05-12T06:56:03Z-
dc.date.issued2015-01-31-
dc.identifier.issn0563-8682-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2433/197827-
dc.description.abstractThis article aims to analyze how Thailand tried to recapture its railways from the Japanese army and maintain them during World War II. While many military trains went south toward Malaya after the outbreak of war, few returned to Bangkok. Thailand, therefore, took the hardline stance of refusing to allocate its rolling stock to the Japanese army unless its rolling stock in Malaya was returned. As a result, Japan proceeded to return Thai rolling stock from Malaya. Thailand also said that more trains should be used to transport rice from the Northeast and East in order to satisfy Japanese demand, for which it requested a military train that was currently running on the Southern line. Although the negotiation ran into difficulties, the Japanese army finally accepted this reduction in the number of military trains. Furthermore, there was a severe shortage of lubricating oil, which was indispensable for train operations, after the outbreak of war. Thailand wanted to buy lubricating oil from Japan, but Japan was reluctant. It agreed only after Thailand warned that it would curtail its loan of military trains to Japan. In this way, Thailand succeeded in reclaiming and maintaining its railways. The main factors behind this were negotiation by bargaining points and the acquisition of concessions through sympathy. Thailand used bargaining points to negotiate with Japan; it insisted that Japanʼs demand could not be met unless Japan accepted its request. Furthermore, Thailand had to persuade Japan that it was incapable of accepting Japanʼs demands; it did so by presenting reasons for Japan to sympathize with it. Thailandʼs two-pronged strategy―presenting bargaining points and acquiring concessions by eliciting sympathy―functioned well to a certain extent.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isojpn-
dc.publisher京都大学東南アジア研究所ja
dc.publisher.alternativeCenter for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto Universityen
dc.rights©京都大学東南アジア研究所 2015ja
dc.subjectThailanden
dc.subjectJapanese armyen
dc.subjectrailwayen
dc.subjecttrain operationen
dc.subjectmilitary trainen
dc.subjectrice transporten
dc.subjectlubricating oilen
dc.subjectタイja
dc.subject日本軍ja
dc.subject鉄道ja
dc.subject列車運行ja
dc.subject軍用列車ja
dc.subject米輸送ja
dc.subject潤滑油ja
dc.subject.ndc292.3-
dc.title第2次世界大戦下の鉄道をめぐる日タイ間の攻防 : タイはいかに列車運行を奪還・維持したかja
dc.title.alternativeScramble for Thai Railways between Thailand and Japan during World War II: How Did Thailand Recapture and Maintain Its Train Operations ?en
dc.typedepartmental bulletin paper-
dc.type.niitypeDepartmental Bulletin Paper-
dc.identifier.ncidAN00166463-
dc.identifier.jtitle東南アジア研究ja
dc.identifier.volume52-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage137-
dc.identifier.epage171-
dc.textversionpublisher-
dc.sortkey02-
dc.address横浜市立大学国際総合科学部ja
dc.address.alternativeInternational Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Yokohama City Universityen
dcterms.accessRightsopen access-
dc.identifier.pissn0563-8682-
dc.identifier.jtitle-alternativeJapanese Journal of Southeast Asian Studiesen
出現コレクション:Vol.52 No.2

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