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dc.contributor.author | Ito, Koichi | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ohtsuki, Hisashi | en |
dc.contributor.author | Yamauchi, Atsushi | en |
dc.contributor.alternative | 伊藤, 公一 | ja |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-06-10T00:40:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-06-10T00:40:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015-02-26 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-5193 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/198323 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The existence of intra-population variations in cooperation level has often been reported by some empirical studies. Evolutionary conditions of polymorphism in cooperation have been investigated by using a framework of the continuous snowdrift game. However, our insights from this framework have been limited because of an assumption that the cooperative reward is a function of total amount of investments within an interacting group. In many cases, payoffs may actually depend on the interactions between the effects of such investments, such as members share the sum of beneficial effects that are individually produced from their own investments. Alternatively, payoffs may depend multiplicatively on investment, such as when investments are complementary. In the present paper, we investigated the influence of such difference on the evolution of cooperation with respect to three aspects of the aggregating process of individuals' contributions for reward, i.e. (i) additive or multiplicative, (ii) aggregation of either investments or effects, and (iii) promotion of advantage or suppression of disadvantage. We analytically show that the possibilities of the emergence of polymorphism are different depending on the type of aggregation process classified from these three aspects. Polymorphism of cooperation level never emerges unless the aggregation process is the aggregation of investment or the multiplicative aggregation of effect with suppression of disadvantage. Our results show the necessary condition for the emergence of polymorphic cooperation levels that are observed in various taxonomic groups. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
dc.rights | © 2015 Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Theoretical Biology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 372, Pages 47–53, doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.02.015. | en |
dc.rights | 許諾条件により本文ファイルは2016-02-26に公開. | ja |
dc.rights | This is not the published version. Please cite only the published version. | en |
dc.rights | この論文は出版社版でありません。引用の際には出版社版をご確認ご利用ください。 | ja |
dc.subject | Adaptive dynamics | en |
dc.subject | Variance in cooperation | en |
dc.subject | Common good | en |
dc.title | Relationship between aggregation of rewards and the possibility of polymorphism in continuous snowdrift games. | en |
dc.type | journal article | - |
dc.type.niitype | Journal Article | - |
dc.identifier.ncid | AA00708258 | - |
dc.identifier.jtitle | Journal of theoretical biology | en |
dc.identifier.volume | 372 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 47 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 53 | - |
dc.relation.doi | 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.02.015 | - |
dc.textversion | author | - |
dc.startdate.bitstreamsavailable | 2016-02-26 | - |
dc.identifier.pmid | 25725346 | - |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
出現コレクション: | 学術雑誌掲載論文等 |
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