Change in Twentieth-century Epistemology

Abstract

This paper aims to illustrate the change in epistemology in the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a sense-datum theory was popular in epistemology. Sense-datum theorists sought the strong foundation of our empirical knowledge. Their project may be considered a recurrence of Descartes' in a sense. Although a justified belief became a powerful candidate for knowledge after the sense-datum theory, this idea faced a serious problem--the Gettier problem. After the Gettier problem, a naturalistic philosophy gradually spread. In this way, twentieth-century epistemology progressed in a different direction. This turn reveals how the conception of knowledge grew softer. I argue that this turn was caused by not only the deadlock of the traditional epistemological analysis but also the prevalence of cognitive science. Cognitive science developed with the development of computer and medical technologies; therefore, philosophy of mind also evolved under their influence. In my opinion, some epistemologists entered this area and this tendency is the mark of change of epistemology. That is, some epistemologists came to pay attention to how our knowledge is produced, rather than what knowledge is. In a previous paper(1), I explained how the conception of knowledge in modern philosophy changed between the times of Descartes and Reid. I showed that the conception of knowledge became, by degrees, more flexible and naturalized. Moreover, I suggested that this change occurred because of the effect of newly introduced psychological considerations on epistemology. On the basis of the above consideration, I argue that a similar phenomenon occurred in both the twentieth century and the modern period.