他者理解と私のなかの「共鳴」 : ミラーニューロン、シミュレーション理論、メルロ＝ポンティ

Abstract

Discovery of "mirror neurons" in neuroscience has given a novel impetus to the "other minds problem" in philosophy. Neuroscientists have discovered that two mental functions--understanding the actions or emotions of others and taking actions (or having emotions) --are carried out by the same neurons, although the functions seem very different from each other. The discovery has encouraged the psychologists who espouse "simulation theory" emerging from the psychological study of "mind-reading", because they believe that the functions of mirror neurons are consistently comprehensible by means of the theory. Simulation theory argues that I cannot read other minds directly. Instead, I simulate them in my mind and understand them indirectly by directly comprehending the simulation in my mind. However, this "via-my-mind" account of mind-reading encounters difficulties that Merleau-Ponty pointed out several decades ago. The mode of mind-reading represented in the account is questionable first because it seems too difficult for children to carry out whereas in fact even very young children can read minds, second because one's mental replica must be less distinct than the mind copied. For the copies in my mind would lack its intended objects, only on the ground of which I would recognize exactly what I feel. Therefore, I must consent to Merleau-Ponty's view that I read other minds directly. Someone will, however, pose the following dilemma. "It seems I could not copy other minds without knowing their contents in advance, and copying minds would be redundant and unnecessary if I can read other minds directly. So why do we copy (or resonate with) other minds?" Solving that dilemma requires showing a necessary relationship between the direct recognition of others and the simulation (or resonance) of others. Otherwise, it could not be explained why recognition and simulation go together and why the same mirror neuron performs such different functions. In the forth section of this paper, I redefine the ambiguous key concept of "recognizing others" so that its denotation corresponds exactly the functions of mirror neurons. The concept contains not only recognizing types of behavior or emotions of others, but also the components of their conduct or emotions, for example, movements of their limbs. I show that comprehending these subordinate components is carried out only by the resonance. However, does this understanding have a use? It is, I think, indispensable in imitating or learning the conduct of others and therefore is essential to the successions of human culture.