マイケル・ウィリアムズの文脈主義 : 「省略と説明要求構造」

Abstract

In the theory of knowledge, various problems are still being discussed. The main problem is especially clarifying what knowledge is. In other words, how do we justify knowledge? There are many responses to this question, for example, from epistemological internalism, externalism, foundationalism, and theory of coherence. Although these approaches are different, they try to survey the necessary and sufficient conditions to be knowledge. In such a case, as is known, the justification condition is particularly problematic, because this condition is necessary to exclude mere opinion, and what kind of situation any belief is properly justified in should be clarified. In this paper, relative to this justification condition, I will discuss Michael Williams' contextualism. The aim of this paper is to clarify the characteristic of his contextualism. In order to achieve this aim, I will first examine D. M. Armstrongs' reliabilism, which is one of the classical forms of reliabilism. Epistemological reliabilism is one of the effective approaches to resist skepticism and resolve the problem of justification. However, reliabilism does not give enough consideration to the normative side of knowledge. Knowing is not only a factual state but also a particular normative status. Michael Williams' contextualism emphasizes the importance of this normative epistemology. On the other hand, Michael Williams inserts the so-called 'Default and Challenge structure' in the middle of his contextualism. 'Default and Challenge' contrasts with 'Prior Grounding', which supports skeptical argument. In order to resist skepticism, the 'Default and Challenge structure' of knowledge-claim saddles challengers, as well as claimants, with justificational obligation.